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ABSTRACT 
Road infrastructures play an important role in the economic improvement of the community in 
the surrounding area. The better speed, flexibility, and accessibility to reach virtually all points 
are the distinct features that road infrastructure offers compared with other transport systems. 
In major disasters, road transportation infrastructure is one of the largest sectors which 
frequently suffer the most damage and losses. Road transport disruptions are also suggested 
as the critical constraints to providing effective and efficient responses in an emergency, and 
that the limited access results in high transport costs and procurement lead times. Accordingly, 
the reconstruction of the road infrastructure is among the highest post-disaster reconstruction 
priorities and is expected to help accelerate the overall disaster-recovery process.  
To achieve the maximum benefit of the investment made in the reconstruction, the road 
infrastructure requires adequate maintenance. Road maintenance offers significant benefits to 
the road users through the provision of better access, comfort, and lower vehicle operating 
costs. Road maintenance neglect may therefore result in increased vehicle costs, accelerated 
deterioration due to the heavier and more frequent traffic, and severe damages requiring early 
reconstruction of road.  
In the case of the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia, the pledges made to Aceh 
exceeded the required amount to restore the affected areas to their original conditions. 
Accordingly, more than 3600 km of roads were reconstructed whilst initially around 2700 km 
of roads were destroyed by the disaster. Most of the local roads were reconstructed either by 
the national government or a donor agency, which were transferred back to the local 
governments for the operational and maintenance needs. As nearly 80% of the road networks 
in Indonesia are district roads, the overall quality and sustainability of the road infrastructure 
are significantly dependent on the capacity of the local governments in road maintenance. 
Accordingly, this study aimed to evaluate the capacity of the local governments in the 
maintenance of the road infrastructure assets within the context of the post-disaster 
reconstruction process.  
In order to achieve the aim and objectives of the research, this study implemented a pure 
qualitative method. Multiple case study was selected as the research strategy. Three districts 
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were included as the case studies, the district of Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya and Aceh Barat Daya. 
Semi-structured interviews with high-level officials, policy makers, and the stakeholders of 
post-disaster road infrastructure reconstruction at the national, provincial, and the local level 
were conducted as the primary data collection methods. The data was analysed using the 
content analysis technique, with the aid of NVivo version 10 software. The findings of the 
research were validated by the means of the literature review and expert interviews.  
The findings suggest that the road infrastructure was generally neglected from maintenance. 
The local governments of the case studies lacked the preventive maintenance culture, and their 
general responses to preserve the road infrastructure were to postpone the maintenance need 
by using the more expensive high standard pavement types (HMA) and to repair the roads 
when they have broken. This condition was affected by a number of internal and external 
factors. The local political condition, the socio-economic condition, the conflict of authorities 
between government agencies involved in road maintenance, and the poor financial capacity 
of the districts, were exacerbated by the poor capacity of the road authorities’ personnel. A 
framework for the reconstruction and maintenance of road infrastructure assets was also 
suggested indicating the different phases of road infrastructure life cycle in a post-disaster 
context.  
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Chapter - 1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study 
In the last several decades, the world has seen an increase in the number of natural disasters. 
Not only has the trend shown an increased in the number of disaster events, the number of the 
affected people and the financial damages and losses are also increasing. The Emergency Event 
Database – EM-DAT, reveals that in the last three decades, nearly 300 natural disaster events 
occur each year with an average of more than US$ 70 billion worth of damages annually.  
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2004), natural disaster 
events are scattered across the world and strike 75% of the world’s area at least once in the 
last three decades. In addition to the increasing number of natural disaster events, the 
geographical distribution of the natural disaster has also been unequal, leaving some regions 
being more vulnerable to disaster than the others. In the last three decades, EM-DAT records 
of the natural (EM-DAT, 2013) for the period of 30 years between 1984 and 2013 shows that 
Asia experiences the largest number of disasters, particularly in the southern, south-eastern, 
and the eastern part of the continent. The three regions had experienced nearly 3400 disaster 
events with a total of more than US$ 1,084 billion worth of damage, killing more than 1.1 million 
people. Furthermore, the statistical data suggest that the three most destructive natural 
disasters - storms, earthquakes and flood, frequently occur in the developing countries. The 
Inter-American Development Bank IaDB (2010) highlights that while 75% of the world 
population are concentrated in the developing countries, they suffer 99% of the mortality 
caused by the natural disasters.  
Furthermore, whilst storm and floods have been recorded as the most frequent disasters, 
earthquakes are the most costly type of disaster. On average, each earthquake disaster causes 
more than US$ 918 million worth of damage (EM-DAT, 2013). In the developing world, one of 
the biggest disasters caused by the earthquake and tsunami ever recorded in terms of damage 
and the number of affected people is the Boxing Day tsunami in Indonesia on December 26th 
2004. In Indonesia, the earthquake and the tsunami caused the road infrastructure sector to 
suffer the most damage and losses after the housing sector (Bappenas, 2005).  
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Transport disruption into and out of the disaster affected area is a vital constraint to the 
provision of an efficient response in an emergency situation (Grünewald et al., 2010). 
Therefore, not only will providing access to the isolated areas reduce the cost and time for 
delivering the emergency aid, it will also help accelerate the overall disaster recovery process. 
As a result, the reconstruction of the road infrastructure becomes one of the top post-disaster 
reconstruction priorities. 
Additionally, post-disaster reconstruction is commonly implemented using the Build Back 
Better principle. Accordingly, providing that the fund is sufficient, the reconstruction of the 
road infrastructure is expected to recover the affected areas beyond their original condition in 
terms of quality and quantity. However, even though such an extended scope of reconstruction 
is aimed at reducing the number of isolated areas and improving the economic condition of the 
affected areas, it may lead to giving extra and long-term maintenance burdens to the recipient 
governments, particularly the local governments with poor maintenance capacities.  
1.2 Justification for research 
Not only disasters cause a significant setback to the development of an area, disasters also 
provide opportunities. On the one hand, disasters cause significant setbacks in the 
development of a country due to the destruction of investments made in the social and 
economic sectors, as well as due to the redirection of funds for the reconstruction which could 
have been used for development (UNDP, 2004). On the other hand, disaster also offers 
opportunities for the physical, social, political and environmental development that may not 
have been available previously (Asgary et al., 2008). Such development opportunities may 
occur in the form of raised awareness towards disaster risk reduction, upgraded health 
facilities, safer building codes, as well as improved quality and wider road infrastructure 
networks.  
By improving the road infrastructure beyond its original condition, it is expected that the 
reconstruction will reduce the number of isolated areas in the affected regions. The two main 
features that road infrastructure offers, access and mobility, are in turn expected to help 
stimulate the improvement of the local economy. However, such efforts also raise a concern 
to the long-term maintenance of the road infrastructure. Improving road surface quality and 
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building wider road networks beyond its initial level present the local government and the 
respective road management agencies the extra and long term technical and financial burdens 
for the maintenance. Additional resources and knowledge may also be required to maintain 
and ensure that the newly reconstructed road assets would reach their design-life and are 
worth the investment value.  
The life-cycle of the road infrastructure generally consists of procurement, operation and 
maintenance, as well as renewal or disposal of assets (British Standard Institute - BSi, 2008). 
Prior to that, feasibility studies will need to be performed to justify and support the needs of 
the project. However, the dynamic condition and the pressure to accelerate the recovery 
process, a complete feasibility study may not be appropriate in a post-disaster reconstruction. 
Also, local governments may not be actively involved in the pre-procurement (planning and 
design) and the procurement phase (tender and construction) of the road infrastructure 
reconstruction in a post-disaster context, as these particular tasks appear to be performed 
either by the national government or the donor agencies. The reconstructed assets will later 
be transferred back to the local governments for the operational, maintenance, and renewal 
(reconstruction) needs, disregarding their capacity and ability to maintain the assets.  
Various studies have been conducted on the road infrastructure subject, focusing on the 
different aspects as described in the following. Perera et.al, (2009) argue that road construction 
projects requires better handling strategies due to its exposure to various risks. Chang (2000) 
evaluates the losses and impacts of the Kobe earthquake in Japan and the recovery of the port, 
while Anapolsky (2002) and Waters (1999) identify challenges associated with the road 
construction projects in Montenegro and Poland. A number of studies also reveal that cost 
escalation has been considered a major and a commonly found issue in a road reconstruction 
project. The major causes of cost escalation and their significance to road project delays have 
also been identified (Odeck, 2004, Kaliba et al., 2009). Furthermore, Wichan et al. (2009) and 
Hegazy and Ayed (1998) develop a Neural Network model to forecast the final highway project 
budget and duration, while Paul et al. (2009) try to eliminate delays through the development 
of a rapid construction decision making system in order to accelerate the road construction 
preliminary process. Additionally, studies on the impact of a road construction project to the 
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community have also been performed towards women’s home industry in Nigeria (Porter, 
1995) and the post-harvest crop losses in Malawi (Cheesman, 1993). 
Even though there is a vast range of literature available on the road construction and the road 
maintenance issues, literature that links the road construction and the post-disaster context is 
very limited, particularly those which are focused on the long-term maintenance capacity of 
the local governments. Therefore, concluding the above discussion, since the local 
governments are held responsible for the management of the road infrastructure, it is argued 
that the local governments’ roles and their long-term maintenance capacity should be 
accounted for in a post-disaster road reconstruction plan. This is particularly important when 
the capacity of the local governments has been renowned to be reasonably poor and the 
amount of pledges made for the reconstruction of the region exceeds the actual needs; 
providing enough fund and greater opportunity for implementing the 'Build Back Better’ 
principle and extending the scope of reconstruction to the widest extent possible. Accordingly, 
a strategy to properly plan and adequately incorporate the local government capacity into the 
post-disaster road reconstruction plan is considered to be the key to ensuring the sustainability 
and maximizing the investment value in the post-disaster infrastructure reconstruction.  
The study is focused on the reconstruction of the tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia. This is particularly 
due to the overwhelming impacts of the disaster, as well as the extensive reconstruction 
activities which took place during the post-tsunami reconstruction period. Subekti (2009) 
highlights that more than 900 national organisations from 55 countries were involved in the 
reconstruction of the tsunami in Aceh. Additionally, as much as US$ 7.2 billion of pledges were 
made for the Aceh reconstruction. These conditions, consequently, raise the concerns which 
form the basis of the study; the challenges and obstacles of the post-disaster reconstruction of 
road infrastructure, the role of the local government in the road reconstruction process, and 
the capacity of the local governments to maintain the road reconstruction assets.  
1.3 Aim and objectives 
The aim of the study is to evaluate the capacity of the local governments in the maintenance 
of the road infrastructure assets within the context of the post-disaster reconstruction process. 
The following objectives are formulated to achieve the aim. 
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 To explore the road infrastructure reconstruction process, policy, and management 
model in Indonesia at the national and the local government level 
 To identify and analyse the obstacles and challenges of road reconstruction in a post-
disaster context. 
 To analyse the local government's roles in the road infrastructure reconstruction and 
their capacity in the maintenance of road infrastructure assets. 
 To develop a framework for post-disaster reconstruction of road infrastructure. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
Complementing the process of justifying and deriving the research problem, the discussion of 
the research methodology adopted in this study will be presented broadly in chapter 3. This 
research adopts the interpretivism view in terms of its philosophical assumptions, which is 
delivered in the subjectivism and value laden nature. The nature of the research aims, 
objectives, and the research questions lead to the selection of the multiple-case holistic case 
studies as the most appropriate research strategy. The research evaluates and analyses the 
capacity of the local government in the maintenance of the post-disaster road reconstruction 
assets and makes linkages to the post-disaster road reconstruction process. 
As the research does not try to observe changes and the development of a phenomenon or 
phenomena over a period of time, from the time horizon perspective, it is accordingly 
considered as a cross-sectional study. Additionally, the research collected the secondary data 
from documents and archival records, including reports, journals, and standards related to the 
focus of the study. The primary data was collected using semi-structured interviews with the 
representatives of the government bodies at the national, provincial and local levels, donor 
agencies, as well as consultants and contractors representing the private sectors. The findings 
were validated through semi-structured interviews with the experts in the research area. For 
the analysis of semi-structured interview data, content analysis and cognitive mapping 
methods were used with the aid of the computer-aided software NVivo (version 10).  
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1.5 Contribution to knowledge 
A typical post-disaster road reconstruction project has a number of challenges and obstacles 
(Hayat and Amaratunga, 2011). Much of the literature currently available focuses on the 
challenges and issues in the road reconstruction in a normal development context. Moreover, 
very little literature was identified incorporating the capacity of the local governments to 
maintain the reconstructed asset as one of the post-disaster road reconstruction requirements. 
It was realised that there is a gap in the knowledge concerning the reconstruction of the road 
infrastructure in the post-disaster context, particularly those which link the road reconstruction 
with the local government maintenance capacity. In fact, the local governments will eventually 
be held responsible for these assets once they are completed. Accordingly, this research fills 
this gap and makes a contribution to the road reconstruction in a post-disaster context. 
Additionally, the result of this study is expected to help improve the road reconstruction 
process which maximises the value of investments made in the post-disaster reconstruction.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis chapters is organised in the following order: 
1.6.1 Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis by presenting a discussion on the key issues 
which lead to the justification of the research and the development of the aim and the 
objectives of the study. It also presents a brief introduction of the research methodology 
adopted for this study, including the study’s expected contribution to theory and practice. 
1.6.2 Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
This chapter provides a discussion and the key issues identified from the literature review 
process, leading to the identification of the research problems of the study. Accordingly, the 
chapter presents a review of the literature related to disaster and disaster management, 
reconstruction of road infrastructure in a post-disaster context, and the road infrastructure 
management issues. Additionally, this chapter also includes literature on the decentralisation 
and conflict issues to provide a context to the Indonesia and Aceh condition, which form the 
basis of this research.  
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1.6.3 Chapter 3 – Research Methodology  
The research methodological design and the research process adopted in the study are broadly 
elaborated in this chapter. The discussion will be initiated with the establishment of the 
research problem, followed by detailed argumentation on the research philosophy, research 
approach, research strategy, research choice, and the time horizons, as well as the data 
collection and analysis technique adopted in this study. The procedure of the data collection 
and analysis is also presented in the subsequent section, followed by the PhD thesis writing 
procedure and process. 
1.6.4 Chapter 4 – Conceptual Framework  
This chapter presents the conceptual framework of the study. The conceptual framework 
chapter discusses the key issues of the study, the relationship between the key issues as well 
as the research boundary which explains the extent of the study.  
1.6.5 Chapter 5 – Data Analysis  
This chapter presents the analysis of data collected in the study. The data analysis is presented 
based on the major categories emerging from the content analysis method. This chapter is 
divided into four sections. Section A presents the analysis of the high-level semi-structured 
interviews. Section B discusses the analysis of the case studies. Section C provides a cross-case 
discussion and will compare and contrast the result of analysis from the case studies. Section 
D presents the discussions resulting from the expert semi-structured interviews, validating the 
main findings of the research.  
1.6.6 Chapter 6 – Research Findings  
Chapter 6 elaborates an overview of the research findings. When appropriate, the research 
findings will be compared and contrasted with the literature, as a means of triangulation and 
validation of the research findings.  
1.6.7 Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
As the final chapter of the thesis, this chapter describes the conclusion of the study, based on 
the empirical investigation. The research findings will be supported by the contribution of the 
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study to the theory and practice. The chapter also describes the limitation of the study as well 
as the suggested future research areas.  
1.7 Summary and the link 
As the introductory chapter of the thesis, this chapter is intended to provide an overview of the 
research. The chapter presents the background of the study as well as the justification of the 
research, which forms the basis of conducting the study. Prior to discussing the summary of the 
research methodology adopted in the study, the research aim and objectives have been 
specified. Finally, the expected contribution to knowledge is also described, followed by the 
outline of the report structure. The following chapter accordingly discusses the process of 
literature review for this study.   
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Chapter - 2  LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction 
Previous chapter provided the background of the study as well as the process of research 
problem identification, which leads to the formulation of the aim and objectives. It also 
summarises the research methodology and the contribution to knowledge that the research is 
aimed to provide.  
This chapter presents the comprehensive literature review and syntheses which have been 
carried out in the identification of the research needs, aim and objectives (summarised in 
section 1.3 of chapter 1 and is further detailed in section 3.2 of chapter 3). As the study merges 
two major areas, disaster management and road infrastructure management, this literature 
review chapter is accordingly structured to provide a better flow of discussion as presented in 
the following:  
 Section 2.1 introduces the purpose of the study and summarises the structure of 
discussions presented in this chapter.  
 Section 2.2 explores and provides an overview with regards to disaster and disaster 
management. 
 Section 2.3 discusses the reconstruction of road infrastructure in a post-disaster 
context. 
 Section 2.4 elaborates the theories on the road maintenance. 
 Section 2.5 elaborates the discussion of the disaster and road infrastructure 
maintenance in the Indonesian context.  
Having provided the structure of this section, the following section will commence with 
exploring the general overview of the disaster and disaster management issues.  
2.2 Disasters and disaster management 
2.2.1 Definition of a disaster 
There have been a large number of studies and literature focused on the disasters and disaster 
management subject, covering almost every aspect of the development sectors. These studies 
 10 
 
include social learning (O'Brien et al., 2010), housing (Gauchat and Schodek, 1980, Boen, 2006, 
Johnson, 2007, Gayani and Raufdeen, 2010), land management (Fitzpatrick, 2006, Oxfam, 
2006), knowledge management (Eriksson, 2009, Kaklauskas et al., 2009), women 
empowerment (Ginige et al., 2009), road and transportation (Scanlon, 2003, Perlez, 2006) and 
Waste Management (Karunasena et al., 2009).  
However, disregard to the number of studies on the subject of disasters and disaster 
management, there seems to be no universal definition of disaster used by the scholars or 
institutions. The differences in the definition of disaster appear to be affected by the 
geographical, economic, and the political situation of the respective countries (Eshghi and 
Larson, 2008), making it practically impossible to summarise in brief (Alexander, 2005). Some 
of the disaster definitions include "an event or series of events that threaten and disrupt the 
lives and livelihoods of the society caused either by natural factors and/ or non-natural factors 
and human factors that result in human casualties, damages to the environment, loss of 
property, and psychological impact" (Law, 2007), and as “an emergency situation of some 
complexities that will cause the loss of lives, damage to property and the environment, and 
hamper the local social and economic activities" (MNSC 2003, cited in Shaluf and Ahmadun, 
2006). Furthermore, DesInventar (2012) defines disaster as “the set of adverse effects caused 
by social-natural and natural phenomena on human life, properties, infrastructure and 
environment (an 'event') within a specific geographic unit during a given period of time."  
In addition to the aforementioned definitions, the most relevant and frequently referred to 
definitions within the disaster management context is probably the one defined by EM-DAT 
and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction – UNISDR. EM-DAT defines 
a disaster as “a situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request at 
a national or international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden event 
that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering” (Vos et al., 2010). UNISDR (2009) 
defines a disaster as “a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society 
involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which 
exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources."  
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Even though the definition of disaster varies slightly among the scholars and institutions, the 
emphases are generally addressed to three aspects; the adverse impact of the event, the scale 
of disruption and distress in the community, and the capacity of the affected community to 
cope with the resulting impacts on their own resource. These three factors are used as 
indicators of whether or not an event is considered a disaster. Additionally, EM-DAT stipulates 
that it will only record an event in their disaster database if one of the following criteria is met; 
10 or more fatalities, 100 or more people are affected, declaration of a state of emergency and 
call for international assistance (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011). As the definition of disaster has been 
elaborated in this section, the next section will accordingly discuss the disaster management 
aspect.  
2.2.2 Disaster management 
Likewise disaster, disaster management has also been defined differently. It is therefore argued 
that understanding the aim of conducting disaster management may help define what disaster 
management is. According to Warfield (2004), the aim of disaster management is “to reduce 
or avoid the potential losses from hazards, assure prompt and appropriate assistance to victims 
of disaster, and achieve rapid and effective recovery." The International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies - IFRC (2012) assumes disaster management to be “the 
organisation and management of resources and responsibilities for dealing with all 
humanitarian aspects of emergencies, in particular preparedness, response and recovery in 
order to lessen the impact of disasters.” Furthermore, Kaklauskas et al., (2009) argue that post-
disaster management strategy should be compatible with the disaster level, economic, social, 
cultural, institutional, technological, environmental and legal/ regulatory condition of the 
respective areas. They also argues that no single strategy could be applied to all countries and 
what is considered the best strategy of one country cannot simply be copied to another 
country. To accommodate the differences in disaster management definitions, Emanuele et al., 
(2009) describe disaster management as “the body of policy and administrative decisions, the 
operational activities, the actors and technologies that pertain to the various stages of a 
disaster at all levels.”  
From the various descriptions and definitions of disaster management, it can be concluded that 
disaster management is related to the management of policy making, the required response 
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activities, and the stakeholders which depend on the type of the disaster and their positions in 
regard to the disaster management cycle. Even though the disaster management strategy may 
be unique to certain areas and for certain conditions, there are, however, major components 
of disaster management that are relatively similar regardless of the type of disaster and its 
location. The major components of disaster management will be presented in the following 
section.  
2.2.2.1 Components of disaster management 
In the discussion of the components of disaster management, scholars and organisations (eq. 
Wolensky and Wolensky, 1990, Freeman et al., 2003, DFID, 2005) use different approaches. As 
discussed in the next paragraphs, the components of disaster management are generally 
described based on the activities included in the process with respect to the phases of the 
disaster management cycle, or based on the core elements requiring management.  
With regard to the activities in disaster management, the components can be classified into 
two major phases of the disaster management cycle; pre-disaster and post-disaster. According 
to Freeman et al. (2003), the pre-disaster components include risk identification, risk 
mitigation, risk transfer and preparedness. It is in this phase where disaster risk management 
and disaster risk reduction activities generally take place, which measures include policy and 
planning, physical preventive, physical coping and/or adaptive measures, and community 
capacity building (Department for International Development - DFID, 2005). Furthermore, the 
post-disaster components include emergency response, rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
Other scholars also refer to the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase as the early-recovery 
period and the long-term recovery period (Wolensky and Wolensky, 1990). Since the activities 
in disaster management are closely related to the disaster management cycle, more detailed 
discussion of this issue will be addressed in section 2.2.2.2 regarding disaster management 
cycle.  
On the other hand, disaster management may be described based on the core elements of a 
disaster requiring management. Khan et al. (2008) argue that a disaster is the result of the 
combination of hazard, vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures of the affected 
people to reduce the potential chance of risks. They argue that disasters only occur when 
 13 
 
hazards and vulnerabilities meet, and also bring in the third element - capacity, into the 
discussion about disaster management. Capacity is imperative, as it may affect the severity of 
hazard impacts and people’s ability to cope with disaster. Therefore, these three elements are 
seen as the basic components of disaster management.  
In accordance with the definition of disaster described previously in section 2.2.1, even though 
hazardous events may occur relatively anywhere in the world, the capacity and the vulnerability 
level of the local community may differ. Consequently, what is considered a disaster in one area 
may not be deemed a disaster in another area, i.e. should it happen in an area with less 
vulnerable people or communities, or when the affected communities are able to cope with 
the impact with their own resources and capacities. Accordingly, it is therefore imperative to 
understand the respective three components of disaster; hazards, vulnerability, and capacity, 
which may affect decisions and responses made towards disaster events. Accordingly, more 
discussion on the three components of disaster management is presented in the following 
sections.  
2.2.2.1.1 Hazard  
A hazard can be defined as “a dangerous condition or event, that threatens or has the potential 
for causing injury to life or damage to property or the environment” (Khan et al., 2008). 
Generally, hazards can be divided into three categories. Firstly, hazards are called natural 
hazards if they are caused exclusively by natural origins (earthquake, cyclone, volcanic eruption, 
etc.). Secondly, socio-natural hazards are hazards which are caused by both natural and man-
made causes (flood, landslide, fire, etc.). Thirdly, man-made hazards are those caused by 
human negligence (pollution, dam failure, wars, etc.).  
Additionally, Etkin and Dore (2003, cited in Ashlin and Ladle, 2007) argue that natural hazards 
will turn into a disaster when they reveal the social vulnerability and cause damage to both the 
physical and social fabric of an environment. Similarly, Cannon (2008) highlights that even 
though a disaster which is related to the natural hazards is generally understood and recognised 
as a natural disaster, a disaster is largely the product decisions made by the human being 
involving the economic, political and social factors.  
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2.2.2.1.2 Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerability is generally understood as “the extent to which a community, structures, services, 
or geographic area is likely to be damaged or disrupted by the impact of particular hazards, on 
account of their nature, construction and proximity to hazardous terrain or a disaster-prone 
area” (Khan et al., 2008). In addition, Rottach (2010) denotes that vulnerability depends on the 
social, economic, cultural and political conditions, which are the result of the internal changes 
and outside influences.  
In general, vulnerability can be divided into two categories, physical and socioeconomic. The 
physical vulnerability is rooted in the physical characteristic of the people or buildings. This 
includes proximity, location, structural strengths, etc. The socioeconomic vulnerability, on the 
other hand, is rooted in the socioeconomic condition of the people or the community at risk. 
Included here are the levels of poverty, education, gender, age, etc. For instance, poor people 
may be more vulnerable to earthquakes due to their inability to build sound concrete houses. 
On the other hand, people living in poorly built concrete houses may be more vulnerable to 
earthquakes than the people living in timber houses. However, even though the vulnerability 
paradigm is often associated with poverty and marginalisation, Cannon (2008) warns that 
regarding vulnerability as more or less the same as poverty may lead to ignoring or undermining 
other hazard risk characteristics that may be different from poverty.  
2.2.2.1.3 Capacity 
In addition to hazards and vulnerabilities, capacity is argued to be one of the important 
elements of disaster management. Khan et al., (2008) define capacity as “resources, means and 
strengths, which exist in households and communities and which enable them to cope with, 
withstand, prepare for, prevent, mitigate or quickly recover from a disaster." Furthermore, 
Khan et al., (2008) classify people’s capacity into physical and socioeconomic capacity. Physical 
capacity is the ability and skills that the affected people possess, which enable them to survive 
or cope with the impact of the disaster. Similarly, socioeconomic capacity is the economic and 
social condition of the affected people, which help them to survive or to cope with the disaster 
impacts. For instance, a wealthy community with strong social cohesion is more likely to survive 
and quickly recover from disaster impact than the poor community.  
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In line with the definition of the disaster, it is the capacity of vulnerable people to cope with 
the hazardous events that distinguishes and makes a hazardous event an emergency situation 
or a disaster. It is therefore argued that capacity building or capacity development should be 
integrated with any disaster mitigation or disaster reconstruction effort.  
The basic components of disaster management have been discussed in sections 2.2.2.1.1, 
2.2.2.1.2, and 2.2.2.1.3 above with regards to hazards, vulnerability and the capacity of the 
affected community. As part of the discussion on the disaster management topic, it is also 
necessary to understand the different activities involved in the disaster management, which 
are mainly segmented and embedded into different phases, which form the disaster 
management cycle. More detail discussion on this issue will be presented in the following 
section.  
2.2.2.2 Disaster management cycle 
Warfield (2004) suggests that disaster management cycle is “an ongoing process by which 
governments, businesses, and civil-society plan for and reduce the impact of disasters, react 
during and immediately following a disaster, and take steps to recover after a disaster has 
occurred... (including) the shaping of public policies and plans that either modify the causes of 
disasters or mitigate their elects on people, property, and infrastructure." Furthermore, 
disaster management activities can be divided into several groups based on the timing and foci 
on the particular activities. These activities altogether form a recurring and continuing pattern 
that illustrates the on-going process which can be regarded as the disaster management cycle.  
Scholars and institutions define the disaster management cycle differently. Some scholars 
separate disaster management activities into three phases of emergencies or crises; pre-
emergency/ crisis, emergency/ crisis and post-emergency/ crisis, (Messer, 2003, Emanuele et 
al., 2009). Wolensky and Wolensky (1990) divide the post-emergency phase as the early-
recovery and long-term recovery period. Similarly, Messer (2003) further subdivides disaster 
management activities into several groups, namely prevention, mitigation and preparedness 
(pre-emergency phase), response (emergency phase) and recovery and development (post-
emergency phase). 
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Nevertheless, the slightly different definitions and naming of disaster management activities 
are generally in accordance with the so-called conventional disaster management cycle, which 
particularly consists of mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery as illustrated in the 
following figure. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Disaster Management Cycle  
Source: Shukla (2013) 
The many variables and activities involved in the application and implementation of disaster 
management lead to the requirement of the tailoring and understanding of the area and the 
context into which the disaster management strategy is to be implemented. Accordingly, as 
mentioned earlier in section 2.2.2, Kaklauskas et al. (2009) argue that no single strategy could 
be applied to all countries and what is considered the best strategy of one country cannot 
simply be copied to another country.  
With regard to development and disaster risk management, UNDP (2004) distinguishes two 
types of disaster risk management; compensatory disaster risk management and prospective 
disaster risk management. Whilst compensatory disaster risk management is focused on the 
“amelioration of existing vulnerabilities and reduction of natural hazards that has accumulated 
through past development pathways," prospective disaster risk management suggests that 
“development programmes and projects need to be reviewed for their potential and to reduce 
or alleviate vulnerability and hazards." Referring to the disaster management cycle, the 
compensatory disaster risk management is more focused on the preparedness and response 
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phase and stands alongside development planning. Prospective disaster risks management, on 
the other hand, is part of the sustainable development planning and is argued to be particularly 
effective in the post-disaster reconstruction phase, when disasters provide the greatest 
opportunity for development.  
The above discussions on the issues of disaster management components and the activities in 
each phase of the disaster management cycle indicate the links between disaster and 
development. Accordingly, the next sections will provide a discussion on the link between 
disaster and development, which cover the issues of development opportunity in disaster and 
followed by the sustainability aspect development.  
2.2.3 Disaster and Development 
Previously in section 2.2.2 the components of disaster management and the various activities 
in each phase of the disaster management cycle have been discussed. Accordingly, this section 
will provide a discussion about the link between disaster and development. UNDP (2004) 
considers natural disaster as both a cause and product of failed development. It argues that, 
on the one hand, natural disaster causes a significant setback to development through 
destruction of infrastructure, the erosion of livelihoods, damages to the integrity of ecosystems 
and architectural heritage, injury, illness, and death. On the other hand, however, risks of 
disaster have also accumulated through inappropriate development interventions. 
Concentration of people in hazard prone areas, collapsed building, and environmental 
degradation are few examples of how failed development has contributed to, at least, 
magnifying the extent of damages and losses in a disaster event. Nevertheless, disaster event 
is also argued to provide a window of opportunities for development, as will be discussed in 
more detail in the following section.  
2.2.3.1 Development opportunity in disaster 
On the one hand, disasters may cause great suffering to the people and cause significant 
setbacks to the development of a country through destruction of decades of social and 
economic investment as well as redirection of funds, which could have been used for the 
development (UNDP, 2004). On the other hand, however, disasters also offer opportunities for 
physical, social, political, and environmental development that may have not been available 
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previously (Asgary et al., 2008). These development opportunities may appear in the form of 
higher media and political attention as well as the communities’ raised awareness regarding 
disaster issues, improved and better enforced building codes, upgraded health facilities, as well 
as construction of new and improved road infrastructure resulting from the post-disaster 
reconstruction activities. Moreover, the increased political and media attention should also be 
used as an opportunity for promoting and implementing the build back better principle and to 
maximise the improvements that can be achieved following a disaster occurrence. Since such 
momentum will not last for a long period after a disaster, Asgary et al., (2008) argue that 
stakeholders’ collaboration and participation, knowledge and experience, long-term and 
holistic vision, division of labour, and use of resources need to be used optimally as post-
disaster opportunities within the first two years after the disaster occurrence.  
Corresponding to the link between disaster and development, even though disaster may open 
up a window of opportunities for development due to the raised awareness and attention 
towards the importance of disaster management, such opportunity is also affected by the 
availability of the fund for the reconstruction, as it may affect the extent to which post-disaster 
reconstruction can reach. Nevertheless, it is also argued that in addition to funding availability, 
it is equally important that any of the improvements and opportunities resulted from the post-
disaster response can be sustained, in order to maximise the investment made in the 
reconstruction period, as well as to avoid the recurrence of the disaster in the future. 
Accordingly, the issue of post-disaster reconstruction fund availability will be discussed in the 
following section 2.2.3.2, which will be followed by the discussion on the sustainability and 
sustainable development in section 2.2.3.3. 
2.2.3.2 Post-disaster reconstruction fund  
As previously mentioned in section 2.2.3.1 above, the extent to which a disaster may be used 
as a development opportunity also depends on the availability of funds for the reconstruction. 
The availability of funds for post-disaster reconstruction can be divided into three different 
scenarios. Each of these three different scenarios also has different targeted outcomes 
(Pranoto, 2011). The first scenario is when funds are inadequate for restoring the affected 
region to its pre-disaster condition. In this case, priorities are given to the reconstruction of 
housing and the rehabilitation of public service at the minimum level, and the provision of aid 
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to stimulate the economic recovery. In the second scenario, the fund is just adequate to restore 
the affected region to its pre-disaster condition. The rehabilitation and reconstruction is 
expected to exceed the minimum level of public service standard and to cover all of the affected 
sectors and areas. The third scenario is when the availability of funds exceeds the amount 
required to restore the affected region to its original condition. In this situation, the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction activities are expected to cover the wider areas and beyond 
the affected sectors and areas.  
2.2.3.3 Bounce-back, bounce-forward, and disaster resiliency in post-disaster reconstruction 
Having discussed the opportunity in disasters and the link to development, there comes a need 
to understand the notion of “bounce-back”, “bounce-forward” and their relevance to the 
disaster resilience concept. The terms “bounce-back” or “bouncing-back” have been used 
widely to describe the ability to recover from impacts and pressures resulting from an accident, 
trauma or in this case, a disaster event. The notion has therefore appeared in the area of 
business (Margolis and Stoltz, 2010), biology (Hamzelou, 2012), neurobiology (Requarth and 
Crist, 2011), material science (2014) as well as in disaster management (Manyena et al., 2011), 
to illustrate the ability and capacity of the affected objects to revert to their original condition, 
hence resilient.  
From the disaster management perspective, Manyena et al. (2011) suggest that the notion of 
“bounce-back” liberates resilience from the vulnerability conundrum. This has mainly helped 
distinguish the concept of vulnerability and resilience. As Irfanullah (2014) suggests, the 
“bouncing-back” capacity of a group of people refers to the ability to return back to the original 
state, prior to the disaster. However, Manyena et al. (2011) further argue that the use of the 
“bounce-back” notion in describing disaster resilience may overlooked the changes that 
accompanied disaster events in that the affected areas may never be the same as the pre-
disaster condition. Additionally, such a view also emits the massage which may be contradictory 
to the spirit of moving forward and making improvements in the post-disaster recovery 
activities – the “build back better” principle. Accordingly, there comes the other notion of 
“bouncing-forward”. Manyena (2009) argues that the idea of resilience should be seen as the 
ability to “bounce-forward” or “move-on” following a disaster, as it has psychological and more 
optimistic implications to adopt positive behaviour in assisting disaster victims. Similarly, 
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McKinney (2014) proposes that the goal of resiliency is not necessarily to bounce back, but to 
bounce-forward. By acknowledging the need to consider both notions, he suggests the 
importance to adapt whilst maintaining the main purpose by redesigning organisations, 
institutions, and systems to better absorb disruptions. Nevertheless, the extent to which post-
disaster reconstruction activities can be implemented also depends on the availability of fund 
for the reconstruction, as discussed previously in section 2.2.3.2.  
Having described the notion of bounce-back and bounce-forward, and their relevance to the 
disaster resilience concept, the following section will accordingly discuss the concept of 
sustainability and sustainable development as embedded concepts in the post-disaster 
reconstruction. 
2.2.3.4 Sustainability and sustainable development 
Historically, disaster management has focused upon the provision of responses and 
humanitarian assistance where the allocation of resources could have been provided for 
vulnerability reduction and development efforts (Alexander et al., 2006). However, as the 
occurrence of disasters has increased over the last several decades and the losses and damages 
have significantly multiplied (Rodriguez et al., 2009, Vos et al., 2010, Guha-Sapir et al., 2011), 
disaster management practitioners are more aware of the disaster cycle and that the 
continuing exposure of vulnerable people to hazards and the resulting consequences are in 
many cases avoidable. This is where the link between development and disaster management 
eventually becomes visible and why, to be more specific, the aspect of sustainable 
development should be embedded into the disaster management strategy. 
The word sustainable, as a derivation of 'sustain', is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as, 
‘being able to be maintained at a certain rate or level’. However, in the context of development 
and disaster management, the practical definition of sustainability has developed and become 
a more complex word which can be seen from the various facets of development, including 
environmental, social and financial. From the disaster management perspective, Gilmour et al. 
(2011) argue that since the disaster management paradigm has shifted towards disaster risk 
reduction, the difficulty in defining sustainable development is rooted in its very broad nature 
and politicised purpose. Additionally, Forum for the Future (2005, cited in Gilmour et al., 2011) 
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defines sustainable as having the ‘capacity for continuance’ and refers to sustainability as a 
‘quality’, and therefore observes that sustainable development is the process by which 
sustainability is achieved. Environmental sustainability, for instance, has been set as one of the 
eight Millennium Development Goals, which is targeted on reversing the loss of environmental 
resources, reducing biodiversity losses, improving basic sanitation and safe drinking water and 
reducing the number of slum dwellers (United Nations, 2012). From the infrastructure 
management point of view, the definition of sustainability goes beyond environmental 
protection in that it needs to include “equity matters and the practicality of financing the 
policies in question over the long term” (Bayliss, 2002).  
The term sustainable development was popularised in 1987 when it was discussed in the 
“Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future” 
(United Nations, 1987). The report is also widely known as the Bruntland Report, named after 
the Chair of the commission and the former Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Bruntland. 
In the report, sustainable development is defined as “development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs." Even 
though the report provides a general and broad definition of sustainability, and its practical use 
in specific fields will need further adjustment and fine-tuning, it has raised the awareness of 
the importance of incorporating the principle of sustainable development into the 
development activities, including the post-disaster reconstruction.  
Due to its broad nature, defining sustainable development is rather difficult and highly 
dependent on the practical use of the definition and may therefore differ between agriculture, 
social, health, construction or economics. Forum for the Future (2005, cited in Gilmour et al., 
2011), emphasises the fact that sustainable development is “a dynamic process which enables 
all people to realise their potential and improve their quality of life in ways, which 
simultaneously protect and enhance the earth’s life-support systems." Accordingly, specifically 
addressed for the purposes of infrastructure management, Gilmour et al. (2011) suggest that 
sustainable development should be seen as “a vision that integrates immediate and longer-
term needs, local and global needs, and regards society, environment, and economics as 
inseparable and interdependent." 
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Regardless of the debatable definition of sustainable development, a conclusive argument is 
further proposed by Gilmour et al. (2011), by stating that any development can be described 
as sustainable only if it integrates the economic, social, and environmental issues. They further 
developed three sets of benchmark indicators for a sustainable infrastructure development 
project for each of the three aspects. Among others, the benchmark indicators include 
demographic, employment rates, investment stimulation, regeneration and job creation 
(economic aspect); waste, air, water, noise, energy and transport use level (environmental 
aspect); housing provision, community satisfaction, social inclusion, participation and 
responsibility as well as stakeholder acceptability (social aspect). Supporting their argument, 
Lewis (1999, cited in Alexander, 2004) links the issue of sustainable development with post 
disaster reconstruction planning by stating that post-disaster reconstruction planning needs to 
be holistic, which goes beyond replacing the damaged buildings and infrastructure but also 
considers the reconstruction of the communities, ensuring equity, access to resources, and the 
equality of opportunity for the most disadvantaged communities, as well as reducing 
community vulnerability.  
In addition to the above arguments, Kaklauskas et al., (2009) support the idea that post-disaster 
management strategy should be compatible with the disaster level, economic, social, cultural, 
institutional, technological, environmental and legal/ regulatory conditions of the respective 
areas. It is probably due to these reasons that the role of local governments in disaster 
management is argued to be increasingly important for the disaster management efforts to 
succeed. Accordingly, the following section will provide a discussion on the issue of local 
government and disaster management. 
2.2.4 Local government and disaster management  
2.2.4.1 Roles of the local government in disaster management 
As previously mentioned, the importance of the role of the local governments in disaster 
management has been increasingly recognized by disaster management practitioners. ISDR 
highlights four major roles of local governments in disaster management, which include 
coordination of multi-level and multi-layer stakeholders, community engagement and linkage 
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with government priorities, strengthening of the institutional capacity, and implementation of 
innovative DRR tools and techniques (ISDR, 2010).  
Additionally, Berke et al. (1993) emphasise the importance of maximizing external aid during 
disaster recovery to establish more effective self-directed and sustainable development 
initiatives within the local organisations. They also highlight the needs for the locals to assume 
the role of active participants, rather than the helpless victims. In a similar fashion, ISDR (2010) 
argues that local governments have crucial roles in the disaster-recovery process as it will 
sustain development once the external stakeholders leave. The collaboration between the 
provincial, local governments and other stakeholders is considered very important as it may 
result in an effective coordination of overlapping resources and responsibilities as well as in 
pooling expertise required for the recovery.  
In addition, Wolensky and Wolensky (1990) summarise that much of the focus of disaster 
management has been placed on the local governments due to at least four reasons; (i) disaster 
management is implemented by the local government, (ii) there is a growing recognition that 
the local governments play the most active roles in emergency operations, (ii) disaster-related 
expectation at the federal level is shifting towards the subnational government, and (iv) many 
of the states require localities to develop comprehensive emergency plans. 
Moreover, local government is considered to be in the best position to effectively engage local 
communities. Kusumasari et al., (2010) underlines that local governments play important roles 
before, during and after the disaster because they know the community very well. Haddow and 
Bullock (2006, cited in Col, 2007) add that “the key government level (in case of the emergency) 
is the one that has relevant equipment and adequate management capacity while still being 
close to the ground and in the midst of the emergency incident." Accordingly, the key 
government level referred to in their statement is the local government as the body that is 
closest to the emergency site and the affected community, which is also required to provide 
the most immediate response should an emergency event takes place.  
2.2.4.2 Local government capacity in disaster management  
Despite the growing recognition and needs of the roles of local governments in disaster 
management, the local governments’ capacity in disaster management has been arguably 
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inadequate. With regard to disaster management practices, de Guzman (2003) argues that the 
disaster management practices in most countries, particularly in the developing world, are 
more inclined towards managing the responses to disasters (which requires preparedness) 
rather than managing risks and the underlying conditions that lead to disasters (which among 
other actions requires risk assessment, vulnerability reduction and capacity enhancement). On 
the other hand, Kusumasari et al., (2010) assert that studies of the role of local government in 
disaster management have been under-explored in at least two major aspects. First, most 
studies have been addressed at the local governments in the developed countries with only a 
few focused on the local government in the developing countries. Second, the resource 
capabilities of local government in managing disasters at every stage of the disaster cycle are 
rarely examined.  
Whilst examining a programme is essential, and evaluation is necessary for future 
improvement, the evaluation of emergency plans has proven to be difficult. As highlighted by 
Henstra (2010), the infrequent occurrence of emergencies makes it difficult to evaluate the 
emergency management programmes and to measure the performance in this field. This 
condition also results in the implementation of lessons learned obtained from one disaster 
being hard to replicate in another disaster. It is even more difficult to replicate the success story 
of the local government’s role in disaster management in a developed country to the local 
governments in developing countries. As a consequence, this condition is suggested as one of 
the reasons why the capacity of local government remains a major problem in the disaster 
management initiative.  
ISDR (2010) denotes five key points of challenges and opportunities to consider when 
attempting replication. The first is the lack of interest and capacities of the local government. 
Here, the support of partner agencies such as national government, donors and NGOs is 
expected to play a catalytic role to fill the initial gaps. The second is understanding local risk 
and vulnerabilities. Even though it has been suggested that local governments know their 
community very well, they often lack sufficient knowledge about disaster risks and 
vulnerabilities of their communities as well as the required and appropriate measures to 
mitigate disaster. The third key point is with regard to the maintenance and upgrading of critical 
infrastructure. Whilst the local governments are responsible for a number of critical 
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infrastructures, the investment to make them resilient is often not very visible, resulting in 
neglect and dilapidation. Fourth, managing a long-term process is difficult. Being a long-term 
process, disaster risk reduction initiatives often suffer from staff changes and unequal interest 
among the key decision makers. Fifth, learning from disasters. It is argued that people are more 
tempted towards short-term, visible recovery works. However, the momentum created by a 
disaster is often to be a very effective time to initiate changes and to engage local governments 
and communities with the long-term efforts.  
Nevertheless, the capacity of the local governments is poor and often leads to local government 
being unable to cope with the problem of overload and is replaced by an improvised emergency 
government or by the higher level of authorities (Barton, 1970 cited in Wolensky and Wolensky, 
1990). Therefore, it is argued that unless the cause of such a problem is understood at the local 
level, the effort to fully embed disaster management into the local government action will be 
difficult to realise. The following section will accordingly identify the common causes of the 
local governments’ inadequate disaster management capacity.  
2.2.4.3 Common causes of the Local Governments inadequate disaster management capacity 
Wolensky and Wolensky (1990) suggest that there is a pattern of inconsistent and often weak 
performance by the local governments across all disaster stages. Two impediments have been 
accused as being the major causes of this condition; the local unwillingness and the low capacity 
to meet new expectations. Cigler (1987, cited in Wolensky and Wolensky, 1990) referred to the 
problem as the "inter-governmental paradox of emergency management, whereby the 
governments least likely to perceive emergency management as a key priority –the local 
governments - are at centre stage in terms of responsibility for emergency management." 
With regard to the organisational and inter-organisational issues, Turner (1976) concludes that 
common causal features that often occur in the public sector are “the rigidities in the 
institutional beliefs, distracting decoy phenomena, neglect of outside complaints, multiple 
information-handling difficulties, exacerbation of the hazards by strangers, failure to comply 
with regulations and a tendency to minimize the danger." All of these factors are frequently 
incubated and accumulate unnoticed until the onset of a disaster and the resulting cultural 
collapse.  
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In addition to the aforementioned factors, Wolensky and Wolensky (1990) also suggest that in 
dealing with major disasters, there is a problematic belief that the demands of major disaster 
can be met merely by extending routine procedures; which conforms with Drabek’s finding that 
“everyday measures used for ordinary emergencies cannot be extrapolated for use in major 
disasters”(1986, p46 cited in Wolensky and Wolensky, 1990). The next section will provide 
further discussion on the critical success factor to improve the local governments’ disaster 
management capacity.  
2.2.4.4 Critical success factors to improve the Local Governments' disaster management 
capacity 
Complementing the above discussion, Kusumasari et al. (2010) conclude that to improve the 
capacity of local government in disaster management, there are a number of critical success 
factors that need to be addressed. These success factors can be grouped into six categories, 
namely; institutional, human resources, policy for effective implementation, financial, technical 
and leadership. More detail on the critical success factors is presented in Table 2.1. 
The key critical success factors of disaster management, as stipulated in Table 2.1, covers the 
various aspects of the local government and the disaster management issues. The institutional 
factors, for instance, affirm the importance of clear structure, role, responsibilities and 
relationships between all levels of government in order to avoid confusion that may occur in 
the dynamic and pressured environment of the emergency phase.  
With respect to the reconstruction of road infrastructures, it is argued that the financial 
commitment should be given a significantly high priority due to the value of losses and damages 
in the sector, the importance of the facilities for the overall recovery, the value of the 
investment provided for the reconstruction as well as the long-term maintenance requirement 
to ensure the sustainability of the reconstructed assets.  
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Table 2.1 – Local Capability Requirements and Critical Success Factors of Disaster Management 
Local government capability: Key functional success factors 
Institutional Having a clear structure, role, responsibilities, and relationship between 
all levels of government 
Human resources Having sufficient personnel, proper task delegation, and division of 
labour 
Policy for effective 
implementation 
Availability of appropriate policies, rules, and regulations for making 
decisions, mobilising resources and engaging relevant public/private 
organisations 
Financial  Having sufficient financial resources to support activities in all stages of 
disaster management 
Technical Having an effective logistics management system, sufficient information 
technology systems, and communication networks between 
organisations, communities, and media representatives 
Leadership  Building local level leadership to make quick and appropriate decisions 
if and when needed 
Source: Kusumasari et al. (2010) 
The above sections have provided a discussion on the issue of disaster, disaster management, 
as well as the role of local government in the disaster management. The common causes of the 
local governments’ inadequate capacity as well as the success factors have also been covered. 
Accordingly, the following section will elaborate the aspect of capacity building in the context 
of post-disaster reconstruction. It is argued that providing a discussion on the capacity building 
aspect will complement previous discussions and enrich the understanding on the capacity 
issues.  
2.2.5 Capacity building in the post-disaster road reconstruction context 
This section elaborates the concept of capacity and capacity building. The discussion will be 
initiated by presenting the concept of capacity, followed by the concept of capacity 
development and the challenges in delivering capacity building initiatives in the post-disaster 
reconstruction.  
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2.2.5.1 The concept of capacity  
UNISDR (2009) defines capacity as “the combination of all the strengths, attributes and 
resources available within a community, society or organisation that can be used to achieve the 
agreed goals.” With regard to the characteristics of capacity, Morgan (2006) underlines that 
due to the different perspectives and the flexibility of the term capacity to cover a range of 
circumstances, capacity may be seen as a training, a general management problem-solving tool, 
or as an umbrella term to which most programming and initiatives can be re-packaged, re-
labelled, and re-legitimised. It is therefore argued that in the discussion of capacity issues, the 
characteristics within which the concept of capacity is understood need to be highlighted. He 
accordingly defines capacity as "the ability of a group or system to make positive contributions 
to the public life.” 
Morgan (2006) argues that a study which focuses on the capacity issues is immediately 
challenged by the various understandings of the term capacity. He asserts that this condition 
occurs due to a number of reasons, including the absence of generally accepted definition of 
capacity, the rapid expansion of the range of capacity issues, the different perspectives of 
capacity seen by different actors, as well as the little interest of organisations to devise a more 
sophisticated formulation of capacity. As a result, the understanding of capacity as defined 
from a macro perspective (e.g. the capacity of a country in increasing its GDP) generally differs 
from that of the micro perspective (e.g. the capacity of personnel to communicate with their 
colleagues).  
Following the above discussion, Morgan (2006) accordingly summarises five characteristics of 
the concept of capacity: Capacity is about empowerment and identity; Capacity has to do with 
collective ability; Capacity as a state or condition is inherently a systems phenomenon, involving 
a complex combination of attitudes, resources, strategies, and skills of both the tangible and 
intangible; Capacity as a potential (latent) state which is elusive and transient; and Capacity is 
about creation of public value. In accordance with the different characteristics of capacity as 
mentioned above, the capacity may be defined differently according to the operational needs. 
For the operational purpose of this study, local government road maintenance capacity is 
therefore defined as “the ability of local government to effectively and efficiently manage 
resources, skills and organisational attributes in order to maximize the value of investments 
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made in the road reconstruction.” As the main concept of capacity has been elaborated, the 
discussion progresses to the concept of capacity building in the next section. 
2.2.5.2 The concept of capacity building 
2.2.5.2.1 Capacity building and capacity development  
As the definition of capacity varies, the definition of capacity building and capacity development 
predictably varies between organisations. The particular term of capacity development is a 
relatively new concept which emerged in the early 1990s. UNDP (2008b) distinguishes the 
difference between capacity building and capacity development mainly on the different 
connotations that each term carries. The term capacity building is generally considered to imply 
a process which starts at a zero point and to create something that did not previously exist. As 
cited in UNDP (2008b), the OECD/ DAC defines capacity building as a process “starting with a 
plain surface and involving the step-by-step erection of a new structure, based on a 
preconceived design.” On the other hand, the term capacity development suggests that there 
are some existing capacities, which are used as the starting point for the improvement and 
enhancement process. Accordingly, UNDP (2008a) defines capacity development as “the 
process through which individuals, organisations and societies obtain, strengthen, and maintain 
the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time.” Slightly 
differently, UNISDR (2009) defines capacity development as “the process by which people, 
organisations and society systematically stimulate and develop their capacities over time to 
achieve social and economic goals, including through improvement of knowledge, skills, 
systems, and institutions.” Additionally, Bolger’s definition of capacity development refers to 
the approaches, strategies, and methodologies used by the developing country, and/ or 
external stakeholders, to improve the performance at the individual, organisational, network/ 
sector, or broader system level (Bolger, 2000). However, UNISDR (2009) denotes that the 
concept of capacity developments extends the term capacity building to cover all aspects of 
creating and sustaining the capacity over time. Furthermore, even though the concept of 
capacity development was introduced relatively recently, it is actually complementing the 
existing ideas such as institutional building, institutional development, human resources 
development, development management, and institutional strengthening (Ginige and 
Amaratunga, 2011). 
 30 
 
Regardless the different definitions of the capacity building and capacity development, the 
researcher argues that the differences between the two terms do not sit in the definitions of 
the terms, but rather in the connotations that the words “building” and “development” imply. 
Accordingly, the researcher suggests that as long as the key elements of the process are well 
understood, there will be no significant impacts of using these two terms interchangeably. It is 
accordingly worth noting that the interchangeable use of the term capacity building and 
capacity development in the following section is solely for the purpose of keeping the original 
citations and not to indicate them as two separate ideas.  
2.2.5.2.2 The key elements of the capacity building framework 
Kenny (2007b) suggests that capacity building activities are aimed at ‘developing the skills, 
resources and knowledge of groups, organisation or nations.’ Hence, capacity building 
practically refers to approaches, strategies and methodologies used to improve the 
performance of individuals, community, organisations or countries to carry out particular 
functions (Kenny, 2007b), at the different social level (Bolger, 2000).  
Moreover, with regard to the community capacity building, McGinty (2002) emphasises five 
key elements to be incorporated in the capacity building strategic plan. The five key elements 
are knowledge building, leadership, network building, valuing community, and the supporting 
information and analysis. Within the context of post-disaster Waste Management, Karunasena 
et al. (2010) propose seven principles of capacity building activities and processes, which 
include skills and confidence building, organisational implementation, linkages and 
collaboration, continuity and sustainability, investment in infrastructure, research and 
development, as well as communication and coordination. The capacity building appears to be 
implemented in three broad forms; community development, skilling and training, and 
involvement of external experts in the reconstruction and development of local political, social 
and economic infrastructure (Kenny, 2007b). However, she warns that the use of training as a 
form of capacity building tends to exclude the local participants as the trainer and does not 
normally start with the needs as identified by the local community.  
Furthermore, the capacity development is widely described either as a process or an objective 
(Bolger, 2000). The capacity development frameworks have advanced in the recent years. 
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According to Bolger (2000), the needs of capacity development is initiated as a response to the 
shortcomings in development assistance, which is primarily due to dominant role of donor-led 
projects and inadequate attention to the long-term capacity. As a consequence, the sustainable 
impact of the development projects has been limited.  
While the various frameworks differ in detail, they generally highlight the processes, capacity 
levels, and the different dimensions within which the capacity development program is taking 
place. Capacity building activities can be implemented using a top-down or bottom-up 
approach and may also be generated internally or externally (Kenny, 2007b). For instance, 
Ginige and Amaratunga (2011 pp. 21) develop a capacity development framework that 
highlight the various roles of the stakeholders involved in a capacity development process with 
regard to the four phases of capacity development; analysis, creation, utilisation, and retention. 
Moreover, Bolger (2000) proposes a capacity development framework which consists of the 
four interrelated dimensions of sustainable capacity building. The four dimensions are 
individual level, organisational level, sector/ network level, and the enabling environment 
(Figure 2.2). 
.  
Figure 2.2 – Conceptual Framework for Capacity Development  
Source: Bolger (2000)  
The conceptual framework of capacity development as shown in Figure 2.2 illustrates the 
different actors and levels involved in the capacity development process. At the highest level, 
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‘Enabling environment’ represent the broad condition where the capacity development 
process is being implemented. At the sector/ network level, the coherent sector (and cross 
sector) policies, strategies, programming frameworks, and effective coordination are 
considered as the key aspects of the capacity development. The organisational level, on the 
other hand, focuses on the organisational structures, processes, resources and management 
issues. It is also argued that the performance of an organisation is affected by the availability, 
effective use and motivations of individuals as the final and the lowest element of the capacity 
development framework (Bolger, 2000).  
As the above discussion has provided an understanding of the concept of capacity building, the 
following section elaborates the challenges in delivering the capacity building programs in the 
post-disaster reconstruction context.  
2.2.5.3 Challenges in delivering capacity building programs in post-disaster reconstruction 
Bolger (2000) argues that the increased interest in capacity development resulted from the 
inadequate attention to the long-term ‘capacity’ issues in the provision of development 
assistance, which eventually led to the limited sustainable impact in priority areas. On the other 
hand, Davos (1998) argues that the improvement in capacity has been undermined by a range 
of procedural concerns related to limited representation, conflicting value judgements and an 
overemphasis on the output of decision-making.  
With regards to the involvement of the local people in the capacity building activities in a post-
disaster context, Kenny (2007b) highlights five major reasons for the exclusion of the locals, 
based on their study in the tsunami reconstruction in Aceh, Indonesia. The first reason related 
to the urgency for a quick action and the scale of destruction. The second reason is due to the 
curtailed freedom to work with the locals by the government and military surveillance. This is 
particularly addressed to the situation in Aceh, as a conflict area. The third reason owing to the 
sheer complexity of the reconstruction, which is affected by the pre-disaster level of 
government authority and exercise of power as well as by the destruction of official records. 
Furthermore, she claims that the established paradigm of Eurocentric notions, which separates 
the worlds into ‘south’ and ‘north’ or ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ regions has been the 
fourth reason to the exclusion of the locals. She argues that this perception has led to viewing 
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externally generated building of the Western capitalist system, including its enterprise, 
governance, and democracy system as a ‘natural’ development implementation model, which 
often result in neglecting the ability or the necessity of local people to organise themselves 
independently. The fifth explanation is regarding the marketization or commercialisation of 
disaster aid programmes. The massive market and funds involved in post-disaster 
reconstruction turn foreign companies and consultant to look at disaster as an opportunity to 
develop themselves by obtaining a lucrative contract.  
This section has provided in-depth discussion on the issues of capacity and capacity building, 
covering the general concept of the capacity and the challenges in delivering capacity building 
programs in the post-disaster reconstruction. Furthermore, as this study is focused on the 
maintenance of the post-disaster road infrastructure assets, the next section will accordingly 
provide a discussion on the issues of road infrastructure reconstruction in the post-disaster 
context, commencing with the importance of road infrastructure. 
2.3 Reconstruction of road infrastructure in the post-disaster context  
2.3.1 The importance of road infrastructure 
Many studies have shown that improvement in the road transport infrastructure may provide 
positive impacts to the community in various ways. Crafts (2009) suggests that increased 
market agglomeration, productivity and labour supply resulting from reduced transport cost 
may create economic development opportunities for the community. Accordingly, 
improvement of the road networks, in particular, may provide positive impacts to the 
community due to better trade, communication and economic and social growth as well as 
increased international competitiveness (Anapolsky, 2002). It appears that the speed, flexibility 
and accessibility of the road transport in reaching virtually all points (Beilock et al., 2002) and 
in connecting other transport systems (Anapolsky, 2002) remains the important and distinct 
characteristics of the road networks compared with other means of transport. A study by 
Cheesman (1993) in Malawi demonstrates how increased accessibility and speed resulting from 
improved road infrastructure helped farmers move their crops efficiently to the storage and 
reduce their post-harvest crop losses. Another study by Bryan et al. (1997) exhibits how the 
construction of the A55 road network in North Wales, UK, resulted in the better access to the 
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local suppliers and the operational cost savings. In addition, at the construction phase, the A55 
project was also estimated to have created more than 4,200 job opportunities with an annual 
income of more than £54 million. 
Within the disaster context, a functioning road infrastructure plays an important role at all 
three stages of the disaster cycle; pre-disaster, disaster, and post-disaster. In the pre-disaster 
stage, which is the prevention and mitigation phase, well-planned road infrastructure may help 
avoid or minimise the impact of the disaster due to the application of preventive and adaptive 
design. Construction of road infrastructure that can withstand and cope with future disasters 
will help ensure the development sustainability and help prevent unnecessary losses resulting 
from the destroyed and non-functional facilities.  
In the post-disaster emergency and reconstruction period, road infrastructure plays a crucial 
role. Grünewald et al. (2010) suggests that transport disruption into and out of the disaster 
affected area is a vital constraint to the provision of an efficient response to the emergency and 
post-disaster reconstruction activity in Haiti. Not only can a functioning road network save lives 
through enabling access for evacuations, it also enables the speedy distribution of aid into the 
affected areas. Similarly, in the reconstruction of Aceh, the collapsed road sections and bridges 
forced the distribution of donations and reconstruction materials to the isolated areas by the 
means of air and water transports, which resulted in both lengthy delivery and high operational 
cost. A similar case was also experienced in the disaster response in Mentawai, West Sumatra 
(Dharmastuti, 2010). Additionally, in the long-term post-disaster reconstruction stage, the 
functionality and serviceability of transport infrastructure have a great impact on the overall 
recovery process. For instance, Chang et al. (2011) argue that the poor transport infrastructure 
in Aceh has been among the factors that caused an increase in the transportation costs and 
construction lead-time; which resulted in the higher construction costs and project delays.  
2.3.2 The impacts of disasters to the infrastructure 
The scale of damages and losses in major earthquakes is in many cases overwhelming. Not only 
do earthquakes cost lives, but they also destroy buildings and infrastructure. For instance, the 
Japan earthquake and tsunami in March 2011 was recorded as the most expensive disaster in 
terms of economic losses (more details in the Table 2.2).  
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As shown in the table, the World Bank (2012) indicates that the losses and damages caused by 
the earthquake reached up to $210 billion, with around 17,500 people died  Out of the total 
losses and damages, the social infrastructure sector suffered as much as $27 billion.  
In the developing world, one of the biggest disasters in terms of losses and damages, as well as 
casualties was the Indian Ocean 2004 tsunami. With regard to the 2004 and 2005 earthquake 
and tsunami in Aceh and Nias, Bappenas (2005) describes that the infrastructure sector 
suffered almost 20% of the total estimated losses and damages. More details of the total losses 
and damages are presented in Table 2.3. The table shows that the overall losses and damages 
suffered by the infrastructure sector were more than US$ 876 million. The road infrastructure 
accounted for 35% of the total amount  (Bappenas, 2005) and more than 2,600 km of road 
networks were destroyed (Sihombing, 2009). In addition, the tsunami reconstruction blueprint 
denotes that the needs for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the road infrastructure in 
Aceh and Nias were more than Rp 6 trillion (Bappenas, 2005).  
Table 2.2 – Losses and damages of japan earthquake and tsunami  
Types  Losses and Damages 
Casualties 
as of August 8, 2012 
 Dead  17,500 
 Missing  2,848 
 Injured  6,109 
Building damage 
as of August 8, 2012 
 Total collapse  129,316 
 Half collapse  263,845 
 Partial damage  725,760 
Evacuees  Maximum (March 14, 
2011) 
470,000 
 Current (August 2, 2011) 343,334 
Estimated economic 
damage  
Buildings  $129 billion 
Public utilities  $16 billion 
Social infrastructure  $27 billion 
Other (agriculture, forests, 
fisheries)  
$37 billion 
Debris  31.2m tons (July 2012) 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
Since the reconstruction of disaster affected areas is generally implemented based on the build 
back better principle, which will try to rebuild the affected areas beyond their original 
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condition, the amount of funds for reconstruction are generally larger than what were actually 
destroyed. 
Table 2.3 – Damage and loss Aceh and Nias earthquake 2005 (US$ Million) 
 Total Impact  Property 
 Damage Losses Total Private Public 
Social Sectors 1674.9 65.8 1740.7 1440.6 300.1 
Housing  1398.3 38.8 1437.1 1408.4 28.7 
Education  110.8 17.6 128.4 9 119.4 
Health  82.5 9.4 91.9 23.2 68.6 
Culture and religion  83.4  83.4  83.4 
Infrastructure  636 240.8 876.8 325.9 550.8 
Transport 390.5 145.4 535.9 165.8 370.1 
Communications 18.9 2.9 21.8 8.6 13.2 
Energy 67.8 0.1 67.9 1.1 66.9 
Water and Sanitation 26.6 3.2 29.8 18.3 11.4 
Flood control, irrigation and 
sea protection works  
132.1 89.1 221.2 132.1 89.1 
Productive Sectors  351.9 830.2 1182.1 1132 50.1 
Agriculture and Livestock  83.9 140.9 224.8 194.7 29.9 
Fisheries  101.5 409.4 510.9 508.5 2.5 
Enterprises  166.6 280 446.6 428.9 17.7 
Cross sector 257.6 394.4 652 562.9 89.1 
Environment 154.5 394.4 548.9 548.9  
Governance and 
administration 
89.1  89.1  89.1 
Bank and Finance  14  14 14  
Total Impact  2920.4 1531.2 4451.6 3461.4 990.1 
 
Source: Bappenas (2005)  
The relationship between fund availability and the scope of post-disaster reconstruction has 
been discussed in section 2.2.3.2. Furthermore, the following section will cover the issue of 
road infrastructure planning and development process.  
2.3.3 Road infrastructure planning and development process 
Similar to other construction projects, the construction of road infrastructure also follows a 
series of steps and planning stages prior to the construction, operation, and ultimately the 
maintenance cycle. In more detail, the U.S. Federal Highway Administration describes in the 
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Project Development and Design Manual (FHA, 2008) the various aspects and activities that a 
road development project needs to put into account. The manual includes planning and 
programming, environmental stewardship, conceptual studies and preliminary design, 
surveying and mapping, geotechnical, hydrology and hydraulic assessment, safety and traffic 
design, highway design, structural design, pavement, right of way and utilities, and design 
feedback. Furthermore, a more generic process of road infrastructure planning and 
development can be seen as illustrated by the Finnish Transport Agency - FTA. The FTA divides 
the process of road planning and development into four phases; feasibility study, preliminary 
engineering planning, final engineering planning and construction planning (FTA, 2010). Once 
the construction is completed and the road is operational, the development phase is followed 
by the maintenance and upkeep activities to preserve the road to a certain level. More details 
of the process are presented in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3 – Road Planning and Development Process  
Source: FTA (2010) 
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The steps and processes of the road infrastructure planning and development as illustrated in 
Figure 2.3 cover the various aspects and requirements to justify the decision to build as well as 
the amount of investments made for a road infrastructure project.  
In addition to the vertical relationship between the steps in the planning process, there are also 
horizontal relationship between road agencies and other stakeholders. For instance, the 
feasibility studies may include the environmental, social and economic feasibility. Accordingly, 
the planning process will need to include and involve various agencies such as the planning 
agencies, environmental bodies, and the finance agencies to assess the impact of the road 
project, as well as the benefit that it offers. In addition to the above feasibility studies, 
particularly aimed at protecting the indigenous people, (World Bank, 2009b) requires that 
project proposal should include an Indigenous People Plan, which identifies the impacts of the 
interventions to the indigenous people and areas. Such requirements are made to ensure that 
the potential negative impacts on the people are kept minimum.  
Even though the process and steps are indeed necessary, the whole planning cycle may not be 
applicable in a post-disaster and emergency situation. The high pressure and needs to 
accelerate the reconstruction process may not allow for complete and diverse feasibility studies 
to be undertaken prior to commencing a road reconstruction project, as such a process will 
normally take a long time. Moreover, the high level of uncertainties and changes in the 
geographical condition also hinders the preparation of a final engineering design (Sihombing, 
2009). 
Having described the general overviews of the road infrastructure planning and development 
process, the following section elaborates major concerns commonly experienced in road 
infrastructure projects. 
2.3.4 Concerns in Road Infrastructure Projects 
The level of success of a project is often reflected in three performance indicators: time, cost 
and quality. This means that a successful project is completed within the specified project 
period, within the allocated budget, and to the intended quality. However, achieving all success 
factors in a road construction project is not a straightforward effort. Often, at least one of the 
factors would be compromised to achieve the remaining performance indicators. When the 
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final quality is non-negotiable, the time and cost components are compromised and occur in 
the form of delays and project cost escalation. Similarly, when time is strictly constrained, the 
quality and cost of the project may suffer.  
Additionally, as an industry, construction is argued to have a higher degree of risk compared 
with other industries due to the many unknown, unexpected, undesirable and unpredictable 
factors that exist in every construction project (Kim and Bajaj, 2000). Accordingly, delays and 
the resulting time and cost overrun are universal phenomena in the construction industry 
(Ahmed et al., 2002) and road construction projects are no exception (Kaliba et al., 2009). These 
problems are more evident in the traditional or the adversarial type of contracts in which the 
contract is awarded to the lowest bidder (Adnan et al., 2009).  
2.3.4.1 Risk management in road projects 
Risk is generally defined as the combination of probability of occurrence and the resulting 
consequences. Even though risks are commonly regarded as a negative matter and may occur 
in every project, risks can actually be managed, and the resulting consequences may also 
provide opportunities. Mills (2001 cited in Perera et al., 2009) argues that risks affect the 
productivity, performance, quality, and cost of the project. Therefore, the capacity of the 
parties involved in a project in managing the risks would consequently determine the success 
of a construction project (Perera et al., 2009).  
Within the context of risk management, Andi (2006) argues that construction risk cannot be 
eliminated and can only be transferred or shared through contract clauses. He also suggests 
that the management of risk is greatly influenced by the uniqueness of the construction 
industry in a specific country. In his study, he reveals a list of 27 risks associated with the 
construction industry. The top ten risks include changes in work, inflation, defective design, 
unforeseen site conditions, financial failure of the owner, delayed payment on the contract, 
deficiencies in specifications and drawings, acts of god, poor performance of suppliers and 
subcontractor, as well as safety issues (Andi, 2006). 
With regard to road projects, Perera et al. (2009) identify 23 risk factors in road construction 
projects and classify them into four types of risk sources, namely; technical and contractual risk, 
economic, financial and political risk, managerial risk, and external and site condition risk. 
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Among other risks, defective design, late approvals, late handing over of the construction site, 
tentative drawings and unforeseen site conditions are highlighted and argued to have thwarted 
contractors on many occasions. More detail about the identified risks is presented in the 
following figure. 
 
Figure 2.4 – Risk classification framework  
Source: Perera et al. (2009) 
When a road project is completed, the following concern which needs to be addressed is 
regarding the maintenance. Despite their initial build quality, road pavements deteriorate over 
time. Even though road maintenance is recognised by most road management agencies as an 
important aspect of maximising the value of capital funds invested in the road sector, road 
maintenance is often undermined and neglected. To provide a deeper understanding of the 
various aspects of road maintenance, a profound discussion is presented in a dedicated section, 
section 2.4. However, prior to discussing the road maintenance issues, the following section 
will provide a discussion on the consequences of the challenges commonly experienced in a 
road project; delays and cost escalation. The discussion that follows will be regarding the main 
challenges and obstacles in post-disaster road reconstruction. 
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2.3.4.2 Delays in construction projects 
Project delays refer to a situation where the project implementation period exceeds the 
planned schedule. As far as time performance is concerned, delays in road construction 
projects are not uncommon. An extensive literature review on the causes of project delays has 
been conducted for the purpose of identifying the causes of delays commonly experienced in 
the construction project, with some particular references addressed to the road construction 
project. Since delays are commonly found in a construction project, various studies have been 
performed, and a number of methods have been developed to identify, avoid, respond, and 
settle disputes arising from delays. Odeh and Battaineh (2002) classified factors causing delays 
in construction projects into eight categories namely: client related, contractor related, 
consultant related, material, labour and equipment, contract, contractual relationship, and 
external factors. Similarly, Ahmed et al. (2002), simplify the causes of delays into two groups, 
internal and external. The internal causes refer to delays resulting from four parties involved in 
the project, namely contractor, owner, consultant, and designer. The external causes 
accordingly refer to delays resulting from parties external to the project, such as government, 
suppliers and weather. Based on the contractual operation, they further group delays into four 
divisions, namely non-excusable, excusable non-compensable, excusable compensable, and 
concurrent delays.  
Looking more into detail on the global experience and studies of the causes of delays in the 
construction projects, the causes are generally typical with some slight variations between 
projects and countries. With the particular focus addressed to the construction project in the 
Gaza strip, Adnan et al. (2009) suggest that the main external causes for delays have been 
strikes and border closure, material scarcity and delays in material delivery to the construction 
site. Additionally, Majid (2006) highlights top ten most important factors contributing to the 
causes of delays in the construction industry in Aceh, Indonesia, as the insufficient numbers of 
equipment, inaccurate time estimate, monthly payment difficulties, change orders, inaccurate 
cost estimate, poor site management and supervision, inadequate modern equipment, 
shortage of construction materials, incompetent project team, improper project planning and 
scheduling, and contractor’s financial difficulties. In Jordan, the most important causes of 
project delays include owner interference to the project, inadequate contractor experience, 
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financing and payments, labour productivity, slow decision making, improper planning, and 
subcontractors, (Odeh and Battaineh, 2002) as well as user changes, weather, site conditions, 
late deliveries, economic condition, and increase in quantity (Al-Momani, 2000). Similar causes 
of delays have also been found in America (Ahmed et al., 2002), Thailand (Ogunlana et al., 
1996), Lebanon (Toufic M and Wissam, 1993) and Malaysia (Wa'el et al., 2007). Specifically 
focused on the road projects, delayed payments, financial processes and difficulties on the part 
of contractors and clients, contract modification, economic problems, material procurement, 
changes in drawings, staffing problems, equipment unavailability, poor supervision, 
construction mistakes, poor coordination on site, changes in specifications and labour disputes 
and strikes were highlighted as the main causes of delays in the road project in Zambia (Kaliba 
et al., 2009).  
Whilst delays are commonly experienced in construction projects, Kaliba et al., (2009) argue 
that even though most road construction projects in Zambia experienced delays, most of the 
delays are actually controllable, except for some external factors such as weather and inflation. 
Albeit contract clauses generally express the risks of delays and the parties responsible for the 
consequences of delays are stipulated in the contract documents, the increasing size and 
complexity in nature of a project tend to complicate the conditions of contract leading to 
further disputes and litigations (Iyer et al., 2008). Ng et al. (2004) also argue that most delay 
analysis techniques are suitable to settle claims once the project is completed, with little helps 
for schedule compression or project acceleration to avoid delays of final project completion 
schedule.  
Furthermore, as Iyer et al. (2008) suggest, the consequences of delays and dispute settlements 
may lead to greater losses as delays may hamper project progress, contribute to cost and time 
overruns, give detrimental effect to the relationship between owner and contractor, as well as 
sending bad signals to the foreign investors. Additionally, Ng et al. (2004) add that whilst initial 
responses to schedule delays are commonly in the form of schedule recovery, i.e. accelerating 
the remaining activities by exploiting more resources or application of alternative construction 
methods; delays will inevitably involve extra cost. 
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Having provided a discussion with regard to delays in the road construction project, the 
following section will discuss another issue commonly experienced in a road construction 
project, the cost escalation.  
2.3.4.3 Cost escalation 
Similar to delays, cost escalation in road construction projects is also commonly experienced 
and in fact occurs in most road construction projects (Odeck, 2004, Kaliba et al., 2009). A 
number of reasons have been accused as the main causes of cost escalation. From the planning 
and design perspective, The General Accounting Office of the United States - GAO (1997) states 
that, among others, cost escalation stems from three major causes: poor preliminary estimates, 
modification of preliminary estimates to reflect more detailed plans and specification, and 
changes in the scope of work. In an attempt to better estimate the final construction cost, 
Hegazy and Ayed (1998) develop a model to estimate the road construction cost in Canada by 
considering project’s physical features, including the type of project, project scope, 
construction year, seasons, location, project duration, size, the availability of water, and soil 
condition. In addition, variations in bid prices submitted by contractors for a project may reflect 
the level of understanding, technology and methodology of bidding contractors which may 
affect their work performances and may accordingly affect the final project cost (Trefor, 2005). 
Furthermore, Kaliba et al., (2009) suggest that bad weather, scope changes, environmental 
protection and mitigation costs, schedule delay, strikes, technical challenges, inflation and local 
government pressures were the major causes of cost escalation in Zambia's road construction 
project. Other causes of cost escalation include reworks (Peter and Amrik, 2003) and design 
constructability (Trefor, 2005).  
However, in addition to these common issues, road reconstruction in a post-disaster context 
may have to deal with issues that are unique in context and scale to post disaster projects; 
particularly in developing countries. More discussion on road reconstruction in a post-disaster 
context is presented in the following section 2.3.5. 
2.3.5 Challenges and obstacles in post-disaster road reconstruction  
In addition to issues commonly experienced in the implementation of road infrastructure 
projects in a normal development context, post-disaster projects have to deal with a 
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significantly more challenging situation. Post-disaster projects struggle with a more complex, 
dynamic and chaotic environment compared to the construction projects in a normal situation 
(Alexander, 2004). Hayat and Amaratunga (2011) state that the challenges in the post-disaster 
road reconstruction include finalisation of project design, land acquisition, corruption, 
administrative issues resulting from the combined and conflicting regulations, and unfamiliarity 
with the local conditions. While most of these risks are commonly found in road projects, the 
scale of the risks is in many cases undermined. For instance, most post-disaster infrastructure 
projects in Aceh adopted a design review concept, which determines only the basic concept, 
tender documents and estimated project value. This method was adopted in order to 
accelerate the reconstruction process (Sihombing, 2009). However, the implementation of 
road reconstruction projects, however, would need a ‘final’ design to be in place before the 
acquisition process of the land required for the project could commence (Hayat and 
Amaratunga, 2011). The process became more complex since the local governments, as one of 
the key stakeholders in ensuring the project sustainability, were also victims of disasters. More 
detailed discussion of the obstacles and challenges will be presented in the following section.  
2.3.5.1 Relatively fewer aid agencies focused on the road reconstruction 
A number of studies suggested that road infrastructure has a very important role to play in 
enabling an efficient and speedy recovery of post-disaster reconstruction (Grünewald et al., 
2010, Chang et al., 2011). Regardless of the importance of the road infrastructure in the overall 
recovery process, however, very few aid agencies provide sufficient focus and funding 
allocation for the reconstruction of road infrastructure. The tsunami and earthquake in Aceh 
and Nias resulted in about 3,000 km of road networks impassable (BRR and International 
Partners, 2005). However, as Chang et al., (2011) argue, many aid agencies working in the post-
tsunami reconstruction in Aceh underestimated the need to rehabilitate the road connections 
by not including it in their initial recovery plans. They further argue that the limited access led 
to many aid agencies experiencing a significant increase in the price of material required for 
the reconstruction in the housing sector. Some of the factors that caused the increase were 
the high transport costs and the procurement lead-time. Consequently, many of the aid 
agencies had to pay for their negligence in the form of project delays and increased material 
price, which often required revision of project scope and schedule.  
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In Aceh and Nias post disaster recovery, USAID and Multi Donor Fund (MDF), through its 
implementing partner the World Bank, were among the few aid agencies that allocated 
significant focus and funding for the reconstruction of road infrastructure. Whilst USAID 
focused its project on the Banda Aceh – Meulaboh access road, MDF projects were focused on 
infrastructure in general whereby the reconstruction of transport infrastructure was the main 
parts of its IRFF project (IREP-IRFF, 2008). On a relatively smaller scale, other aid agencies 
working on the road reconstruction also include ADB and JICA. International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) also contributed to the road reconstruction through labour based road 
rehabilitation program, which is mainly focused on the rural road, aiming at increasing the local 
capacity for road construction, and providing income through wages (ILO, 2005).  
2.3.5.2 Finalisation of project design 
Considering the amount of time and resources needed, developing an ultimate plan and design 
prior to the tender of a disaster reconstruction project is very hard, if not impossible. Therefore, 
the BRR adopted a design review concept, which determines only the basic concept, tender 
documents, and the estimated project value - leaving the details of the design to the awarded 
party. This was meant to accelerate most of the reconstruction projects, and was claimed to be 
an effective method (Sihombing, 2009). However, road reconstruction required a different 
approach and obtaining a ‘final’ design is an urgent priority for the commencement of the land 
acquisition process. As a result, there were significant delays in the road reconstruction project 
in Aceh. Some of the main causes of the delay were that road design and implementation plan 
had not been approved by the time it was needed. Changes to the design and scope of projects 
are not uncommon in road construction projects, both in the developed and developing 
countries, which is considered to be one of the most significant causes of project delays (Kaliba 
et al., 2009). In Aceh, this issue, along with frequent changes to the project scope due to budget 
thresholds and disagreement over the final road alignment (USAID, 2006) were the additional 
causes of the project delays.  
Inevitably, variations and adjustments also occurred in the project implementation. However, 
for road reconstruction project co-funded between the GoI and the donor countries or 
organisations, there was little flexibility in the project total budget. One of the solutions to deal 
with the project cost escalation was to reduce the project’s scope of work. As an example, many 
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of the IRFF road reconstruction projects were long sections of roads that were broken down 
into smaller packages of road segments. Some packages included the construction of culverts 
or bridges. Accordingly, to maintain the targeted quality of the road structures within the initial 
budget ceiling, changes in the scope of works often resulted in the reduction in the road length 
or the omission of some project items. The latter option may include the deferral of bridge 
construction into future projects. Consequently, many of the projects resulted in some sections 
being left with ‘untouched’ parts at the end of the road segment while some others may have 
a newly built road with temporary wooden bridges in between. Additionally, from a 
socioeconomic perspective, road design will also need to demonstrate its sensitivity to the 
indigenous society and somehow accommodate their needs into the design. Whilst the actual 
and long-term benefits to the society have yet to be assessed further, there were concerns 
from the community living along the new “American–style thoroughfare” in the Aceh West 
Coast area regarding the speeding traffic and their demands to be able to sell snacks along the 
road as they used to do (Perlez, 2006). 
2.3.5.3 Land Acquisition issues  
The reconstruction of Aceh West Coast road network consisted mainly of three major tasks; 
construction of new road networks, rehabilitation and improvement of existing road networks, 
and debris clearance. In some areas, many of the previous road networks had been submerged 
by the tsunami, leaving road realignment as the only option to connect the existing road 
networks. As it was in most areas in Aceh, the community settlements were established along 
the main road networks, and many of these settlements had developed into small coastal cities, 
which were highly dependent on the existing road networks as the only sensible land access 
into and out of their cities. Many of these cities were also devastated by the tsunami and in 
many places left almost no survivors. This situation eventually led to another issue, the land 
acquisition. 
Indonesia recognises two types of land title, land that is formally registered with the National 
Land Agency (BPN) and land title acknowledged by the customary law (Tanah Adat). While the 
definition and application of this customary law vary between regions, the customary land title 
in Indonesia is, in general, a land parcel where the ownership of which is acknowledged by and 
attributed to a community, and it is therefore for the community to decide its use, transfers of 
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ownership and to solve the land-related disputes (IDLO, 2008). Indonesian law also regulates 
that once the customary land is registered and titled, the customary land right will then be 
annulled. However, the complexity and cost of land registration have been deterring the 
customary landowners to register their land with the Badan Pertanahan Nasional – BPN 
(National Land Agency) office. Additionally, as stated by Oxfam (2006) in its reports, only around 
25 % of land in the tsunami-affected areas of Aceh was statutory-titled land, i.e. registered 
under the government laws with paperwork held by the landowners and in the BPN offices. 
This means that the official documents did not entirely reflect the reality of land use on the 
ground. This has been another challenge that may be unique to Indonesia and hence the scale 
of difficulties resulted from such a peculiarity is also unique to the post-disaster reconstruction.  
Furthermore, land acquisition is a common constraint in a road construction project. Adversely 
affect the construction process, acquiring land for a project may become a lengthy process, 
particularly when the lands to be purchased are owned by the private sectors. In its audit 
report, USAID (2007) specifically addresses the issue of land acquisition as the highest 
determinant to completing the reconstruction project to the planned schedule and cost. 
Additionally, the Aceh west-coast road reconstruction projects had to deal with more than 
three thousand parcels of land, increasing the complex nature of the land acquisition process. 
In the tsunami affected area, not only had many of the road networks been washed away by 
the tsunami, hence requiring relocation of the road, but many landowners, personnel, and 
officers responsible for the land acquisition process were also victims of the event (BRR and 
International Partners, 2005, Fitzpatrick, 2006).  
Adding to the number of land parcels, disputes also occur in the community between those 
whose lands were affected by the project. Many of the tsunami survivors, or their relatives, 
moved or lived in other areas and were not readily available on sites for discussion about the 
land acquisition issues. Eventually, land issues emerged and caused disputes and delays in the 
land acquisition process during the project implementation. There were cases where the 
community or individuals blocked access to construction sites claiming that their land had not 
been paid for or that the price negotiation had not been finalised and mutually agreed. 
 
 48 
 
Table 2.4 – Damage to property rights and the land administration system  
Damages Quantification of Damage 
Loss of BPN staff 40 BPN staff in Aceh Province, 30% of staff in Kota Banda 
Aceh. 
Offices and equipment: 6 BPN land offices destroyed or severely damaged, including 
Banda Aceh District Office completely demolished. 
Destruction of office and survey equipment, including 
computers, to support urgent record recovery. 
Damage to Government land 
books (the official 
register of land): 
10% of land books lost. 
Remaining 90% needing urgent conservation and restoration 
work 
Destruction of official land 
documents 
80% of land documents lost, including almost all cadastral 
maps. 
Damage and disappearance 
of property rights 
evidence: 
The destruction of much of the physical evidence of property 
boundaries and witness evidence held in the minds of 
those who perished. 
300,000 land parcels 
affected 
170,000 urban and 130,000 rural including 549 parcels on 
Nias affected by the tsunami 
60,000 (40,000 urban and 20,000 rural) and 240,000 non-
registered Land Parcels: 
5% of titled land parcels were mortgaged, with mortgages 
registered by BPN 
Source: BRR and International Partners (2005)  
In the Aceh post-tsunami reconstruction process, whilst anticipated, the significant amount of 
time and other difficulties related to the land acquisition were underestimated (USAID, 2007). 
The poor capacity and resources of the local government to manage the land acquisition 
process in such an extensive scale did not progress as expected. The prolonged process 
eventually resulted in delays to a level where funding allocation for purchasing lands from the 
BRR was no longer usable. In turn, the district government needed to allocate funds from its 
own budget, a process that required parliamentary approval and lengthy bureaucracy. Project 
wise, this also resulted in more delays.  
Several alternatives were attempted by both the governments of Indonesia and USAID to speed 
up the land acquisition processes, including the establishment of a special committee by the 
local government and parliament as well as requesting the governor to exercise an “eminent 
domain procedure” (Perlez, 2006). Nonetheless, the latter option was rejected due to 
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additional grievances such as procedures might give to the community; an option that might 
have been taken in a normal development project.  
2.3.5.4 Administrative problems  
Since most of the road reconstruction project was funded or co-funded under the loan or grant 
agreement by donor countries, combined regulation and administration between the 
Government of Indonesia and the donor agencies were engaged in many parts of the project. 
The Indonesian Presidential Decree no 80/2003 stipulates that if any conflicting regulations 
occur between Indonesia’s and donor’s regulations in projects that are partially or fully funded 
under loan or grant schemes, then donor regulation would prevail. Accordingly, unfamiliarity 
with certain procedures and requirements inevitably occurred. In the initial phase of the USAID 
project, the implementation plan proposed by the Indonesian contractor, PT Wijaya Karya 
(WIKA), was not approved due to its non-compliance with the US requirement which caused 
delays to the project commencement (USAID, 2006). 
Nugroho (2008) explains that delays in the road reconstruction project also occurred due to 
administrative issues such as delays in proposal approval, establishment of Project 
Management Unit (PMU), consultant recruitment and mobilisation, and retendering. Such 
delays led to further deterioration of road infrastructure, which resulted in the spreading of 
news and complains in the newspaper, giving more pressures to those involved.  
Furthermore, from a different perspective, Brooks et al., (2010) highlight that the provision of 
aid usually comes with certain conditions that in some cases may lead to ‘collusive’ agreements, 
forcing the price level higher. The required condition may occur in the form of involvement of 
contractors or consultants from the donor countries, as a means of channelling donation funds 
back to the donor countries (Kenny, 2007b). This could be the case for the reconstruction of 
road infrastructure in Aceh, where most of the projects were funded or co-funded by donor 
countries. An example of such a high price difference could be seen in the reconstruction of 
Aceh West Coast road. WIKA was awarded a $12 million contract to reconstruct an 80 km long 
road section which tasks included (1) design and construct 20 km of new roads in four distinct 
segments and one bridge, (2) perform other road maintenance, repair and rehabilitation work, 
and (3) remove bridge debris. Conversely, Parson Global Service, a U.S. Architect-Engineer firm, 
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was awarded a $35 million contract to perform technical design reviews and supervise WIKA’s 
reconstruction activities (USAID, 2006). Even though such a contrast in contract value may be 
seen as ‘reasonable’ from a national and international level of experience perspective and 
capability, the necessity of awarding such a contract to an international company is 
questionable if the overall project performance is considerably poor.  
Additionally, delay in payment is known to be a major cause of project delays on a construction 
project. In their study, Kaliba et al., (2009) argue that delays in payment are the greatest cause 
of road project delays in Zambia. Delays in payment to the contractor, which may be caused by 
both project owner and contractor, add additional burdens to the contractors and to their 
financial cash flow, hindering their progress. This also appeared to be the case for the 
reconstruction of road infrastructure in Aceh. In most of the road construction projects, the 
local contractors and subcontractors employed in the project were also affected by the tsunami 
disaster. The involvement of the local contractors was inevitable as it was considered the key 
to achieving the reconstruction success and to ensuring the sustainability. However, very few 
contractors had the required qualifications. Moreover, prior to the tsunami, the development 
of Aceh in the broader context had not been progressing well as a result of the prolonged 
conflict (please refer to section 2.5.7 regarding the conflict in Aceh). This situation, in addition 
to the extensive number of projects to be delivered in the reconstruction process, increased 
the barriers that the local contractors had to overcome. Frequently, they had to rent equipment 
from other companies, which meant that the contractors became highly dependent on the 
project’s cash disbursement.  
2.3.5.5 Corruption Risks 
A number of studies have been conducted with regard to the issue of corruption in the 
humanitarian actions following a disaster. Ewins et al. (2006) identify corruption risks 
associated with humanitarian activities and mapped them according to the phases, activities 
and benefiting parties. The study concludes that corruption risks in humanitarian actions are 
affected by pre-event corruption and transparency levels, value of relief activities and the 
condition of the affected area. With a score of 2.8 on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
(where 10 being the least corrupt index), Transparency International (2010) ranks Indonesia as 
110th out of the 178 countries in its 2010 CPI.  
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Consequently, as the tsunami was one of the most deadly natural disasters recorded in history, 
taking place in a region which had suffered a prolonged conflict, the risk of corruption in the 
reconstruction of Aceh was expectedly high. In public procurement, corrupt practices may 
occur in the form of awarding contracts to the best briber instead of based on the best price-
quality value. Such practice may result in higher contract value or purchase of unnecessary 
items (Søreide, 2005), or fraud resulting from discrepancies between amounts paid to suppliers 
for goods and the quantity of goods delivered (Oxfam, cited in Schultz and Søreide, 2006). 
Furthermore, corrupt practices in the developing countries are often seen to be common and 
a fact of life which are part of the business game (Ibrahim, 1993). Additionally, it is a common 
practice in a construction project to subcontract parts or most of the project to a number of 
subcontractors which may also result in a higher risk of corruption. In such schemes, project 
owners or consultants have little influence and authority over the subcontractors as their 
performance will be mainly the responsibility of the general contractor. However, this also 
means that regardless of the vast experience of the general contractors or consultants, project 
performance may be highly dependent on the subcontractors’ capacities which in many cases 
are understandably and expectedly low. In 2006, the unfair and unreasonable subcontracting 
rates paid by the state-owned company PT Waskita Karya (WK) to its subcontractors was 
reported as the main cause of the project delay. This lead to the Turkish Red Crescent, as the 
project owner, cancelled 500 units out of the 1050 houses initially awarded to WK (Serambi 
Indonesia, 2006). The company was later added to the BRR’s contractor black list. It was found 
that WK subcontracted the house construction to various subcontractors with a significant 
difference in the unit price ranging from Rp 68 million to Rp 82 million. Consequently, 
subcontractors receiving the lower unit price ceased construction. While this case occurred in 
the housing reconstruction project, similar practices might also happen in the road 
reconstruction projects.  
2.3.5.6 Other challenges 
In addition to the aforementioned challenges and obstacles, Nugroho (2008) adds that the 
reconstruction of road infrastructure in Aceh and Nias had to deal with the limited availability 
of professional and skilled human resources, issues between the contractors and local partners, 
security, price increase, and difficulties in obtaining a bank loan due to the global financial crisis. 
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The lack of professionally skilled human resources available in Aceh resulted from various 
causes. On the one hand, the scale of reconstruction activities was so substantial that they 
required a significant number of skilled personnel. On the other hand, the required level and 
the number of human resources might not be available locally, which was either due to the fact 
that most locals were victims of disaster, or simply due to the low capacity of the locals. 
Furthermore, when the tsunami hit Aceh in 2004, Aceh was in the middle of a prolonged 
conflict between GAM and the Government of Indonesia - GoI. Hence, recruiting personnel 
from outside of Aceh was also a challenge due to the security issue. When it was possible, it 
would also need to provide much higher wages. Also, at the lower level, there seemed to be a 
resistance from the local work force towards bringing-in labour from outside Aceh (Sihombing, 
2009). Due to this reason, it is argued that while the security problem had been significantly 
abridged after the peace agreement between GAM and GoI in 2005, human resources 
remained a big challenge in the reconstruction of Aceh. 
Another issue was regarding the joint partnership between the contractors and the local 
partners. The partnership between them might occur in the form of joint-venture, as a 
contractor-supplier, or as the subcontractors for the project. In the first case, the national and 
local contractor collaborated to form a joint venture and pursue a project. Some of the 
problems resulted from such collaborations were recorded in details by Sihombing (2009) as 
the following. In one case, a national-local joint venture company submitted the most 
expensive bid, but were adamant about winning the project. The condition further turned into 
a rage when there seemed to be no chance of winning. In another case, Sihombing (2009) 
highlights a case where a national company lost a procurement tender due to the local 
partners’ lack of experience in the procurement of heavy vehicle equipment, and forcefully 
tried to justify their bid position. Accordingly, Sihombing (2009) suggests that in order to avoid 
threats from the bid participants who were eager to win, the procurement committee often 
had to work literally out of the public reach by moving to another city.  
The above sections have provided in-depth discussion surrounding the road reconstruction 
issues in a post-disaster reconstruction context. The topics of the importance of road 
infrastructure, the concerns in the road infrastructure projects, as well as the challenges and 
obstacles experienced in the post-disaster road reconstruction have also been discussed. 
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Accordingly, the following section is dedicated to discussing the road maintenance aspect 
which follows immediately after the completion of the road infrastructure and accordingly 
forms the bases of the research questions.  
2.4 Road maintenance 
Improved road infrastructure may offer significant benefits to the road users through the 
provision of better access, comfort, and lower vehicle operating cost (Burningham and 
Stankevich, 2005). However, to obtain the long-term impacts of the road improvement, well-
planned maintenance programs are required or otherwise the design-life may not be reached, 
and the investment may not yield the expected value. As expressed in the UNECA report (1987), 
the objectives of road maintenance are specified by the Zimbabwean road management agency 
as to preserve the capital investment, reduce vehicle operating costs, and ensure the safety of 
the road users. 
2.4.1 The need of road maintenance 
Road pavements deteriorate over time, and their structural strengths will gradually decrease 
to a level where maintenance intervention is required to restore their condition and extend 
their service life. The deteriorated pavements eventually affect the ride quality, safety, and 
increase the road user cost. Boamah (2010) summarises that road deterioration is primarily 
affected by the physical environment, traffic, material properties, road construction quality, 
design standards, and the age of the pavement. For a road network to be sustained over its 
designed life-cycle period, adequate maintenance must be allocated in accordance with its life-
cycle (Robinson et al., 1998). If road maintenance is neglected, a number of consequences will 
occur. Martinez (2001) highlights that the most important consequences of road deterioration 
are: 
 Exponential increase in vehicle operating cost and the resulting loss of efficiency in the 
road transportation system 
 Increase in investment cost due to the earlier need for road reconstruction 
 Increase in the number of accidents 
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Furthermore, from the financial aspect, poorly maintained road infrastructure deteriorates 
faster and the required remedies cost more than what it actually needs to maintain the road in 
the first place. A study of Harral and Faiz (1988) regarding the road maintenance in 85 countries 
concludes that as much as $45 billion worth of investment in the road infrastructure could have 
been saved by a provision of less than $12 billion of preventive maintenance. Another study 
confirms that the rehabilitation of a paved road after 15 years of lack of maintenance may cost 
as much as $200,000 per km, whilst the provision of regular maintenance for the 15-year period 
will only cost as much $60,000 per km (Heggie, 1996). Similarly, Brooks et al. (1989a) suggest 
that road construction that is properly maintained may be expected to last twice as long and is 
cheaper than the construction of a road to last twice as long without proper maintenance. 
Furthermore, poorly maintained road infrastructure may also increase road user costs. This 
cost particularly incurs due to the blocked access during the rainy season, reduced travel speed, 
and shortened vehicle parts life caused by potholes and accidents. It is also argued that each 
dollar ‘saved’ on the road maintenance may result in an increase to the vehicle operating cost 
by $2 to $3 (Heggie, 1996). Furthermore, as the road condition deteriorates and gets more 
dangerous to pass, transport service will be more infrequently available and unreliable, before 
they cease completely (Done, 2008).  
Poorly maintained road may increase the risk of accident to the road users. Potholes, cracks, 
corrugated and polished pavement, as well as the absence of road marks may cause accidents 
and result in injuries or deaths. Even though the well-maintained road may also increase the 
risk of accident due to the higher vehicle speed, for instance, accidents caused by a poorly 
maintained road may lead to legal claims from the victims. Atkinson (1997) summarises briefly 
that neglecting the road maintenance needs has consequently resulted in the liability claims 
from the road users as much as £600 million per year in the UK and US$ 400 million to US$ 850 
million in the USA in 1991. Additionally, Atkinson also suggests that the actual cost of liability 
claims is much higher when the legal and in-house costs were included. As the population is 
more aware of the possibility to obtain compensation for injuries caused by the neglected 
defects and as the legal and in-house charge increases, the overall costs of liability claims will 
also increase over time.  
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In Indonesia, the government has been struggling to provide adequate maintenance of its road 
networks. Each year, the government of Indonesia can only allocate around 60% of the Rp 27 
trillion (US$ 2.7 billion) required for the construction and the maintenance of the national road 
alone (antaramataram.com, 2010). The regional road networks are considerably poor, where 
less than 25% were in good condition and more than 50% were damaged (Table 2.10). 
Consequently, the poor road condition is predicted to cost road users as much as US$105 
million per day and accused as one of the causes of the low investment growth in Indonesia 
(DoT, 2005b). Therefore, in addition to the provision of adequate funding for the development 
of road infrastructure, sufficient financial resource allocation is also required for the 
maintenance activities. The allocation will need to consider its overall life-cycle period in order 
to ensure sustainability and to achieve the maximum benefit of the investment. 
Having presented the importance of the road maintenance, there is a necessity to understand 
the factors affecting the performance and the deterioration of the pavement. Accordingly, the 
following sections are dedicated to provide an overview of the factors affecting the 
performance and deterioration of pavement. 
2.4.2 Factors affecting the performance and deterioration of pavement 
Road pavements are generally designed to last for 20-40 years. There are a number of factors 
affecting the pavement performance which determines the pavement design life and the needs 
for maintenance. These factors can be considered as being “internal” and “external," relative 
to the road structure.  
2.4.2.1 Internal causes 
The internal causes are related to method and material properties, which contribute to the 
structural strengths of a pavement so that the road can achieve its designed life period and 
carrying capacity. These factors are considerably important and are reflected in the age of 
pavement and its deterioration time path (Harral and Faiz, 1988). The internal factors include 
construction quality, material standard, design specification and proper craftsmanship 
(Kendrick, 2004), and the age of pavement.  
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According to Harral and Faiz (1988), typically two-thirds of the pavement deterioration 
problems take place in the final third of the pavement design life. Within the first two-third of 
the period, also called as the grace period, road pavement may survive even without 
maintenance after which road maintenance needs may surge dramatically. This is probably why 
the allocation of road maintenance is often delayed until it is too late to rectify the level of 
damages which have occurred.  
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, one of the factors affecting the road performance, 
which determine the needs of the road maintenance is the structural design of the road 
pavement. Even though the structural strength of the road pavements is also affected by other 
factors such as work methods and supervision quality, it is argued that road construction 
designers frequently ignore the possibility to perform future maintenance and mainly focus on 
other issues such as investment cost, traffic safety, aesthetic appearance, regional 
development and environmental effects (Karim, 2011). Karim also concludes that the problems 
rooted to six main factors, namely insufficient consulting, insufficient knowledge, regulations 
and specifications without consideration of maintenance aspects, insufficient planning and 
design activities, inadequate organisation, and demands from other authorities. Accordingly, 
the decision on selecting and determining road pavement designs and types is considered to 
be an important factor to predict the future maintenance needs and to achieve the design-life.  
2.4.2.2 External causes  
In addition to the internal factors, the external factors include environmental factors (Boamah, 
2010), traffic loading (ACMA, 1976), and vehicle accidents. The environmental factors consist 
of the climatic condition such as rainfall, solar radiation, temperature and soil type and terrain 
condition, which affect the pavement performance. Intense sunlight and cold temperature may 
raise and lower pavement temperatures, leading to the thermal movement in the form of 
expansion and contraction of the pavement materials. This condition may lead to the pavement 
surface becoming fatigued and cause cracking to occur. Cracking on the surface may cause 
water ingress and gradual loss of fine and coarse aggregate and eventually affect the sub-grade 
stability. Additionally, swelling and shrinkage of the subgrade due to moisture movement may 
also cause cracking and heaving.  
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Traffic loading is the main external factor affecting the performance of a pavement. Pavement 
design should accommodate the estimated wheel or axle load, tyre pressure, the configuration 
of vehicle axles, and the number of axle loads to be carried during the design life. (ACMA, 1976). 
Additionally, horizontal forces on the pavement surface caused by vehicle breaking and turning 
wheels may cause slippage cracking to the pavement. This normally occurs in areas where the 
bond between the surface and base course is poor. Another factor that is not commonly 
mentioned as a factor detrimental to pavement performance is vehicle accidents. When 
vehicles collide in an accident, the resulting impact may cause damage to the road surface and 
nearby facilities such as guard rail and kerbs.  
Harral and Faiz (1988) summarise the deterioration cycle of road infrastructure in a chart as 
shown in the following figure  
 
The Road Deterioration Cycle
DETERMINANTS OF DETERIORATION 
  Topography and subgrade soil 
  Material and thickness of pavement layers 
  Drainage (surface and internal) 
  Quality of construction and maintenance 
  Environment (rain, frost, solar radiation) 
  Traffic (volume, axle loads, and configuration) 
  Road condition
FORMS OF DETERIORATION 
Paved roads Unpaved roads 
  Potholes   Potholes 
  Ruts   Ruts 
  Cracks   Corrugations 
  Broken edges   Erosion 
  Shoulder wear and deformation   Gravel loss  
Roughness
MAINTENANCE 
  Drainage clearing and vegetation control 
  Patching of cracks and potholes 
  Shoulder repairs 
  Reseals/surface treatment 
  Pavement strengthening/rehabilitation 
  Reconstruction (deferred maintenance)
VEHICLE OPERATING COST 
  Speed   Spare parts 
  Fuel consumption   Maintenance labor 
  Tire wear   Vehicle utilization and age
Loss of 
Structural Strength
 
Figure 2.5 – The Road deterioration Cycle  
Source:  Harral and Faiz (1988) 
As the causes of road deterioration have been elaborated in the above sections, the following 
section will discuss the various approaches that can be adopted in providing road maintenance. 
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2.4.3 Maintenance intervention 
Based on the time period and frequency of maintenance works, Robinson et al. (1998) suggest 
that two approaches can be adopted; scheduled and condition-responsive. In the scheduled 
approach, maintenance works are carried out regularly based on the schedule which has been 
planned previously. This approach is appropriate when the deterioration rate is stable and 
maintenance work is predictable. Vegetation control and culvert cleaning are examples of 
maintenance activities that may use this approach. The other approach is condition-responsive. 
In the condition-responsive approach, intervention is triggered by the pavement condition, 
hence the name. A number of performance criteria are usually determined as the minimum 
requirement level. When the condition drops below the minimum level, intervention is 
performed to restore the pavement condition to the required level. The common performance 
criteria are roughness, surface distress, structural capacity, and pavement texture and friction 
(Robinson et al., 1998). Other maintenance activities that are performed based on the 
condition-responsive approach include emergency and winter maintenance.  
Whilst maintenance interventions can be carried out based on the two approaches, the 
maintenance activities are generally classified into three categories; routine maintenance, 
periodic maintenance and rehabilitation. Routine maintenance activities include all works that 
occur regularly and frequently, and are carried out on an annual or monthly basis. These include 
vegetation control, drainage control, pothole filling and crack sealing. Periodic maintenance 
includes the activities which are required less frequently compared to the routine maintenance 
activities. An example of periodic maintenance activity is resealing the pavement which takes 
place every five years.  
Even though routine maintenance activities are actually ‘periodic’ in terms of time scale and 
periodic maintenance is also ‘routine’ in terms of regularity of occurrence, the terms are given 
to distinguish the frequency of the required activity. Furthermore, even though routine and 
periodic maintenance activities are carried out regularly, pavements will still wear and 
deteriorates to a level where rehabilitation is required. Therefore, rehabilitation is performed 
to restore pavements to their initial condition. An example of rehabilitation is the pavement 
overlay, which takes place approximately every 10 to 15 years, depending on the design life 
and maintenance level. Figure 2.6 illustrates the various activities involved in road works, while 
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the maintenance activities included in each of the maintenance categories are presented in 
Table 2.5.  
Table 2.5 – Maintenance Activities  
Maintenance categories Maintenance Activities 
Routine Maintenance Vegetation control 
Drainage and culvert control 
Pothole fixing 
Crack sealing 
Etc. 
Periodic Maintenance Resealing 
Rehabilitation Overlaying 
Source: Bina Marga (1995) 
Road works
Major works
Light works
New construction
Upgrade
Rehabilitation
Maintenance
Supporting works
Emergency
Periodic 
maintenance
Routine 
maintenance
 
Figure 2.6 – Road works activities  
Source: Bina Marga (1990) 
Once the maintenance needs and the required activities are identified and planned, the 
following step concerns the party who is expected to actually implement the maintenance 
tasks. There are various ways in doing so, some of which will be discussed in the following 
section regarding the contracting methods. 
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2.4.4 Contracting methods in road maintenance 
In performing the road maintenance activities, there are a number of methods that road 
authorities can adopt. The first option is to utilise the in-house personnel. This means that the 
maintenance activities are carried out by its own personnel. The other option is to contract 
some or all maintenance activities to the contractors. When a contracting-out option is 
selected, the in-house staff may act as supervisors for the project. Additionally, when 
contracting-out is selected as the method for performing the maintenance activities, road 
authorities can choose between the two types of contracting; method based and performance-
based contract.  
2.4.4.1 Method-based contract 
In the method-based contracting, the specifications of materials, working methods, and the 
activities expected from the contractors are described in the contract. Contractors are 
responsible for meeting the specified work items and are therefore assessed and paid based 
on their ability to meet the required works. For instance, a method based contract will specify 
a number of potholes or length of road section where potholes need to be repaired. It will also 
specify materials and methods that the contractor needs to follow. The contractor may be paid 
based on unit price; e.g., the area of potholes repaired, or based on a lump sum amount - an 
agreed sum of money for a set of works. This is why the method-based contract is also known 
as a unit price or lump-sum contract.  
In the method-based contracting, the contract also specifies a list of works and the time scale 
expected from the contractor to complete the works. The contractor may or may not receive 
incentives from the project owner (i.e., road authorities) for completing early, but normally, 
the contractors will be fined for their late completion or delays.  
2.4.4.2 Performance-based contract 
A Performance-based contract takes the opposite approach. Instead of specifying what 
contractors need to do, performance-based contracts list the minimum performance expected 
to be provided by the contractors. In a performance-based contract, the contractors are 
required to deliver a ‘product’ and therefore, the methods of works and material selection are 
generally decided by the contractor.  
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By adopting the performance-based contracts, road authorities transfer the risk associated 
with the road maintenance to the contractors. Accordingly, contractors who accept the risks 
also have the opportunity to gain more profit by performing a more effective and efficient 
design, process, technology or management (Zietlow, 2004). He also adds that performance-
based contracts give the advantages of reduced maintenance cost through the application of 
more effective and efficient technologies and work procedures, provide transparency to road 
users, road administration and the contractors, improved control and enforcement of quality 
standards and improved overall road conditions.  
Furthermore, Zietlow (2004) suggests that adopting performance-based contracts for road 
maintenance may result in cost reductions of between 10%-20% compared with the traditional 
method-based contract.  
 
Figure 2.7 – Distribution of risks to road agencies and contractors using  
different forms of performing road maintenance services  
Source: Zietlow (2004)  
Figure 2.7 shows that by using in-house staff, road maintenance risks are borne solely by the 
road agencies. When outsourcing (method-based contracting) is adopted, some of the risks are 
transferred to the contractors. Furthermore, in performance-based contracts, the longer the 
contract term, the more the risks are transferred to the contractors. When the long-term road 
concession method is used, the risk is transferred to and solely borne by the contractor.  
2.4.5 Common issues in the road maintenance  
In general, the main problems in maintaining the road infrastructure are rooted in the 
institutional and financial issues, with some references to the technical, organisational, and 
human-resource issues (Heggie, 1994). More structurally, Robinson et al. (1998) classify factors 
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affecting the performance of the road management agency into two broad categories, internal 
and external, relative to the road management agency.  
The internal factors are those within the control of the agency. On the other hand, the external 
factors are accordingly issues, which are out of the direct control of the road administration 
agency. These may include the physical environment, legal and regulatory framework, the 
socio-cultural background of the country, political situation, macro economy and the national 
resource availability, overall government employment policies, and relationship with other 
institutions. More details of these factors are presented in Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8 – Road Management Issues  
Source: Robinson et al. (1998) 
Even though these affecting factors are divided into different categories, they are not mutually 
exclusive and are in fact related to each other. For instance, the availability and use of data may 
be affected by the availability and sufficiency of fund allocation, which could be caused by the 
political interference and the macro-economic condition.  
As further discussed below, a number of studies have identified common issues related to the 
road maintenance. These common issues include fund competition, division of responsibilities 
between central and regional government, politicised priorities, lack of customer focus, 
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perverse monetary incentives, inefficient work methods and inflexible term and conditions of 
the civil service (Heggie, 2003). Despite the rapidly deteriorating road infrastructure due to the 
maintenance neglect, developing countries tend to expand their road infrastructure without 
giving adequate priority to maintaining the existing networks (UNECA, 1987). As Klockow and 
Hofer (1991) suggest, road maintenance neglect may lead to increased vehicle cost, severe 
damages requiring re-construction of road, unbearable financial needs, and accelerated 
deterioration due to the heavier and more frequent traffic.  
Martinez (2001) also examines the experience of road maintenance in the sub-Saharan African 
countries and concluded that the road deterioration problems are rooted to the following 
problems. 
 The financial constraint, leads to road maintenance financing difficulty 
 Traffic growth and axle overload exceed forecasts 
 Technical constraint affects road maintenance quality 
 Highway administration lacked technical and management capability 
 ODA donors failed to supervise their projects and to coordinate their actions 
The next sections will provide a more detailed discussion of the internal and the external factors 
affecting the road maintenance performance.  
2.4.5.1 Internal Factors 
As previously described, the internal factors refer to issues which are within the control of the 
road management agency. The internal factors can be categorised into two groups, those which 
are institutional and those which are rather technical.  
2.4.5.1.1 Institutional factors 
Following the Robinson et al. (1998) approach of classifying the road maintenance issues, the 
institutional factors include financial and resources management, organisational management 
and human resources. The following section will elaborate these issues in more detail.  
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2.4.5.1.1.1 Financial 
From the financial aspect, financial management capacity and funds sufficiency are often 
referred to as the main sources of challenges in the road maintenance, particularly in the 
developing countries. As Talvitie (2000) summarises, there are five sets of costs need to be 
considered by the road administration namely the construction cost, rehabilitation and periodic 
maintenance cost, routine maintenance and system operation cost, road user costs, and 
external cost to society. The latter include pollution, development, and production benefits. 
The road management agency will therefore need to calculate the most effective expenditure 
allocation in order to achieve the optimum total road cost (refer to Figure 2.9 below). 
 
Figure 2.9 – Optimization of the road condition and road budget  
Source: Talvitie (2000) 
The above figure shows the relationship between the road condition and the cost or budget 
allocation for the maintenance. As road condition gets better, the administration cost increases 
and the road user cost decreases. The optimum and efficient expenditure will be achieved 
where the balance between the two meets. This is where the road administration expenses do 
not exceed the savings made in the road user cost. The dotted lines show the changes in road 
condition and expenditure resulting from the improvement in the road administration 
productivity.  
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According to ADB (2003), there are a number of reasons behind the poor allocation of funds 
for the road maintenance and these reasons include the political, cultural, and social 
background. Whilst these problems are common in most countries, developing countries face 
additional problems, such as low income per head, acute shortage of revenue, weak 
governance, lack of qualified local consultants and contractors, and weak legislation (Heggie, 
2003). Furthermore, ADB (2003) argues that the problems with the road maintenance are 
typically due to the insufficient allocation for the maintenance needs and that eventually much 
less is actually spent. The ADB also suggests that while on the one hand fund allocation is 
insufficient, the allocated fund is also inefficiently used, typically shown by the large workforce 
with low productivity, hence most allocations are spent for wages.  
With regards to the financial support, road maintenance commonly receives low priority, 
particularly when it needs to compete with other sectors such as the education and health 
sectors. The global experience proves that when the budget allocation for the road 
maintenance has to compete with other sectors, the road maintenance normally loses in 
priority, despite the suggestion that adequate maintenance should have the highest priority on 
the resource utilisation (UNECA, 1987). It is argued that such a condition occurs since the 
benefits of maintaining roads have not been widely understood by the decision-makers and the 
consequence of inadequate maintenance is not always immediately obvious (Potter, 1997). In 
other words, it is hard to convince the politician to secure funding and to allocate funds to 
repair roads that do not seem to be broken (ADB, 2003), regardless the fact that billions of the 
capital investment made in the road sectors will be eroded due to maintenance neglect, as 
experienced in the Sub-Saharan Africa (Heggie, 1994).  
Accordingly, to obtain sufficient and sustainable financial resources required to fund the road 
maintenance needs, there are several alternative resources that can be exercised, which 
include taxation, toll roads, external financing assistance, earmarking revenues, and the 
establishment of road funds (UNECA, 1987). However, the global experience shows that the 
difficulties in providing sufficient funds for the road maintenance have been addressed 
primarily by earmarking certain related taxes and charges into a dedicated account, so-called 
road funds. Road fund is a mechanism to collect road-user charges directly from the vehicle 
users. The main principle of road fund mechanism is to treat road infrastructure networks as a 
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business and to provide the market on a fee-for-service basis (Heggie, 1999). The establishment 
of the road fund scheme was initiated by the fact that the developing and transition countries 
are struggling to fund their road maintenance needs since the road sector needs outgrown the 
government’s tax revenues. Looking at how big the scale of the road infrastructure, it is 
accordingly argued that road assets need to be managed in a business-like approach, where 
users need to pay for using the road networks (Heggie and Vickers 1998). Accordingly, those 
who use the roads are charged for the services they get from the road networks. The charges 
are typically collected as a proportion of the fuel-levy and vehicle licences, and the funds are 
managed by a dedicated body.  
Currently, the methods of financing the road maintenance needs through the road fund 
scheme has developed into the second model, commonly addressed as the ‘second generation’ 
road fund. The ‘first generation’ road fund was established in 1988 when the World Bank 
launched a Road Management Initiative (Potter, 1997). This first generation of road funds 
comprised of earmarking revenues from the road users into the national account and is 
administered by the government officials. However, this mechanism was not successful and 
some even failed completely (ADB, 2003). ADB further argues that the failure of the first-
generation road fund mechanism rooted to three issues. First, as the revenue is collected and 
administered by the government officials in the national account, it is vulnerable from being 
raided and used for other purposes. Second, the required funds may not be released timely 
and sufficiently, causing a further backlog in the maintenance. Third, the funds collected under 
the road funds user charge mechanism may not entirely be deposited in the road fund agency, 
an example of which is when the state-owned petroleum company retaining revenues intended 
for road funds during the economic recession.  
This condition led to the development of ‘second generation’ road fund. The second generation 
road fund requires funds to be managed by a dedicated and independent body, generally 
focused only on the maintenance of road infrastructure. The second generation road fund 
appears to be more successful. It involves the collection of road user charges and 
administration by an independent board consisting of the public and the private sectors. The 
aim of the second generation road funds remains in ensuring that the funds are spent 
effectively and efficiently, giving the road users the best value for money.  
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Another possible approach is through the cost-sharing mechanism. In such mechanism, 
financial support from the road fund administration is made available on a cost-sharing or fund-
matching basis. However, this approach seems to be difficult to implement where the local 
government lacks the resources to contribute from their own local revenue.  
In the case of Indonesia, in order to improve the road condition and help ensure the 
sustainability of the road infrastructure, the Indonesian government has initiated the 
establishment of a road fund agency as stipulated in Law no 22/2009. However, the road fund 
agency has not been functioning and its supporting mechanism and regulations have not been 
clearly defined. Until the road fund agency starts functioning, it seems that the road 
maintenance will continue relying on fund sourced from the general expenditure and the 
normal budgetary system.  
Whilst most countries are leaning towards accepting the road fund scheme as an effective 
means to providing sustainable financial resources to the road maintenance needs, Potter 
(1997) underlines that a dedicated road fund scheme is only a means to delivering efficient 
road maintenance services. Moreover, even though the road fund model seems to be a 
sustainable and viable resource of financial needs for the road maintenance, the main concern 
lies in carefully setting up the fund collection and distribution method to reduce the possibility 
of fund being diverted away from the local road maintenance (Robinson and Stiedl, 2003). As 
the financial aspect has been discussed, the next section presents the institutional capacity.  
2.4.5.1.1.2 Institutional capacity 
With regards to the core problems of the road maintenance issues, the report of UNECA (1987) 
acclaims that the main cause of road deterioration problems related to the institutional 
capacity. In supporting the argument, Robinson (2006) suggests that even though most 
developing countries insufficiently finance their road maintenance needs, lack of financial 
resources is not the only causes of the road management agencies’ poor performance. In most 
cases, there is also a need to strengthen and improve the organisational management and the 
regulatory arrangement.  
From the organisational and management aspect, learning from the experience of the Sub-
Saharan African countries, the institutional problems in the road maintenance rooted to the 
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poor management and the lack of enabling environment within the road agency, which 
undermined the need to provide incentives and to increase staff motivation (Heggie, 1994). 
More specifically, Heggie (1994) further argues that the problems include unclear managerial 
responsibility, poor terms and condition for staff, poor leadership, little managerial autonomy, 
keeping accounts to ensure that budget is not over-spent, no independent source of revenue, 
as well as the lack of independent external audit. World Bank, cited in Klockow and Hofer 
(1991), adds that the main issues in the road maintenance problems are caused by misallocated 
fund, unsound maintenance strategies, inefficient implementation, and lack of public pressure 
for better roads.  
Furthermore, UNECA (1987) argues that road damage could have been contained should the 
institution operates in a more effective, responsible and attentive manner. It points out that 
the institutional reforms may be addressed by increasing political attention to road 
maintenance, strengthening the accountability of the road management agency, and by 
appreciating the performance through the introduction of incentives. It is also suggested that 
strengthening the road management accountability, in particular, should be achieved by linking 
budgets with the physical outputs, separation of planning and evaluation tasks from the 
executing agency, and monitoring of road conditions. Moreover, UNECA (1987) emphasises 
that in order to improve the utilisation of the road system and therefore facilitate the 
movement of people and commodities, a successful road management agency would require 
competent planning, designing, financing, and scheduling capacity, in addition to providing 
training to the human resources.  
Another point worth emphasis is that even though a proper road maintenance plan needs to 
be prepared for the medium and long term period (e.g., three, five or ten-year period), the 
budget allocation is normally allocated on annual bases. Hence, the maintenance strategy (e.g. 
budget allocation, work priorities and scope of works) selected for each year may affect the 
maintenance plan of the subsequent year. To put into practice, any unfinished or neglected 
maintenance work will need to be added in the subsequent year plan. However, the financial 
needs will eventually be more than the initial estimates as the pavements continue to 
deteriorate, requiring greater maintenance interventions at the greater costs. Therefore, not 
only such condition illustrates the importance of regularly modifying and updating the 
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maintenance plan it also demonstrates that neglecting immediate maintenance requirements 
would eventually add burdens to the subsequent year plan and increase the total maintenance 
budget needs.  
However, as highlighted by Klockow and Hofer (1991), the road maintenance problems do not 
exist in isolation and in fact embedded in a system which comprises many elements. As also 
suggested by UNECA (1987), road maintenance efforts should address the issues concerning 
the encouragement and the provision of training for the road maintenance personnel, effective 
distribution among relevant institutions, establishment of effective transport regulations, 
improve controls and monitoring, and the use of simple method of inspection. The above 
discussion concludes the discussion on the institutional factors of the road maintenance 
problems. Accordingly, the next section will discuss the technical factors. 
2.4.5.1.2 Technical factors 
The technical aspect of the road maintenance covers the availability and use of data, materials 
and supplies, and the plant and equipment; the capability to undertake technical operation, 
monitoring, and feed-back; and access to research and information. This section will 
accordingly highlight the major external issues experienced by the road administrations.  
To adequately and properly produce a good-quality road maintenance plan, the road 
management agency would be required to utilise a maintenance management system. The tool 
would assist the road administrator, planners and the field staff to determine the financial 
needs, setting up priorities, and produce implementation programs, and for the road 
monitoring team to predict the time that pavement distress had been reached. Such tasks are 
made possible since the management system provides better prediction models of the 
pavement performance and vehicle operating cost, as well as computerised analysis which 
enables the evaluation of the vast array of options (UNECA, 1987). It further suggests that the 
information from the database will also assist the preparation of the life-cycle analysis of the 
pavement in order to optimally generate the construction-maintenance-rehabilitation strategy 
and minimise the total costs.  
However, the road management system also needs to establish a database, and more 
importantly the maintenance and regular updates of the database to reflect the actual 
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condition. Unfortunately, the accuracy and the quality of the information provided by the 
maintenance management systems are highly dependent on the operators rather than the 
process of procurement and setting up the computer hardware and software. Therefore, the 
system needs to engage expert advisory services and provide adequate training for the local 
personnel. Nevertheless, as previously indicated, the biggest challenge in the management 
systems remains in the commitment of the senior management to allocate fund and sustain 
the trained staff for the management of the system, which is commonly neglected soon after 
the installation (ADB, 2003). 
Furthermore, as presented by UNECA (1987), there has been a great interest within the road 
management agencies to utilise modern methods and techniques of road maintenance, 
maintenance management systems, and the maintenance road equipment. However, such a 
high interest has been hindered by the unavailability of the financial resources and local labour, 
even though certain maintenance operations require the use of such equipment.  
The above sections have provided profound discussions on the internal factors of the road 
management issues. Accordingly, the following section will elaborate the external factors. 
2.4.5.2 External Factors 
External factors are those which are beyond the direct control of the road authorities. As 
discussed previously in section 2.4.5.1.1.2, one of the concerns that need to be addressed to 
improve road management capacity is by establishing effective transport regulation and 
monitoring method. With regard to regulation, UNECA (1987) highlights the need to implement 
strict monitoring of vehicle imports, enforcement of tax levy based on axle load, promotion of 
multiple axle vehicles, and the development of measures for weight restriction monitoring. 
However, as described by ADB (2003), the problems in road management are not only due to 
the weak planning and programming produced by the road management agency, but also due 
to the political interference in the day-to-day operation. More discussion on the political aspect 
will be covered in the next section.  
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2.4.5.2.1 Politicised decision making process 
In the developing countries, decisions are often made based on consensus instead of economic 
rationale and therefore road is often seen as public service, not a business (ADB, 2003). As a 
result, many governments in the developing countries fail to see the importance and the 
economic benefits of preventive road maintenance. Consequently, many governments opt to 
pursue the more expensive curative approach which is to rehabilitate the road networks when 
they are heavily damaged. In another case, in order to reduce the social jealousy, it is 
considered more important and politically ‘attractive’ to pave new road and reduce the 
isolation of a village instead of spending money for maintaining the existing road of the 
neighbouring villages (ADB, 2003). In similar fashion, UNECA (1987) further stressed that the 
attitude of the decision makers towards road maintenance frequently and adversely affects the 
road condition as the politicians promote construction of new roads in order to seek prestige, 
planners favour the capital projects as the developmental benefits are relatively easier to 
measure, and that senior engineers prefer to have new construction works rather than 
maintenance due to the relatively greater project values. In Indonesia, for instance, even 
though on the one hand, there are indications of increased needs and dependencies towards 
road infrastructure, and the Indonesian government is struggling to further develop its road 
infrastructures, the existing road networks are suffering from poor maintenance and 
deteriorate rapidly (more detail is presented in section 2.5.4). Correspondingly, Klockow and 
Hofer (1991) propose that the urgent solutions to address the road maintenance problems are 
by establishing the required institutions which work efficiently, meeting the technical 
requirements, and allocating sufficient maintenance financial needs.  
Accordingly, one of the efforts towards improving road management from the external aspect 
is by decentralising the road management authority from the central agency to the lower level 
of institution. In fact, decentralising road management authority is becoming a more common 
approach to addressing issues in road maintenance. More discussion on the decentralisation 
of road management authority is presented in the following paragraphs. 
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2.4.5.2.2 Decentralised system 
The developing countries are decentralising the road management administration. It is argued 
that the decentralisation is expected to improve the rural road services by increasing the 
efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of services and in responding the needs of the 
constituents (Robinson and Stiedl, 2003) through alleviating the decision-making bottleneck, 
simplifying bureaucratic procedures, and increasing sensitivity to the local conditions and 
needs (Robinson and Stiedl, 2001).  
Decentralisation is defined as the transfer of power, resources and responsibility for planning 
and management from the higher level to the lower level of governments (Jütting et al., 2005) 
or other bodies (Robinson and Stiedl, 2003). With regards to road infrastructure, the 
decentralisation of road administration is therefore the transfer of responsibility of road 
management from a centralised body to the subordinate level bodies. In turn, decentralisation 
is expected to be the instrument that encourages broader participations of citizens and 
ultimately lead to increased efficiency and improved governance (Jütting et al., 2005). 
Accordingly, in a decentralised system, the responsibility is transferred to the agencies or 
subordinate level of organisations, which may well represent the constituents. These agencies 
may include the field unit of government agencies, subordinate level of governments, semi-
autonomous public authorities, and private or voluntary NGOs (Rondinelli et al., 1989). 
However, disregards to the aims of decentralisation, there are concerns that decentralisation 
may erratically place responsibility for road maintenance to incompetent organisation 
(Robinson and Stiedl, 2001).  
The above sections have elaborated factors affecting the road maintenance capacity, which can 
be classified into internal factors (section 2.4.5.1) and external factors (section 2.4.5.2). 
However, these factors do not normally occur in isolation. In fact, these factors are related to 
each other, which will be elaborated in the following section.  
2.4.5.3 Relationships between the affecting factors  
As previously stipulated, the internal and external factors affecting the road maintenance 
capacity are inter-related to each other. In order to describe these relationships, Brooks et al. 
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(1989b) adapted Adair's model (1983) regarding the effective leadership to link all the factors 
affecting the performance of the road management agency.  
In the modified model, the environmental, tasks and individual capabilities are replaced with 
the institutional, technical and management capabilities the interdependence factors to 
effective organisation. Accordingly, Brooks et al. (1989b) suggest that improving the 
institutional arrangement is more difficult than introducing specific management or technical 
advances. They therefore conclude that improving the institutional capacity forms the basis for 
an effective and sustainable managerial capability to be developed. The relationship is then 
presented in a ‘pyramidal’ model which is illustrated in Figure 2.10a below. Additionally, the 
model also suggests that the implementation of changes to improve the performance of the 
road administrative requires the pyramid to be built from the bottom component to the upper 
ones.  
Furthermore, Robinson et.al (1998) propose a set of recommendations for steps in 
implementing changes in the road management sector, by adopting the Brooks et al. (1989b) 
pyramid approach as shown in Figure 2.10b. These recommendations can be summarised as 
the following. 
 Address the external factors; gaining political commitment, possibly by the involvement 
of road users and other stakeholders; agreeing the restructuring policy and institutional 
framework; framing any legislation required to support the changes; securing and 
maintaining the availability of sufficient funds for the implementation of policy. 
 Address the internal institutional factors to improve effectiveness and efficiency 
 Address the technical factors 
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Figure 2.10 – Brooks Pyramid  
Source: Brooks et al. (1989b) 
Not only does the pyramid model illustrate the need to implement changes from the bottom 
element to the upper ones; the model also demonstrates that the elements on the lower part 
act as the enabling elements for the upper ones. Hence, it suggests that promoting changes on 
the technical aspects may not be effective and efficient, if not impossible, if the institutional 
factors are not sufficient. Accordingly, modifying the institutional arrangement may not be 
productive should the support required from the external institutions (i.e. political commitment 
and the regulatory framework) is not obtained adequately. 
As the above sections have covered various factors affecting the road maintenance capacity, 
the following section will provide a discussion on the global experience attempting to solve the 
road maintenance problems.  
2.4.6 Road maintenance capacity improvement efforts  
Some of the efforts to overcome the road maintenance problems have been through increasing 
the road user taxes, reducing permanent workers and encouraging the involvement of the 
private sectors, as well as the use of a sophisticated computer-based pavement management 
system to help in the planning and programming of maintenance works (ADB, 2003). In the final 
report of the fourth African Highway Maintenance Conference, UNECA (1987) proposes a set 
of recommendations for the road maintenance issues in Africa, which include utilisation of 
contract-maintenance, the establishment of autonomous equipment pools, productivity 
 75 
 
performance bonuses, road funds and revolving funds, as well as the implementation of labour 
intensive methods in the maintenance operations.  
Even though such efforts have been made, there are challenges that hinder the effective and 
efficient road maintenance initiatives. For instance, ADB (2003) underlines the experience 
where increasing the road taxes does not ensure the sufficient allocation and expenses for road 
maintenance, involvement of private contractors for the maintenance works was troubled by 
delayed payment, erratic workload and inflation, or magnified bid price to cover the risks 
eventually diminished the intended savings. Additionally, with regards to the availability and 
use of data, ADB (2003) highlights that even though the problem can be overcome with the 
installation of a sophisticated pavement management system, the challenges remain in the 
consistent use, update, and operation of the system, which is generally neglected soon after 
the installation due to lack of fund and support from the senior management, and the high staff 
turnovers.  
With regards to the rural roads development, Donnges et al. (2007) conclude that the efforts 
of reducing poverty in the rural areas by the means of improving access can only be justified if 
sufficient attention is also addressed to the maintenance needs which will ensure the 
sustainability of the physical access. They further highlight the success of the rural road 
development program in India, the PMGSY, which included the needs of future maintenance 
up to five years after their completion in the road rehabilitation contracts prior to fully returning 
the maintenance responsibility to the local authorities. However, they also emphasise that 
budget allocation sufficiency is often spoilt by the inability to expend the allocation, which is 
affected by the personnel capacity and the irregular apportionments of the budget allocation.  
The above sections have provided in-depth discussion on the disaster management and the 
road maintenance aspect. Section 2.2 elaborates the issues regarding disaster and disaster 
management, while section 2.3 and section 2.4 respectively discuss the issue of post-disaster 
reconstruction of road infrastructure and the road maintenance aspects.  
Additionally, as presented in section 1.1 of Chapter 1, the world is facing a significant increase 
in disasters, both in the number of occurrence and in the number of losses and damages. The 
statistical data suggests that the three most destructive natural disasters - storms, earthquakes 
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and flood, frequently occur in the developing countries. The Inter-American Development Bank 
highlights that while 75% of the world population are concentrated in the developing countries, 
they suffer 99% of the mortality caused by the natural disasters (2010). Furthermore, in the 
last three decades, EM-DAT records of the natural disasters for the period of 30 years between 
1984 and 2013 (EM-DAT, 2013) show that Asia experiences the most disaster, particularly in 
the southern, south-eastern, and the eastern part of the continent. The three regions have 
experienced nearly 3400 disaster events with a total of more than US$ 1,084 billion worth of 
damage, killing more than 1.1 million people. (EM-DAT, 2013).  
In the developing world, one of the biggest disasters caused by the earthquake and tsunami 
ever recorded in terms of damage and the number of affected people is the Boxing Day tsunami 
in Indonesia on December 26th 2004. As a result, Subekti (2009) highlights that more than 900 
national organisations from 55 countries were involved in the reconstruction of the tsunami 
affected areas in Aceh. Additionally, as much as US$ 7.2 billion of pledges were made for the 
Aceh reconstruction. The earthquake and the tsunami caused the road infrastructure sector to 
suffer the most damages and losses after the housing sector (Bappenas, 2005). More than 
3600km of roads were rehabilitated and reconstructed during the post-disaster reconstruction 
period, which raised a concern over the maintenance of the reconstruction assets. Due to the 
aforementioned overwhelming impacts of the disaster, as well as the extensive road 
reconstruction activities which took place during the post-tsunami reconstruction period, this 
study is accordingly focused on the reconstruction of the tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia. To 
provide a thorough understanding on the study area, the next section will elaborate the context 
of Indonesia.  
2.5 The Indonesian context 
2.5.1 Disasters in Indonesia 
The Republic of Indonesia is an archipelagic country located in the Southeast Asia. Its 
geographical condition and location make Indonesia one of the most disaster-prone countries. 
Two of the largest volcanic eruptions ever recorded, Tambora Mount in 1815 and Krakatau 
Mount in 1883, took place in Indonesia. On December 26th in 2004, earthquake and tsunami 
killed more than 167,000 people and caused economic losses of more than Rp 48 trillion.  
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In addition to volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, and the subsequent tsunamis, Indonesia is also 
prone to other types of man-made and natural disasters. According to the National Disaster 
Management Agency - Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB, 2010), the list of 
disasters in Indonesia includes landslides, floods, droughts, wildfires, erosions, fires, extreme 
wave and abrasion, extreme weather, technological failures, epidemiological and social 
conflicts.  
In Indonesia, within the 30-year period from 1983 to 2012, EM-DAT (2012) recorded that the 
top 10 natural disasters causing the greatest losses and damages have been seismic activities 
(earthquake and tsunami), floods and wildfire. In total, these disasters caused damages worth 
more than US$21.5 billion. In terms of economic losses, five of the ten worst natural disasters 
within that period have been earthquake events (including the subsequent tsunami) which 
accounted for almost 50% of the total losses and damage.  
Not only have earthquakes caused the greatest damages and losses, they have also caused the 
greatest number of fatalities. Six out of ten worst natural disasters in Indonesia have been 
earthquake events, which were responsible for almost more than 98% of the total casualties of 
179,677 people. More detail information on the top 10 natural disasters is presented in Table 
2.6 and Table 2.7. 
As shown in Table 2.6, the scale of damages caused by the major earthquakes are, in many 
cases, overwhelming. On December 26th, 2004, an earthquake measuring 8.9 on the Richter 
Scale (Bappenas, 2005), and followed by tsunami waves, hit 12 nations along the Indian Pacific 
Ocean. Among the 12 nations affected, the province of Aceh in Indonesia suffered the greatest 
level of damages and losses. According to the Bappenas (2005) the earthquake and subsequent 
tsunami, which also affected a number of the neighbouring countries, including Thailand, Sri 
Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Somalia, caused the death of more than 126,000 
people, resulted in more than 93,000 missing persons and lead to more than half a million of 
IDPs in Indonesia alone.  
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Table 2.6 – Top 10 natural disasters in Indonesia (total damages) 1983-2012 
Disaster Events 
Damages (000 
US$) 
Earthquake (seismic 
activity) 
Total 10,451,600 
29/11/1998 200,000 
26/12/2004 4,451,600 
27/05/2006 3,100,000 
12/09/2007 500,000 
30/09/2009 2,200,000 
Wildfire 
Total 9,300,000 
Sep 1997 8,000,000 
Mar 1998 1,300,000 
Flood 
Total 1,755,800 
09/02/1996 434,800 
27/01/2002 350,000 
31/01/2007 971,000 
Total 21,507,400 
Source: EM-DAT (2012)  
 
Table 2.7 – Top 10 natural disasters in Indonesia (total number of fatalities) 1983 – 2012 
Disaster Events Fatalities 
Earthquake (seismic 
activity) 
Total 176,898 
 12/12/1992 2,500  
 26/12/2004 165,708  
 28/03/2005 915  
 27/05/2006 5,778  
 17/07/2006 802  
 30/09/2009 1,195  
Epidemic 
Total 2,107 
 Jan 1998 672  
 May 1998 777  
 Jan 2004 658  
Drought  Sep 1997 672  
Total 179,677  
Source: EM-DAT (2012)  
Three months later on March 28th 2005, an earthquake measuring 8.2 on the Richter Scale 
devastated Nias Island in the Northern Sumatra and resulted in 900 casualties and 40,000 
displaced persons (BRR and Partners, 2006). Despite the difference in the number of victims 
and losses between the two earthquakes, they were both highly destructive. As illustrated in 
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the ‘Aceh And Nias One Year After The Tsunami’ report (BRR and International Partners, 2005), 
the boxing day earthquake caused the Simeulue Island (the island nearest to the earthquake 
epicentre) to sink for about one meter. However, the following Nias earthquake caused it to 
rise more than two meters above the sea level, exposing the coral reefs which were once 
submerged under the seawater. To rebuild these regions it was estimated that approximately 
US$ 4.9 billion was required (BRR and Partners, 2006). From the infrastructure point of view, 
the Ministry of National Development Planning - Bappenas (2005) describes that among other 
development sectors, including; social, infrastructure, production, economic and governance, 
the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Aceh which was soon followed by the Nias earthquake in 
March 2005 had resulted in the infrastructure sector suffering almost 20% of the total 
estimated losses and damages. More details of the total losses and damages are presented 
previously in Table 2.3, section 2.3.2. 
The Indian Ocean tsunami and the subsequent earthquakes in March 2005 are probably the 
most significant disasters in terms of disaster management initiatives in Indonesia. The 
extensive level of losses and damages, the number of fatalities and the intense level of 
attention by the media and international organisations has alerted the national consciousness 
to the importance of disaster management in Indonesia. Additionally, the tsunami 
reconstruction blueprint (Bappenas, 2005) denotes that the needs for rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of road infrastructure in Aceh and Nias were more than Rp 6 trillion, as the post-
disaster reconstruction would need to replace the damaged infrastructure beyond their original 
condition (please refer to section 2.2.3.2 regarding “Post-disaster reconstruction fund”).  
Furthermore, the level of destruction caused by the disaster was so immense that the 
government of Indonesia immediately pronounced it as a national disaster (Bappenas, 2005). 
According to Law no. 24/ 2007 (2007), indicators for determining the status of a disaster include 
the number of victims, the amount of financial losses, the level of damages of infrastructure 
facilities, the affected geographical area as well as the level of the socioeconomic impacts. Also, 
the consequent impact was far beyond the local and provincial governments’ capacity to cope 
with their own resources. As a result, the national government immediately appointed the 
national disaster management agency to act as the overall emergency response coordinator 
and established a special agency for the reconstruction and rehabilitation in Aceh and Nias. 
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Accordingly, the roles and responsibilities of these agencies will be discussed in the following 
section.  
2.5.2 Disaster Management Agency 
2.5.2.1 Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana – BNPB  
Indonesia has established a special agency responsible for the coordination and the 
implementation of the disaster management and post-disaster reconstruction activities. This 
disaster management agency was established initially in 1945 as an agency responsible for 
providing aids to post-war victims and their families. Over time, this agency experienced several 
changes in name, roles and responsibilities, which eventually also accommodated the man-
made and natural disasters. Since 2008, this agency has been further developed into disaster 
management agency with wider scope of work and changed its name to Badan Nasional 
Penanggulangan Bencana - BNPB (National Agency for Disaster Management). The history of 
the agency development is presented in Figure 2.11. Among others, the main functions of BNPB 
are to provide guidance and direction regarding disaster mitigation, emergency, rehabilitation 
and reconstruction activities; develop standards for disaster mitigation efforts, disseminate 
disaster reduction activities to the public, as well as to produce manual for the development of 
disaster management agency at the regional level (BNPB, 2012).  
With regards to the reconstruction of tsunami disaster in Aceh, the government of Indonesia 
established a special agency for the reconstruction of the affected areas. The agency is called 
Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Aceh Nias, also known as the BRR, which will be described 
in the following section.  
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Figure 2.11 – History of Disaster Management Agency in Indonesia  
Source: BNPB (2012) 
2.5.2.2 Badan Rehabilitasi Dan Rekonstruksi Aceh-Nias 
As previously described, the level of destruction caused by the 2004 tsunami and the 
subsequent earthquake in 2005 was devastating. Consequently, the scale of rehabilitation and 
reconstruction activities required to restore the affected area was so overwhelming that it was 
beyond the capacity of the regional government to cope with the impacts and even beyond the 
scope of the existing national disaster management agency in 2004; Bakornas PBP (National 
Coordinating Agency for Natural Disaster and Refugees Relief). As a response, the Government 
of Indonesia initiated a master plan and issued a regulation in lieu of law (PERPU) no 2/2005 
(2005) for the establishment of the special agency, Badan Rehabilitasi Dan Rekonstruksi Aceh 
Nias - BRR (The Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias). This agency was 
responsible for the implementation and the coordination of all rehabilitation and 
reconstruction activities in Aceh and Nias Island. Its specific mandate was to “design policies, 
strategies and action plans, within an atmosphere of transparency and accountability, and to 
implement them through effective leadership and coordination of the combined domestic and 
international effort to rebuild Aceh and Nias back better and safer"(Sugiarto, 2009).  
In order to reduce bureaucracy and accelerate the pace of reconstruction, as well as to provide 
a prompt response to the reconstruction needs, BRR was established at a ministerial level of 
authority and was headquartered in Banda Aceh; which was the centre of the disaster and 
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reconstruction activity. In the implementation process, BRR involved a number of local 
government agencies and also included their representatives in the BRR organisational 
structure. In accordance with the PERPU no 2/2005, BRR was dismissed in 2009, four years after 
its mandate was instituted in 2005. The responsibility for the coordination and implementation 
of incomplete reconstruction projects was then transferred to the respective ministries.  
Along with the termination of the BRR and the transfer of incomplete projects to the respective 
ministries, the reconstruction assets were also handed over to the respective (provincial or 
local) governments, which were expected to be responsible for the long-term operation and 
maintenance of the assets. However, the reconstruction of road infrastructure raised two main 
concerns. The first concern was whether the development opportunity ‘offered’ by the tsunami 
disaster had been used to improve the road infrastructure in line with the build back better 
principle. The second is related to the sustainability of the road reconstruction assets, with the 
particular focus addressed on the role and the capacity of the local government to maintain the 
assets. These two issues are highlighted as the main concerns of the reconstruction of road 
infrastructure in the disaster context, which lead to the formulation of the aim of this study, 
“to evaluate the capacity of the local governments in the maintenance of the road 
infrastructure assets within the context of the post-disaster reconstruction process” (for more 
detail, please refer to section 3.2.4 regarding the process of research problem identification 
and section 3.2.5 regarding the research aim and objectives).  
Whilst the above sections have provided an overview of disasters in Indonesia and the agencies 
responsible for disaster management, there is a need to synthesise what the reconstruction of 
road infrastructure means in a post-disaster setting. However, prior to discussing the road 
infrastructure in Indonesia, the next section will elaborate the Indonesian government system, 
as it will provide a broad picture on how the road infrastructure in Indonesia is managed.  
2.5.3 Indonesian government system 
The government system in Indonesia has experienced a number of changes. The most relevant 
change which impacts are essential to this research is probably the change from a centralised 
to a decentralised system which began in 1999 by the issuance of two Laws; Law no 22/1999 
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regarding Regional Governance and Law no 25/1999 regarding the fiscal balance between the 
national and the regional governments.  
In the Indonesian laws and regulations, the subnational governments; which consist of the 
provincial and the local government, are often referred to in the same terms; regional 
governments (Pemerintah Daerah). This is particularly true when the subject being discussed is 
relevant to both the provincial and the local governments. Accordingly, in this report, the term 
of “regional government” will be used when the subject being discussed is relevant to both the 
provincial and the local governments. Otherwise, provincial government and/or local 
government (district and cities) will be addressed specifically. The government system of 
Indonesia will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.  
2.5.3.1 Structural hierarchy 
The structure of the Indonesian government and their functions are explained in the Law no 
32/2004 (Law, 2004a). Administratively, Indonesia is divided into a number of provinces, and 
the provinces are further subdivided into districts and cities. Furthermore, districts and cities 
are divided into Kelurahan and/or villages. The following Figure 2.12 illustrates the structural 
hierarchy of the Indonesian government.  
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Figure 2.12 – Hierarchical Structure of Indonesian Governments  
Source: Law (2004a)  
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At the local level, there are two types of government, district and cities. A district is governed 
by a Regent or locally called as Bupati, and a city is governed by a Mayor. The main differences 
between districts and cities are that a district is governed by a Bupati, has a relatively wider 
area, and consists of several sub-district (kelurahan) and villages. One of the (bigger) sub-
districts is selected as the capital ‘city’ of the district. A city, on the other hand, is governed by 
a Mayor, consists of several and relatively smaller sub-districts and kelurahan. Unlike a district, 
a city does not have villages on its structure.  
Furthermore, the decentralisation process in Indonesia allows for the establishment of new 
regions as well as the unification of several geographically connected regions. Accordingly, 
many local governments in Indonesia were part of a larger district which then developed and 
formed a separate local government. More discussion on the issue of decentralisation in 
Indonesia will be presented in the following section. 
2.5.3.2 Decentralisation in Indonesia 
Decentralisation in Indonesia was initiated in 1974 with the issuance of Law no 5/1974. 
However, it was not until 1999, following the collapse of the Suharto regime, that the fiscal and 
administrative decentralisation was changed and radically applied. The decentralisation 
emerged as a result of the failure of the national government during the centralised system era 
in responding and providing solutions to the needs and the unique problems that each region 
faced. The rationale behind decentralisation relates to the responsiveness and accountability 
resulting from the closer proximity between the government and citizens (Devas, 1997). 
Additionally, Rasyid (2004) argues that the previous centralised system mainly concentrated on 
dealing with domestic and local affairs and thus failed to adequately observe, learn and 
understand the global financial and economic trends which eventually led to the 1997 financial 
crises in Indonesia.  
In 1999, two laws were issued in response to the demand and pressure for decentralisation 
from the regional governments. The two laws become the basic foundation of the 
decentralisation system in Indonesia and replaced Law no 5/1974 regarding the Governance 
Principles in the Regions. The two laws are: 
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 Law no. 22/1999, which was later replaced by Law no. 33/2004, is related to the 
Regional Governments and stipulates the political and administrative authority and 
responsibility of the national, provincial, district and city governments in the 
decentralised structure. 
 Law no. 25/ 1999, which was later replaced by Law no. 34/ 2004, is related to the fiscal 
balance between the National Government and the Regional Government, providing 
the legal foundation for fiscal decentralisation, which also outlines the new income 
resources and financial share between the national and regional governments. 
In the decentralisation era, the government system is carried out based on three principles; 
decentralisation, co-administration and deconcentration. According to Law no. 32/2004 
(2004a), decentralisation is defined as the transfer of authority from the national government 
to the regional governments. Co-administration is defined as the devolution of areas of 
responsibility from the national government to the regional governments. Deconcentration is 
defined as the distribution or delegation of authority from the central government to the 
governor or to regional officers as the representatives of the national government. 
Following the decentralisation of the government system in Indonesia, a significant extent of 
authority and responsibility were also transferred from the central government to the regional 
governments. Accordingly, the regional governments are now responsible for the management 
of their own expenditure and resources, which are originated locally or received through the 
fiscal balance mechanism and as deconcentration funds allocated by the national government.  
Within the road infrastructure context, the transferred responsibilities include the provision 
and allocation of funds for the development and the maintenance of the road infrastructure. 
More than 80% of the road networks are district roads, which are under the responsibility of 
the local government. As a result, the overall condition of the road networks in Indonesia is 
highly dependent on the capacity of the local government in managing the road networks. 
Whilst a proportion of the financial needs to manage the district road networks are provided 
by the national government through the Dana Alokasi Umum – DAU (Block Grant Fund), the 
local governments are held responsible for the financial management of the majority of the 
road networks.  
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However, the financial management capacity of the local governments in Aceh is considerably 
poor. A World Bank survey on Aceh’s Public Financial Management (PFM) capacity (2007) 
concluded that the average score of the local governments’ PFM capacity is 41%, which ranges 
from good (69%) to very poor (15%). The survey also concluded that among the nine key areas 
of financial management, all local governments perform poorly in at least one strategic area. 
The nine key areas are (1) regulatory framework; (2) planning and budgeting; (3) cash 
management; (4) procurement; (5) accounting and reporting; (6) internal audit; (7) public debt 
and investment; (8) asset management; and (9) external audit and oversight (World Bank, 
2007).  
2.5.3.3 Fiscal Balance 
In the centralised system, both the provincial and the local governments acted as the 
representatives of the national government. The national government delegated tasks, at the 
regional level, to the regional government and accordingly provided the funds required to 
perform such tasks. In the decentralised system, most of the tasks are now the responsibility 
of the local governments. Unlike the centralised system, where regional government 
performed certain tasks assigned to them by the national government, in the decentralised 
system, the regional governments create and implement their own policies and fund their own 
programmes. Accordingly, the national government transfers the financial resources to the 
regional governments under the fiscal balance and revenue sharing mechanism. In addition to 
the general fiscal balance and revenue sharing mechanism, Aceh province holds a special 
autonomy status, which gives Aceh additional budget allocation from the oil and gas revenue 
sharing and the special autonomy funds. More discussion regarding the special autonomy 
status of Aceh province will be presented in section 2.5.6.  
2.5.4 Road infrastructure in the Indonesian context 
Indonesia has a population of more than 237 million people (BPS, 2010a). Of all transportation 
modes, road transportation predominates the movement of goods and people. Annually, 
around 99% of the 3.8 billion passenger travels and 97% of the 2.4 billion tonnes of goods 
movements are delivered by land transport. Particularly in Java and Sumatra Island, the 
proportion of road transport is as high as 80-90% of the total movements (DoT, 2005a). 
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Additionally, the rate of the road vehicle growth is also high. According to BPS (2010b) between 
2004 and 2009, the number of vehicles grew from 23 million vehicles in 2004 to more than 52 
million vehicles by 2009, a growth of greater than 220% (see Table 2.8). This indicates the 
increasing needs and dependencies towards the road infrastructures in Indonesia.  
Whilst the need for good and reliable road infrastructure is high, the road infrastructure 
condition is not satisfactory. By 2006, less than 32% of the 34628.8 km national road networks 
were in good condition. The remaining networks were either in moderate condition (50%), 
lightly damaged (9.3%) or severely damaged (9.1%) (Bina Marga, 2010).  
Table 2.8 – Vehicle Growth in Indonesia 
Year Car Bus Truck Motorcycle 
2004 4,464,281 933,199 2,315,779 23,055,834 
2005 5,494,034 1,184,918 2,920,828 28,556,498 
2006 6,615,104 1,511,129 3,541,800 33,413,222 
2007 8,864,961 2,103,423 4,845,937 41,955,128 
2008 9,859,926 2,583,170 5,146,674 47,683,681 
2009 10,364,125 2,729,572 5,187,740 52,433,132 
Grand Total 49,547,659 11,843,490 26,005,780 247,073,871 
Source: BPS (2010b) 
Table 2.9 – Condition of National Road in Indonesia 2006-2008 
No Condition 2006 2007 2008 
    km % km % km % 
1 Good 10956.6 31.6% 11905.4 34.4% 17200.9 49.7% 
2 Moderate 17314.3 50.0% 16565.7 47.8% 11620.1 33.6% 
3 Lightly Damaged 3210.1 9.3% 3232.7 9.3% 4617.9 13.3% 
4 Heavily Damaged 3147.8 9.1% 2925.0 8.4% 1189.9 3.4% 
  Total 34628.8 100% 34628.8 100% 34628.8 100% 
Source: Bina Marga (2010) 
As shown in Table 2.9, the national road condition improved substantially in 2008. As explained 
by  Bina Marga (2010) such an improvement of road condition was resulting from the launch 
of road capacity expansion projects by the national government, rather than from road 
maintenance initiatives. 
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At the local level, the condition of the road infrastructure is poor. In the period of three years 
between 2006 and 2008, more than 50% of the road infrastructure were damaged (more 
details are presented in Table 2.10). 
Table 2.10 – Condition of District and City Roads in Indonesia : (Bina Marga, 2010) 
No Condition 2006 2007 2008 
   km % km % km % 
1 Good 69,050.8 24.35% 68,727.7 24.26% 69,948.8 24.27% 
2 Moderate 69,921.1 24.65% 71,106.7 25.10% 72,330.5 25.10% 
3 Lightly Damaged 96,019.3 33.86% 90,799.7 32.05% 88,462.1 30.70% 
4 Heavily Damaged 48,620.4 17.14% 52,687.9 18.60% 57,444.0 19.93% 
 Total 283,611.6 100% 283,322.0 100% 288,185.4 100% 
 
In the next section, the classification of the road in Indonesia is presented based on the 
ownership and characteristic of the road network.  
2.5.4.1 Classification of roads  
Road networks can be classified into several categories according to the ownership and road 
characteristic. According to law no 22/2009, the latter category includes the function of the 
road and traffic intensity as well as the axle-load bearing capacity.  
2.5.4.1.1 Classification of roads based on the road characteristics 
Based on the characteristic, the Law no 22/2009 classifies road into class I, class II, class III and 
special road. The classification is determined by the owner of the roads (national, provincial or 
local government) and is marked by the provision of road sign.  
Class I roads are the arterial or collector road which can accommodate vehicles with maximum 
2.5m of width, 18m of length and 4.2m of height and 10 tonnes of axle weight. Class II roads 
are arterial, collector, local or neighbourhood road, which can accommodate vehicles with 
maximum 2.5m of width, 12m of length and 4.2m of height and 8 tonnes of axle weight. Class 
III roads are arterial, collector, local and neighbourhood, which can accommodate vehicles with 
maximum 2.1m of width, 9m of length and 3.5m of height and 8 tonnes of axle weight. In 
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certain condition, the maximum axle weight can be reduced to less than eight tonnes. The 
special roads are arterial road, which can accommodate vehicles with maximum 2.5m of width, 
18m of length and 4.2m of height and 10 tonnes of axle weight. 
2.5.4.1.2 Classification of roads based on road ownership 
Law no 22/2009 and Government Regulation no 34/2006 stipulates that based on the road 
ownership, road networks are divided into two categories; private roads and public roads. 
Whilst private roads are road networks owned by private entities, public road can be further 
subdivided into five categories; national road, provincial road, district roads, city roads and 
village road.  
The national roads are road networks which are under the responsibility of the national 
government. The road networks that fall into this category are primary arterial roads, primary 
collector roads which connect the provincial capitals, toll roads, and the national strategic 
roads. Similarly, the provincial government are road networks under the responsibility of the 
provincial government. Road networks of this category are primary collector roads which 
connect the provincial capitals with district capitals/ cities, primary collector roads which 
connect district capitals/cities, and the provincial strategic road.  
The district roads include primary collector roads which are not covered by the provincial and 
national requirements as described above, primary local roads which connect the district 
capital with the sub-district capitals, district capital with the village centres, sub district capitals 
with other sub district capitals, sub district capitals with the village, and roads which connect 
the villages. Also included here are secondary roads which are not included as the provincial 
road as well as the district strategic roads. Accordingly, the management of district roads is 
under the responsibility of district governments.  
Furthermore, city roads are the secondary road networks within a city. The village roads are 
primary neighbourhood and primary local roads which are not included as the district road 
which connects areas or settlements within a village.  
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2.5.5 Road infrastructure in the Aceh province context 
In section 2.5.4, the overall condition of road infrastructure in Indonesia at the national context 
has been discussed. At the provincial and local level, however, the road infrastructure condition 
is considerably poorer. In Aceh Province, in 2004 only 17.8% of road networks were in good 
condition; around 60% were in fair condition and more than 22% were in poor condition (see 
Table 2.11 ).  
Table 2.11 – Road network condition in Aceh Province, 2004 (World Bank and BRR, 2006a) 
Types of 
road 
Good Condition Fair Condition Poor Condition Total Length 
Km % Km % Km % Km % 
National 127 7.4 1,052 61.3 538 31.3 1,716 9.21 
Prov. 199 12.6 646 41.1 727 46.2 1,571 8.44 
Districts/ 
Cities 
2,995 19.5 9,410 61.3 2,995 19.5 15,339 82.35 
Total 3,320 17.8 11,108 59.4 4,259 22.8 18,627.3 100 
 
Table 2.11 indicates that as the road networks deteriorate over time, the biggest concern lies 
in the roads with fair condition, as they may soon deteriorate to the poor condition, unless 
proper maintenance is provided.  
In the road sector, decentralisation is translated as the distribution or transfer of authority and 
responsibility to manage the road infrastructure assets. As a result, the national government is 
responsible for the national roads; the provincial government is responsible for provincial 
roads, and the local governments are responsible for the district/city roads - which also include 
the road networks at the sub-district and the village level.  
In the Aceh context, this means that the regional governments are responsible for the 
development and the maintenance of more than 90% of the road networks; which is more than 
18,000 km in total. Around 80% of these networks are managed by the local governments, 
increasing the road infrastructure management dependency towards the local government 
capacities. Several issues have been identified with regard to the poor road conditions and the 
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road maintenance in Aceh. Some of the major issues will be discussed in more detail in the 
following section.  
2.5.5.1 Road maintenance issues in Aceh 
From the global experience, the main problems in the maintenance of the road infrastructure 
are rooted to the institutional and financial issues, with some references to the technical, 
organisation and human-resource issues (Heggie, 1994). More structurally, Robinson et al., 
(1998) classify factors affecting the performance of the road management agency into two 
broad categories, internal and external, relative to the road management agency (section 
2.4.5). The technical factor is defined as the organisation’s capability to undertake the physical 
or engineering task, consisting of the availability and use of data and resources, technical 
capability, as well as access to research and information. The institutional factors include 
financial and resource management, organisational issue and human resource. On the other 
hand, the external factors include physical environment, legal and regulatory framework, socio-
cultural background of the country, the political situation, macro economy and the national 
resources availability, overall government employment policies, and the relationship with other 
institutions.  
Even though these affecting factors are divided into different categories, they are not mutually 
exclusive and in fact related to each other. For instance, the availability and use of data may be 
affected by the availability and sufficiency of fund allocation, which is basically resulting from 
the political interference and macro-economic condition. Additionally, despite the rapidly 
deteriorating road infrastructure due to the maintenance neglect, developing countries tend 
to expand their road infrastructure without giving adequate priority to maintaining the existing 
networks (UNECA, 1987). As Klockow and Hofer (1991) suggest, road maintenance neglect may 
lead to increased vehicle cost, severe damages requiring re-construction of road, unbearable 
financial needs, and the accelerated deterioration due to the heavier and more frequent traffic. 
The discussion will accordingly progress to the issues in road maintenance within the context 
of the Aceh province.  
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2.5.5.1.1 Gradual decrease of the Operational & Maintenance budget for public service 
In order to improve the road condition and help ensure the sustainability of the road 
infrastructure, the Indonesian government has initiated the establishment of a road fund 
agency as stipulated in Law no 22/2009. However, the road fund agency has not been 
functioning and its supporting mechanism and regulations have not been clearly defined. Until 
the road fund agency starts functioning, it seems that road maintenance will continue relying 
on fund sourced from the general expenditure and the normal budgetary system.  
Furthermore, the decentralisation system and Aceh’s special autonomy status have resulted in 
a significant increase in the annual budget expenditures. This is mainly due to transferred 
responsibilities from the central government to the local government as well as additional 
income sourced from the special autonomy fund and the oil and gas revenue sharing. In 
contrast, however, the allocation for the ‘operation and maintenance’ of public services has 
gradually decreased, as shown in Table 2.12 (World Bank and BRR, 2006a).  
Table 2.12 – Composition of Aceh Public Expenditure 2003 – 2005 
Expenditures 2003 2004 2005 
  Prov. Districts Prov. Districts Prov. Districts 
Apparatus Expense 34.7% 34.9% 37.2% 38.5% 40.9% 39.8% 
 Capital 5.4% 4.1% 4.9% 4.3% 7.1% 4.8% 
 General Administration 22.7% 26.1% 23.4% 28.2% 24.2% 31.1% 
 Operation and 
maintenance 
6.5% 4.6% 8.9% 6.1% 9.5% 4.0% 
Public Expense 65.0% 55.6% 62.6% 51.8% 58.2% 50.9% 
 Capital 28.9% 16.6% 28.1% 15.2% 24.5% 18.6% 
 General Administration 2.1% 22.5% 1.3% 22.5% 0.9% 18.2% 
 Operation and 
maintenance 
34.1% 16.5% 33.2% 14.1% 32.9% 14.1% 
Unexpected Expenses 0.3% 2.3% 0.2% 2.1% 0.9% 1.6% 
Financial Ass. & Sharing Exp. 0.0% 7.3% 0.0% 7.6% 0.0% 7.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Adapted from World Bank and BRR (2006a) 
The proportion of budget allocation for the Operation and maintenance (O&M) of public 
expenses between 2003 and 2005 is higher at the Provincial level (at about 32-34%). Whereby, 
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for the same period, the district governments in average allocated less than half of the 
Provincial O&M allocation; at only 14-16% of its total annual budget. A large proportion of the 
annual budget was allocated for the general administration expenditure. The allocation was 
shared to all public facilities and put a significantly higher threat to the road infrastructure in 
Aceh.  
One of the causes of poor road maintenance allocation was argued to be rooted in the 
inadequate capacity of the local governments in financial management. A study about the Aceh 
regional governments’ Public Financial Management capacity was conducted by the World 
Bank and BRR (2006a), which will be discussed in the next paragraphs. 
2.5.5.1.2 Poor public financial management capacity 
The fund for the road maintenance needs in Aceh is currently sourced from the general budget 
expenditure which follows the normal budgeting process. In this approach, the allocation of 
fund for the road maintenance will need to compete directly with other sectors. Unfortunately, 
it has been widely recognised that the decision-making process in the developing countries is 
often delivered subjectively due to the political pressure rather than economic consideration 
(ADB, 2003).  
Unfortunately, the regional governments’ PFM is considerably low. According to the report of 
Public Financial Management in Aceh (World Bank, 2007), the low PFM capacity was due to the 
rapid decentralization process which transferred the fiscal responsibilities and financial 
resources to the local governments, and that the process was not followed by increased 
capacity of the local government to manage these resources. This condition is worsened by the 
significant rise to the number of new districts in Aceh (from 10 districts in 2000 to 21 districts 
by 2011) as well as by the impacts of the prolonged conflict and the tsunami. 
As presented in Figure 2.13, the score of most of the districts in the West Coast area (Aceh 
Selatan, Aceh Barat, Nagan Raya, Aceh Barat Daya and Aceh Jaya) are below the average district 
score. Since the tsunami hit most of the West Coast areas, the majority of road infrastructures 
in these districts have accordingly been reconstructed relatively rapidly during the post-disaster 
reconstruction period. Consequently, concerns over the maintenance of the reconstructed 
road infrastructures in these areas are therefore higher.  
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Figure 2.13 – PFM Scores of 21 districts in Aceh  
Source: World Bank and BRR (2006a) 
2.5.5.1.3 Delays in budget approval  
Another concern related to the PFM capacity and the road maintenance is in regard to delays 
in the annual budget approval. The financial year in Indonesia starts on January 1st and ends on 
December 31st. According to the Regulation of Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) no 59/2007, 
the draft of the annual budget proposal needs to be submitted by the Governor to the 
parliament for approval at the latest by the first week of October. The parliament, accordingly, 
need to approve the budget proposal at the latest 1 month prior to the start of the financial 
year, i.e., 1st of December. However, approvals of the annual budget proposal have always been 
delayed. The dates of approval of the provincial and the case study district governments’ annual 
budget are presented in Table 2.13.  
As shown in the table, the delays in the budget approval can be as late as June of the running 
financial year. Such delays occurred due to both the overdue submission of the budget proposal 
by the governor and the late approval by the local parliament. Because of the delays, the 
national government issued a penalty of 25% cut of the Aceh’s DAU (block grant) in 2011, which 
was worth as much as Rp 178 billion (US$ 17 million) (Fik, 2011).  
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Table 2.13 – Budget Approval date of the Aceh Province 
Financial 
Year 
Date of Budget 
Approval 
2006 March 5th 2006 
2007 May 20th 2007 
2008 June 24th 2008 
2009 January 29th 2009 
2010 March 19th 2010 
2011 April 15th 2011 
2012 February 10th 2012 
 
Additionally, delays in the budget approval would also mean that the remaining time to spend 
the allocated budget is automatically reduced as the budget will need to be expended by the 
31st of December. If the government could not expend their entire budget allocation, the 
allocation for the following year might be consequently adjusted to reflect the actual fund 
expending capacity.  
2.5.6 Special autonomy status of Aceh 
The decentralisation process in Indonesia resulted in the establishment of autonomous regions 
where most of the technical and financial responsibilities are transferred from central 
government to the regional government. Accordingly, most of the funds and budget allocation 
that were previously managed by the central government in the centralised system have now 
been transferred to the regional governments.  
Aceh Province, however, has a special autonomy status from the central government. In 1999, 
Aceh was given a special region status which gives it greater authority with regard to religious, 
customary and educational matters, as well as in the role of Ulama (Moslem clerics) in the 
decision-making processes (Law, 1999). In 2001, the special regional status of Aceh Province 
was followed by the provision of special autonomy status through Law no. 18/2001. The special 
status provides Aceh’s annual budget with a greater amount of fiscal balance and additional 
revenue sharing from oil and gas production.  
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2.5.6.1 Aceh Special Fund  
Due to the special autonomy status that was given in 2001 (Law, 2001), Aceh receives two 
additional sources of income namely; additional revenue sharing of oil and gas (Dana 
Tambahan Migas) and special autonomy fund (hereafter called as OTSUS fund). These funds 
were assigned to Aceh for a 20-year period, starting from 2008.  
2.5.6.1.1 Additional Revenue Sharing for Oil and Gas 
According to Law no 33/2004 (Law, 2004b), the regional governments in Indonesia receive a 
proportion of revenue generated from the oil and gas production. The proportion of revenue 
sharing received by the regional governments is 15.5% of the net oil production revenues and 
30.5% of the net gas production revenues produced in the respective regions. However, due to 
the special autonomy status, Aceh also receives an additional amount of revenue sharing from 
oil and gas production, in addition to the regular revenue sharing mentioned above. The 
proportion of the additional revenue sharing varies over a designated period.  
Based on the Law no 18/2001 (Law, 2001), the proportion of additional revenue sharing for oil 
and gas received by Aceh province is as follows: 
1. 55% for oil and 40% for gas, for eight years until 2009. 
2. 35% for oil and 20% for gas (2009 onwards) 
This allocation is given to the regional governments of Aceh, which includes the provincial and 
local governments. Distribution of the additional revenue sharing between provincial and local 
governments is stipulated in Clause 5 of Qanun no 2/2008 and is summarized in Table 2.14. 
Table 2.14 – Distribution of Additional Revenue Sharing of Oil and Gas  
No Receiver Allocation Remarks 
1 Provincial 
Government 
40%  
2 Producing districts 25% Districts that produce oil/ gas 
3 Non-Producing 
districts 
35% 50% is equally distributed to all districts and 
50% is shared proportionately according 
to the set of indicators  
 Total 100%  
Source: Qanun Propinsi NAD (2008) 
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According to Qanun no 2/2008 (2008), a minimum of 30% of the total fund must be allocated 
to the education sector. Accordingly, use of the fund for other development programs and 
activities may not exceed 70%. However, even though the fund is distributed to all districts in 
Aceh, it is not given in the form of budget transfer, but in the form of budget allocation to fund 
the approved projects and activities previously requested by the relevant districts. The projects 
and activities are also carried by the provincial government for the districts, and hence the fund 
is included in the provincial budget, APBA.  
2.5.6.1.2 Special Autonomy Fund (OTSUS fund) 
OTSUS fund is fund allocation included in the national budget APBN instead of the provincial 
budget APBA or the district budget APBK. However, this fund is managed by the government of 
Aceh Province as the representative of the national government at the regional level. The 
OTSUS fund is allocated to fund the development projects, particularly for the development 
and the maintenance of infrastructure and the economic, poverty reduction, education, social 
and health sectors. The Otsus fund allocation worth around Rp 3.5 trillion (~£175 million) in 
2008 to Rp 6.2 trillion (~£310 million) in 2013 per annum. 
Based on Qanun no 2/2008, the use of OTSUS fund is distributed as follows: 
 Maximum 40% is allocated for development at Provincial level. 
 Minimum 60% is allocated for development at the district level, distributed to all 
districts based on a formula stipulated by the governor according to the number of 
people, areas, GRDP, Human Development Index, Construction Expensiveness Index 
(IKK) and other relevant indicators.  
Table 2.15 – Distribution of OTSUS fund 
No Receiver Allocation Remarks 
1 Provincial Government Max 40%  
2 Districts governments Max 60% The fund is shared proportionately 
according to certain indicators, such 
as number of people, areas, GRDP, 
HDI and other relevant indicators.  
 Total 100%  
Source: Qanun Propinsi NAD (2008) 
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Similar to the additional revenue sharing of oil and gas production, even though the fund is 
distributed to all districts in Aceh, it is not given in the form of budget transfer. Instead, it is 
distributed in the form of a budget allocation to fund projects and activities requested by the 
relevant districts. The agreed projects and activities will also be carried out by the provincial 
government, as the representative of national government, for the districts. Hence, this fund is 
included in the national budget APBN and not in the regional budget APBA or APBK.  
The above sections have provided the context of the Indonesian government system, as well 
as the current position of the disaster management and road maintenance efforts. The context 
of Aceh as the focus area of the study has also been discussed in detail. As the Aceh province 
experienced a conflict of more than 30 years prior to the peace agreement in 2005 between 
the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia (GoI), it is imperative to 
have an overview of the conflict in Aceh as it is argued to have affected the reconstruction and 
the maintenance of the road infrastructure in the province. Accordingly, the discussion 
progresses to the following chapters to the topic of conflict in Aceh.  
2.5.7 Conflict in Aceh 
The conflict in Aceh between Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – GAM (Aceh Free Movement) and the 
Government of Indonesia (GoI) was initiated by the establishment of GAM in 1976, demanding 
to separate from Indonesia and to form its own government. However, as Miller (2012) 
summarises, there were precursors of conflicts that eventually lead to the establishment of 
GAM. McCulloch (2006) describes that there are three factors commonly referred to as the 
sources of conflict in Aceh; the corrupt and ‘predatory’ practices of non-Acehnese in the 
province, the human rights abuses by those acting on behalf of Indonesian government, as well 
as the argument that Aceh was never legally part of Indonesia. However, Miller (2012) 
highlights that the conflict in Aceh was believed to have stemmed back in 1873 by the invasion 
of the Dutch to the State of Acheh-Sumatra, which ‘illegally transferred’ Aceh to the Indonesian 
government in 1949. The illegal transfer was confronted as the involvement of Aceh in the 
Indonesian struggle with the Dutch colonial government by supplying human and economic 
resources was completely voluntary. However, Aceh agreed to join the new Indonesian state 
as long as Aceh was given autonomy to uphold the Islamic principles, which lasted only for a 
year by the inclusion of Aceh as part of the North Sumatra province, one of the 10 provinces in 
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the newly reorganised administrative system in 1950. The discovery of oil and gas resource in 
1971 in Aceh raised the resentment of the Acehnese as most of the profits were siphoned out 
of Aceh leaving little improvement to the local economy. Additionally, the sense of betrayal was 
worsened in 1974, when the new law no 5/1974 practically stripped off the Aceh special region 
principles and removed the influence of Ulama (Muslim clerics) in the governance. This was 
followed by the embedment of armed forces in Aceh to “defend national economic interests, 
to prevent the emergence of opposition forces, and to monitor and control those ‘legitimate’ 
political parties that had helped to elevate Suharto to power” (Miller, 2012).  
The discontentment eventually grew and led to the establishment of Acheh-Sumatra National 
Liberation Front – ASNLF, locally known as GAM, in 4th of December 1976, “re-declaring the 
‘free and independent Sovereign State of Aceh-Sumatra.” The conflict virtually ended in august 
2005, with the signature of the peace agreement between GAM and the government of 
Indonesia (2005). The peace agreement was soon followed by the general election which 
appointed Irwandi Yusuf, a former GAM official, as the governor of Aceh for the period of 2007 
– 2012. In 2012, Irwandi Yusuf lost the general election to Zaini Abdullah, who was also a former 
high-rank official of GAM. As an overview of the conflict in Aceh has been presented, the 
following section will provide a discussion on the main issues in post-conflict reconstruction as 
identified from the literature.  
2.5.7.1 Post-conflict reconstruction 
From their experience in the post-conflict reconstruction in East Timor, Rohland and Cliffe 
(2002) highlight several key lessons learned from different perspectives, including pre-mission 
planning and readiness, financial mobilisation and aid coordination, as well as reconstruction 
design and implementation. They suggest that in the planning period, early engagements of 
stakeholders, clear roles and responsibilities between institutional organisations and a “truly” 
joint planning between the national counterparts and donors are the key lessons learnt to 
successful post-conflict reconstruction. From the financial aspect, they also add that the 
inappropriate complexity of aid financing mechanism experienced in East Timor hindered 
national ownership and prevented the integration of funding sources into the national budget. 
Finally, the reconstruction design and implementation phase should well consider finding the 
right balance between building human and institutional capacity and the management of 
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emergency rehabilitation and services. Here, the reconstruction may need to make a trade-off 
between reconstruction speed and national capacity building. Additionally, “the use of 
community-driven approach, non-governmental and private sector capacities, as well as the 
prompt response to building procurement and payment systems are argued to help accelerate 
reconstruction and service delivery. 
Additionally, Billon and Waizenegger (2007) confirm that the pre-disaster political trends have 
a significant impact on the post-disaster conflict outcomes and that the spatiality of conflicts 
and disaster as well as the post-disaster condition of governable spaces and public discourse 
determine the political fallouts of the tsunami in Aceh and Sri Lanka. It is also argued that the 
historical hostility experienced by a nation has a strong influence to the current stage of ethno-
political conflict, which ultimately hinders the process of nation building. It is also argued that 
cultural and ethnic distinction have been enhanced, or even created, by the colonial process 
which exercises a divide-and-rule policy and promotes ethnic identities (Smith AD, 1979 cited 
in Imtiyaz and Stavis, 2008). With regards to political fallouts of disaster, they further suggest 
two main arguments. First, disasters may result in political changes. This is particularly due to 
the resulting grievances among the affected population and the more acute sense of identity, 
the enhanced legitimacy for the political leadership and the greater scrutiny over dominant 
institutions and development policies, shifting of political actors, and post-disaster 
spontaneous collective action. Conflict also changes the behaviour, preferences and 
institutional functioning resulting from the compromised security of individuals and 
communities (World Bank, 2009a). Second, the pre-disaster context and trends of politics 
largely determine the political fallouts of disasters. They believe that with regards to conflict 
transformation, disasters accelerate and amplify the pre-disaster social and political dynamics, 
rather than providing a ‘new departure’ as a result of the devastating impact of disasters.  
Billon and Waizenegger (2007) also conclude that disaster may provide an opportunity for 
peace building due to changes in the value structure among survivors, the mutual needs for 
relief assistance, enhanced local political socialisation and mobilisation, as well as international 
involvement and disaster diplomacy. On the other hand, conflict can also greatly adverse the 
growth of political, social and economic institutions which impacts affect the economies in the 
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post-conflict period (World Bank, 2009a).Some of the major concerns in post-conflict 
reconstruction will be discussed in the following section.  
2.5.7.2 Post-conflict reconstruction and development discourse 
According to Anand (2005), post-conflict reconstruction is relevant to the development 
discourse due to three things. First, conflict increases the challenge to development, 
particularly since most conflicts take place in the developing countries. Second, since conflict 
frequently affects the poor people, it exacerbates the inequality, hence hindrance the MDG 
achievement. Thirdly, conflicts seem to influence aid priorities creating a ‘crowding-out’ effect.  
Additionally, Based on their study on the post-conflict reconstruction in East Timor, Rohland 
and Cliffe (2002) highlight the need to link the design and implementation of reconstruction 
programs to the four objectives of reconstruction, which are to build technical and managerial 
capacity, to achieve rapid physical reconstruction, to restore service delivery, and to establish 
sustainable policies and institutions. Additionally, Anand (2005) also suggests to link 
reconstruction programs with poverty reduction- as one of the MDGs targets, effective 
governance and state reconstruction, as well as conflict prevention and peace.  
 
Figure 2.14 – Post-conflict reconstruction objectives  
Source: Rohland and Cliffe (2002), and Anand (2005) 
The post-conflict reconstruction objectives as illustrated in Figure 2.14 are by no means 
exhaustive and are open for discussion. However, they provide a general understanding and 
basic principles to be considered in any post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Additionally, in the 
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post-conflict reconstruction, as well as post-disaster reconstruction, it is widely approved that 
the efforts should also operate within the Build Back Better principle, an effort to reconstruct 
the affected areas beyond its original condition. Even though the interpretation of Build Back 
Better is not clearly defined, Kennedy et al. (2008) suggest that the build back better principle 
should cover five topics; materials, construction, community participation, standards, and 
grants. They further argue that the Build Back Better should be evaluated and measured from 
four aspects; (i) safety, security and livelihoods, (ii) improved connection between post-disaster 
reconstruction outcomes and the permanent communities, (iii) fairness and equity, (iv) 
connecting relief and development by tackling the root causes of vulnerability.  
The above section has provided general understanding on the post-conflict reconstruction, as 
well as its links with the development discourse. Accordingly, the following sections will 
elaborate the major concerns in a post-conflict reconstruction.  
2.5.7.3 Major concerns in a post-conflict reconstruction 
Anand (2005) argues that the reconstruction of infrastructure in a post-conflict setting has to 
face at least nine challenges, which make post-conflict reconstruction different from 
infrastructure development in the normal condition. The first challenge is with regard to 
conflict as often a complex situation. Whilst most conflicts rooted to three main causes, 
economic, political, social and historical causes, they often interact to each other hence it is 
difficult to isolate or identify a single cause of conflict. The second challenge is the different 
perception on the level of importance of infrastructure reconstruction, which is mainly due to 
the severity of infrastructure damages and its role in the overall post-conflict reconstruction. 
Third, conflict normally weakened the institutions, erodes trust, and increases transaction 
costs. Where the main cause of conflict is due to ethnic fractionalisation, the principles of 
fairness and equity may be more crucial than resource efficiency. Fourth, problems and failures 
in the infrastructure reconstruction can be used by the opponent of peace as a weapon to 
confront the legitimacy and effectiveness of the reconstruction process, leading to demoralized 
workers and delays. Fifth, post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction may experience the 
problem of ‘missing-baseline, which among others is due to the fact that post-conflict 
reconstruction needs to cover beyond what were actually damaged by the conflict, but also 
those which have deteriorated due to maintenance neglect, and those required to accelerate 
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the recovery. The sixth challenge is regarding the displacement of people. On the one hand, 
this will lead to a concentrated influx of displacement people, which eventually challenges the 
limited ability to appropriately take measures. On the other hand, displacement and migration 
also affect the availability and capacity of the human resources needed for the reconstruction. 
Seventh, the role of visual media may exaggerate the effect of infrastructure failure, frequently 
leading to donor agency working in ‘sort things out quickly’ rather than correctly. Eight, the 
involvement of international bodies and transition government may increase the expectation 
of local community regarding the standards and quality of infrastructures to be provided, 
regardless of whether such expectations are appropriate or affordable. The ninth major 
challenge is the governance dilemma with regards to determining the higher priority between 
institutional rebuilding and infrastructure reconstruction. Whilst institutional rebuilding may 
take significantly long time, reconstruction of infrastructure facilities in the absence of 
appropriate institutions may delay conflict recovery, particularly resulting from the better 
access for rebels to group and move or for the state military forces to oppress certain ethnic 
groups.  
2.6 Summary and the links 
This chapter reviews and synthesises the existing literature on the issues relevant to the 
research with the aim of capturing the knowledge and understanding with regards to the issues 
surrounding the disaster and disaster management (section 2.2), post-disaster road 
reconstruction (section 2.3), and the road infrastructure maintenance (section 2.4). This 
chapter has also provided thorough discussions and overviews on the context of disaster and 
road infrastructure condition in Indonesia and the Aceh province (section 2.5). The structural 
hierarchy of the governments, the financial and budgeting mechanism, and the special 
autonomy status of Aceh province have been described. Additionally, the general disaster 
trends, the impact of the earthquake and tsunami in 2004 in Indonesia, as well as the roles and 
tasks expected from the disaster management agency in Indonesia have been elaborated in 
detail. All of the aforementioned references to the literature eventually lead to the 
identification of problems, which justify and help shape the research objectives, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter.  
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Chapter - 3  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the comprehensive process of literature review and synthesis 
observing the various aspects of the research topics and the identification of the research gaps. 
Accordingly, this chapter rationalises the research methodology adopted in this study and will 
be presented in the following order. 
 First, the process that leads to the derivation of aims, objectives and research questions 
of the study will be discussed in section 3.2 . 
 Second, the identification of the research philosophy, research approach, research 
strategy, research choice, time horizons and data collection analysis technique which 
follow the Saunders onion approach is presented in the research methodological design 
in section 3.3. 
 Third, the writing up process of the PhD thesis is elaborated in section 3.4. 
 Ultimately, the credibility of the research is presented in section 3.5.  
3.2 Derivation of aim, objectives and research questions  
3.2.1 Initial stimulus for the research 
The researcher’s interest in the disaster management and post-disaster reconstruction issue 
initially emerged due to his personal work and life experience. First, as the researcher lived in 
the city of Banda Aceh, Indonesia, which was heavily devastated by the tsunami in December 
2004, he witnessed and experienced himself the impact of the disaster to both the community 
and the built environment. Second, during the post-disaster reconstruction period, the 
researcher was also involved in the reconstruction through his assignments in a number of 
organisations working in the post-disaster recovery, including one which was involved in the 
reconstruction of infrastructure facilities throughout Aceh and Nias. It was during his 
assignment in the reconstruction of infrastructure facilities that he had his initial first-hand 
experience to learn about the challenges and issues in the reconstruction of road infrastructure 
in a post-disaster setting. The technical aspect of road construction, mixed with the financial, 
political, legal and socio cultural issues, complicated the project management and 
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reconstruction efforts. At this point, the researcher’s interest to study more about post-disaster 
road infrastructure reconstruction grew. Third, as part of the post-disaster reconstruction 
initiatives, the government of Aceh launched a scholarship program for Acehnese people 
wanting to continue their study to a higher degree in order to recover their human resources, 
which were killed by the tsunami. The researcher applied for a place and was granted a 
scholarship to pursue a PhD degree.  
These three factors accordingly and sequentially acted as the initial stimuli for the researcher 
to conduct a research on a PhD level. As the researcher’s previous education was in the civil 
engineering and construction management areas, the PhD research was accordingly focused 
on the management aspect of the post-disaster road infrastructure reconstruction issue.  
Even though the initial stimuli grew a strong interest to conduct a research in road 
infrastructure reconstruction issue, there were many aspects in the area that could and needed 
to be researched. To help funnel down the subject of interest and investigate the gaps in the 
body of knowledge, a literature review process was then conducted.  
3.2.2 Literature review 
For the literature review, the research commenced with broadly observing the context and 
identifying the gaps in the disaster management issue in Indonesia. Each phase of the disaster 
management cycle was examined and linked with the context of the local government in the 
developing countries and ultimately connected with the Indonesian context. Furthermore, a 
cross-sectional literature review was also conducted. Not only this process focused on the 
different phases of the disaster management cycle, it also scrutinised the different aspects and 
issues of the road management with regards to the disaster management cycle. At this point, 
the literature review process resulted in a number of issues potential for the research topics.  
A more extensive literature review was then conducted in order to narrow down the potential 
research foci to the one that was suitable for the study. Journals, project reports, books, and 
webpages were incorporated as sources of information. Through the extensive literature 
review, the researcher then found that there were many issues identified in the road 
construction projects. The high uncertainties of field conditions and the high dependency of 
road projects on the weather and environmental condition, for instance, turns it to be the type 
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of projects with most possibilities of disruptions resulting in delays and cost escalations (please 
refer to section 2.3.4 of chapter two). On the other hand, the chaotic and dynamic nature of 
post-disaster reconstruction also aggravated the challenges and obstacles commonly faced in 
the normal development context (section 2.3.5).  
Following the process of identifying and highlighting the potential research topics, a further 
literature review was again conducted. It was found that there was a gap in the literature which 
linked the issue of the road infrastructure maintenance with the post-disaster reconstruction 
process. Furthermore, all constraints, limitations, and the expected level of impacts that the 
outcomes of each topic alternatives might offer were put into consideration and were 
discussed with the supervisors. As a result, it was agreed that the study would be focused on 
linking the road maintenance and the post-disaster road reconstruction process. Following the 
establishment of the research focus, the initial aim of the study and a set of research objectives 
were then determined.  
3.2.3 Pilot interviews 
Following the extensive literature review process, two pilot interviews were conducted with 
the aim of fine-tuning the initially established set of aim and objectives of the study. The 
interviews were conducted with one consultant and one project manager who were involved 
in the post-disaster road reconstruction in Aceh, Indonesia. Both pilot interviews were 
conducted in semi-structured approach, using Skype teleconference facility. As a result, the 
pilot interviews were able to help the researcher highlighting the following concerns: 
 As the post-disaster reconstruction activities had been virtually ended, there were 
concerns over the sustainability of the reconstruction assets.  
 Due to the decentralised system, most of the reconstruction assets were registered at 
the district level. Hence, the local governments played the most important roles in 
maintaining them.  
 There is a need to identify the underlying problems of the road maintenance issues.  
From the pilot interviews, the aim, objectives, and the research questions of the study were 
further refined as presented in section 3.2.5. The process of the development of the final aim, 
research objectives and research questions is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 – Research Problem Identification Process 
 
3.2.4 Identification of the research problem 
As stated by Sekaran and Bougie (2013), a problem statement is academically relevant if 
nothing is known about a topic, much is known about the topic but the knowledge is scattered 
and not integrated, much research on the topic is available but the results are (partly) 
contradictory, or the established relationship does not hold in certain situations. In addition to 
being relevant, they further suggest that research problem also needs to be feasible, i.e. can 
be answered within the research restrictions. The restrictions may be due to time, money, 
availability of data, and expertise of the researcher. Accordingly, the process of identifying the 
research problem needs to put into account these constraints.  
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A significant number of studies have been undertaken by many researchers on the importance 
and challenges faced in the development of road transport infrastructure as described in the 
following. Perera et al., (2009) discovered how road construction projects are exposed to 
various risks thus requiring better handling strategies. Anapolsky (2002) and Waters (1999) 
identified the challenges associated with road construction projects in Montenegro and Poland, 
while Chang (2000) tried to evaluate losses and impact of earthquakes and the recovery of Port 
Kobe in Japan.  
A number of studies also reveal that cost escalation has been a major issue in a road 
construction project. In response, studies have been undertaken to analyse bid patterns 
(Trefor, 2005), identify major causes of delays and their significance to road project delivery 
times (Odeck, 2004, Kaliba et al., 2009) and the development of the Neural Network based cost 
forecasting model (Hegazy and Ayed, 1998, Wichan et al., 2009). Moreover, Paul et al., (2009) 
conducted a study on eliminating delays through development of rapid construction method 
decision making. In addition to the previous list, studies on the impact of road construction 
projects on the community have also been undertaken into woman’s occupations in Nigeria 
(Porter, 1995) and post-harvest crop losses in Malawi (Cheesman, 1993). 
Despite the many studies that have been published on disasters and road construction areas, 
very little literature specifically covers the maintenance aspect of the road reconstruction in a 
post-disaster context. It is argued that the complexity and dynamic situation of working in a 
post–disaster environment requires particular discussion and should be distinguished from 
projects in a normal development context. Accordingly, the aim of this study is to fill the gap in 
the body of knowledge with regards to the maintenance of the post-disaster road 
reconstruction assets. 
3.2.4.1 Opportunities in a disaster 
As previously discussed in section 2.2.3.1, despite the damage and loss that disasters may cause 
to development, disasters may also provide opportunities. On the one hand, disasters may 
cause great suffering to people and cause significant setbacks in the development of a country 
through destruction of decades of social and economic investment, as well as the redirection 
of funds, which could have been used for development and reconstruction (UNDP, 2004). On 
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the other hand, however, disasters also offer opportunities for physical, social, political and 
environmental development that may not have been available previously (Asgary et al., 2008). 
These opportunities were seen in Aceh and Nias post-disaster reconstruction. The amount of 
pledges made to Aceh and Nias exceeded the minimum fund required to restore the regions to 
their pre-disaster condition by US$1.3 billion (Subekti, 2009), therefore, it was possible to 
implement a 'build back better' scenario in the rehabilitation and the reconstruction of the 
affected region, beyond its original condition.  
3.2.4.2 Local governments’ poor road management capacity 
In general, the lack of Aceh’s local government capacity to maintain its assets has not been 
unrecognised. Burstedde (2009) identifies some gaps in the capacity of Aceh’s local 
governments in asset management, including “data completeness, – currency, -availability, – 
maintenance, business processes, government procedures, staff (capacity and skills), lack of 
commitment from the decision makers, lack of organisation, unclear responsibilities and 
technical infrastructure.” He also argues that to the local government of Aceh, asset 
management is “understood merely as a process of listing the asset inventory in a paper-based 
system; which resulted mainly from the requirement of the existing regulation.” Whilst 
Burstedde’s statement describes the gaps related to the asset-management issue in Aceh in 
general, these gaps are also relevant to the road infrastructure management in particular. 
Commitment from decision-makers and data completeness, currency, availability and data 
maintenance may lead to the preparation of inaccurate budget proposals and, hence, fund 
allocation. 
To conclude, the decentralised system makes the local governments responsible for the 
management of road infrastructure in the long term. Accordingly, the local governments’ roles 
and their capacities should be accounted for in a post-disaster road reconstruction plan. It is 
particularly important when the capacity of the local governments is poor and the amount of 
pledges made for the reconstruction of the region exceeds the actual needs; providing enough 
fund and greater opportunity to 'build back better’ and extend the scope of work required 
(please refer to section 2.2.3.2 regarding post-disaster reconstruction fund). Accordingly, a 
strategy to adequately incorporate the local governments’ capacity into the post-disaster road 
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reconstruction plan is considered to be the key to ensuring that the investment made in the 
road infrastructure reconstruction yields the maximum value.  
3.2.5 Research aim, objectives and research questions 
The process of identifying the research problems eventually led to the establishment of the 
aim, objectives and research questions of the study, which will be summarised as the following.  
3.2.5.1 Aim of the research 
The aim of the study is to evaluate the capacity of the local governments in the maintenance 
of the road infrastructure assets within the context of the post-disaster reconstruction process. 
3.2.5.2 Research objectives 
The following objectives are formulated to achieve the aim. 
 To explore the road infrastructure reconstruction process, policy and management 
model in Indonesia at the national and the local government level 
 To identify and analyse the obstacles and challenges of the road reconstruction in a 
post-disaster context. 
 To analyse the local government's roles in the road infrastructure reconstruction and 
their capacity in the maintenance of road infrastructure assets. 
 To develop a framework for post-disaster reconstruction of road infrastructure and the 
local government capacity in the maintenance of road infrastructure assets. 
3.2.5.3 Research questions  
In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, the following research questions have been 
identified: 
 What are the roles of local governments in the post-disaster road infrastructure 
reconstruction process? 
 What management model and strategy are used for the road maintenance in Indonesia 
at the national and the local government level? 
 What are the challenges faced by local government in the maintenance of road 
infrastructure assets? 
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 What is the status of the local governments’ capacity in maintaining the road 
infrastructure assets? 
The above section describes the aim, objectives, and research questions of this study. The 
following section will accordingly present the methodological design in which way they will be 
achieved and answered.  
3.3 Research methodological design  
Prior to conducting any research, it is essential that the methodology of the research is 
prepared. Research methodology is defined as the overall approach to be used in the research 
process, from the theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis of the data (Collis and 
Hussey, 2009). In order to explain the appropriate research methodology for this research, the 
researcher will follow the ‘research onion’ model proposed by Saunders et al., (2009). This 
model is followed due to its clear definitions and systematic order of process starting from the 
philosophical stance of the research in the outer layer, down to the central point of the research 
onion which is the data collection and data analysis process.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Saunders' Research Onion Model  
Source: Saunders et al. (2009) 
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However, researcher following the Saunders model of research methodological design should 
be aware that the components and layers of the onion are not mutually exclusive to each other. 
For instance, a researcher may adopt more than one research strategies (eq. utilising both case 
study and survey strategies for certain part of the research), and that a research may use both 
deductive and inductive approach for the different part of the studies.  
Having described the justification for using Saunders's onion model, the remainder of this 
section will accordingly elaborate the research methodology of this study following the steps 
of the research onion model, starting with the research philosophy as the first layer.  
3.3.1 Research Philosophy 
The outer layer of the research onion is the philosophy of the research. Saunders et al., (2009) 
express research philosophy as an over-arching term that relates to the development of 
knowledge and the nature of that knowledge. He also points out that the adopted philosophy 
and assumptions will underpin the research strategy and methods which follow as part of the 
strategy and it would be misleading to think that one philosophy is ‘better’ than another as they 
are ‘better’ at doing different things. Furthermore, Easterby-Smith (2002) suggests that 
understanding research philosophy is important for at least three reasons: 
 It can help to clarify research designs;  
 It can help the researcher to recognize which design will work and which will not 
 It can help the researcher to identify, and even create, designs that may be outside his 
or her past experience.  
Most literature classifies research philosophy into three main perspectives, namely ontology, 
epistemology and axiology (Saunders et al., 2009). Accordingly, the following paragraphs will 
provide a brief summary of each perspective and later describe the philosophical stance of this 
study. 
3.3.1.1 Ontology 
Ontology concerns the nature of reality and assumptions about the way in which the world 
works (Saunders et al., 2009). There are two aspects of the ontological position; objectivism 
and subjectivism. At one end of the spectrum, objectivism assumes that social entities exist in 
 113 
 
reality external to the social actor concerned with their existence. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the term subjectivism holds that social phenomena are created from the perceptions 
and consequent actions of those social actors concerned with their existence and is often 
associated with social constructionism that views reality as being ‘socially constructed’ by 
different social actors (Saunders et al., 2009). Remenyi et al. (1998) also stress the importance 
of knowing “the details of the situation to understand the reality or perhaps a reality working 
behind them.”  
3.3.1.2 Epistemology  
Epistemology concerns what is acceptable knowledge in a particular field of study (Saunders et 
al., 2009). In their book, Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) define epistemology as a general set of 
assumptions about the best ways of inquiring into the nature of the world. There are different 
names assigned to philosophical stances within epistemology, but they generally have similar 
meanings. Saunders et al. (2009) distinguish epistemological stances into positivism and 
interpretivism while Remenyi et al. (1998) categorise them as positivism and phenomenology.  
According to Saunders et al. (2009), a research using a positivism philosophy is likely to 
represent a natural scientific approach where only observable phenomena can lead to credible 
data. In a similar fashion, Remenyi et al. (1998) add that working within a positivism philosophy 
implies that the researcher is working with an observable social reality and that the end product 
of such research can be the derivation of laws or law-like generalisation similar to those 
produced by the physical and natural scientist. A researcher adopting a positivism approach 
will be concerned with facts rather than impressions and undertake the research in a value-
free way (Saunders et al., 2009).  
On the other end, the interpretivism approach recognises the differences that exist between 
humans as social actors and encourages the researcher to understand such 
differences(Saunders et al., 2009). The challenge for a researcher adopting the interpretivism 
approach would be to enter the social world of the research subjects and understand their 
world from their point of view (Saunders et al., 2009).  
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3.3.1.3 Axiology 
The third continuum in the research philosophy is axiology. Axiology is a branch of philosophy 
that studies judgement about values. These value judgments may lead to the drawing of 
conclusion which may be different from those drawn by the researcher with other values. The 
main emphasis in this philosophical branch is whether research assumptions are made in a 
value-laden or value-free environment (Collis and Hussey, 2009).  
3.3.1.4 Philosophical stance of this study 
Within the context of the research philosophy, the aim of this research is to evaluate the 
capacity of the local governments in the maintenance of the road infrastructure assets within 
the context of the post-disaster reconstruction process in Aceh, Indonesia. As this process 
involves different stakeholders and the fact that their ‘subjective’ perceptions and decisions 
collectively ‘socially construct’ what was seen as the road reconstruction ‘phenomena’, the 
ontological stance of this research falls on the subjectivism continuum. Additionally, this 
research adds special emphasis upon the involvement and the role of the local governments in 
the road reconstruction process. The different perceptions and experiences of the various 
stakeholders involved in the reconstruction process will be analysed. Their interpretation of the 
phenomena found in the road reconstruction process will vary according to, among other, the 
role, responsibility, capacity and level of experience of each stakeholder. Accordingly, this 
research recognises and values such differences and will therefore utilise the in-depth semi-
structured interviews with a number of stakeholders and experts to understand their different 
perceptions. From that point of view, the epistemological stance adopted by this research lies 
in the interpretivism approach.  
In addition, the data collection process includes interviews with different sources. The 
researcher believes that personal interaction with the interviewees is of high importance in 
order to obtain a good insight into the interviewees’ perceptions and to understand the context 
of the phenomena being discussed. Hence, from the axiological stance, this research will be 
value-laden in nature. 
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Figure 3.3 – The Research Philosophy of This Study 
 
The above figure summarises the philosophical stance of this study. Furthermore, following the 
Saunders research onion layers, the next section will discuss the appropriate research approach 
for this study. 
3.3.2 Research Approach 
According to Saunders et al. (2009), the research approach relates to the way in which theory 
is developed. There are two types of approaches to research, deductive and inductive. In the 
deductive approach, the researcher develops theory and hypothesis (or hypotheses), expresses 
the hypotheses in operational terms to explain the relationship between variables, and tests 
these hypotheses prior to examining the specific outcomes and if necessary, modifies the 
theory according to the findings (Robson, 2002 cited in Saunders et al., 2009).  
In the deductive approach, Saunders et al. (2009) describe that the causal relationship between 
variables is developed with the researcher being independent of what being observed in order 
to satisfy the principle of scientific rigour. In the inductive approach, in contrast, no theory is 
developed prior to data collection. Instead of creating a cause and effect link independently as 
in the deductive approach, a research using an inductive approach believes that an insight into 
the way in which humans interpret and perceive their social world is critical and is particularly 
concerned with the context in which such events take place.  
This research is mainly a combination of exploratory and explanatory. The main purposes of 
this research are to evaluate the post-disaster road reconstruction process in Aceh, 
Objectivism Subjectivism  Ontology  
Positivism Interpretivism 
  
Epistemology  
Value Free Value Laden  Axiology  
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investigating the capacity of the local governments in maintaining the reconstructed assets, as 
well as to understand the reasons behind the phenomena being studied.  
At the initial phase the research deductively obtained understanding and created certain 
assumptions based on the findings from the literature review and pilot interviews. However, at 
the later stage, apart from the understanding gained from literature and document reviews, no 
theories and propositions or hypotheses were made for testing. Instead, the primary data was 
collected through semi-structured interviews and document analysis from which a conclusion 
would be made at a later stage. Accordingly, from that perspective, this research mainly used 
an inductive approach. More details on the different approaches adopted in the study with 
regards to the development of theory are presented in Figure 3.4.  
 
Research aim and 
objectives
Pilot interviews
Initial stimulus
Literature reviews
Conceptual 
framework
Data Collection
Semi-structured 
Interviews
Individual case 
report
Individual case 
report
Individual case 
report
Cross case analysis Build initial theory
Triangulation of 
theory
Literature
Expert validation 
interview
Develop Theory
 
Figure 3.4 – The process of theory building 
 
The next layer of the research onion is the research strategy. Therefore, the various strategies 
suitable for this study are discussed in the following section.  
3.3.3 Research Strategy 
In conducting a research, there are a number of strategies or approaches that can be adopted. 
The choice of an appropriate research strategy for a study is based on the research questions 
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and objectives (Avison et al., 1999, Saunders et al., 2009), the extent of existing knowledge, the 
amount of time and other resources available and the philosophical underpinnings (Saunders 
et al., 2009).  
Yin (2003) divides research strategies into experiment, survey, archival analysis, history and 
case study. In addition to these strategies, Saunders et al., (2009) add action research, 
grounded theory and ethnography into the research strategy list. Each research strategy has its 
own advantages and disadvantages. However, a common misconception is that the various 
research strategies should be arrayed hierarchically and that certain strategy will only fit certain 
phase of the research (Yin, 2003). In fact, each strategy can be used for all three research 
purposes; exploratory, descriptive or explanatory. Instead of distinguishing the strategies 
hierarchically, Yin (2003) argues that there are three other conditions for identifying research 
strategy; the type of research question posed, the extent of control an investigator has over 
the actual behavioural events, and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to 
historical events. Even though each strategy has its distinctive characteristics, there are also 
large overlaps among them (Yin, 2003). The following table summarises characteristics of each 
strategy.  
Table 3.1 – Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies 
Strategy Form of research 
questions 
Requires control of 
behavioural 
events? 
Focuses on 
contemporary 
events? 
Experiment How, why Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, 
how many/much 
No Yes 
Archival analysis Who, what, where, 
how many/much 
No Yes/No 
History How, why No No 
Case study How, why No Yes 
Source: COSMOS, cited in Yin (2003) 
The first condition for identifying a research strategy concerns the type of research questions, 
which are commonly categorized into ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘how’, and ‘why’ type of questions 
(Yin, 2003). The purpose of this study is partly exploratory, which is to find out and understand 
what happened in the post-disaster road reconstruction in Aceh. This is reflected in the ‘how’ 
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type of research questions developed for this study, which includes ‘how was road 
reconstruction in Aceh managed and delivered at the local level?’ From this point of view, this 
study may therefore adopt any of the five strategies described above.  
However, the remaining questions of this study also include the ‘why’ type of questions, as the 
second purpose of this study is also explanatory. This means that in addition to finding out what 
actually happened in the road reconstruction process in Aceh through addressing some ‘how’ 
type of questions, this study is also aiming at understanding ‘why’ such phenomena occurred 
and therefore need to establish causal-links between the observed phenomena. For instance, 
through the interviews with the key stakeholders, this study aims to get an insight into the 
decision-making process, the process of finding and creating solutions for the challenges and 
obstacles experienced in the project delivery, as well as in the maintenance of the road assets 
once the construction is completed.  
Since the survey and archival analysis strategy may not be suitable to answer the ‘why’ type of 
research questions, as far as the research questions are concerned, the survey and archival 
analysis strategies are considered inappropriate for this study. Therefore, the experiment, 
history and case study remain the possible options of research strategy for this study.  
The second conditions that Yin (2003) emphasises is related to the ability and requirement to 
control the behavioural events. As summarised in Table 3.1, this condition is obviously required 
for an experimental method. The experimental method owes much to the natural science 
where the purpose is to study the causal-links through observing the effect of interventions of 
one independent variable towards another dependent variable (Hakim, 2000 cited in Saunders 
et al., 2009). Additionally, Yin (2003) stresses that experimental method is done when an 
investigator can manipulate behaviour directly, precisely and systematically. In order to achieve 
the greater control over aspects of the research, experiment researches are often conducted 
in the laboratories rather than in the field (Saunders et al., 2009). Since this research does not 
have control over the behavioural events being studied, conducting an experiment research is 
accordingly not possible. At this point, the remaining possible options for this study are the 
historical and case study method.  
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To identify the more appropriate strategy between the remaining two options, the third 
condition is applicable. This condition is related to the degree of focus on the contemporary as 
opposed to the historical events. Whilst the historical method focuses on past events where 
documents and cultural and physical artefacts are used as the main sources of evidence, the 
case study has two additional techniques not usually included in the historical method; direct 
observation and interviews (Yin, 2003). Many aspects of these research strategies are 
overlapping. However, the case study’s unique strength is its ability to use a vast range of 
source of evidence beyond that which might be available in a conventional historical study (Yin, 
2003). This research mainly concerns with issues that happened in the past - the road 
reconstruction in Aceh post-disaster recovery, which has now completed. However, even 
though the road reconstruction in Aceh has completed, it can be considered as contemporary 
since the issue is still relevant to present conditions and many of the stakeholders and experts 
involved in the process are still available to provide input for this study through interviews. 
Direct observation in the field is also possible to be used as one source of evidence for this 
study. Accordingly, based on the aforementioned justification, the case study method is 
considered to be the most appropriate for this research and thus is adopted.  
In addition to Yin’s list of research strategy, Saunders et al. (2009) add action research, 
grounded theory and ethnography as the possible options for research strategy. To complete 
the justifications for the research strategy selection, the following paragraphs will elaborate 
the possibility of using any of these alternatives for this study.  
According to Avison et al., (1999), action research is a unique method in the way it associates 
research and practice, so research informs practice and practice informs research 
synergistically. Saunders et al. (2009) stress the strengths of an action research strategy as it 
focuses on change, the recognition that time needs to be devoted to diagnosing, planning, 
taking action and evaluating, and the involvement of employees (practitioners) throughout the 
process. Additionally, action research is an iterative process involving both researchers and 
practitioners acting together on a particular cycle of activities (Avison et al., 1999) that forms a 
continuing action of diagnosing, planning, taking action and evaluating (Saunders et al., 2009). 
To achieve the intended objective, Schein (1999 cited in Saunders et al., 2009) emphasises the 
importance of involvement of the employee (as part of the research objects) throughout the 
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research process, as they are more likely to implement change they have helped to create. 
From this point of view, it is accordingly both the lack of the required access to perform 
intervention towards the organisation and phenomena being studied and the 
inappropriateness with the research objectives which hinder the adoption of action research 
as a strategy for this study.  
Additionally, grounded theory can be seen as a process of ‘theory building’ through a 
combination of induction and deduction approach (Saunders et al., 2009). In the grounded 
theory, data collection starts without the formation of an initial theoretical framework and the 
theory is developed from data generated by a series of observations that lead to the generation 
of predictions, which are then tested in further observations that may or may not confirm the 
predictions (Saunders et al., 2009). Even though this strategy is considered a possible 
alternative, it is argued that developing an initial framework based on the available literature 
on the road management and road reconstruction project in the non-disaster context as a 
starting point would be a more efficient and effective strategy. This approach is adopted based 
on the result of the literature review and the initial observation which suggests that most of 
the post-disaster road reconstruction projects are indeed delivered based on the best practice 
of road projects in a non-disaster context with the addition of some waivers and exceptions to 
accommodate the challenges, uncertainties and dynamic condition of a post-disaster 
reconstruction. Hence, even though considered as a possible alternative, grounded theory 
strategy is not selected for this study. 
The next research strategy is ethnographic. Saunders et al., (2009) refer to this strategy as “a 
research strategy that is very time-consuming and takes place over an extended time period as 
the researcher needs to immerse herself or himself in the social world being researched as 
completely as possible.” In addition to seeing the above factors as obstacles for this study, this 
study also does not see the benefit of immersing deeply into one particular group towards 
achieving the research objectives and answering the research questions of this study. 
Therefore, the ethnographic method is not suitable for this study.  
Based on the above reasoning and justification, the case study strategy is considered as the 
most appropriate strategy for answering the research questions of this study. However, as 
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Saunders et al., (2009) emphasise, the aforementioned research strategies should not be 
thought of as being mutually exclusive and that the combinations or use of more than one 
strategies in one research is, in fact, quite possible. The next section provides a more detailed 
discussion of the variant of case studies and one which is adopted in this study.  
3.3.3.1 Case study design of the study 
Having determined that case study as the appropriate strategy for this study, the next concern 
is with regard to the type of case study design, which best suited the research. Yin (2003) 
classifies four types of case study designs that are commonly used in research. The 2x2 cases 
study matrix consists of single and multiple-case study in one direction and the unit of analysis 
of the study – holistic and embedded designs – in the other direction. Simply, the types of case 
study designs are (1) Single-case holistic, (2) Single-case embedded, (3) Multiple-case holistic, 
and (4) Multiple-case embedded. The case study type matrix is shown in Figure 3.5.  
Case Case Case
Case Case
Unit of 
Analysis
Unit of 
Analysis
Unit of 
Analysis
Unit of 
Analysis
Unit of 
Analysis
Unit of 
Analysis
Single-case design Multiple-case design
Holistic
(Single unit of analysis)
Embedded
(Multiple unit of analysis)
 
Figure 3.5 – Basic types of case study design  
Source: Yin (2003) 
Compared to single-case study, multiple-case study designs have distinct advantages. A single 
case study is justifiable when the case represents (a) a critical test of existing theory, (b) a rare 
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or unique circumstance, (c) a representative or typical case, or when the case serves a (d) 
revelatory or (e) longitudinal purpose (Yin, 2003). Nevertheless, the most important advantages 
of a multiple-case study design are that the evidence can be more compelling and that the 
study is more robust. Therefore, Yin (2003) suggests that if the choice and resources are 
available, multiple-case design may be preferred as it may provide the possibility of direct 
replication and more powerful analytic conclusions. He also adds that if common conclusions 
are found from the cases, it will also expand the generalizability of the findings. Additionally, 
Amaratunga and Baldry (2001) suggest that multiple case study approach would strengthen the 
results through replication of the matching pattern which increase confidence in the 
robustness of the theory.  
The post-disaster road reconstruction in Aceh was coordinated by a government body specially 
established following the 2004 tsunami and the subsequent earthquake in 2005 called Badan 
Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi – BRR (Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency). Even though 
BRR was in charge for coordinating the overall reconstruction activities, the road reconstruction 
projects were run and funded by different donor agencies that used different approaches and 
regulations in their project. Additionally, the road reconstruction projects were scattered over 
the province of Aceh and Nias Island and had to involve different local governments with 
different levels of resources and capacities, and also with different environmental conditions. 
Hence, in accordance with Yin’s rationale for doing multiple-case design and the nature of the 
research objects, this study sees an opportunity to get better research outcomes if the multiple-
case study approach is adopted.  
As far as the unit of analysis is concerned, this study is focused on evaluating the capacity of 
the local governments in the maintenance of the post-disaster road reconstruction assets. The 
research will evaluate and link the road maintenance aspect with the process of post-disaster 
road infrastructure reconstruction. Therefore, the case study design for this research falls into 
the multiple-case holistic category, where the unit of analysis being the capacity of the local 
governments in the maintenance of the road assets.  
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Having discussed the various possible strategies to answer the research questions of the study 
which resulted in multiple-case holistic type considered as the most appropriate strategy, the 
following section will accordingly present the criteria of the case study.  
3.3.3.2 Case study criteria 
As discussed in section 3.3.3.1, it is argued that the most appropriate methodology to address 
the research aims and objectives as well as to answer the research questions is by adopting a 
multiple case study strategy. Accordingly, the study needs to develop a set of criteria within 
which districts are considered eligible for the study. For the purpose of answering the research 
questions of the study, the researcher has developed the case study selection criteria to justify 
the selection of the research focus areas. 
3.3.3.2.1 The district was directly affected by the 2004 earthquake and tsunami 
This research limits its focus on evaluating the capacity of the local governments to maintain 
the road reconstruction assets in the areas directly affected by the earthquake and 2004 
tsunami in Aceh Province, Indonesia. Therefore, the geographical areas concerned are the 8 
districts on the north and the West Coast area of the Aceh province which include: 
1. Aceh Besar,  
2. Aceh Jaya,  
3. Aceh Barat,  
4. Nagan Raya,  
5. Aceh Barat Daya,  
6. Aceh Selatan,  
7. Singkil and  
8. Simeulue.  
The geographical position of the district is illustrated in Figure 3.6 
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Figure 3.6 – Map of the Aceh Province and the tsunami affected districts  
in the West Coast area 
Being directly affected by the tsunami wave, the above 8 districts were eligible for the case 
study. However, in addition to being directly affected by the tsunami, there are also other 
criteria that need to be satisfied, which will be discussed in the following section. 
3.3.3.2.2 The district was established prior to the tsunami in 2004. 
The decentralised system in Indonesia allows for the separation and unification of districts. 
However, as stipulated in section 3.2.5.2, one of the objectives of the study is to analyse the 
roles of the local governments in the post-disaster road reconstruction process and their 
capacity in the maintenance of post-disaster road infrastructure assets. Additionally, as the 
study is also a cross-sectional study (refer to section 3.3.5 for more details), the case study 
districts for the research will need to be established prior to the tsunami disaster on 26th 
December 2004. This is a particularly important requirement as it will be irrelevant to conduct 
a cross-sectional research onto a subject that did not practically exist in the period of time on 
which the research is being conducted.  
More details on the establishment date of the West Coast Aceh cities and districts are 
presented in the following Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 – Establishment date of Aceh West Coast districts 
District/ City Establishment data References 
Aceh Besar 4 November 1956 Emergency Law no 7/1956 
Aceh Jaya 10 April 2002 Law no 4/2002 
Aceh Barat  4 November 1956 Emergency Law no 7/1956 
Nagan Raya 10 April 2002 Law no 4/2002 
Aceh Barat Daya 10 April 2002 Law no 4/2002 
Aceh Selatan  4 November 1956 Emergency Law no 7/1956 
Singkil 20 April 1999, Law no 14/1999 
Simeulue 4 October 1999 - Law no 48/1999 
 
Based on the above criteria, all of the 8 districts remain eligible for the case studies.  
3.3.3.2.3 The districts had road projects implemented under the post-tsunami reconstruction 
scheme 
As the study focuses on the post-disaster reconstruction of road infrastructure, the case studies 
of the research will need to have had road projects in their area under the post-disaster 
reconstruction scheme. From this perspective, all the above districts were also eligible for the 
study.  
3.3.3.2.4 The availability and access to data 
In addition to the aforementioned criteria, the blanket criteria will be the availability of access 
to data. Included here is the acceptance of the interviewees representing the districts to 
participate in the study through interviews.  
3.3.3.3 The selection of the case studies 
As the study adopted multiple-case studies approach, the replication logic was used in the 
selection of the case study. With regards to determining the number of case study in a 
qualitative study, Yin (2013) suggests that the process should be led by the findings of the 
original or the first case study. As he further explains, each additional case study must be 
carefully selected so that it either (a) predict similar results (literal replication) or (b) predicts 
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contrasting results bur for anticipatable reasons (theoretical replication). Accordingly, it is 
argued that the theoretical replication approach is more appropriate for a study which allows 
for replicating and conducting a relatively large number of case studies. The theoretical 
replication would be then used to support the initial proposition resulted from the original case 
study and the literal replication process conducted earlier. As this study is constrained by the 
PhD period, time, and resources (refer to section 7.4 of chapter 7 for more discussion on the 
limitations of the study), the study was accordingly focused on using the literal replication 
approach only.  
Amaratunga and Baldry (2001) argue that the process of selecting the cases for a research 
inevitably involved discretion and judgment, which may be based on convenient of access 
whilst exhibiting the appropriate components to be observed. Accordingly, as the starting 
point, the research commenced with Aceh Besar district as the main case study. Aceh Besar 
was selected as the main case study as it was one of the most devastated districts by the 
tsunami and was located near the provincial capital. Accordingly, the access to data, location, 
and the respondents for the interviews were expected to be more conveniently available to be 
used as a starting point. As it turned out later in the data collection process, the respondents 
from the Aceh Besar were among the first to respond to the researcher’s request for interviews.  
The case studies of the research were further progressed to also include other districts meeting 
the case study criteria as set in section 3.3.3.2 and was stopped when the data saturation had 
been achieved and that expanding the study was not expected to yield new information. The 
saturation point was achieved after collecting more data from the district of Aceh Jaya and 
Aceh Barat Daya. Accordingly, the case studies of this research were Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya, and 
Aceh Barat Daya.  
The above sections have presented and discussed in detail the research strategy adopted for 
this study, as well as the criteria and the process of the case study selection. Accordingly, the 
next section will elaborate the next layer of Saunders' research onion concerning the research 
choices.  
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3.3.4 Research Choices 
The next step of the research design according to Saunders’ research onion model is to 
determine the research choice. Research choice concerns whether qualitative or quantitative 
data, or both, is used for the study. Saunders et al. (2009) point out that the individual 
quantitative and qualitative techniques and procedures do not exist in isolation and classifies 
research choices into two main categories; mono method and multiple methods 
Mono method refers to using a single data collection technique and its corresponding data 
analysis procedures whilst the multiple methods is where more than one data collection 
techniques and analysis procedure is used to answer the research questions of a study. 
Furthermore, multiple methods can be divided into the multi-method and mixed-methods 
study. Multi-method is defined as using more than one method, either quantitatively or 
qualitatively, in a single study and analyse them in accordance with their relevant procedures. 
Meanwhile, mixed-method is defined as using both quantitative and qualitative data collection 
techniques and analysis procedures in one research design.  
Research Choices
Mono Method Multiple Methods
Multi Methods Mixed Methods
Multi Methods 
Quantitative Studies
Multi Methods 
Qualitative Studies
Mixed Method 
Research
Mixed Model 
Research
 
Figure 3.7 – Research choices  
Source: Saunders et al. (2009)  
Furthermore, when quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis procedures are 
used in parallel or sequential time in a study, the study is referred to as using a mixed-method 
research. Additionally, if the study combines the qualitative and quantitative techniques and 
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procedures, the study is referred to as using a mixed-model research. Accordingly, this study 
will organize more than one data collection techniques in the form of semi-structured 
interviews and documents. It will accordingly use the content-analysis technique for the data 
analysis procedures. Hence, from this perspective, this study falls into the multi-method 
qualitative-studies type of research. 
The next section will ‘peel off’ the next layer of the research onion, which is the time horizon 
of the study.  
3.3.5 Time horizon 
A better way of understanding the ‘time horizon’ aspect of a research is by looking at the 
features of the time horizon subdivisions. The time horizon of a study can be divided into the 
cross-sectional and longitudinal. A study is considered to be a cross-sectional when the study 
focuses on a particular phenomenon (or phenomena) at a particular time; while in contrast a 
longitudinal study focuses on a particular phenomenon (or phenomena) and observes their 
changes and developments over time (Saunders et al., 2009, Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). 
With regards to this issue, the main aim of the study is ‘to evaluate the capacity of the local 
governments in the maintenance of the road infrastructure assets within the context of the 
post-disaster reconstruction process’. Here, the study is looking at a ‘snapshot’ of time, which 
is the post-disaster reconstruction period; with particular attention given to the time when the 
maintenance of the post-disaster road infrastructure assets process took place. The study is 
also not trying to compare or observe changes to, or development of, any particular 
phenomenon being studied over a period of time. Hence, from a time horizon perspective, this 
research can be considered as a cross-sectional study.  
The next section will provide a brief discussion on the research techniques adopted in this 
study, which will include data collection and data analysis techniques. 
3.3.6 Research Techniques 
Research techniques relate to data collection and their analysis procedures. Walliman (2006) 
defines data as the raw materials of research that can be interpreted and refined into 
conclusions. Moreover, he argues that even though data can be collected from virtually 
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everywhere, it needs a plan of action that identifies and uses the most effective and 
appropriate methods of data collection. Accordingly, this section will elaborate on data 
collection techniques and the analysis procedures adopted in this study. 
One of the main advantages of case study research is the opportunity to employ various data 
collection techniques. According to Yin (2003), the sources of evidence for case study research 
may be obtained from six sources; documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, 
participant observation and physical artefact. To maximize the benefit of these sources of 
evidence he suggests to follow three principles; using multiple sources of evidence as it allows 
an investigator to yield a more convincing and accurate conclusion; creating a case study 
database which enables independent inspections and allows other investigators to review the 
evidence directly and not be limited to the written case study reports; maintaining a chain of 
evidence, which will allow the external observer to follow the derivation of any evidence and 
trace the steps in either direction.  
Furthermore, among the many sources of evidence that can be employed for a case study, this 
research will primarily collect data through documents, archival records, and semi-structured 
interviews. The following section will accordingly elaborate the data collection techniques 
adopted in this research, initiated with the discussion of documents as the source of evidence.  
3.3.6.1 Documents and archival records 
The post-disaster road-reconstruction projects in Aceh involved an extensive number of 
government bodies, NGOs, media, donors and international aid agencies. Accordingly, they 
have also produced a number of progress reports, lessons learnt reports, news articles - most 
of which are available for public access. These documents will be one of the main sources of 
evidence for this study. Also, information obtained from these documents, including the results 
from the literature reviews, was used to develop the list of questions used for the semi-
structured interviews. In addition to the aforementioned sources, legal and regulatory 
documents such as laws, presidential decrees, and government regulations would also be 
included as sources of evidence.  
In addition to documents and semi-structured interviews, archival records that come in the 
form of statistical data, maps and charts from the relevant agencies were also used as input to 
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this study. Among others, the archival records used in the study include the annual budget 
allocation and the statistical data of the respective case studies.  
3.3.6.2 Semi-structured interviews 
In addition to documents and archival records, semi-structured interview was also adopted as 
one of the data collection techniques. As stipulated earlier, in addition to answering the ‘how’ 
type of questions, this study is also trying to answer a number of ‘why’ questions. This requires 
profound understanding and justification over, for example, certain decision-making processes 
and solutions to particular issues. Such understanding is expected to be achieved by doing semi-
structured interviews with a number of stakeholders and experts in the road-reconstruction 
context.  
With regards to types of interviews, Saunders et al. (2009) highlights that a structured interview 
is conducted by presenting the interviewees a set of identical questions and also often in a 
same sequencing order and pre-coded answers. A structured interview aims at quantifying the 
responses, hence it is also called a ‘quantitative research interview’. On the other hand, 
unstructured interviews do not have a predetermined set of questions. The topic or topics of 
the interview are set, but the interview flows freely about the topic area. Questions are often 
posed based on the responses of the interviewee. This type of interview is also called as 
‘informant interview’ as it is the informant’s perception that leads the conduct of the interview 
(Saunders et al., 2009). An unstructured interview is more appropriate for the exploratory type 
of research.  
Semi-structured interviews sit between the aforementioned two types of interviews. When 
conducting semi-structured interviews, a set of topics and questions to be covered is prepared 
as the interview flow guidance. Saunders et al. (2009) emphasise that the topics and questions 
may vary from an interview to interview, according to the specific organisational context and 
relevance to the research topic. Additionally, the questions may not need to be posed in a 
sequential order, but rather depend on the flow of the interviews.  
By using a semi-structured interview, a researcher has the flexibility to explore the topics of 
interview by providing the interviewees a higher degree of freedom to communicate their 
perspectives which may not be available in a structured interview. On the other hand, by having 
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a set of topics and questions in hand, a semi-structured interview seems to be a more effective 
way to answering the research questions compared to the unstructured interviews where the 
respondent is given more control on the interview flow. Accordingly, based on the 
aforementioned advantages of the semi-structured interviews, this research adopted semi-
structured interviews as the primary data collection technique. The research conducted three 
types of semi-structured interviews; high-level, case-study, and expert validation semi-
structured interviews. Each of these types of interviews will be discussed in more detail in 
section 3.3.6.2.2, 3.3.6.2.3, and 3.3.6.2.4 which will be presented following the discussion on 
the sampling technique below.  
3.3.6.2.1 Sampling techniques 
With regards to the sampling techniques, there are two approaches that can be used for data 
collection, probability sampling and non-probability sampling (Saunders et al., 2009, Berg and 
Lune, 2012, Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). A sampling technique is referred to as probability 
sampling when the probability of each member of the population is known. On the other hand, 
when the probability of each member of the population being included as the samples is not 
known, it is called non-probability sampling. Determining which sampling technique is more 
suitable for a study depends on the nature of the research.  
As this research is trying to get insight into the capacity of the local government in the 
maintenance of the post-disaster reconstruction assets, and also aims at evaluating the process 
of the post-disaster road infrastructure reconstruction in Aceh, Indonesia, it would then require 
the involvement of participants that have knowledge and experience in this area. Accordingly, 
as the research is targeting participants with specific criteria, non-probability sampling is 
considered to be the most appropriate way to answer the research objective. This view is also 
supported by Berg and Lune (2012), who highlight that non-probability sampling tends to be 
the norm of a qualitative study.  
Berg and Lune (2012) underline that there are four types of non-probability sampling 
commonly used in a research; quota sampling, purposive sampling, snowball sampling, and 
convenience sampling. Similarly, Saunders et al. (2009) add self-selection sampling to the list. 
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Each of the sampling techniques has its own characteristic which selection should therefore be 
made based on the needs and nature of the research.  
For the purpose of the data collection utilising semi-structured interview, a combination of 
purposive sampling and snowball method were used. A purposive sampling obtains its samples 
based on the relevance and knowledge of the participants. Whilst the relevance is related to 
the issue or theory being investigated, the knowledge aspect is related to the knowledge and 
experience of the participants about the issue. Sekaran and Bougie (2013) refer to judgement 
sampling as one forms of purposive sampling, and emphasise that this method is used when 
the information being sought lies in a limited number of category of people. Therefore, in such 
a case, any type of probability sampling will not be useful.  
The purposive sampling method for the study was initiated by producing a list of interviewee 
criteria, based on their relevance and the expected level of knowledge and experience. The 
targeted interviewees were officials involved in the reconstruction of the road infrastructure 
who represent the main agencies involved in the reconstruction process. These include the 
BRR, donor agencies, planning agencies, public works, contractors and consultant. In addition, 
local government officials responsible for the planning and maintenance of road infrastructure 
were also included. At the next stage, government personnel responsible for the management 
of road infrastructure were identified. From the planning agency, officials responsible for the 
road infrastructure planning unit were included. From the public works department, the 
officials responsible for the management and the maintenance of the road infrastructure in the 
public works department were also included. Other relevant interviewees representing 
national government, donor agencies and private sectors were also identified. Furthermore, 
names and contact of the potential interviewees meeting the set criteria were obtained 
through reports, webpages, online search, as well as personal connection and referrals that the 
researcher had previously obtained. At the next step of the purposive sampling, the targeted 
interviewees were then contacted by email and telephone for their acceptance and willingness 
to be involved in the study. Further on, appointments were made at the agreed time and at the 
location suitable for the interviewees.  
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In addition to the purposive sampling method, the researcher was also aware that there might 
be relevant and knowledgeable respondents overlooked or not known to the researcher. 
Accordingly, the snowballing method was used to complement the purposive sampling 
method. The research sought advice and suggestions from different sources, including the 
targeted interviewees, regarding any relevant potential respondents suitable and available for 
the interview. The new referrals were then matched with the set criteria and were then 
contacted and asked for willingness to participate in the study, as well as to arrange the 
interview meetings. The research sampling methods adopted in the study are illustrated in the 
following Figure 3.8.  
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from reports, online search and 
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Contact potential 
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phone and emails
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Method
Snowballing 
Method
Seek Advise and 
Suggestion of 
names from 
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Figure 3.8 – Data collection technique and sampling method 
 
With regards to the sampling technique as illustrated by Figure 3.8, the differences between 
the purposive and snowballing sampling method lie mainly in the way of selecting respondents 
for the interview. In the purposive sampling method, names of respondents are determined by 
the researcher on purpose, based on the criteria that have been set previously, hence called 
purposive sampling. On the other hand, snowballing method involved names of respondents 
being obtained or referred to by someone, often by one of the interviewees. The referred 
respondents may also give another referral. The process of referring respondents in this 
method resembles a rolling snowball, hence called snowballing method.  
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Having a list of potential interviewees, the researcher would then contact the potential 
interviewees by email or telephone communication. They were explained about the objectives 
of the interviews and what were expected from them from the interviews. If the potential 
interviewees accept to participate in the interviews, the location and time for the interviews 
were allocated and agreed based on both interviewees and researcher availability. Prior to 
interview, the interviewees were given the informed-consent sheet and signed as a proof of 
their acceptance and willingness to be involved in the study, as well as to assure the interviews’ 
confidentiality. This sampling technique was adopted and applied to all three types of semi-
structured interviews conducted in this study. Accordingly, the discussion will progress to the 
first type of the semi-structured interviews of the study with the high-level and policy-maker 
personnel.  
3.3.6.2.2 High-level semi-structured interviews 
At this stage of interviews, the high-level and policy-maker personnel involved in the 
reconstruction and the maintenance of road infrastructure in Indonesia were interviewed. In 
total, ten respondents were interviewed, represented the disaster management agency, the 
ministry of public works, the planning agency at the national and the provincial level, and donor 
organisations. The profiles of the respondents are presented in Table 3.3.  
Table 3.3 – Profiles of respondents for the high-level semi-structured interviews 
No Code Organisation  Roles 
1 PM01 Disaster Management Agency Deputy for infrastructure 
2 PM02 Disaster Management Agency Deputy for finance 
3 PM03 National Planning Agency Director for Special Area and 
Disadvantaged Region 
4 PM04 Disaster Management Agency Director for Human Resource 
5 PM05 Provincial Government Provincial Secretary 
6 PM06 Provincial Planning Agency Head of road infrastructure planning 
7 PM07 Donor Organisation Project Manager 
8 PM08 Donor Organisation Operation Office 
9 PM09 Ministry of Public Works Head of National Road Service Region III 
10 PM10 Dept. of Transportation Head Division of road transportation 
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The respondents for this type of interviews were selected using a sampling technique as 
discussed previously in section 3.3.6.2.1. Prior to the interview, an interview guideline was 
prepared to capture the respondents’ perceptions on the challenges and obstacles experienced 
in the reconstruction and the maintenance of road infrastructure (please refer to Appendix B 
for the guideline). Particular focus was also addressed at the involvement and roles of the local 
governments in the post-disaster reconstruction in Aceh, with regards to the maintenance of 
the road infrastructure. The high-level interviews lasted for approximately 45 to 60 minutes. 
The data was then analysed using content analysis approach, which will be discussed in more 
detail in section 3.3.6.4.  
3.3.6.2.3 Case study semi-structured Interviews 
As explained in section 3.3.3.3, the research resulted in conducting three case studies; Aceh 
Besar, Aceh Jaya, and Aceh Barat Daya, all of which satisfied the requirement set as the case 
study criteria as discussed in section 3.3.3.2. As a result, eighteen respondents were 
interviewed at this stage, representing the three case studies which were selected based on 
the respondent criteria and sampling technique as described in section 3.3.6.2.1. Accordingly, 
the profiles of the respondents, and their affiliation to the case study are presented in Table 
3.4.  
As in the high-level semi-structured interviews, an interview guideline was prepared prior to 
the interview (please refer to Appendix C for the guideline). The interview guideline was 
prepared aiming at capturing the respondents’ views and experiences in the reconstruction and 
the maintenance of the road infrastructure. Respondents were also asked for their hindsight 
on the factors affecting the performance of the local governments in maintaining the road 
assets, the process of capacity building in road maintenance aspect in the case studies, as well 
as with regards to the links between the road maintenance capacity and the post-disaster 
reconstruction process.  
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Table 3.4 – Profiles of respondents for case-study semi-structure interviews  
and their case study affiliation 
No Code Organisation Case One 
Aceh Besar 
Case Two 
Aceh Jaya 
Case Three 
Aceh Barat Daya 
1 CS01 Planning Agency √ - - 
2 CS02 Public Works √ - - 
3 CS03 Public Works √ - - 
4 CS04 Public Works √ - - 
5 CS05 Contractor √ - - 
6 CS06 Contractor √ - - 
7 CS07 Consultant √ - - 
8 CS08 Planning Agency - √ - 
9 CS09 Public Works - √ - 
10 CS10 Public Works - √ - 
11 CS11 Contractor - √ - 
12 CS12 Public Works - √ - 
13 CS13 Consultant - √ - 
14 CS14 Public Works - - √ 
15 CS15 Planning Agency - - √ 
16 CS16 Public Works - - √ 
17 CS17 Consultant - - √ 
18 CS18 Consultant - - √ 
Total respondents 7 6 5 
 
3.3.6.2.4 Expert semi-structured interviews for validation 
The expert semi-structured interviews for validation involved interviewing experts in the area 
of post-disaster reconstruction and road management. This type of interview was aimed at 
validating and refining the findings of the research. The interviews were conducted in a semi-
structured approach, where the questions were posed in order to confirm whether the 
qualitative analysis of the data successfully captured the phenomena being researched.  
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Table 3.5 – Profile of respondents for the Expert validation semi-structured interviews 
No Code Professional Background 
1 Val01 Academic 
2 Val02 Consultant 
3 Val03 Consultant 
4 Val04 Academic 
5 Val05 Consultant 
 
The interview questions were with regards to the key research findings, grouped into four main 
categories; general responses of the local governments towards road maintenance, main 
factors affecting the local governments’ performance on road maintenance, post-disaster 
reconstruction process, safety and security issue in the post-conflict area. These categories 
were developed based on the findings from the semi-structured interviews with the 
stakeholders. The selection criteria of the interviewees were based on their experience. The 
interview guidelines are available in Appendix D. 
3.3.6.3 Relevance of the data collection techniques and research objectives 
This section aims to elaborate the links between the various data collection techniques (section 
3.3.6) and the research objectives (section 3.2.5.2). The main purpose is to demonstrate which 
of the data collection techniques were relevant and utilised to answer each particular research 
objectives. The following Table 3.6  summarises their relevance.  
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Table 3.6 – The Relevance of the Data Collection Techniques and the Research Objectives 
Research Objectives 
L
it
e
ra
tu
re
 R
e
v
ie
w
 
D
o
c
u
m
e
n
ts
 &
 
a
rc
h
iv
e
s
 
H
ig
h
-l
e
v
e
l 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s
 
C
a
s
e
 s
tu
d
y
 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s
 
E
x
p
e
rt
  
In
te
rv
ie
w
s
 
To explore the road infrastructure reconstruction process, 
policy and management model in Indonesia at the 
national and local government level 
√ √ √ √ - 
To identify and analyse the obstacles and challenges of 
road reconstruction in post-disaster context. 
√ √ √ √ - 
To analyse the local government's roles in the road 
infrastructure reconstruction and its capacity on road 
infrastructure management 
√ √ √ √ √ 
To develop a framework for post-disaster reconstruction 
of road infrastructure √ √ √ √ √ 
 
Having described the data collection techniques adopted in the study, the following section will 
accordingly discuss the data analysis process.  
3.3.6.4 Data analysis 
Data analysis procedures consist of examining, categorizing, tabulating, testing or otherwise 
recombining both quantitative and qualitative evidence to address the initial propositions of a 
study (Yin, 2003). Qualitative data refers to all non-numeric data or data that have not been 
quantified while quantitative data refer to all numeric data (Saunders et al., 2009). Developing 
a general strategy for data analysis is essential as it may reduce potential analytic difficulties 
(Yin, 2003). In accordance with the different data collection techniques employed in this study, 
there were also a number of steps of data analysis used for this study. Saunders et al., (2009) 
divide the processes of analysing qualitative data into three types of groups; summarising, 
categorisation and structuring of meanings, which can be used on their own or in combination.  
Prior to making an analysis, the data collected from the interviews were transcribed into written 
accounts. For the analysis, Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CASDAQ) 
was used as the aiding tool. In this case, the software used was NVivo version 10. Non-verbal 
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indications seen from the interview process will also be included as additional notes in the 
respective transcription. According to Saunders et al., (2009), using such software 
systematically may help establish the continuity and increase both the transparency and 
methodological rigour. In the next step, the recorded interviews were imported to the NVivo, 
followed by importing the transcriptions' files which were made earlier using the Microsoft 
Words 2013. By importing the transcripts onto the recorded interviews, the researcher can 
easily playback the relevant interview section to confirm and recheck the wordings, tone and 
mood of the interviewees. 
3.3.6.4.1 Content analysis 
Content analysis was carried out on the data gathered from the semi-structured interviews. 
Interview results were transcribed and imported to the NVivo audio files. Transcriptions were 
then coded on multiple stages approach called open coding, axial coding, and selective coding 
process. In the open coding process, information from the interviews was coded based on the 
main ideas of the emerging information. At this phase, any new information was coded into 
nodes unsystematically. No classification and grouping were done here. This process resulted 
in hundreds of nodes.  
At the later phase, the nodes were then classified and grouped into relevant themes. Up to this 
stage, the transcriptions were still in the original Indonesian Bahasa language. Since the 
researcher’s mother tongue is Indonesia, same as the interviewees, the transcription and data 
analysis process was remained in Bahasa. This was done to avoid any loss in of information in 
the translation process and due to the fact that the researcher feels that he may grasp 
information better if the data was analysed in his mother tongue. This process is called axial 
coding.  
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Figure 3.9 – Data Coding Process 
 
Once the axial coding process is finished, the transcription codes were translated into English 
and were manually exported to Microsoft Word documents for further elaboration and 
discussions in the form of thesis chapters and sections. In the translation and exporting process, 
information from the transcription was selected based on its appropriateness and relevance to 
the themes. Accordingly, this process is called selective coding.  
3.3.7 The research onion of this study 
Having described and elaborated the various layers of the Saunders Onion, the following Figure 
3.10 summarises the research methodology adopted by this study; following the research 
onion model of Saunders et al., (2009).  
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Figure 3.10 – Methodology of this research 
Adopted from Saunders’ Research Onion 
The above figure illustrated the different layers of the Saunders onion, representing the various 
methods, choices, approaches and strategies adopted for the study in order to answer the 
research questions. The next section will describe the thesis writing up process. 
3.4 Thesis writing up process 
The result of this research must be compiled and presented in the form of a thesis. Not only 
does the thesis keep records of what have been done throughout the PhD journey, it also shows 
the sequences and the logics behind each research decision. Even though the thesis is produced 
in the end of the research, the thesis writing up process was started in the very beginning of 
the PhD journey and was continually conducted throughout the research period.  
The above sections have discussed the research philosophical assumptions, approaches, 
strategies and various data collection techniques adopted in the study. They were presented 
and discussed to demonstrate and justify the various decisions made in the research. However, 
in addition to justifying decisions, a research will also need to ensure the quality of the works. 
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Accordingly, the following section is dedicated to presenting the various techniques adopted in 
this study in order to maximise the credibility of the research.  
3.5 Research credibility 
3.5.1 Reliability 
According to Saunders et al. (2009) the reliability of a research refers to the extent to which the 
data collection techniques or analysis procedures adopted in the study will produce consistent 
findings.  
Robson (2002) concludes that the reliability of a research may be threatened by four factors. 
The four threats represent biases and errors that can be caused by both the subject or 
participants and the observers. Practically, the four threats to the research reliability are: 
subject or participant error, subject or participant bias, observer error, and observer bias. The 
following figure shows the reliability threats in a 2x2 matrix.  
Participant Error Observer Error
Participant Bias Observer Bias
Participant Observer
Er
ro
r
B
ia
s
 
Figure 3.11 – Four Threats to Reliability  
Source: Robson (2002) 
According to Kirk and Miller (1986), there are three types of reliability; quixotic reliability, 
synchronic reliability, and the diachronic reliability. The quixotic reliability refers to a 
circumstance where a single method continually yields unvarying results. In order to achieve 
the quixotic reliability, the study adopted a multiple case study approach, which is aimed at 
claiming the literal replication by comparing the findings from the different case studies, as well 
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as from the different interviewees. The data collection protocols were also tested and 
consulted with several colleagues and experts in the research area prior to interviewing the 
respondents. Such a test was conducted in order to ensure that the interview questions are 
well understood and that the possible responses are in accordance with the researcher’s aims 
of proposing a particular question. 
The synchronic reliability, on the other hand, concerns the similarity of outcomes resulting from 
different observations of similar objects within the same time period. To ensure that the 
research findings would be synchronically reliable, the study developed a set of case study 
protocols which describe in detail and in consecutive order the research process. Such protocol 
is intended to minimise the errors and biases during the data collection process (Amaratunga 
et al., 2002).  
The third type of reliability, the diachronic reliability, relates to the stability of an observation 
over time. This type of reliability concerns whether the adopted research methodology would 
yield similar results and remain unchanged over different period of time. This type of reliability 
is argued to be applicable and appropriate to assess features which relatively remain 
unchanged over time, such as landmarks and buildings, and is more difficult to achieve with 
socio-cultural phenomena. The nature of the study, which is a cross-sectional (see section 
3.3.5), observes a phenomenon for a particular period of time. Accordingly, the research 
methodology adopted in the study is not expected, and is not likely, to yield similar findings 
should it is repeated in a different period of time. This is particularly due to the changes to the 
observed phenomenon over the period of time.  
3.5.2 Validity 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) research validity concerns ‘the extent to which the 
measures and research findings provide accurate representation of the things they supposed 
to be describing’. Thus, the validity of the research refers to whether the finding statements 
are ‘true’. According to Kirk and Miller (1986), a research is exposed to two types of validity 
threats. The first type of error is with regard to accepting a statement to be true when it is 
actually false. The second type of error, on the contrary, is rejecting and assuming a statement 
to be false when it is actually true. The validity of a research is accordingly affected by various 
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aspects, such as the impact of the researcher on the settings, the values of the researcher, and 
the true status of a respondent’s account (Silverman, 2009). 
Ensuring a validity of a qualitative research is therefore intriguing, particularly when the 
researcher has the adoption of axiological view in the study; acknowledging the impacts and 
influences of the different values to the research. However, as Silverman (2009) suggested, 
there are two forms of validation that can be adopted in a study; triangulation of data and 
respondent validation. In accordance to Silverman’s view, accordingly, the research adopted a 
multiple case study approach with different data collection methods; documents and archival 
records, semi-structured interviews which involved a wide range of interview respondents; 
stakeholders at different government level and from different type of agencies. The findings of 
the results were compared and contrasted with the literature, and were also validated by the 
experts on the research subjects with their comments and reviews.  
3.5.3 Generalisability 
Another aspect of credibility is research generalisability. According to Saunders et al. (2009), 
generalisability refers to whether the research findings can be equally applicable to other 
research settings. In other words, generalisability concerns whether the research can be 
repeated in other organisations, for instance, and can be expected that the similar result would 
be achieved. Based on the definition, generalisability is therefore probably one of the 
‘downsides’ of a research adopting a case study approach. As highlighted by Amaratunga and 
Baldry (2001), case study results can be generalised to the theoretical propositions (analytical 
generalisation) but not to the populations or universe (statistical generalisations). They further 
add that a case studies research should not be aimed at inferring global findings from a sample 
to a population but rather to understand and articulate patterns and linkages to the theoretical 
importance. A similar view is also proposed by Saunders et al. (2009) by suggesting that the 
purpose of the research adopting a case study approach will not therefore be to produce a 
theory that is generalisable to all populations. Accordingly, as the case respondents and the 
case studies were selected based on their relevance to answering the research questions, and 
were accordingly based on a set of criteria determined by the researcher, the results of the 
study may therefore be generalised only to areas or events that have similar characteristics and 
features to the case studies.  
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3.6 Summary and the link 
This chapter has presented a discussion on the research methodology adopted for this study. 
The discussion includes the various steps and processes involved in the research process. First, 
the identification and derivation of aim and objectives of the study were presented. The section 
covers the various steps and phases of the literature review process, leading to the 
identification of research problems. Second, the methodological design of the research was 
elaborated. In this section, the philosophical stance of the study was also discussed; including 
the data collection techniques adopted to answer the research questions. Next, the thesis 
writing up process has also been elaborated. Finally, the ways in which the credibility of the 
research, consisting of research reliability, validity and generalizability are assumed were also 
discussed. In this section, the various credibility measures expected from a research were 
presented, followed by the credibility measures which were aimed to be achieved by the 
researcher. 
Having discussed in detail the research methodology adopted in this study, the following 
section is accordingly dedicated to present and discuss the conceptual framework of the study 
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Chapter - 4  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter presented the methodological approach of the study. In this chapter, the 
process adopted in the development of the research conceptual framework will be discussed. 
The conceptual framework illustrates the key ideas and main subjects which are relevant and 
significant to the progress of the study, defines the relationship between them, and sets the 
boundaries within which the research will be conducted. Accordingly, the conceptual 
framework of the study will be elaborated in this chapter, which will be structured in the 
following order: 
 Firstly, the chapter begins by addressing the needs for establishing the conceptual 
framework in section 4.2 
 Secondly, section 4.3 covers the key issues of the study as identified from the literature 
review and pilot interviews 
 Thirdly, the process of conceptual framework development is presented in section 4.4 
 Fourthly, the chapter is concluded by presenting the conceptual framework of the study 
in section 4.5.  
4.2 Why a conceptual framework is needed?  
A conceptual framework was described by Miles and Huberman (1999) as a tool to explain, 
either graphically or in narrative from, the main issues to be studied and the presumed 
relationship between them. They further suggest that the conceptual framework is 
fundamental as it specifies who and what, will or will not be studied, and assumes their 
relationships. Accordingly, the development of the conceptual framework is an essential part 
of the research process.  
The ultimate aim of this research is to build some useful theories to be applicable in the area 
of road infrastructure maintenance in a post-disaster reconstruction context, using a case study 
as the research strategy (section 3.3.3). However, as noted by Yin (2003), a good case study 
research will eventually force the researcher to commence with a set of preliminary theory 
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related to the topic. Therefore, it confirms the need to pre-establish a theory or conceptualise 
the phenomenon prior to the data collection and data analysis process.  
Accordingly, prior to conducting the case study and interviews with the policy makers and the 
experts, a conceptual framework was developed, which was driven by the outcomes of the 
literature review and the pilot interview process. The conceptual framework demonstrates the 
need to evaluate the capacity of the local government in the maintenance of the post-disaster 
road infrastructure reconstructed assets. 
4.3 Identification of key issues for the development of the conceptual 
framework  
The key areas of the research, emerging from a comprehensive literature review process and 
the pilot interviews were used for the development of the conceptual framework. Accordingly, 
the emerging key issues can be listed as (i) the importance of road infrastructure to disaster 
recovery (section 4.3.1), (ii) post-disaster reconstruction as an opportunity for development 
(section 4.3.2), (iii) local government roles in disaster management (section 4.3.3), (iv) the 
national policy on road maintenance (section 4.3.4), (v) the importance of road maintenance 
(section 4.3.5), (vi) Post-conflict reconstruction (section 4.3.6). Each of these key issues will be 
discussed in the following sections.  
4.3.1 The importance of road infrastructure to disaster recovery 
A number of studies have shown that improvement in the road transport infrastructure may 
provide positive impacts to the community in various ways. As discussed in more detail in 
section 2.3.1, the improvement in road infrastructure may lead to increased market 
agglomeration, productivity and labour supply (Crafts, 2009), better trade, communication and 
economic and social growth, as well as increased international competitiveness (Anapolsky, 
2002).  
Within the disaster context, a functioning road network plays an important role at all three 
stages of the disaster cycle; pre-disaster, disaster and post-disaster. In the pre-disaster stage, 
well-planned road infrastructure may help avoid or minimise the impact of the disaster due to 
the application of preventive and adaptive design. In the post-disaster emergency and 
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reconstruction period, Grünewald et al. (2010) suggests that transport disruption into and out 
of the disaster affected area has been considered a vital constraint to the provision of efficient 
response in the emergency and post-disaster reconstruction activity. Collapsed road sections 
and bridges may lead to the distribution of aids and reconstruction materials to the isolated 
areas by the means of air and water transports, which could result in both prolonged delivery 
and high operational cost. As Chang et al. (2011) argue, the poor transport infrastructure in 
Aceh was among the factors that caused an increase in the transportation costs and the 
construction lead-time, which resulted in the higher construction costs and project delays (for 
more details, please refer to section 2.3.5 regarding Challenges and obstacles in post-disaster 
road reconstruction). Furthermore, with regards to the post-conflict areas, the road 
infrastructure plays a significant role in speeding up the development of the affected areas, 
which was abandoned and neglected during the conflict (more discussion is presented in 
section 2.5.7.2 regarding Post-conflict reconstruction and development discourse) 
4.3.2 Post-disaster reconstruction as an opportunity for development 
Whilst disasters may cause great suffering to people and cause significant setbacks to 
development, disasters also open a window of opportunity for development in the social, 
political and environmental aspects (Asgary et al., 2008). The efforts of promoting and 
implementing the build back better principle can also benefit from the increased political and 
media attention, which may not be available previously. More detailed discussion regarding the 
opportunity for development in the post-disaster reconstruction is covered in section 2.2.3.1. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which the post-disaster reconstruction can be implemented also 
depends on the availability of the fund. As discussed in section 2.2.3.2, there are 3 different 
scenario of fund availability in a post-disaster reconstruction; fund is inadequate to restore the 
affected areas to their original condition, fund is just adequate, and fund exceeds the amount 
required to restore the affected areas to their pre-disaster condition. Relating to this issue is 
the sustainability of the reconstruction assets (section 2.2.3.3) which determines the value of 
investment made in the reconstruction.  
 149 
 
4.3.3 The role of the local government in disaster management 
As discussed in section 2.2.4, the importance of the role of the local government in disaster 
management has been increasingly recognised by disaster management practitioners. Despite 
the growing recognition, and needs, of the roles of local governments in disaster management, 
local government capacity in disaster management has, arguably, been inadequate. As de 
Guzman (2003) argues, disaster management practices in most countries, particularly in the 
developing world, are more inclined towards managing the responses to disasters (which 
requires preparedness) rather than managing risks and the underlying conditions that lead to 
disasters (which among other actions requires risk assessment, vulnerability reduction and 
capacity enhancement). ISDR further argues that local governments have a crucial role in the 
disaster-recovery process as it will sustain development once the external stakeholders leave 
(ISDR, 2010). In a similar fashion, Kusumasari et al., (2010) underlines that local governments 
play an important role before, during and after the disaster because they know the community 
very well.  
Nevertheless, the capacity of local governments is frequently inadequate and often leads to 
local government being unable to cope with the problem of overload and is replaced by an 
improvised emergency government or by the higher level of authorities (Barton, 1970 cited in 
Wolensky and Wolensky, 1990).  
4.3.4 National policy on road maintenance  
Other key issues identified in the study are with regards to the national policy on the road 
management aspect. The level of government and road management authority responsible for 
the maintenance of the road infrastructure greatly determines the road infrastructure 
condition, particularly due to the different level of capacity that each of the government has, 
as well as the institutional arrangement between the different levels of authorities. As 
described in detail in section 2.5.3.2 of chapter 2, in the decentralised government system, the 
local government and the respective local road authorities bear the main responsibilities and 
authorities for the management of most of the road infrastructure networks. As also 
highlighted by Robinson and Stiedl (2003), the benefit of having a decentralised road 
management system in developing countries can only be assured through a long-term 
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investment in establishing an effective system at the local level and building the local capacity. 
Donnges et al. (2007) argue that such condition result from the lack of efforts to ensure that 
the local authorities possess the knowledge and skills to effectively deal with the road 
maintenance during the decentralisation process. They further argue that the existence of 
appropriate capacity is the key to the effective implementation of road maintenance, on top of 
the existence of the political will, changed attitude, and the financial availability.  
4.3.5 The importance of road infrastructure maintenance  
Improved road infrastructure may offer significant benefits to the road users through the 
provision of improved access, comfort, and lower vehicle operating cost (Burningham and 
Stankevich, 2005). However, to obtain the long-term impacts of the road improvement, a well-
planned maintenance program is required otherwise the design-life may not be reached, and 
the investment may not yield the expected value (more details are discussed in section 2.4.1). 
As highlighted by Martinez (2001), road deterioration may lead to at least three important 
consequences; increase in vehicle operating cost, increase in investment cost, increase in the 
number of accidents.  
Even though road pavements are generally designed to last to 20-40 years, there are a number 
of factors affecting the pavement performance which determines pavement design life and the 
needs for maintenance. Additionally, the designed life of road infrastructure is described 
assuming that proper road maintenance works are carried out when they are required. 
However, road deterioration does not immediately occur in the early years of completion. 
According to Harral and Faiz (1988), typically two-thirds of the pavement deterioration 
problems take place in the final third of the pavement design life. Within the first two-third of 
the period, also called as the grace period, road pavement may survive even without 
maintenance; after which road maintenance needs may surge dramatically. Within the grace 
period, typically the initial four to five years of road construction, road may not show any 
deterioration at all. Nevertheless, this fact could be misleading as people may get too focused 
on the roughness of the road surface and ignore the actual structures which help achieve or 
maintain the road roughness over time which failures are not immediately visible.  
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4.3.6 Post-conflict reconstruction 
In a post-conflict reconstruction, early engagements of stakeholders, clear roles and 
responsibilities between institutional organisations and a “truly” joint planning between the 
national counterparts and donors are the key lessons learned to successful post-conflict 
reconstruction (Rohland and Cliffe, 2002). It is also suggested that the reconstruction design 
and implementation phase should well consider finding the right balance between building 
human and institutional capacity and the management of emergency rehabilitation and 
services. Furthermore, “the use of community-driven approach, non-governmental and private 
sector capacities, as well as a prompt response to building procurement and payment systems 
are argued to help accelerate reconstruction and service delivery. 
Nevertheless, Billon and Waizenegger (2007) confirm that the pre-disaster political trends have 
a significant impact on the post-disaster conflict outcomes and that the spatiality of conflicts 
and disaster as well as the post-disaster condition of governable spaces and public discourse 
determine the political fallouts of the tsunami in Aceh and Sri Lanka. It is also argued that the 
historical hostility experienced by a nation has a strong influence to the current stage of ethno-
political conflict, which ultimately hinders the process of nation building. With regards to 
political fallouts of disaster, Imtiyaz and Stavis (2008) also suggest that disaster may result in 
political changes and that the pre-disaster context and the trends of politics largely determine 
the political fallouts of disasters. They further added that with regards to conflict 
transformation, disasters accelerate and amplify the pre-disaster social and political dynamics, 
rather than providing a ‘new departure’ as a result of the devastating impact of disasters. 
Additionally, Billon and Waizenegger (2007) also conclude that disaster may provide an 
opportunity for peace building due to changes in the value structure among survivors, the 
mutual needs for relief assistance, enhanced local political socialisation and mobilisation, as 
well as international involvement and disaster diplomacy. On the other hand, conflict can also 
greatly adverse the growth of political, social and economic institutions which impacts affect 
the economies in the post-conflict period (World Bank, 2009a). 
The identified key issues, as discussed in sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.3.4, and 4.3.6 
above were then incorporated into the conceptual framework. The process of conceptual 
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framework development will be discussed in the following section. However, the initial 
conceptual framework would be refined as the research progressed.  
4.4 Development of the conceptual framework  
This section covers the process of the development of the conceptual framework. The 
development of the conceptual framework was initiated by identifying the key issues of the 
study resulting from the literature review process. Following this process, the identified key 
issues were further refined in the second phase of literature review and used as input and 
guidelines for the pilot interviews. The process was later followed by the refining the 
boundaries of the study, the key concepts, and the interrelationship between them. The 
process of the conceptual framework development is illustrated in Figure 4.1, and the resulting 
conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 4.2.  
Literature Review
Key 
concept
Key issue Key issue
Key issue
Pilot interviews
Key 
concept
Key 
concept
Inter-relationships
Conceptual 
framework
Specific Literature 
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Figure 4.1 – Development of Conceptual framework 
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The following sections elaborate how the key issues lead to the process of key concept 
identification and definition of the boundaries, as well as the inter-relationship between them.  
4.4.1 Key concepts 
As a result of the literature review process, the identified key issues of the research were 
further refined through specific literature review and pilot interview process. As discussed in 
section 3.2.3, the pilot interviews underline the concerns regarding the sustainability of the 
road infrastructure reconstruction assets. Particular emphasises were further addressed to the 
capacity of the local governments in road maintenance who bear the greatest responsibility to 
maintain the infrastructure in the decentralised government system. The respondents also 
highlight the lack of awareness of the local government towards the importance of 
maintenance and further suggest identifying the underlying problems.  
Accordingly, the key concepts for the development of the conceptual framework are therefore 
the road reconstruction process, the involvement of the local government in the road 
reconstruction process, and factors affecting local governments’ capacity in road maintenance. 
Additionally, the impact of the post-conflict is also considered as one of the key concepts. 
Having identified the key concepts of the conceptual framework, the following sections will 
describe the relationship between the identified concepts.  
4.4.2 Interrelationships between key concepts 
Having presented the key concepts of the conceptual framework, this section will elaborate the 
relationship between them. This research merges two major areas; the disaster management 
and the road infrastructure maintenance. Both subjects are connected by the need to restore 
and improve the road infrastructure condition damaged by the disaster. This is particularly due 
to the life cycle of the road infrastructure, which spans between two periods of time; the 
planning, procurement, and the construction processes which take place during the disaster 
recovery period, and the operation and maintenance processes which take place in the post-
reconstruction period.  
Due to the inadequate capacity of the affected local governments to take the lead to restore 
the damaged road infrastructure, the road reconstruction activities were performed by the 
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national government and donor agencies. Since the local governments are held responsible for 
the long-term maintenance needs, there is accordingly a need to explore the involvement of 
the local government in the road reconstruction process as one of the main stakeholders of the 
road infrastructure.  
Furthermore, after completion, the reconstructed road assets were handed-over to the local 
governments for the operation and maintenance. Since the maintenance capacity of the local 
governments has been renowned to be limited, the research highlights the need to evaluate 
the capacity of the local governments in the maintenance of the post-disaster road 
reconstruction assets and identify the underlying problems of the road maintenance issue, 
which will be linked back to the post-disaster reconstruction process. These issues eventually 
demonstrate the interrelationship between the key concepts. The contributions that each of 
these key concepts provides to the capacity of the local government in maintaining the post-
disaster road reconstruction assets are illustrated in the conceptual framework.  
4.4.3 Boundaries  
Once the key concepts and the relationship between them have been identified, the conceptual 
framework requires a clear definition of the research boundaries. The specific literature review 
and pilot interviews suggest that unlike the normal development process, post-disaster 
reconstruction frequently engages great scale and rapid reconstruction activities. Also, 
assuming the fund is sufficient, post-disaster reconstruction would also be used as an 
opportunity for the physical, social, political, and the environmental development such as 
better road construction and the expansion of the road networks, which is aimed to reduce 
isolation and improve the economic condition (section 2.2.3.1). Nevertheless, the literature 
suggests that the road infrastructures in the developing countries suffer from rapid 
deterioration and loss of investment, due to the lack of maintenance. A study of Harral and Faiz 
(1988) regarding the road maintenance in 85 countries concludes that as much as $45 billion 
worth of investment in the road infrastructure could have been saved by a provision of less 
than $12 billion of preventive maintenance. Another study confirms that the rehabilitation of a 
paved road after 15 years of lack of maintenance may cost as much as $200,000 per km, whilst 
the provision of regular maintenance for the 15-year period will only cost as much $60,000 per 
km (Heggie, 1996).  
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In the event of the earthquake and tsunami on December 26th 2004, twelve countries were 
affected by the disaster. In Indonesia, the province of Aceh was the most devastated area. From 
the road infrastructure perspective, more than 3600 km of road networks were reconstructed. 
This condition raised a concern over the maintenance of the extensive reconstruction assets. 
Accordingly, the boundary of the research was defined as the post-disaster reconstruction of 
road infrastructure in the Province of Aceh, Indonesia. In addition, this study is particularly 
focused on the road maintenance at the district level, as most of the roads are under the 
responsibility of the local governments. However, as Aceh province underwent a conflict for 
almost 30 years prior to the tsunami, the impact of conflict is also considered as an additional 
boundary of the research. Additionally, it is worth noting that this study is conducted under the 
sponsorship of the local government of Aceh province. Hence, the result of this study is 
expected to have a direct contribution to the development of Aceh province. Among other 
factors, this has also been the justification for selecting the maintenance of road infrastructure 
in Aceh as the main focus of this study.  
4.5 Conceptual framework 
The established conceptual framework, as presented in Figure 4.2, is developed by 
comprehensively consider the key concepts, the interrelationship between the key concepts, 
and is constrained by the research boundaries as discussed in section 4.4.3 above. As the 
research is progressing to the data collection and data analysis process, the conceptual 
framework is subjected to further refinement, in order to accommodate and reflect the 
research findings.  
4.6 Summary and the link  
This section has presented the conceptual framework of the study. The process of conceptual 
framework development was initiated with the identification of key issues, followed by fine-
tuning the key issues into key concepts through specific literature and pilot interview process, 
and defining the interrelationship of the key concepts and the research boundaries. The 
established conceptual framework illustrates the various aspects which act as the key affecting 
and enabling environment to the successful post-disaster reconstruction. Furthermore, the 
conceptual framework also displays the various subjects integrated into the post-disaster 
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reconstruction of the road infrastructure, within which the key issues and concepts need to be 
further observed. At the later stage, the framework demonstrates and links these issues to the 
resulting capacity of the local government in road maintenance. Having developed the 
conceptual framework, the next chapter is dedicated to presenting the analysis of data 
collected from the case studies.  
 
Figure 4.2 – Conceptual Framework of the study 
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Chapter - 5  DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 presented the conceptual framework of the study which provides and defines the 
boundary of the research. This chapter elaborates the data analysis of three types of semi-
structured interviews conducted in the study; the high-level interviews, case-study interviews, 
and the expert validation interviews. The chapter is divided into four sections, as described in 
the following. 
 Section A is dedicated to present the analysis of the semi-structured interviews 
conducted with the high-level officials and policy makers at the provincial and the 
national level.  
 Section B will provide the analysis of the three case studies. 
 Section C will accordingly present the cross-case analysis of the case-studies. In this 
section, the results of the case-study will be compared and contrasted. 
 Section D validates the findings of the study with the experts in the area of disaster 
management and road infrastructure maintenance. 
Having presented and discussed the four main sections of the chapter, a summary of the 
empirical analysis will be provided.  
SECTION A – HIGH LEVEL SEMI-STRUCTURED 
INTERVIEWS 
5.2 Background information of the high-level interviews. 
This section is focused on presenting the analysis resulted from the semi-structured interviews 
conducted with the high-level officials and policy makers. As described in 3.3.6.2.2, ten 
respondents were interviewed, representing the disaster management agency, the planning 
agency, the public works, and donor organisations. The interviews were aimed at capturing the 
respondents’ perceptions on the main issues of the reconstruction and the maintenance of 
road infrastructure. Particular focus was also addressed at the involvement and roles of the 
 158 
 
local governments in the post-disaster reconstruction in Aceh, with regards to the maintenance 
of the road infrastructure. Accordingly, the discussions will be grouped into two main 
categories: the local government road maintenance capacity and the links to post-disaster road 
reconstruction.  
5.3 Procedures adopted in analysing the high-level semi-structured 
interviews. 
The local governments’ capacity in the maintenance of the road infrastructure at the local level 
and the link with the post-disaster reconstruction process were explored through interviewing 
ten high-level officials and policy maker respondents using semi-structured interview approach. 
All ten respondents were also involved in the post-disaster reconstruction in Aceh. The purpose 
of having the high-level interviews was to explore and contextualise the road reconstruction 
and maintenance initiatives at the local level from the policy makers’ perspective. Accordingly, 
the respondents’ perspectives and experiences in the reconstruction of the road infrastructure 
in Aceh were explored to obtain hindsight into the road reconstruction process.  
The data gathered from the interviews was coded using NVivo (version 10) followed by the 
development of cognitive maps using the aid of the same software. Cognitive maps are 
presented to assist with understanding the connections and relationships between main 
factors. The coding structure of the analysis is presented in Figure 5.2, Figure 5.5, and Figure 
5.7 with respect to the main issues analysed. The cognitive maps for the high-level semi-
structured interviews are accordingly presented in Figure 5.4, Figure 5.6, and Figure 5.8. The 
generic cognitive map and the meaning of each box is illustrated in Figure 5.1 
 
 
Figure 5.1 – The generic model of the cognitive map 
 
As the procedure of analysing the data has been discussed, the following section will 
accordingly analyse and present the findings from the semi-structured interviews with the high-
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level officials and policy makers, which will be further subdivided into two discussion topics, 
Local Governments road maintenance capacity in section 5.4.1 and Links to post-disaster 
reconstruction in section 5.4.2. 
5.4 Analysis of high-level interviews 
5.4.1 Local Governments road maintenance capacity  
In this section, the respondents’ perceptions and experiences with regards to the capacity of 
the local government in road maintenance were explored. As with the capacity issue, the 
interviews resulted in the discussion of two major areas; the main factors affecting the capacity 
of the local government in maintaining the road infrastructure, and the capacity building in 
road maintenance. Accordingly, the analysis will commence with exploring the main factors, 
initiated with the discussion of the external factors.  
5.4.1.1 The main affecting factors 
5.4.1.1.1 External factors 
The external factors of the road maintenance capacity are those which are outside the direct 
control of the road authorities and somehow constrain the way they may operate. As the 
external factors are beyond the authority of the road agency, they are essential in enabling a 
supporting work environment for the local governments in performing the road maintenance 
tasks.  
The external factors of road maintenance consist of several groups of issues, as shown in the 
following figure from the NVivo snapshot. The groups of issues are legal and regulatory, 
political, socioeconomic, and inter-organisational relationship. Each of these issues will be 
presented in separate sections.  
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Figure 5.2 – The coding structure for the external factors in road maintenance capacity 
 
5.4.1.1.1.1 Legal and regulatory 
The legal and regulatory aspect of the road maintenance capacity covers laws and regulation 
that provide the basis and work environment for the road authority. This includes laws and 
regulation regarding the organisational structure and inter-organisational relationship between 
authorities involved in the road maintenance, as well as the financial and budgeting procedure.  
The Indonesian government has issued several laws and regulations regarding the road 
maintenance financial arrangement. Government Regulation no 34/2006 (Government 
Regulation, 2006) article 57, describes that the national government is responsible for the 
management of national roads and that the provincial and district governments are responsible 
for the provincial and district roads. Additionally, as described in article 59 of the regulation, 
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part of the authority to manage the national road networks can be transferred to the provincial 
government based on the “co-administration” principle. According to the regulation, each of 
the government levels are therefore responsible for the development of roads under their 
authority. The road development tasks include programming and budgeting, technical 
planning, land acquisition, construction, and operation and maintenance (Government 
Regulation, 2006, article 83). Article 85 of the regulation further stipulates that in the case that 
the regional governments cannot afford to allocate sufficient fund for the road development, 
the national government may provide assistance. However, the elucidation of the regulation 
no 34/2006 article 85 describes that the regional governments are considered unable to fund 
the road development if they have allocated at least 20% of the total annual budget for 
maintaining and upgrading road infrastructure but still unable to meet the minimum road 
service standard. 
Furthermore, the provision of assistance to the regional governments by the national 
government is implemented through the allocation of Specific Grant Allocation (DAK). The DAK 
is a grant provided by the national government to the regional governments for specific 
purposes only, which are authorised by the ministry of finance, and detailed by the respective 
line ministries. For the road sector, the use of the allocation is detailed by the ministry of public 
works (MPW) in the form of ministerial regulations, such as Regulation of MPW no. 
39/PRT/M/2006 and Regulation of MPW no. No. 42/PRT/M/2007 regarding the technical 
guidance on the use of Specific Grant Allocation (DAK) for the infrastructure sector. These 
ministerial regulations have been replaced by the newer Regulation of MPW no 
15/PRT/M/2010 on the same subject. According to the regulation of MPW no 15/PRT/M/2010 
article 10, for the road sector, the DAK fund can only be used for periodic maintenance, 
rehabilitation and surface upgrade, as well as for completing the construction of a road section. 
It further explained that road sections which can be included in DAK-funded projects are those 
that have been registered or in the process of registration as district roads by a Bupati decree.  
In addition to laws and regulations describing the specific use of the DAK, the ministry of Home 
Affairs also issued a regulation regarding asset management. The Regulation of Ministry for 
Home Affairs no 17/2007 (Regulation of MoHA, 2007) article 7 describes that the maintenance 
needs should be included in the work plan of the related regional agencies, based on the list of 
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asset inventory. The maintenance needs will later be used as one input for the annual budget 
needs. Article 9 of the regulation further explains that upon the approval of the annual budget, 
the asset management agency will then prepare the list of maintenance needs for the 
maintenance work implementation.  
In the post-disaster reconstruction process, these regulations appeared to be the main reason 
for asset transfer refusal and asset maintenance neglect. Most of the reconstruction of road 
infrastructure in the post-disaster reconstruction period was implemented by BRR and donor 
agencies. All of the BRR projects, and any donor projects which were listed and included in the 
National Budget must be registered as the national assets prior to transferring back to the 
regional government as a grant (Regulation of MoF, 2008). Once the asset transfer process 
completed, the asset ownership, as well as the maintenance responsibility, would be held by 
the recipient governments. However, as the transfer of asset experienced delays, the road 
maintenance needs were neglected as the Local Governments did not allocate the 
maintenance needs in their budget. The problem was highlighted by PM07 by stating that 
assets that are not recorded in the district governments’ list of inventories could not receive 
budget allocation. A similar comment was expressed by PM03, by saying 
“The district annual budget can only allocate funds for the OP, operation and 
maintenance, if it had been listed as the district’s asset” – PM03 
As a result, the delays in the asset transfer process resulted in road sections being abandoned 
and that no maintenance needs were provided. More discussion on this issue will be presented 
in section 5.4.2.3 regarding the asset transfer.  
5.4.1.1.1.2 Political  
Another external factor affecting the road maintenance capacity is with regards to the political 
aspect. In the process of post-disaster road infrastructure reconstruction and in the road 
infrastructure maintenance, political pressure seems to be a highly influential factor and was 
experienced coming from different directions. As PM02 highlighted 
“The politics, the political pressure came from various angles… if there were unsatisfied 
parties, then it would (be problematic). They would say that the BRR was not absorbing 
aspirations, not being sensitive to the community background.” – PM02 
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According to Law 27/2009 (Law, 2009b) article 341, the local parliament consists of members 
of political party registered in the election and was selected through the election. Additionally, 
due to the special autonomy status and the peace agreement between the government of 
Indonesia and GAM, Aceh was given a privilege to establish local political party for the provincial 
and local level, as stipulated in Law 11/2006 (Law, 2006) chapter XI article 75. The following 
section will accordingly discuss the impacts of the political condition to the road maintenance.  
Parliament budgeting authority 
In the decentralised system of Indonesia, the parliament has the budgeting authority. 
According to Law no 27/2009 (Law, 2009b) article 343, the local parliament has three main 
functions, namely legislation, budgeting and the monitoring of law and budget allocation 
implementation. Article 344 of the same Law further explains that the parliament has the 
obligation and authority to discuss and approve the draft of the budget proposal submitted by 
the local governments.  
Moreover, due to the decentralised system in Indonesia, the political pressure is widely 
experienced. This was argued to be particularly affected by the direct election system of the 
head of regional governments as well as the parliament members. The parliament members 
are directly elected by the community in the election. Accordingly, in addition to being 
registered and promoted by a political party, the parliament members would therefore need 
to deliver the political campaign of their political party and at the same time need to make 
themselves electable by conducting an individual campaign by creating political programs and 
agendas to the community. Once elected, such political programs and agendas would ideally 
be translated into producing legislations and approving budget proposals and development 
programs that reflect and help realise their campaign and promises. 
However, in order to fulfil their political programs and promises, parliament members would 
therefore intervene the projects and programs proposed by the Local Governments. This 
condition was experienced widely. As PM01 described, even at the national level, the national 
parliament member would also put pressure on the development at the regional level, 
demanding that their hometown district to receive more development programs than the 
others. PM01 said  
 164 
 
“Actually, the political pressure was very strong… How was the pressure? The parliament 
members come from certain districts… so the pressure is that they want the development 
in their districts to be larger than other districts.” – PM01  
In addition to the issues related to the budgeting authority of the parliament, the higher 
political preference on capital projects also hinders the road maintenance efforts. More 
discussion will be presented in the following section. 
High preference on capital projects 
Another issue which is commonly experienced in the discussion of road maintenance is the 
politically and technically higher preference on the capital projects compared to the 
maintenance intervention works. ADB (2003) highlights that the value of the project, the 
relatively more sophisticated level of the work, and the immediate impact of a capital project 
is more politically and technically interesting for the politicians, as well as for the road 
engineers. 
Additionally, the post-disaster reconstruction activities have reconstructed more than 3600km 
of road networks all over Aceh and Nias, around 1000km more than what was destroyed. The 
extensive road reconstruction activities apparently reduced the maintenance backlog and 
improve the overall road condition. However, the preference of the politicians, and also the 
road authorities over the capital project unfortunately and potentially lead to wasted and 
unnecessary investment. For instance, the newly established district of Pidie Jaya; located in 
the eastern coast of Aceh, recently built an 800m long, four-lane flyover bridge which cost them 
more than Rp 76 billion. The necessity to build the flyover bridge was questioned as it was built 
over active rice paddy fields, in the capital city of the district which has a population of 18,000 
people and an area of 127 km2; a population density of around 140 people/km2 (BPS Pidie Jaya, 
2012). PM06 argued that the project was unnecessary and was a consequence of the high 
preference of the Local Governments and politicians on capital and monumental project.  
“Eventually, there would emerge programs or activities which are monumental, and are 
not actually fundamental. Just to build something big, the benefit is not so (big), but also 
needs quite a large of investment. For example… the flyover in Pidie Jaya. It was not 
supposed to be built, but was built.” – PM06 
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He further added that the Local Governments seem to not have considered the long term 
requirement of the project and also suggested that such poor development project was a 
consequence of the mind-set of those involved in the development planning. As he further said 
“In the end, it adds burdens to the provincial government. When bad things happen, they 
will write to the provincial government, please help (maintain) because our budget (the 
LG) has run out.” – PM06 
Another main point emerged from the interview was that at the national level the maintenance 
of road infrastructure gets a higher priority. The national government recognises the wide 
impact of poorly maintained roads to the economy. However, it was suggested that this view 
was not well grasped by the regional governments. At the regional level, the maintenance of 
roads seemed to get low priority. PM06 argued that the number of unpaved road sections, 
combined with the contract value of new road construction projects, resulted in the high 
preference over road construction projects than the maintenance interventions. He said  
“Maintenance is not considered a priority. Why? Because there are still many other roads 
which have not been paved… The budget allocation for the construction is also not small. 
So it is considered that the priority should be there (for the construction).” – PM06 
In addition to development programs having to be prepared according to the parliament’s 
demand, the political pressure gradually decreased the budget allocation for road 
maintenance. As explained by PM06, he was concerned that eventually there would be nothing 
left in the budget for the road maintenance needs. As he said  
“This is what I have been observing. Since the discussion of budget takes place in several 
locations (in the government and parliament), occasionally the budget allocation for 
maintenance, which we have allocated for a certain sum, is gradually cut. I am afraid that 
it will eventually be gone.” – PM06 
As PM06 further explained, the Planning Agency (Bappeda) will normally propose a certain 
amount of budget allocation for the maintenance of the road infrastructure. However, the 
decision on the final budget allocation will eventually be determined between the government 
and the parliament in the budget discussion session. Since the maintenance needs frequently 
get lower priority, the budget allocation discussion often resulted in the postponement of 
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maintenance works to the later year, as an excuse to the limited budget availability in the 
running year and due to competition with other sectors. PM06 further emphasises his worry 
on this issue,  
“What we are afraid of is that they (the maintenance works) would be postponed to next 
year, but it may be suddenly gone (deleted).” – PM06 
Political partiality 
Another issue emerging from the interviews was that the political partiality was one of the main 
affecting factors in the process of road maintenance decision making. To better illustrate this 
issue, it is necessary to present a statement from PM08 regarding the political pressure for 
maintenance allocation. PM08 articulated his confusion on the Local Governments’ justification 
and excuses for not providing the maintenance fund for the post-disaster road reconstruction 
assets which was based on two different occasions.  
First, for the foreign-funded district road projects, Local Governments’ acceptance and 
willingness to provide the maintenance fund after project completion was agreed in the form 
of MoU between BRR and the respective Local Governments (please refer to section 5.4.2.2 
regarding Consideration of maintenance). Second, as previously discussed in the section 
5.4.1.1.1.1 above, the Local Governments also refused to maintain the road reconstruction 
asset before the legal documentation was completed and that the road assets had been 
formally transferred to the Local Governments.  
However, the two occasions were contradictory as the Local Governments and the parliament 
were in fact able to provide the maintenance fund of the following first year of the foreign-
funded projects despite the incomplete asset transfer process. However, the maintenance 
allocation for the second year, conversely, was immediately rejected by the parliament. PM08 
said  
“With regards to the funding (for the road maintenance needs) of the first year, I do not 
know how, but somehow they managed to provide it. But for the second year, the 
parliament immediately blocked it.” – PM08 
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The two occasions reveal that the political willingness plays a greater role in determining 
budget allocation for maintenance. This was suggested by PM02 
“Formally, the Local Governments cannot allocate maintenance needs if the formality 
(asset transfer) is not done yet, even though actually (with) governor discretion it can be 
done, if they are brave. However, the nature of politic does not work that way.” – PM02 
The discretion meant by PM02 is that the governor might actually issue an instruction to 
provide allocation for the maintenance of road assets accepted from the third party as grants, 
as stipulated in the Regulation of Ministry of Home Affairs no 17/2007 article 19. However, 
since it may provoke political disputes, the regional government chose not to exercise that 
authority.  
5.4.1.1.1.3 Socioeconomic 
In addition to the legal and regulatory and the political issues affecting the Local Governments 
capacity on road maintenance, socioeconomic challenges seemed to be one of the biggest 
factors that drove the decision-making process.  
Distribution of wealth 
Another interviewee also expressed that there had been a dilemmatic position with regard to 
distributing wealth (expanding road networks) and setting up development priority principle 
(maintaining existing networks) which had been commonly experienced in development 
planning.  
However, PM01 argued that development of an area is still required even though the Local 
Governments are known to be incapable of maintaining the assets in the future. As he argued 
“The argument will be, if the Local Governments is not capable, not able to maintain, then 
there should be no development in the area? I choose to use the development equality 
approach. Hence, I will still need to build, even though they cannot maintain” – PM01. 
As also suggested by PM06, the maintenance needs did not get high priorities as the need to 
expand to road networks was considered to be more urgent. As most of the road networks at 
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the local level had not been paved, road network expansion was deemed very important to 
distribute wealth and to stimulate the economic growth.  
The respondents’ comments on the socioeconomic factors in the road maintenance have 
presented an insight and background into why maintenance of road infrastructure gets a lower 
priority when compared with the construction of new roads resulting from the high social 
pressure in development to distribute wealth and reduce the number of isolated area. In 
addition to the distribution of wealth, corruption was also argued to have affected the road 
maintenance efforts.  
Corruption 
Corruption has been a big problem in Indonesia. The Transparency International report on 
global corruption perception listed Indonesia as the 114 out of the 117 countries surveyed in 
its 2013 report (Transparency International, 2013). This was also seen to be one of the root 
problems of road maintenance. 
Additionally, corruption problem was also experienced in the traffic loading control. The 
department of transportation was responsible for performing this task. The traffic loading 
control was particularly done by the means of using the weighing stations. According to the 
regulation, the passing trucks will need to get on the weighing stations and any excess loading 
will need to be removed. However, the traffic loading control cannot be enforced due to the 
corruption issue on the side of the weighing stations' operator. As PM10 expressed 
“As I said earlier, it’s a ‘vicious circle’ (complex problem)… So the problem (can be solved) 
if the operator work soundly and firmly. And that also related with the law enforcement 
that needs to be implemented on the site, which has become a public secret, the illegal 
extortion” – PM10 
PM10 further described how working as one of the weighing stations' operators has been one 
of the most favourite positions among the employees of the transportation agency due to its 
corruptibility. However, this phenomenon was not only experienced in Aceh, but seemed to be 
a national phenomenon. As PM10 further suggested 
 169 
 
“All over Indonesia. All over Indonesia the weighing stations (operators) have been the 
favourite position for those who wants to do little works with big money. All over 
Indonesia, not only in Aceh. I have been travelling around, meeting with other department 
of transportation personnel from all over Indonesia, the weighing station is the most 
favourite post.” – PM10 
Another corruption issue emerging from the interview was raised by PM01. Interviewee PM01 
described how the issue of corruption affected the decision-making process with regard to the 
road maintenance and the road management in general.  
Particularly addressed to the development of the road information management system, he 
argued that the idea to develop a proper GIS-based system for road maintenance had been 
proposed and initiated during the post-disaster reconstruction period. He argued that such 
system will allow the road authorities to provide a strong basis to justify the maintenance 
needs. In turn, this would also help road authorities to justify their budget proposal, by 
presenting informed consent options to the parliament, without having to fight and bribe the 
parliament. As he said 
“If we can develop that (system)… we do not have to bribe or other sort of things, which 
is commonly practiced until now.” – PM01 
Regardless the benefit of adopting such a system, however, he later explained that the proposal 
for development and utilisation of the road information management system was rejected by 
the Local Governments, accusing that it was based on the reduced chances and gaps for 
corruption. He said  
“The system was offered to the public works, but they did not want to adopt it… if they 
used it, they could not play around. They preferred to play around with the parliament.” 
– PM01 
This section has elaborated the corruption issue surrounding the Local Governments’ activities 
on road maintenance. Accordingly, the section will continue to discuss the safety and security 
aspect as one of the main contributing factors affecting the Local Governments’ road 
maintenance capacity.  
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5.4.1.1.1.4 Inter-organisational relationship 
The next external factors affecting the maintenance capacity of the local governments are with 
regards to the inter-organisational relationship. Inter-organisational relationship refers to the 
relationship between government or private institutions and other stakeholders of the road 
infrastructure. From the discussion with the provincial and national representatives, two main 
issue emerged regarding the inter-organisational relationship namely the road management 
authorities and the establishment of road transportation and traffic board.  
The road management authorities 
With regards to the road management, the authorities and responsibility on road management 
and road transportation are distributed vertically between different levels of government 
agencies as well as horizontally between different departments at the same government level. 
According to Government Regulation no 34/2006  article 25, the vertical distribution of road 
authority means that the national road is managed by the national government, the provincial 
road is managed by the provincial government, and the district road is accordingly managed by 
the district government.  
Whilst the vertical distribution separates and classifies roads according to their level of 
ownership; national, provincial and district road, and therefore each road section is owned by 
one particular government level, the horizontal distribution means that there are more than 
one authorities responsible for certain tasks of the road management in each road section.  
According to law no 22/2009 (Law, 2009a), there are five government institutions involved in 
the road and traffic management. As stipulated in article 5 paragraph 3, the responsibility and 
authority related to the management of road and road traffic are distributed as the following 
 Road matters are under the responsibility of the ministry responsible for the road sector 
 Transportation and traffic infrastructure and facilities are under the responsibility of the 
ministry responsible for the transportation and traffic infrastructure and facilities 
 Transportation and traffic Industrial development are under the responsibility of the 
ministry responsible for the industry 
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 Transportation and traffic technology development are under the responsibility of the 
ministry responsible for the development of technology 
 Motor vehicle and driver registration and identification, law enforcement, operational 
management and traffic management and traffic education are under the responsibility 
of the police force. 
Apart from the police force, the ministries responsible for the first four tasks are not explicitly 
stipulated in the law. This is particularly due to the frequently changing names of the ministries 
with little or no changes in the authority and responsibility, and that the regional government 
may have different names for similar agencies. Nevertheless, as in 2014, at the national level 
these ministries are consecutively the ministry of public works, ministry of transportation, 
ministry of industry and ministry of research and technology.  
The above arrangement is designed for the ministerial level, i.e. for the national level. Due to 
the autonomous region system, the regional governments may therefore establish their own 
agencies. Accordingly, at the district level, the distribution of authority on road transportation 
and traffic needs to be adjusted and synchronised with the organisational structure at the local 
level. For instance, the institution responsible for the industry in Banda Aceh is combined with 
the trade, cooperative and SMEs affairs. Hence, the name is the Agency for Industry, trade, 
cooperative and SMEs. Another example is with regards to the transportation agency. In Aceh 
Barat Daya, the agency is combined with communication and information hence the name is 
called the Agency for transportation, communication and information. Detailed information on 
the tasks of these agencies is presented in Figure 5.3. 
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Road transportation 
and traffic
Transportation Industry Research and Technology PolicePublic Works
 Inventory of road service level 
and its problems
 Planning and programming as 
well as determining the 
expected road service level 
 Planning, construction and use 
of road; and optimisation
 Reparation of road geometry 
and/ or intersection
 Determination of road class on 
each road section
 Test of road fitness in 
accordance with road traffic 
safety and security standard 
 Development of information 
and communication system on 
road infrastructure sector
 Determining general plan of 
road transportation and traffic 
 Traffic management
 Motor vehicles technical 
requirement and properness
 Public transportation licencing
 Development of information 
and communication system in 
the road transportation and 
traffic facilities and infrastructure 
sector
 Development of human 
resources implementing road 
transportation and traffic 
 Investigating breach of public 
transport licencing, motor 
vehicle properness and 
technical requirement which 
require particular expertise and 
equipment
 Planning and programming of 
motor vehicle industry 
development
 Development of motor vehicle 
equipment industry ensuring 
road transportation and traffic 
security and safety
 Development of road 
equipment industry ensuring 
road transportation and traffic 
security and safety
 Planning and programming of 
motor vehicle tehcnology 
development
 Development of motor vehicle 
equipment technology ensuring 
road transportation and traffic 
security and safety
 Development of road 
equipment technology ensuring 
road transportation and traffic 
security and safety
 Testing and issuing driving 
licence
 Motor vehicle registration and 
identification
 Collection, monitor, analyse and 
present road transportation and 
traffic data
 Traffic management, protect, 
escort and patrol
 Law enforcement which include 
traffic law breach and accident
 Traffic education
 Traffic management 
implementation
 Traffic operational management 
implementation
 
Figure 5.3 – Distribution of authorities and responsibilities on road transportation and traffic management  
Source: Law (2009a) 
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Since these different organisations work on the same road network levels, the horizontal 
distribution of authorities apparently results in having conflicting and contradictory roles 
between them.  
One of the examples is with regards to the problem caused by the overloading vehicles. As 
stipulated in Law no 22/2009 article 8, the public works is responsible, among others, for the 
planning, development and repair/ maintenance of the road infrastructure. On the other hand, 
article 9 of the same law stipulated that the transportation agency is responsible, among 
others, for investigating the breach in public transport licence, motor vehicle technical 
requirement, fitness and properness. Additionally, in controlling the vehicle axle load capacity, 
the transportation agency collaborates with the police force since the police force (article 12) 
is responsible, among others, for enforcing the law which includes breach of the traffic 
regulations.  
However, the transportation agency frequently blames the public works for the rapid 
deterioration of the road infrastructure to be resulting from the poor construction quality they 
provided. The directorate general of road transportation even explicitly stated in one of the 
decrees no SK.81/AJ.108/DRJD/2004 (Dirjenhubdat, 2004), article 5.1, that “the (rapid road 
deterioration) problems are not rooted in the failure of the operator to enforce the limit, but 
the existing roads are not built with adequate standard.” On the other hand, public work denies 
the accusation by stating that it was the failure of the transportation agency in monitoring and 
controlling the traffic, particularly the heavy-loaded vehicles, which caused the road to 
deteriorate rapidly.  
A particular case was experienced in the Province of Riau, Indonesia where the conflict between 
the two regional agencies escalated in 2013 as reported by the local media Riau Terkini (2013). 
The public works agency was accused to have provided a poor-quality road that the road 
deteriorated very rapidly. Refusing to be blamed for the damage, the public works agency 
resists that the transportation agency was to blame for not installing the maximum load sign of 
3.5 tons on the road, and that the transportation agency had failed to control the traffic. The 
transportation agency denied the allegation by saying that the road sign had been installed long 
before the public works asked them. The transportation agency further highlighted law no 
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22/2009 (Law, 2009a) article 2 paragraph c, which stipulates that the minimum loading capacity 
of class III road, the lowest class, is set to be 8 tons which is more than twice the limit that the 
public works had referred to (3.5 tons) . However, the article 3 of the same law also stipulates 
that in certain condition, the maximum loading capacity of the class III road can be set to lower 
than 8 tons. Accordingly, it seemed that there had been no communication between the two 
agencies into what the maximum loading capacity of the particular road section had been 
actually set for.  
Other similar cases where disputes and argumentation between the two agencies regarding 
damaged road have also been reported in other places such as in Surabaya (Bappeda Jatim, 
2011) and Jakarta (Dewi and Maris, 2014). These examples illustrate the conflicting and 
contradictory roles of the various government institutions involved in the road management.  
In Aceh, another case of the conflicting role was also experienced as highlighted by the PM10, 
regarding the installation of road signs and road marks. According to the law no 22/2009 (Law, 
2009a), the public works is responsible for the construction of road infrastructure, and the 
transportation agency is responsible for the management of road transportation and traffic. 
The law also stipulates that the transportation agency is held responsible for the traffic 
management. However, it does not explicitly stipulate which agency is responsible for the 
installation of the road marks and signs. This eventually led to confusion and overlapping tasks 
between the two agencies. As highlighted by PM10 
“Yes, there has been overlapping (roles) as I see it. So, recently there was a workshop in 
Batam, and this was questioned. Where and in what condition should Public Works do the 
road marks and signs, and vice versa, in what condition should the transportation agency 
do them? And this was still unsolved.” – PM10 
PM10 further argued that the unfamiliarity of public works on road marks and road signs 
installation had led to public works installing poor-quality materials. He further added that,  
“And what happened now is, the quality of the road marks and signs of the public works, 
compared with the department of transportation is so different. Pay attention to the road 
from here to the east area, have you ever seen road signs which are only yellow, with 
nothing in them (blank signs)? Have you seen them? The black parts (the signs) have 
peeled off.” – PM10  
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The conflicting roles of the government institutions involved in the road management have 
been discussed in details in the above section. Accordingly, the following section will provide 
an insight into the issue of vertical relationship between the government levels. 
In addition to the above issues, there was also an issue with regards to the vertical relationship 
between the governments. In terms of road maintenance, the governments cannot intervene 
and provide assistance to the government level other than what is directly under it. This means 
that the national government, under certain conditions, can only provide maintenance 
assistance to the provincial government, but not to the district governments, as they will be 
two levels down below. Having said that, the district government can accordingly receive 
maintenance assistance only from the provincial government. As PM01 emphasises. 
“If (the road maintenance needs) is handed over to the national government, it won’t 
work. This is because the national road (authority) can only go down one level. So it can 
only, for example, construct the provincial road. It is still possible, it is still allowed (for the 
provincial roads). But there are conditions. The road must be strategic. Of course, if the 
road is considered strategic by the (national) Public Works, even though it is a provincial 
road, they will handle it.” – PM01 
Whilst the above discussion was addressed to the maintenance of road infrastructure in 
general, it was also applied in the maintenance of the post-disaster road infrastructure 
reconstruction assets. In the reconstruction of road infrastructure in Aceh, there was a gap in 
time between project completion and transfer of assets to the relevant district government. As 
argued by PM03, the time gap and delays in the asset transfer have resulted in some road 
networks being neglected of maintenance. This is particularly due to the unclear regulation and 
policies on which institution is responsible for the maintenance in between the transfer 
process. As stipulated by PM03 
“What is also important is that… if some roads have not been transferred from the 
national government to the regional governments... then it must be clear if there are 
budgets (for the maintenance) from the Ministry of Finance, or Ministry of Internal affairs, 
or Ministry of Public Works. But it can’t be the Ministry of Public Works as they will not 
touch district roads…” – PM03 
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As a result, there was time where the road maintenance was neglected due to unresolved 
assets ownership status and maintenance responsibility. More detailed discussion on asset 
transfer issue will be discussed later on in section 5.4.2.3. The asset transfer issue is only briefly 
presented here as an overview on the impact of the national policy to the maintenance of the 
post-disaster road reconstruction assets.  
As the national public works cannot formally intervene and assist road projects at the district 
level, the intervention and assistance from the ministry of the public works to the maintenance 
of district roads are done in a different way. Additionally, the assistance for road infrastructure 
maintenance from the national government is also delivered through the provision of the 
specific allocation fund (DAK) for the regional governments. The DAK is provided as part of the 
regional annual budget.  
The establishment of road transportation and traffic board 
In order to improve the coordination between the different institution and to improve the 
involvement of the stakeholders, Law no 22/2009 article 13 stipulates that the implementation 
of road transportation and traffic needs to be conducted in a coordinated approach. 
Consequently, the law further stipulates that the coordination tasks will be designated under 
the authority of the road transportation and traffic board at all government levels; national, 
provincial and district level, which need to be established at every government level. As a follow 
up, a Government Regulation detailing the responsibilities, task, and authorities of the board 
was issued in 2011 as a Government Regulation no 37/2011 (Government Regulation, 2011). A 
complete list of members of the board is presented in Table 5.1.  
The Government Regulation no 37/2011 regarding the road transportation and traffic board, 
article 11, describes that the board functions as a platform to synchronise the main tasks and 
functions of each institution involved in the management and implementation of road 
transportation and traffic. Article 21 further describes that the members of the board at the 
regional level include a number of government officials and community representatives, as well 
as the private sector working in the road sector. In Aceh, the establishment of the road 
transportation and traffic board was regulated by a Governor decree no 551.1/541/2011.  
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Table 5.1 – Member of Road Transportation and Traffic board  
No Member of forum 
1 Head of governments (Governor, Bupati or Mayor) 
2 Head of Police force 
3 State-owned or district-owned companies working in the 
road transportation and traffic sector 
4 Association of public transportation companies 
5 Representatives from the high education institutions 
6 Expert in the road transportation and traffic 
7 Non-government organisations focusing on the road 
transportation and traffic, and 
8 Road transportation and traffic Watchdogs at the district 
level 
Source: Government Regulation (2011) 
According to PM10, the establishment of the road and traffic board had resulted in improved 
coordination between the government institutions involved in the management, and that the 
implementation of road infrastructure development program had been showing a positive 
progress. Specifically addressed at the coordination between the public works and the 
transportation agency, PM10 stipulates that there has been an improved coordination between 
the two agencies. As he said  
“There were overlaps. That is why (now) we always clarify… Public works will submit (their 
list of projects), we will check… so there will be no overlaps. In the last two years we did 
this… not previously.” – PM10 
As the interview was conducted in 2013, PM10’s comment also shows that the issuance of 
Government regulation no 37/2011, followed by Governor Decree no 551.1/541/2011, 
appeared to be immediately in effect after their issuances. 
The above sections have provided in-depth discussion on the impacts of external factors to the 
road maintenance capacity of the Local Governments. The various external factors affecting 
Local Governments’ capacity in the maintenance of road infrastructure have been discussed, 
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ranging from the legal and regulatory, political, socioeconomic, as well as the inter-
organisational relationship aspects. The cognitive map of the external factors affecting the road 
maintenance capacity is presented in Figure 5.4 .  
Accordingly, the following sections will present factors affecting the road maintenance capacity 
from the internal side. The internal factors are divided into two categories, the institutional and 
technical; each of which will be discussed in a dedicated section. 
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Figure 5.4 – The cognitive map of the external factors
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5.4.1.1.2 Institutional factors 
The internal factors of road maintenance are those within the direct control of the road 
authorities. The discussion of the internal factors of road maintenance capacity will be divided 
into two categories, the institutional and the technical factors. The institutional factors refer to 
the organisational and managerial arrangement of the road authorities and the likes, whilst the 
technical factors refer to the capability of the road authorities to perform the physical and 
engineering tasks (Robinson et al., 1998). The NVivo snapshot of the institution factor analysis 
is presented as Figure 5.5. Accordingly, the discussion of the internal factors in the following 
sections will be initiated by presenting the institutional factors regarding the financial 
management.  
 
Figure 5.5 – The coding structure for the Institutional Factors in Road Maintenance Capacity 
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5.4.1.1.2.1 Financial Management 
In this section, the capacity of the Local Governments in the road maintenance from the 
financial management perspective will be elaborated. The budgeting and allocation of the road 
maintenance needs in Indonesia follows the general budgeting and allocation procedures. 
Therefore, no special account or mechanism have been setup for the maintenance of road 
infrastructure ADB (2003) suggests that the financial problems of road maintenance can be 
grouped into four categories; fund is not allocated in sufficient amounts, fund allocation is not 
spent, fund allocation is not spent effectively, and fund allocation is not spent efficiently. As a 
matter of fact, the discussion of the road maintenance financial problems in the case study 
districts emerging from the semi-structured interviews also showed similar results. Therefore, 
the financial problems of road maintenance will be presented in the following section according 
to the four categories. 
Fund is not allocated in sufficient amount 
The first financial problem in the road maintenance is that the budget allocation for proper 
road maintenance is not sufficient. One of the main causes of the insufficient budget allocation 
for road maintenance was due to fund competition with other sectors and expenditure needs. 
With regards to competition with other sectors and other expenditure needs, PM07 doubted 
that the post-disaster road infrastructure reconstruction assets will be maintained by the 
recipient Local Governments. PM07 expressed his doubt and disappointment on the 
maintenance of reconstruction assets by saying that  
“If they can maintain 50% to 60% (of the reconstruction assets), it will be very good. 
Putting aside the assets they received from the BRR, they can’t even maintain their own 
assets. This is because their mind-set is that (maintenance) is not a priority.” – PM07 
Furthermore, as previously described in section 5.4.1.1.1.2, the political condition greatly 
affects the budgeting decision. However, even though on the one hand the parliament holds 
the authority for budgeting, the government also have the authority to justify the proposed 
program and their budget expenditure plan. Unfortunately, disfavour to the road maintenance 
needs, the governments also give lower priority for the road maintenance needs. As a 
representative of the provincial government, PM05 explained 
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“We do (have intervention authority to the budgeting process). But in the end it depends 
on the budget allocation needs… the priority (for maintenance) loses to other more urgent 
needs.” – PM05 
PM05 drew an example from the education sector, where the maintenance of education 
facilities were also neglected regardless the current national regulation to allocate 20% of the 
regional budget for education. As he explained 
“Currently, there is a national regulation that 20% of the budget allocation need to be 
allocated to the education sector... Even so, I don’t think they touch the maintenance (of 
the education facilities).” – PM05 
PM05 further explained that the local governments actually had budget allocations for the 
maintenance of road infrastructure. However, he was not sure if the allocation was sufficient.  
“If asked whether the fund is available, the fund is available. But in regard to sufficiency, 
that is another issue. Regarding sufficiency, we allocate what we can.” – PM05 
Additionally, PM03 and PM08 highlighted that there was also an issue with regards to the 
commitment of Local Governments to provide maintenance allocation. As highlighted by PM03 
and PM08. 
“The commitment of each district varies between one district to another district, with 
regards to the operation and maintenance needs, particularly the maintenance needs.” – 
PM03 
PM08 further emphasised that one of the conditions to receive the foreign-funded road 
infrastructure projects, the benefiting local governments were required to sign a MoU, 
agreeing to provide budget allocation for the future maintenance needs. However, the MoU 
was only respected for the first year following the construction completion. For the second 
year, the budget allocation was not approved by the parliament. He described  
“With regards to the funding (for the road maintenance needs) of the first year, I do not 
know how, but somehow they managed to provide it. But for the second year, the 
parliament immediately blocked it.” – PM08 
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Fund allocation is not spent 
In addition to the issue of insufficient maintenance allocation, there was also an issue regarding 
the unspent budget allocation. Concerning the financial capacity of the local governments, 
PM03 argued that Aceh province had been given a lot of privileges. Due to the special autonomy 
status, Aceh province accordingly receives a large amount of additional sums in the annual 
budget, called the special autonomy fund, totalling 1%-2% of the total national general 
allocation fund (section 2.5.6.1). However, PM03 suggested that the greater problem is rooted 
in the financial management capacity to spend their annual budget allocation. PM03 supported 
his argument by stating that 
“A lot of privileges have been given to Aceh, but the spending quality is so poor. So it is a 
matter of their public finance (capacity).” – PM03 
One of the causes of the unspent budget allocation was due to the delays in the approval of 
the annual budget proposal. Section 2.5.5.1.3 of the literature review regarding the delays in 
budget approval) summarised that delays in the annual budget approval were commonly 
experienced in Aceh. Accordingly, the budget expending period was shortened as it would need 
to be expended by the 31st of December of the running year, regardless the time the budget 
was approved and the time the local governments were starting to use it.  
Consequently, the delays in the budget approval also means that the road infrastructure project 
may not start according to the initial timetable and that the projects schedule frequently had 
to be implemented in the rainy season.  
The above discussions conform to the report of the ADB about road maintenance in Asia. The 
ADB (2003) suggests that road agencies in Asia are typically allocated only 40% of the 
maintenance needs (insufficient allocation issue) and that the actual disbursements were often 
much less (unspent budget allocation issue). Accordingly, the following section will look at the 
issue of inefficient use of the budget allocation.  
Fund allocation is not spent efficiently 
ADB report (2003) suggests that another financial issue in the road maintenance is that the 
road authorities use their budget allocation inefficiently. The typical problems include large 
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workforce with low productivity, resulting in more funding goes to the wages than to perform 
the actual maintenance works; weak planning and programming, and inefficient functioning 
due to political interference.  
The issue of inefficient use of budget allocation also emerged in the interview. As suggested by 
PM07, most of the budget allocation was spent on the routine expenses which mainly include 
the salary, official trips, and office administration. PM07 complained 
“We also need to see it from the budgeting perspective. What percentage is used for 
development? In Aceh, in average 60% to 70% (of the budget) is used for routine expenses, 
so the remaining fund is so little.” – PM07 
Similar complaint was also raised by PM09. He argued that the government should start to 
improve their budget efficiency, particularly by increasing personnel efficiency. He said 
“Their general expenses are bigger than what is allocated for the development. Around 
60% to 70% are used for salaries, official trips, paper, and so on. For the development is 
only 30%. In fact, why don’t they increase personnel efficiency, right?” – PM09 
PM09 also added that improvement must be made simultaneously. Whilst on the one hand, 
the road maintenance problems need to be improved by establishing a proper system and 
building the capacity to maintain the roads, on the other hand, the local governments need to 
improve their expenditure efficiency. He added 
“First, they lack of a (maintenance) system… Second, they lack of capacity, it is very 
limited… due to bigger allocation for general expenditure than for the development.” – 
PM09 
5.4.1.1.2.2 Human resources 
One of the most important issues in the discussion of institutional factors affecting the capacity 
of the local government in road maintenance is regarding the human resource. Accordingly, 
this section is dedicated to provide an in-depth analysis on the human-resource issue.  
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Lack of interest 
According to PM07, the road maintenance problem is affected by the mentality and the 
capacity of the local government in asset management. He argued that the assets of the local 
governments had not been used optimally to provide income to the district and therefore, the 
operational and the maintenance of the assets were seen as a burden to the local budget. He 
argued that this was primarily due to the lack of interest and the capacity of the local 
government to produce creative programs and work plan. He stressed  
“That is not a matter whether there is regulation or not. Its personnel matter. First, it’s 
about capacity, the other is about interest.” – PM07 
 
He further suggested  
“There is certainly a weakness in the asset-management model of the local government. 
Because, the smart ones will actually see these assets as resources which have the 
potential to provide income.” – PM07 
Planning capacity 
This section focuses on the capacity of the local government in the road maintenance planning. 
Referring to the general development planning issues, Solihin (2009) concludes that failure in 
development planning can be caused by a number of reasons, they are  
 Improper planning process due to lack of information, poor planning method capacity, 
unrealistic plan, excessive political influence which leads to ignoring the technical 
planning.  
 Poor planning execution due to the unsynchronised process of planning and 
implementation, incompetent personnel, lack of community participation, which 
results in no support from the community.  
 Inappropriate planning paradigm which leads to misled development direction.  
 Planning is translated as the total control of human life, such a centrally planned system 
may result in development planning constraining individual initiatives, capacity building 
and the potential capacity of the community.  
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Accordingly, the analysis of the semi-structured interviews with the provincial and national 
stakeholders also suggested similar condition. With regards to the maintenance plan, PM01 
strongly suggested that the Local Governments need to develop a reliable road management 
system which can be used to justify the needs to perform maintenance works, as well as the 
consequences of not performing the maintenance. Actually, an effort to provide the local 
governments with more accurate input for the road maintenance planning had been made. 
During the post-disaster reconstruction period, a GIS-based road information management 
system was developed and was offered to the local governments.  
By adopting a proper road information system, PM01 added that the local governments would 
be able to produce a reliable justification for the road maintenance budget proposal. He said 
“So we can propose (the maintenance needs) to the parliament, not based on a made-up 
justification, like how it’s now done by the public works. Currently, let’s just ask, if (for 
example) the damage cost is Rp 100 million, let’s ask for Rp 200 million. What will be 
approved is Rp 2 million. Not Rp 200 million, not Rp 100 million. Because they do not have 
data to support it.” – PM01  
He further added that the system would also able to provide the parliament with informed 
consent options regarding the consequences of selecting one of the maintenance plan over the 
other. As described by PM01  
“If we have such a system, if the parliament chooses (one of the proposed maintenance 
plans)... The consequences of their decision can be modelled.” – PM01 
As the human resources issues have been presented, the next section will progress to the issue 
of organisational management.  
5.4.1.1.2.3 Organisational management 
The organisational management refers to the performance of the local government or the road 
authorities in performing the day-to-day operation of their internal organisation. Also included 
in this category is the decision making process of the local governments.  
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Leadership 
The first issue emerging from the interviews regarding the organisational management was 
that there was a conflict of interest in determining the development of road maintenance 
program. Addressing the issue of how the provincial government disproportionately allocates 
the budget allocation for the maintenance of the national road, PM10 highlighted  
“In Aceh, those who have lived here long enough must know. Particularly for the public 
works projects. The Banda Aceh to Aceh Besar roads, in one year it can be upgraded 
several times. Whilst the road in Aceh Timur has never been touched, it was only in 2012 
that it was touched. The national roads there have had potholes, but not touched.” – 
PM10 
The reason of such imbalanced road maintenance work plan was further suggested by PM10 
as a consequence of poor leadership and the resulting conflict of interest.  
“I did an interview with public personnel, (they say) it depends on the leader. Where he is 
from. It cannot be detached… If that’s the case for the national road, let alone the district 
roads.” – PM10 
Political stability 
Another factor emerging from the interview regarding the organisational management is that 
the officials in the local governments were often affected by the political pressure that may be 
imposed onto them.  
For instance, PM02 described that the provision of road maintenance allocation for the road 
sections which transfer process have not been completed (refer to section 5.4.1.1.1.2) was 
actually possible if the head of the regional governments issued a discretion on the needs. 
However, he understood that the resulting political pressure hindered such action. PM02 said 
“Actually, governor or mayor discretion is enough, if they are brave enough (to argue with 
the parliament). But in politics it’s not done that way. Similarly, if I am given a house, how 
can I let the roof leaks because I have not been given the certificate. It can’t be that way.” 
– PM02 
In the decentralised system in Indonesia, the heads of Local Governments are elected by the 
public in an election system. Additionally, as stipulated in the Law (Law, 2004a), the autonomy 
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status in Indonesia is placed at the district level, reducing the power of the governor as the 
head at the provincial level to intervene the programs at the district level. This is mainly because 
the local governments hold the authority and responsibility to manage their own districts and 
accordingly make their own development program.  
However, this condition may be different if the Bupati are from the same party as the governor. 
As suggested by PM06, if the head of the local governments was from the same political party 
with the governor, the ‘Bupati’ (regent) would be more compliant with governor instructions. 
Accordingly, such a compliance from the local governments were mainly due to the political 
relationship between them, rather than the hierarchical structure. Regarding this issue, PM06 
said 
“They (Local Governments’ head and Governor) are now more associated because they 
are from the same political party. They have their own ethics. They have their own policy. 
So the chemistry between the governor and the Local Governments’ head is more because 
of that.” – PM06 
Consequently, PM10 explained that in order to obtain the financial assistance or road 
maintenance project in their area, the head of local government or sub-district would often 
need to lobby the higher level government. PM10 said 
“The attention (to district roads maintenance) is poor. And they need to lobby. The head 
of sub-district or head of Local Governments need to use all their strength to lobby in 
order to get them (road projects).” – PM10 
The institutional factors affecting the performance and the capacity of the local government in 
road maintenance from the stakeholders at the provincial and national level have been 
discussed in detail in the above sections. The cognitive map of the institutional factors on the 
road maintenance is presented in  
Accordingly, the following section will present the technical aspects of the road maintenance 
issue.  
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Figure 5.6 – Cognitive map of the institutional factors
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5.4.1.1.3 Technical factors 
The technical factors of the road maintenance capacity refer to the capability of the road 
authorities to perform the physical and engineering tasks (Robinson et al., 1998). Accordingly, 
this section will therefore discuss and present issues emerging from the interviews with the 
representatives from the national and provincial level. Two main categories of issues were 
indicated, those related to the road design and those related to the traffic overloading control. 
The NVivo coding of the technical factors is presented in Figure 5.7. 
. Each of these categories will be presented in the following section.  
 
Figure 5.7 – The coding structure for the Technical Factors in Road Maintenance Capacity 
 
5.4.1.1.3.1 Road design 
Over standard design 
From the technical perspective, the local governments’ maintenance capacity appeared to be 
affected by the over-standard design of the road infrastructure provided in the post-disaster 
reconstruction period. The over-standard design generally refers to the new type of road 
construction relative to the local governments’ general experience as well as to the higher road 
structural quality standard. Such a design was considered as an over-standard design as it raised 
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some discussion points in the reconstruction and the maintenance of the road infrastructure in 
Aceh.  
The concerns emerging from implementing the over-standard road design was briefly 
summarised by PM08. He described that the construction of the district road in Aceh was 
designed to have a standard indifference to the national road networks. The use of a higher 
quality design was also meant to compensate the poor maintenance capacity of the local 
governments. It was expected that the reconstructed assets would be therefore functional for 
a longer period and also a slower deterioration rate.  
On the contrary, some districts which were not familiar with the new type of road construction 
experienced technical and financial difficulties. Additionally, PM08 argued that the gaps in the 
technical knowledge could be overcome by providing a capacity building program to the local 
governments  
“For the district road in Aceh, in particular, we made the pavement (specification) 
standard not far from the national roads… Some districts we observed did not have the 
maintenance capacity… and therefore we need to improve their technical capacity for 
road maintenance.” – PM08 
He further added 
“If their technical capacity is insufficient, the structure of the road requiring maintenance 
may need to be adjusted to their capacity… For example, if they are used to work with 
macadam roads, and now we paved it with Hotmix design, the (required) capacity will be 
different.” – PM08 
PM08 explanation above illustrated the challenges that the local governments were facing in 
Aceh. In the reconstruction of the road infrastructure in Aceh, the standard design widely used 
for the road infrastructure was the Hotmix design, internationally known as the HMA. This type 
of structure was relatively new to the local governments in Aceh and the public works at the 
district level. Prior to the tsunami, the local governments commonly used macadam design for 
the district roads.  
One of the consequences of the introduction of the standard design was that the construction 
and the maintenance cost were accordingly higher. This concern was expressed by PM03 
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regarding the objections and complains from the local governments with regards to having to 
perform the maintenance of the over-standard design infrastructure.  
“Regarding Local Governments poor maintenance capacity, it will create problems when 
they are asked to manage or maintain assets… which are over-standard… Problems will 
occur if the over-standard assets have to be managed or maintained… They will object.” 
– PM03 
Poor construction quality 
The capacity of the local government in road maintenance is also affected by the construction 
quality. The road construction quality determines the road axle loading capacity and the 
deterioration rate. Accordingly, it may also determine the types and the interval between 
maintenance interventions. With regards to the quality of the district road infrastructure in 
Aceh, PM10 raised his concern that one of the main factors of the rapid road deterioration was 
due to the poor construction, which he accused to not have been built according to the 
specification. He said 
“The construction may not be according to the specification.” – PM10 
Additionally, road surface roughness is widely used as one of the indicators to determine the 
level of road deterioration. For instance, the international roughness index (IRI) is used to 
measure road surface degradation and accordingly determine the required intervention. 
However, road deterioration does not immediately occur in the early years of completion. 
Within the grace period, typically the initial four to five years of road construction, road may 
not show any deterioration at all. Furthermore, with regards to the construction quality, most 
road infrastructures start to show deterioration long after the project completion, and 
commonly even after it passes the defect liability period, a period where contractors are held 
responsible for the maintenance of the road they built.  
Accordingly, in Aceh, by the time the roads were starting to show obvious deterioration, the 
contractors were no longer responsible for the maintenance. The contractors could no longer 
be held responsible for the damages, particularly on the basis that the road construction was 
accused to have a poor quality. The issue of holding contractors’ liability gets more complicated 
since the poor quality issue is also then mixed with the issue of traffic loading control.  
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5.4.1.1.3.2 Traffic overloading control  
The road maintenance problems of the district road in Aceh were commonly linked back to the 
issue of poor road quality and the overloading traffic. The conflict between the agency 
responsible for ensuring the road quality (the public works) and the agency responsible for the 
monitoring of the passing traffic (the transportation agency) has been discussed in section 
5.4.1.1.1.4. Accordingly, this section will discuss the traffic overloading control issue from the 
technical perspective, i.e. the capacity to perform the traffic overloading control tasks.  
The challenges and problems surrounding the traffic loading control issue in Aceh were 
described in detail by PM10. He explained that in the implementation of traffic overloading 
control, the transportation agency was facing a number of challenges. These challenges will be 
discussed in the following section 
Conflicting policies 
The first traffic loading control issue was regarding the enforcement of traffic loading capacity 
regulation. Particularly aimed at controlling the overloading traffic in Aceh Province, the 
ministry of transportation issued an instruction to enforce the zero overload from January 2009 
(MoT, 2008). The policy was later supported by the directorate general of land transportation 
of the ministry of transportation by issuing an instruction to enforce the zero overload 
tolerance limit to the passing traffic (Dirjenhubdat, 2012) 
The regulation was issued as a follow-up action for the implementation and enforcement of 
Law no 22/2009. The regulation reemphasises the point stipulated in the law no 22/2009, 
article 307, that no administrative penalty in the form of charges can be enforced in regard to 
overloading capacity. Instead the overloading vehicle must be prosecuted with a penalty of 
imprisonment for a maximum period of 2 months or Rp 500,000 (£25) in fine. The regulation 
also stressed that all previous regulations and instructions which were conflicting with the law 
no 22/2009 were accordingly obsolete.  
However, even though the instruction practically only reemphasising the national Law, which 
should therefore actually be implemented nationally, it was not respected in Aceh. As 
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highlighted by PM10, the zero overload policy could not be implemented at the regional level 
as the regions made their own policies and set their own tolerance limit. He described 
“The instruction could not be implemented nationwide all over Indonesia… because the 
reality is that each region allows a tolerance limit. A certain percent (of overloading 
capacity) will be tolerated. Each region has their own policies.” – PM10 
The refusal of the head of the transportation agency of the Aceh province was also reported in 
the local newspaper (Waspada, 2009). It was reported that the Head of the transportation 
agency allowed a tolerance limit of up to 25% of the vehicle maximum loading capacity, which 
created a confusion to the weighing station operators.  
In addition to regional governments enforcing different regulations in their regions, PM10 also 
raised an issue regarding the technical challenges that the weighing stations were facing on 
site. More discussion will be presented in the next section.  
Weighing stations 
The above section has provided a discussion on the traffic overloading control from the 
enforcement perspective. Accordingly, this section provides a discussion on the technical 
aspect of the traffic overloading control. As suggested by PM10, the overloading vehicles would 
actually need to remove the excess weight before they could continue their journey. However, 
PM10 explained that the weighing station operator experienced difficulties in removing or 
unloading the loose materials. He said 
“We at the provincial level tried to enforce the zero overload policy. But it was hard. First, 
for instance, the big trucks come from Medan carrying the basic needs materials. It’s not 
a problem if they are in unit (sacks), but if they are loose (pack), what can we do.” – PM10 
He further explained that the weighing stations lack the personnel to unload materials from the 
prosecuted vehicles, and also lacked the facilities to store them. PM10 describes the situation 
as confusing  
“If they need to be unloaded, who would do it? If they are removed, who would dispose 
it? They (truck personnel) won’t unload it, if you want it, you do it (they would say).” – 
PM10 
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Additionally, after the tsunami, there were only two weighing stations remain functional in 
Aceh. The first one was in Semadam, near the border with the North Sumatra province. The 
second one was in Jontor, in the west coast area of Aceh (Dirjenhubdat, 2014). The remaining 
stations were destroyed by the earthquake and the tsunami. Since there were only two 
weighing stations operating, and both were located near the border of the North Sumatra 
province, the transportation agency practically could only control the interprovincial traffic 
which passed the route where the weighing stations were located. Accordingly, the overloading 
traffic moving within the province of Aceh was virtually untouched. As explained by PM10 
“So indeed (the control) is weak. If there are only those two, the control is weak. If for 
instance a ship hauls in Tapaktuan, it does not go through Singkil (Jontor). It may be 
travelling to Calang (Aceh Jaya) or Takengon (mid Aceh), which can’t be monitored.” – 
PM10 
To cope with the lack of overloading vehicle controlling facilities, the transportation agency was 
provided with portable weighing stations. However, most of the equipment was no longer 
working. This was suggested by PM10 
“We used to have several portable loading control equipment.” – PM10 
As the equipment to control the overloading traffic is limited, the overloading vehicles remain 
as one of the significant factors affecting the rapid deterioration rate of the road infrastructure 
in Aceh.  
This section has provided discussions on the main factors affecting the performance of the local 
governments in road maintenance. The external factors, covering the legal, political, 
socioeconomic, and the inter-organisational relationship between government and private 
institutions have been elaborated in section 5.4.1.1.1. The institutional factors which include 
the financial management, human resource and organisational management have also been 
discussed in detail in section 5.4.1.1.2. Finally, the issues surrounding the technical factors 
related to the road design and traffic overloading control have been presented in section 
5.4.1.1.3. The cognitive maps of the main affecting factors on the local governments’ road 
maintenance capacity is presented in Figure 5.8. Having presented the factors affecting the 
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capacity of the local government in road maintenance, the following sections elaborate the 
issue of road maintenance capacity building in the post-disaster reconstruction. 
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Figure 5.8 – The cognitive maps of the technical factors
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5.4.1.2 Road maintenance capacity building in post-disaster reconstruction 
The previous sections have provided an insight into how the external and the internal factors 
affected the capacity of the local governments in the maintenance of road infrastructure from 
the perspective of the high-level officials and policy makers. The focus of the study is the 
capacity of the local governments in the maintenance of the road infrastructure assets after 
the post-disaster reconstruction activity in Aceh. Accordingly, following the previous discussion, 
this section is dedicated to provide an analysis on the issue of capacity building activities in the 
road maintenance within the context of post-disaster reconstruction. The discussion will be 
initiated by presenting the capacity building approaches as it emerged in the interviews, 
followed by the challenges faced in the implementation of the capacity building programs in 
post-disaster reconstruction.  
5.4.1.2.1 Capacity building approaches 
One of the main concerns of the post-disaster reconstruction in Aceh highlighted in this study 
is that the reconstruction resulted in a great number of assets to the local governments, who 
are held responsible for the operation and maintenance. Accordingly, in the case where local 
governments’ capacity has been renowned to be low, decision need to be made with regards 
to the scale and approach of the post-disaster reconstruction activity, particularly if there was 
a threat that the investment made in the reconstruction could diminish in a short period. 
Accordingly, it was argued that capacity building program is an important component of post-
disaster reconstruction. 
From the discussion with the interviewees, it emerged that the capacity building program in 
the post-disaster road reconstruction should be targeted at the main stakeholders of the road 
maintenance, particularly the local governments and the local consultants. Ultimately, such 
effort was expected to improve the attitude and the mind-set of the road maintenance 
stakeholders which would eventually stimulate the change.  
In this section, the various approaches and methods of implementing the capacity building 
programs related to the road maintenance, as construed by the interviewees will be discussed. 
The coding structure for the capacity building approaches is presented in Figure 5.9. 
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Figure 5.9- Coding Structure for the capacity building approach 
 
5.4.1.2.1.1 Formal education 
The first capacity building approach took place in the form of formal education sessions such 
as the provision of trainings, seminars, workshop and skills certification.  
In the post-disaster reconstruction period, various seminars and trainings were provided to 
different target groups. Some of the trainings which were relevant to the road maintenance 
capacity includes procurement, asset management and road construction trainings. The 
procurement capacity of the local government personnel was one of the main concerns during 
the post-disaster reconstruction. By improving the procurement capacity, it was expected that 
it would eventually lead to improved financial accountability and accordingly improve the local 
governments’ budget expenditure capacity.  
As added by PM04, the provision of the procurement training for the local government 
personnel was part of the commitment to improve the local governments’ personnel capacity 
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“What we frequently did was (training) for procurement of goods and services. Project 
management training… because our commitment was to build the capacity of our 
colleague from the Local Governments.” – PM04 
Additionally, asset management trainings were also provided to the local governments’ 
personnel. PM02 described that during the disaster reconstruction period, the local 
governments were also given trainings to use the SIMDA software, a software for the regional 
asset information management system. By implementing and applying the software, it was 
expected that the local governments would be able to better prepare the maintenance work 
plan. PM02 explained  
“SIMDA. Information system for asset management. It is actually a capacity building 
(program), in short, to make a balance sheet, to know for example the cycle of 
maintenance, and so on.” – PM02 
Not only were trainings provided about the pre-construction skills, trainings were also provided 
to the local government personnel regarding the quality control and the quality assurance of 
the road construction.  
5.4.1.2.1.2 Recruitment and placement 
In addition to the formal educational sessions provided to the local governments’ personnel in 
forms of trainings and workshops as mentioned above, the capacity building efforts to the Local 
Governments also occurred in the form of recruitment and placement of Local Government 
personnel in the BRR. As described by PM04, the involvement of the local personnel in the BRR 
was aimed at both improving the capacity of the local governments and building the sense of 
the ownership to the reconstruction assets by involving the locals in the reconstruction process. 
This was described by PM04  
“Two things expected. First, the capacity building of our Acehnese friend. Second, let’s 
rebuild Aceh together. Those are the point. I was warned… to recruit local people. 
Otherwise, they would not feel involved in the reconstruction of Aceh.” – PM04 
Another justification of recruiting the local governments’ personnel, as suggested by PM09, 
was that after the tsunami many of the local governments’ personnel were practically inactive 
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as a consequence of the devastated physical and organisational structure of the government. 
PM09 said 
“We used their (Local Governments) personnel because they were also idle… so we used 
their personnel.” – PM09 
From the human resource management point of view, PM04 suggested that since the 
reconstruction, which was led by the BRR could not rely entirely on the local human resources, 
BRR had to accordingly recruit personnel from outside of Aceh. However, to ensure that the 
capacity building process could take place along the reconstruction activity, PM04 emphasised 
that the local personnel dominated the composition of personnel. He explained  
“The composition was 60-40, it was even 70-30. 70% were Acehnese, and the 30% was 
from outside. It started with around 55-45… as the organisation got bigger, more 
positions were filled with the Acehnese.” – PM04 
Additionally, PM04 suggested that the involvement of local personnel did not only take place 
in the form of distributing the personnel composition between local and non-local personnel, 
but was also in the form of giving higher priority to the local people in the recruitment process. 
PM04 explained 
“If, for example, there are four candidates, two from Aceh and two from outside of Aceh, 
if the marks (qualification) almost equal… I will choose the Acehnese. If the outsiders have 
slightly higher marks… I will choose the Acehnese. Only when it’s far (higher), I will choose 
outsiders. Because certain qualifications are not available in Aceh, that’s the only reason.” 
– PM04  
However, he further highlighted that regardless the effort to give the local people a higher 
priority in the recruitment process, the capacity of the personnel remained the most important 
factor. He said 
“The first consideration would be the capacity. The capacity of each of the personnel, 
whether they were appropriate or not. Or, the skill was required there or not… we may 
choose someone else, which could be Acehnese or not.” – PM04 
In addition to building capacity of the local people as part of the post-disaster reconstruction, 
the peace agreement MoU also particularly stated the requirement to involve the ex- GAM in 
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the reconstruction process. When asked if there was political pressure in the recruitment of ex-
GAM personnel in the BRR, PM04 said 
“The intervention would be minimised… it had to be considered why recruit a certain 
person… It was not just to let loose (uncontrolled). Otherwise, there would be many people 
coming in but not knowing what to do with them.” – PM04  
However, PM04 admitted that such condition was a consequence and part of the post-conflict 
reconstruction. As he said 
“One, the damage was due the tsunami. Second, the post-conflict condition need to be 
considered.” – PM04 
The above statement concludes the various capacity building approaches adopted in the post-
disaster road reconstruction activity. The following section will therefore provide a discussion 
on the challenges experienced in the capacity building efforts.  
5.4.1.2.2 Capacity building challenges 
The efforts of capacity building of the local governments, particularly in the road maintenance, 
appeared to have experienced a number of challenges. These challenges, will be described in 
the following section.  
 
Figure 5.10 - The coding structure for the capacity building challenge 
 
The main challenge of the capacity building program emerging from the interviews was the lack 
of political interest in the capacity building programs. The poor political interest in the capacity 
building programs was also excused as an impact of the political condition is Aceh. After the 
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tsunami, which was followed by the signature of the peace agreement between the Indonesian 
Government and the Aceh Free Movement (GAM), most of the district governments and 
parliaments were dominated by ex-GAM personnel.  
Whilst on the one hand the capacity building program for the Local Government personnel is 
considered to be limited, on the other hand, an effort to improve the planning system, had 
been refused by the Local Governments due to the low interest on the system. This was 
particularly experienced in the asset management capacity building program. As explained by 
PM02 
“The SIMDA (asset management software) system… honestly not everyone (Local 
Governments) wanted to accept it. The early adopter was the mayor of Banda Aceh. He 
was the early adopter of SIMDA. The remaining (districts), it was after we (BRR) were 
dismissed that some districts asked please also make one for us.” – PM02 
Additionally, one of the most influencing factors to ensuring that road infrastructure is 
maintained is the sufficiency of budget allocation for the maintenance needs. Thus, the quality 
of the budget expenditure plan is very important, and is accordingly argued to be the essential 
skills. However, there appeared to be lack of capacity building program aimed at improving the 
budgeting skill.  
As discussed previously in section 5.4.1.1.1.2, the budgeting process was highly influenced by 
the parliaments. Accordingly, it was suggested that there was a considerable need to provide 
the parliament members with the budgeting skill trainings. However, one interviewee saw that 
the results of such effort would be dubious as the parliament members are practically replaced 
every five years. As PM08 stated 
“It is difficult. Because they are replaced every five years.” – PM08  
In addition to the aforementioned problems, another challenge in the capacity building of local 
governments’ personnel, particularly with regards to the road maintenance capacity was due 
to the high pressure on accelerating and speeding up the recovery process. As a consequence, 
the reconstruction was more focused on the reconstruction of the physical infrastructure and 
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that the capacity building programs specifically aimed at improving the road maintenance 
capacity appeared to be lacking. 
5.4.1.2.3 Summary 
The issues in the capacity building, covering the capacity building objectives, approaches and 
challenges have been elaborated profoundly in this section. Additionally, the cognitive map 
presenting all of the capacity building issues emerging from the data analysis is illustrated in 
Figure 5.11. Since the research focuses on the capacity of the local government in the 
maintenance of the post-disaster road reconstruction assets, there is a need to link the current 
local governments’ road maintenance practices with the post-disaster reconstruction activity 
and elaborated in more detail.  
Accordingly, the following section will provide an in-depth discussion on the links to the post-
disaster reconstruction. The section will cover the issue of stakeholders’ involvement, 
consideration of maintenance, the asset transfer process, and will be concluded by the 
discussion of the post-disaster road reconstruction success indicators. As the issues 
surrounding the local governments’ capacity in the maintenance of road infrastructure are 
closely related to the post-disaster reconstruction activity, some of the concerns have been 
mentioned in the previous sections. However, these concerns will be reemphasised to provide 
a thorough understanding of the link between road maintenance capacity and the post-disaster 
road reconstruction process.  
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Figure 5.11 – Cognitive map of the capacity building in road maintenance
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5.4.2 Links to post-disaster reconstruction 
This section is focused on discussing the links between the post-disaster reconstruction and the 
capacity of the local governments in the maintenance of road infrastructure. Accordingly, this 
section will discuss the issue of local governments’ involvement, consideration of maintenance 
needs, the asset transfer process, and the success indicators of the road infrastructure 
reconstruction. 
5.4.2.1 Local governments involvement  
From the interviews, it emerged that the involvement of the local governments in the post-
disaster road reconstruction activities was conducted in four ways. It was suggested that the 
local governments were involved in the reconstruction of the road infrastructure by the means 
of getting inputs for the road reconstruction blue print, assignment of government officials in 
the BRR, distribution of tasks and coordination, and through the establishment of joint 
secretariats. These four methods of local governments’ involvement will be elaborated in the 
following sections. The coding structure for the local governments’ involvement in the 
reconstruction of the road infrastructure is presented in Figure 5.12 
 
 
Figure 5.12 - The coding structure for the involvement of the local governments 
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5.4.2.1.1 Inputs gathering 
The stakeholders involvement method included in this category consists of activities where the 
BRR and other government institutions gathered together to collect input for the 
reconstruction plan. The local governments were involved in the planning process even though 
it was constrained by the fact that they were also victims of the disaster 
The challenge was described by PM09. According to him, the local governments were not 
primarily involved in the implementation process because they were devastated by the 
disaster. He said 
“In the planning… in the programming (local governments were involved). The 
coordination was done during the planning and programming process. Afterwards, the 
implementation was done separately… They were actually not in the position that was 
strong enough to do the works, because they were also victims (of the disaster). They lost 
staff, assets, equipment, and so on. Even their documents were missing.” – PM09 
Supporting the view of PM09, PM03 gave similar comment and added that the local 
governments were involved in the implementation process as the project monitoring body. He 
stated 
“I think the involvement of the local governments in the planning, in the consultation 
(process) were obvious. During the implementation, the monitoring task, (local 
governments’ role) was also obvious.” – PM03 
On another occasion, PM01 explained that the BRR assisted the local governments prepare 
their annual investment plan. Instead of doing it for them, he highlighted that the local 
governments led the process and the BRR facilitated the process based on the local 
governments’ plans. He said 
“The (annual) investment plan was made by the LGs. If you ask how we absorbed (LGs) 
aspirations, it is through it. I didn’t make a system where we ask them (to do things), no. 
I put them in the front. You (LGs) make it, I will facilitate. You plan your development, I 
will guide you.” – PM01 
He further added that the process changed the typical top-down approach to the bottom-up 
approach.  
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“We changed the top-down (approach) to bottom-up. What is better than that? Nothing. 
If I ask them for the aspiration, it would still be top-down. I mean, if I want to develop an 
area, I ask you what you want; it would still be top-down. Here… You (the LGs) are in the 
front, you plan, and I will give you the tools to make it.” – PM01 
The next method of local governments’ involvement in the reconstruction process was through 
the assignment of the local government personnel in the reconstruction agencies.  
5.4.2.1.2 Assignment of local government personnel 
Another form of local governments’ involvement in the reconstruction process was the 
assignment or appointment of government employees to the BRR as board of directors or 
loaned staff. Not only did such arrangement acted as a form of capacity building, as described 
in section 5.4.1.2.1, it also helped merging and blending the various institutions involved in the 
process.  
The involvement of stakeholders in the post-disaster reconstruction process through 
assignment took place at the various levels. At the high level, this was done by including the 
governor in the BRR organisation structure. As described by PM03  
“In the implementation, the BRR also had what was called board of directors… The 
governor is there.” – PM03 
Additionally, at the implementation level, the reconstruction agencies recruited the local 
governments’ personnel to be posted in various positions and levels. As described by PM09, 
the BRR utilised the idle personnel in the local governments to help the BRR in the 
reconstruction process. He further added that the reconstruction needed to involve the local 
personnel, as they know the area very well. He said 
“The (LGs) staff that was not used, or was idle, we asked to help us.” – PM09 
5.4.2.1.3 Distribution of tasks and coordination 
Another form of local governments’ involvement in the reconstruction process was the 
distribution of tasks and coordination. In the reconstruction of Aceh, BRR was in charge to 
coordinate and lead the reconstruction process. Part of the tasks involve coordination with the 
regional governments, donor agencies, NGOs, as well as the private sectors with regards to the 
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distribution of reconstruction projects and tasks. The coordination and distribution of 
reconstruction tasks might occur in the form of distribution of areas (appointing certain areas 
to certain organisation), sectors (appointing certain development to certain organisation i.e., 
housing or sanitary needs), or functions (appointing certain phase of project to certain 
organisations, i.e. planning, construction, etc.).  
Additionally, the distribution of task with the regional governments in the post-disaster 
reconstruction process also took place in the form of the land acquisition process. PM05 
explained that in the road reconstruction process, the provincial government was responsible 
to acquire the land required for the project. He said 
“The main task of the provincial government in the (road) reconstruction was to acquire 
land. The land acquisition was absolutely the obligation of the provincial government. 
Done by PG’s personnel. Paid by the provincial budget.” – PM05 
He further described the process as 
“As the planning was completed, it was handed to us. Our job was to acquire land for the 
whole roads. If the road diverted to a route which was not its original route, we had to 
acquire the land.” – PM05 
5.4.2.1.4 Establishment of joint secretariats 
Furthermore, within the 4 year period of BRR in Aceh, the BRR experienced a number of 
organisational changes. The organisational changes were required to accommodate the 
growing needs in the reconstruction process. One of the changes include the establishment of 
joint secretariats and the regional offices.  
PM02 describe the arrangement as 
“With regards to public infrastructure, we had a joint-planning. It was called joint 
secretariats. Between LGs, normally (represented by) the planning agencies, and our 
(BRR) regional office.” – PM02 
Additionally, the regional offices were established to improve coordination with the district 
governments, in order to accelerate the reconstruction process. As suggested by PM07 
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“The regional offices were established not other than to improve coordination with the 
district government, so it would be quicker.” – PM07 
One of the objectives of the joint secretariats was to avoid duplication of programs. As PM02 
further stressed 
“We ensure that there would be no project duplications… We shared tasks.” – PM02 
CS18 further justified that project selection and prioritisation was done and discussed in the 
joint secretariats and was therefore requested and approved together. He said 
“The proposal was discussed in the joint secretariats. The joint secretariats consisted of 
the BRR and the district governments. From there, program priorities were made… That 
is why BRR did not want to snatch programs… they need to be discussed in the Joint 
secretariats.” – CS18 
As the various ways of local governments’ involvement in the reconstruction of road 
infrastructure in the post-disaster reconstruction process have been discussed, the following 
section will cover the issue of maintenance needs consideration in the reconstruction period.  
5.4.2.2 Consideration of maintenance  
In the post-tsunami reconstruction in Aceh, the amount of pledge exceeded the needs to 
restore the affected areas to the original condition. As a result, building back better principle 
was adopted and was applied in the reconstruction. In the road sector, the reconstruction 
activities resulted in more than 3600 km of roads were reconstructed, nearly 1000km more 
than what were initially destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami.  
One of the concerns resulting from the extensive scale of reconstruction was the sustainability 
of the reconstructed road assets, particularly with regards to the maintenance of the district 
roads by the respective local governments. Accordingly, this section is focused on analysing the 
maintenance needs consideration during the process of road infrastructure reconstruction. 
Data analysis shows varying views on the maintenance consideration issue, which will be 
presented in the following sections 
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5.4.2.2.1 Considered 
With regards to the consideration of maintenance needs for the road infrastructure, some 
interviewees notified that the future maintenance needs was considered and included in the 
decision making process of the road reconstruction projects. The consideration of maintenance 
needs were reflected and justified in two ways, as presented in the following sections.  
One way of ensuring that the road infrastructure is maintained by the local governments took 
place in the form of setting up an MoU between the BRR and the respective local governments. 
In the MoU, local government expressed their willingness and acceptance to maintain the roads 
that will be built by the BRR for them. Additionally, the MoU also stipulated that the minimum 
annual allocation required to maintain the particular road section as much as Rp 20 million per 
year, with an increase of 5% for each of the following year as a consequence of asset 
depreciation. As explained by PM08 
“The district roads… we expected that once the construction has been completed… all 
projects at the district level would be maintained, and have sufficient operational 
allocation… To anticipate this, there was no other way than to require the commitment 
of the respective Bupati… Project in the respective district would not commence before 
the Bupati signed the MoU (regarding) their acceptance to maintain and provide 
allocation for the maintenance and operations. It is also stipulated there, the 
maintenance and operational allocation (requirement) for the first year. It needs to be 
detailed and the details must be submitted on the final handover of the projects.” PM08 
However, the MoU for the maintenance needs between BRR and the respective local 
governments was only done for the foreign-funded projects, particularly those included in the 
IRFF project. No MoU was required for projects funded by the state budget.  
Additionally, as previously discussed, setting up an MoU between the BRR and the local 
governments was only applied to the foreign-funded projects and not for the self-funded 
(national budget) projects. Justifying the absence of an MoU requirement for the remaining 
projects, PM02 suggested that the financial resources of the local governments in Aceh was 
seen to be sufficient to maintain the road. This was particularly because Aceh province receives 
an additional budget allocation from the national government as part of its Special Autonomy 
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status. Particularly addressed at the financial needs for the road infrastructure maintenance, 
PM02 stipulated 
“They (LGs) are supposed to be able (to maintain)… the reconstruction fund was 
abundant. Aceh was not like this before that time… After the reconstruction, with 2% DAU 
(special autonomy fund), from the economic perspective, the economic condition of Aceh 
will not change.” – PM02 
He further explained  
“We were very worried that as we had Rp 20 trillion per year, poured in Aceh, and was 
pulled (stopped) in a sudden… it would collapse… But it didn’t, due to the additional fund 
of the 2% DAU (special autonomy fund). It will sustain them (reconstruction assets).” – 
PM02 
The above suggestions refer to the additional budget allocation called special autonomy fund 
that Aceh province receives from the national government since 2008 (section 2.5.6.1). 
Accordingly, from the financial aspect, the local governments were expected to have the fund 
required for the maintenance. 
Another preventive measure adopted in the post-disaster reconstruction of the road 
infrastructure in Aceh was to use a higher road specification as a standard design. The Hotmix 
(HMA) pavement type was widely used in the reconstruction of road infrastructure in Aceh, 
replacing the macadam type which was widely used by the local governments prior to the 
tsunami. By using the higher quality pavement type, it was expected that the road 
infrastructure would accordingly last longer, to compensate the expected poor road 
maintenance capacity of the local government. As explained by PM08 
“For the district road in Aceh, in particular, we made the pavement (specification) 
standard not far from the national roads.” – PM08 
Whilst the preventive measures adopted in the post-disaster road reconstruction have been 
discussed in this section, most of the road sections were in fact suffering from the road 
maintenance neglect. More discussion will be elaborated in the following section. 
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5.4.2.2.2 Not considered 
Whilst the above views suggested that the road maintenance need was considered in the post-
disaster road reconstruction process, it also emerged from the interviews that the road 
maintenance need was not well put into account in the planning and reconstruction process. 
This was stipulated as due to three reasons; the reconstruction was focused on the needs of 
the affected community, the reconstruction was focused on the reconstruction speed in order 
to accelerate the recovery process, and that the local governments was expected to be 
responsible to maintain the reconstruction assets returned back to them. Further detail of 
these issues will be discussed in the following sections.  
The first excuse for overlooking the future road maintenance needs in the road reconstruction 
process was suggested by PM05 that the reconstruction process was focused on the recovery 
of the affected areas and accordingly focused on the local governments’ needs. He argued that 
the development of an area should not be based on the local governments’ maintenance 
capacity but rather on the needs. He highlighted 
“I think, development should not be according to Local Governments’ capacity. Rather, 
development should look at the community needs, not based on the capacity and ability 
of local governments to maintain (the assets) afterwards. Not like that.” – PM05 
He further said 
“The most important thing in the reconstruction is to build everything according to the 
community needs… After that is done, the management, sufficient or not (the 
maintenance capacity problems) can be overcome slowly.” – PM05 
Whilst reconstruction needs were considered as the main drivers in the road reconstruction 
process, PM09 also argued that the pressure to speed up the recovery process was high. 
Accordingly, he suggested the consideration of future maintenance needs of the road 
infrastructure was put aside. He stated 
“It is actually like this. Did we, when we were planning, we constructed, we thought about 
the other end (maintenance)? No. We actually initially did think that way. We were 
thinking about how to provide the infrastructure quickly. Regarding the maintenance, put 
aside. Because the demand was so high.” – PM09 
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Furthermore, another justification for not putting into account the future maintenance needs 
in the reconstruction of road infrastructure was expressed by the interviewees in regards to 
the asset ownership. Since the reconstructed road infrastructure actually belonged to the local 
governments, the argument was that the local governments were accordingly responsible for 
the maintenance of the assets.  
PM09 suggested that the BRR was responsible for providing the capital projects and that the 
local governments as the end beneficiaries of the project were held responsible for the 
operational needs, which included the maintenance. PM09 stated 
“The philosophy was that capital project was the responsibility of the BRR. But when we 
talk about operation, it was indeed the responsibility of the beneficiaries. Since the 
beginning, the setting has been like that… So we reconstructed in the proper way. 
Reconstructed them better. But for the maintenance, it was the local governments to 
bear. – PM09 
Giving an illustration to explain his argument, PM09 added  
“Actually, from the asset law, it is their asset. We only did construction on top of it. That’s 
it.” – PM09 
The above discussions have provided an insight into the issue of maintenance needs 
consideration during the post-disaster road reconstruction. Furthermore, the following section 
will cover the issue of asset transfer process, the process of returning the road reconstruction 
assets to the respective local governments.  
5.4.2.3 Asset transfer process and challenges 
The assets reconstructed by the BRR were transferred to four types of institutions. The 
reconstruction assets of BRR were transferred either to the national government, provincial 
government, local governments, or the community, depending on the nature and the end 
beneficiaries of the project. With regards to the reconstruction assets at the district level, the 
assets would initially need to be registered as state assets and therefore managed by the 
Directorate General of State Asset Management. Once the assets have been registered as the 
state assets, they would be transferred back to the district government for the operation and 
maintenance. This process was explained by PM02. 
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However, due to the great number of assets to be transferred to the regional governments, the 
asset transfer process could not be completed by the end of BRR period. Accordingly, the asset 
transfer tasks were continued by the liquidation team, an agency specially established to 
transfer the reconstruction assets to the particular governments. The coding structure of the 
asset transfer process is presented in Figure 5.13. 
 
Figure 5.13 – The coding structure of the asset transfer 
 
5.4.2.3.1 Challenges 
The process of asset transfer experienced a number of challenges. These challenges frequently 
resulted in delays in the asset registration process and therefore the absence of budget 
allocation for the operation and maintenance needs. Many of the challenges resulted in the 
local government refuse to accept the assets. More discussions on the challenges in the asset 
transfer will be presented in the following sections, grouped according to their similarities.  
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One of the main problems in the asset transfer process was due to the poor asset management 
capacity of the personnel involved in the process. Even though the lack of experience could be 
one of the reasons, PM01 argued it could not be used as an excuse, particularly since the 
mechanism had been stipulated in the national regulation and most of those involved were 
government officials who were supposed to know the regulation. One of the causes of this 
problem, as highlighted by PM05 was due to the fact that BRR personnel was recruited from 
different institutions which were frequently replaced and relocated. As he said 
“(This was) because at that time the BRR recruited its personnel from various institutions. 
Then, the personnel were frequently changed. As a result, the administrative 
requirements was not well-maintained and inconsistent.” – PM05 
Another issue raised by one of the interviewees was the poor asset management capacity due 
to the local governments’ lack of interest to improve their system. With regards to using an 
asset management system, PM02 described how most local governments ignored the need to 
use the asset management system, and even ignored the offer to adopt the system in the first 
place. As PM02 said, 
“The SIMDA (asset management software) system… honestly not everyone (the LGs) 
wanted to accept it. The early adopter was the major of Banda Aceh. He was the early 
adopter of SIMDA. The others, it was after we (BRR) were dismissed, some district asked 
‘please also make one for us’.” – PM02 
In addition to the issue of asset management capacity, another problem causing delays in the 
transfer of assets was with regards to the method of valuating the assets. Explained by PM01, 
the asset valuation process escalated the asset transfer problem. First, the process of asset 
valuation might result in further delays. Second, the local governments did not have the 
capacity to do the asset valuation, nor do they have the budget to pay the consultant to do the 
valuation. Third, the valuation process may result in dispute due to the different values that 
might be given to an asset, as they were valued at different time. He explained 
“When we were finished, the most difficult and time consuming (process) was the asset 
transfer. The transfer of asset to local governments was difficult. The local governments 
wanted that the assets to be revaluated, before they accept them. If they asked for 
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revaluation, they would not sign the value which they did not think represent the current 
value at that time.” – PM01 
With regards to the cost and impact resulting from the asset revaluation process, PM01 argued 
“The problem was, they also did not have money to (do) asset revaluation, to pay the 
consultant. (Even) if they appointed a consultant, the consultant would have different 
opinions (on the value). The project that we built was 100%, at the valuation time it had 
been (used) for several years. The consultant might appraise different value.” – PM01 
The next category of asset transfer challenges which resulted in the road maintenance neglects 
was due to the difficulties experienced in the project administration side. One of the main 
issues causing problems and delays in the transfer of reconstruction assets to the local 
governments was with regards to the completeness of the assets document. Additionally, as 
described by PM02, the local governments worked strictly in accordance with the formal rules 
and regulations, which therefore resulted in the maintenance neglect. As he illustrated 
“It’s like this, the government works based on formal norms. Even though I have occupied 
the building, but because the paperwork is not with me yet, I will not maintain the 
building.” – PM02.  
Interviewee PM02 further added that the absence of the formal paperwork resulted in the 
maintenance neglect.  
“Indeed, formally the Local Governments would not grant maintenance allocation if the 
formal (paperwork) had not completed.” – PM02 
Supporting the PM02 comment on the formal paperwork requirement for the asset transfer, 
PM08 explained the problem as  
“For us, after the final handover, since we had been covered by the MoU, we considered 
that the assets were the responsibility of the LGs… Because they had signed prior to 
project implementation. But what happened was, without official handover from the 
national government to the provincial government, and to district government, the local 
governments would have difficulties in allocating budget. So they could not make the 
budget request to the parliament.” – PM08 
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He further showed his concern that it was the bureaucratic process which hindered the 
allocation of the maintenance budget.  
“Those were the problems. Not due to unwillingness, but due to bureaucracy the 
(maintenance) fund was not approved.” – PM08 
Likewise, PM02 argued that the legal process was the main challenges experienced in the 
process of transferring reconstruction assets back to the local governments.  
“In my opinion, one of the biggest take-away (problem) was the legal process. The legal 
process of asset handover. For example, I am giving a car, the car has been possessed, 
but since the licence paperwork and car registration have not been handed-over, it has 
not actually been transferred, right?” – PM02 
With regards to the ownership status of road sections that have not been transferred to the 
LGs, PM03 explained that the roads belong to the national government. As he said 
“Automatically it belongs to the central (government) because the status had been 
changed to state-owned property. State-owned property becomes district-owned 
property if the transfer has been accepted. But if it hasn’t… they are still state’s assets.” – 
PM03 
Another challenge in the asset transfer process of road infrastructure assets included those due 
to the land registration and certification problem. As highlighted by PM02, the land registration 
and certification problem was due to the dependencies of the process on the national land 
management body (BPN) who has the authority to issue the land certificate. He said 
“In this country, the one who has the authority to issue the land certificate is the BPN. 
Why they have not done, sometimes the reason is that it’s just not done yet… just being 
relaxed. It happened.” – PM02 
In addition to the administrative and legal requirements as the challenges to the asset transfer 
process, there was also problems due to the poor condition of the assets when the asset 
transfer process took place. In addition to road deterioration due to overloading traffic, PM09 
also argue that the poor condition of the road infrastructure was also due to the lack of routine 
maintenance. He said 
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“Another issue… the maintenance needs to be done every year. Even if the construction 
(quality) is good, it still needs maintenance. Grass needs to be cut, cracks need to be 
repaired, right? (without maintenance) three or four years, it will be damaged.” – PM09 
He further argued that the local governments did not consider this matter. He further argued 
that when refusing to accept the road reconstruction assets, the local governments did not put 
into account the initial road condition prior to the tsunami reconstruction. He said 
“They (the LGs) did not consider the initial condition of the construction. They only see 
that the roads are now damaged. Fix them first before I accept them. In fact, we did not 
build new roads. We reconstructed the existing road. We rehabilitated, we overlaid the 
existing roads.” – PM09  
The issue of poor road condition in the asset transfer process as discussed above was closely 
linked to the time gap between the project completion and the asset transfer process itself. 
The process of transferring the road infrastructure assets to the regional government generally 
took place at the end of the BRR period. Some assets were even transferred after BRR have 
been officially closed in 2009, regardless the project completion time. As a result, the 
maintenance of the assets between the project completion (i.e. the final handover of the assets 
from the contractor) and the transfer to the local governments were neglected.  
PM02 further confirmed that the time gap between project completion and transfer of assets 
had been one of the main problems. He said 
“The transition between (project completion) and handover of assets to the LGs, there 
was quite a long gap.” – PM02 
Additionally, PM09 added that some of the road reconstruction project was not finished by the 
end of BRR period and was therefore continued by the ministry of the public works. PM09 
accordingly highlighted that during the gap, the roads were not maintained.  
“They (the unfinished project) are all working beyond the BRR period. Imagine, during this 
time are they maintained? Actually, not. Who maintains them? We no longer have the 
authority. Legally we have no power. However, the assets have not yet been transferred.” 
– PM09 
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The above section have provided an in-depth discussion on the challenges in the asset transfer 
process. The various issues in the asset transfer process, which eventually lead to the delays in 
the transfer process and maintenance neglect have been also been presented, covering the 
various views of the interviewees on the issue. The cognitive map of the challenges in the asset 
transfer process is presented in Figure 5.14 . 
Accordingly, the following section will provide a discussion on the post-disaster road 
reconstruction success indicators as perceived by the interviewees at the national and the 
provincial levels.  
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Figure 5.14 – Cognitive map of the asset transfer challenges
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5.4.2.4 Post-disaster road reconstruction success indicators 
This section will present the success indicators of the post-disaster road reconstruction. The 
indicators presented in this section were derived from the discussion with the high-level 
officials and policy maker interviewees at the national and the provincial levels. The success 
indicators are grouped in accordance to their similarities into three main categories, namely: 
disaster impact recovery, socioeconomic condition and improved road infrastructure condition. 
Each of these indicators will be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
 
 
Figure 5.15 - The coding structure for the post-disaster success indicators 
 
One of the success indicators of road reconstruction is with regards to the impact of the 
reconstruction on the recovery pace. The interviewees generally perceived that the 
reconstruction of road infrastructure has largely contributed to the speedy recovery of the 
tsunami affected areas. As suggested by PM05 
“I see that the communities have rapidly recovered.” – PM05 
Furthermore, the reconstruction of road infrastructure resulted in more road reconstructed 
than destroyed. This means that on the one hand the reconstruction of road infrastructure 
helped reduce the maintenance backlog by rehabilitating or reconstructing the unaffected road 
sections. On the other hand, this also means that reconstruction of road infrastructure 
potentially gives extra burden to the local governments to maintain the road reconstruction 
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assets. Extending the scope of the road reconstruction to also include the unaffected road 
section was also doable due to the fund availability. As suggested by PM09, fund availability 
was used as an opportunity to implement the build back better principle. He said 
“We (adopted) build back better (principle). What was damaged, we repaired. Then (as) 
we had spare fund, we extended beyond what was damaged. So we did not only restore 
the damaged (road sections) to the original condition, but also the coverage. The 
coverage was also wider than what was destroyed by the tsunami.” – PM09 
He added 
“So not only what was destroyed that we repaired… the build back better was 
(implemented) vertically and horizontally. Vertical means the quality is repaired, 
horizontal means the coverage is extended. That is why there are differences (between 
destroyed and reconstructed road length).” – PM09 
In addition to the length of the road sections repaired during the post-disaster reconstruction 
period, the quality of the reconstructed road was also believed to have better quality. As argued 
by PM08  
“I considered (the road reconstruction) as successful. Because we assessed this ourselves. 
So when the projects were completed and after the contractors’ defect liability period, we 
went around. The projects were still exist (and) in good condition.” PM08 
He further added that the reconstructed road assets were generally in good condition.  
“Roads that were built were still in good condition. Even though there were some small 
potholes, but with the maintenance fund that Local Governments (provided), the potholes 
were patched. They were maintained.” – PM08 
PM08 view was also supported by, PM09, whom argued that in general the road are still in 
good condition. He said 
“There are spots that we could not say 100% perfect, but they are relatively more durable 
than what is normally constructed… I received photos that there potholes, but generally 
they are still in very good condition.” – PM09 
Another benefit of the road reconstruction activities was with regard to the reduced travel time 
to the tsunami affected areas. Such impact was raised by PM08 and PM05. PM08 described 
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“So far we have observed and proved that it was very beneficial. We did a survey to Aceh 
Jaya, Pidie, Bireuen, Pidie Jaya and Sabang. For instance, in Sabang, the community is 
now used to travel, from what used to take 5 hours can now be travelled in just half an 
hour.” – PM08 
Similarly, PM05 added 
“If you want to go to Meulaboh, now it takes only 3.5 hours. No more rafts. Smooth.” – 
PM05 
The post-disaster road reconstruction success indicators have been discussed in detail in this 
section. Accordingly, the cognitive map of the success indicators is presented in the following 
Figure 5.16 
This section provides in-depth discussion on the links and connections between the local 
governments’ road maintenance capacity with the post-disaster reconstruction process. The 
issue of local governments’ involvement, consideration of maintenance needs, asset transfer, 
as well as the post-disaster road reconstruction success indicator have been presented 
profoundly above. Accordingly, this section concluded the analysis of the semi-structured 
interviews with the high-level officials and semi-structured respondents and the discussion will 
therefore progress to the analysis of the case studies in the next section.  
 
Figure 5.16 – Cognitive map of the road reconstruction success indicator
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SECTION B – THE CASE STUDIES 
This section presents the analysis of the case studies of the research. The process of the case 
study selection is discussed in section 3.3.3.3. Accordingly, the case studies of the research are 
the district of Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya, and Aceh Barat Daya, three out of the 8 districts and cities 
in the west coast of Aceh province which were directly affected by the 2004 tsunami. The 
following section will accordingly provide background information about the case studies. The 
discussion will further progress to the analysis of each of the case study in section 5.7 (Aceh 
Besar), section 5.8 (Aceh Jaya), and section 5.9 (Aceh Barat Daya).  
5.5 Background information  
5.5.1.1 Case study 1: Aceh Besar District 
The Aceh Besar district is located on the tip of Sumatra Island, surrounding the city of Banda 
Aceh. The northern part of the district is the Malacca strait, the city of Sabang and the city of 
Banda Aceh. In the western part, the border is the Indonesian Ocean. The area of Aceh Besar 
district also includes some islands in the Malacca Strait and the Indonesian Ocean.  
 
Figure 5.17 – Map of Aceh Besar location  
Source: Wikipedia 
The population of Aceh Besar is 371,412 people, which are spread in 23 sub-districts and more 
than 600 villages. More details on the geographical information of the Aceh Besar district are 
presented in Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2 – Geographical Information of Aceh Besar district  
Description Remarks 
Location 5.2
0 – 5.8o North Latitude and 
95.0o- 95.8o East Longitude 
Number of sub-districts: 23 sub-districts and 604 villages 
Border North: Malacca strait, Sabang 
and  Banda Aceh 
South: Aceh Jaya 
East: Pidie 
West: Indonesian Ocean 
Land Area 2,974.12 km
2 
Source: BPS Aceh Besar (2013) 
The district of Aceh Besar is governed by a Regent, locally called as a ‘Bupati’, which is elected 
through an election. The number of the civil servants in Aceh Besar is 7,605 personnel. More 
than 50% of the civil servants (4,147 personnel) are in the department of education, which 
mainly consists of teachers. From the political aspect, the parliament of Aceh Besar is 
dominated by the representatives of the Aceh Party, a local party which mainly consist of the 
ex-combatant or their supporters. The composition of the parliament members is presented in 
Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3 – Composition of the Parliament Members as of 2009 Election 
Fraction Number of 
Representatives 
Aceh Party 10 
Democrat 5 
PAN 9 
Golkar Bulan Bintang 6 
PKS PPP 5 
Total 35 
 
Furthermore, Table 5.4 presents the list of road projects implemented by the BRR during the 
post-disaster reconstruction project. As shown in the table, more than 63km of the district 
roads (including 170m of bridges) were reconstructed by the BRR.  
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Table 5.4 – BRR’s Road Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Projects in Aceh Besar by 2008  
Project Name Project Value (x1000) Length (km) 
 Jalan Desa Lamkeuneu-eu   Rp  323,680  0.80 
 Jalan Desa Lampisang   Rp  314,750  0.80 
 Jalan Lampuuk - Lamlhom - Lampulo   Rp  2,709,611  4.00 
 Jalan Tanjung Selamat Miruk Taman   Rp  3,161,960  4.40 
 Jembatan Alue Ateuk   Rp   49,142  0.02 
 Jembatan Alue Tho   Rp  49,125 0.02 
 Jembatan Krueng Kalak (12.6 m)   Rp  780,000  0.01 
 Jembatan Lam Jruen   Rp  33,000  0.02 
 Jembatan Lampadang - Lamteh (26.8 m)   Rp  249,770  0.03 
 Jembatan Lamsie (52.5 m)   Rp   331,085  0.05 
 Jembatan Maheng   Rp  37,834  0.02 
 Jl. Lampadang - Lamteh Lambadeuk   Rp  4,267,831  3.10 
 Jl. Lampineung - Miruk Taman   Rp  3,129,950  3.70 
 Jl. Pasar Lhoong - Umong Sirebee   Rp  924,640  3.00 
 Jl. Pasar Lhoong - Umong Sirebee, Cs   Rp  7,739,866  7.30 
 Jl. Siron - Cot Iri   Rp  410,197  0.50 
 Krueng Glumpang - Seunelop   Rp  2,599,900  2.76 
 Lambadeuk - Lampuuk   Rp  6,322,727  7.20 
 Lambaro - Krueng Mak   Rp  5,690,453  4.50 
 Lampeuneurut - Pk. Biluy - Sibreh   Rp  4,377,272  5.00 
 Pasar Lhoknga - Lampuuk, Cs   Rp  2,388,113  3.00 
 Sp. Cot paya - Miruk Taman - Sp. Lambitra   Rp  3,066,322  3.13 
Jl. Lampulo-Lam lhom-Lampuuk,Cs  Rp  4,100,105  5.40 
Peukan Bada-Ajuen-Bukit Kusumba-Mata 
Ie,Cs 
 Rp  2,955,462  4.70 
Total  Rp  56,012,795  63.46 
Source: Nugroho (2008) 
The general road condition of the district road in Aceh Besar is presented in Table 5.5. As shown 
in the table, the road condition in the Aceh Besar district is described as ‘fit’ and ‘damaged’, 
instead of ‘good’, ‘moderate’, ‘damaged’, and ‘heavily damaged’ as it is now more commonly 
used in the other districts. Accordingly, the ‘fit’ category represents the road with good and 
moderate condition and the ‘damaged’ category therefore represents the damaged and the 
heavily damaged condition. Additionally, the length of the district road networks in Aceh Besar 
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increase substantially in 2009. This is particularly due to the upgrade of status of 385.5km from 
the village roads to the district roads.  
Table 5.5 – District Road Condition in Aceh Besar (PU Aceh Besar) 
Year District Road Condition* Total Length 
(km) Fit (km) Damaged (km) 
2006 357.65 38.27% 576.85 61.73% 934.50 
2007 383.65 41.05% 550.85 58.95% 934.50 
2008 442.00 47.30% 492.50 52.70% 934.50 
2009** 574.20 43.50% 745.80 56.50% 1320.00 
2010 610.10 46.22% 709.90 53.78% 1320.00 
2011 662.50 50.19% 657.50 49.81% 1320.00 
2012 693.40 52.53% 626.60 47.47% 1320.00 
* Fit = Good + Moderate 
 Damaged = Damaged+ Heavily Damaged 
** In 2009, the status of 385.5km of village roads were upgraded to district 
roads, increasing the total district road networks from 934.5km to 1320km. 
Furthermore, Table 5.6 presents the ratio of district roads with Hot Mix Asphalt surface type. 
As shown in the table, within the 6 year period between 2006 and 2012, the road networks 
with Hotmix surface increased from 242.7km to 638km, showing a trend of upgrading road 
surface to the Hotmix type. 
Table 5.6 – District Road Sections with Hot Mix Asphalt Surface) 
Year Number of Road 
Sections 
Length 
(km) 
% of total 
road length 
Total Road 
Length 
2006 120 242.70 25.97% 934.50 
2007 145 289.00 30.93% 934.50 
2008 175 351.80 37.65% 934.50 
2009 206 479.40 36.32% 1320.00 
2010 228 534.90 40.52% 1320.00 
2011 260 601.90 45.60% 1320.00 
2012 269 638.00 48.33% 1320.00 
Source: PU Aceh Besar (personal communication) 
The construction and the maintenance of the road infrastructure in Aceh Besar are managed 
by the public works agency. The public works agency in Aceh Besar is responsible for four main 
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tasks which are represented by the four departments in the agency. More detail of the 
organisational structure is presented in Figure 5.18. As shown in the figure, the road 
infrastructure is managed by the Department of Roads and Bridges.  
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Figure 5.18 – Organisational Structure of Road Authority in Aceh Besar 
 
5.5.1.2 Case study 2: Aceh Jaya District 
The district of Aceh Jaya is located in the west coast of Aceh province. The district is relatively 
new as it was separated from Aceh Barat district in 2002. In the northern part, the border is the 
Aceh Besar and Pidie district. In the western and the southern part the border is the Indonesian 
ocean.  
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Figure 5.19 – Map of Aceh Jaya location 
Source: Wikipedia 
The district has a high rainfall intensity where rain occurs in more than 160 days of the year 
with an average rainfall intensity of 270.4mm per month. The district of Aceh Jaya has a 
population of 78,540 people, which are spread in 9 sub-districts and more than 170 villages. 
More details on the geographical information of the Aceh Jaya district are presented in Table 
5.7. 
Table 5.7 – Geographical Information of Aceh Jaya  
Description Remarks 
Location 04
022’-05016’ North Latitude and 
95002’-96003’ East Longitude 
Number of sub-districts: 9 sub-district and 172 villages 
Border North:Aceh Besar, Pidie 
South:Indonesian Ocean, Aceh Barat 
East: Pidie, Aceh Barat 
West: Indonesian Ocean 
Land Area 3727 km
2 
Source: Bappeda Aceh Jaya (2012) 
The district of Aceh Jaya is governed by a Regent, locally called as a Bupati, which is elected 
through an election every 5 years. Additionally, the number of civil servants in Aceh Jaya is 
3,042 personnel. Similar to Aceh Besar, the parliament of Aceh Jaya is also dominated by 
representatives from the Aceh Party, a local political party highly influenced by the ex-
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combatants. Fourteen out of the 20 parliament members in the district are from the Aceh Party. 
The composition of the parliament members, based on the fraction in the parliament is 
presented in Table 5.3 
Table 5.8 – Composition of the Parliament Members as of 2009 Election 
Fraction Number of 
Representatives 
Aceh Party 14 
Union* 6 
Total 20 
*The union fraction consist of representatives from several political parties 
With regards to the post-disaster road reconstruction, Table 5.9 presents the list of road 
projects implemented by the BRR during the post-disaster reconstruction project. As shown in 
the table, more than 40km of the district roads were reconstructed.  
Table 5.9 – BRR’s Road Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Projects in Aceh Jaya by 2008 
Project Name Project Value 
(x1000) 
Length (km) 
 Alue Ambang – Panton  Rp  2,581,580 2.7 
 Batee Tutong – Simpang Tugu  Rp  3,262,930 2.42 
 Blang Dalam –Jemheuk  Rp 3,661,729 5 
 Jalan dalam Kota Calang  Rp 5,000,000 3.08 
 Jembatan Krueng Padang ( 80 m), oprit 1.334 m  Rp 6,459,419 1.33 
 Jembatan Kuala Bakong, 50 m  Rp 4,563,636 0.05 
 Keude Panga – Ujong Buloh, Batal  Rp 6,809,090 7 
 Krueng Tho- Mata ie Baru  Rp 3,406,955 4.75 
 Lamno – Sango  Rp 3,602,625 3.9 
Jalan Lingkar Kota Calang Rp 11,178,416 10 
TOTAL Rp 50,526,380 40.23 
Source: Nugroho (2008) 
Additionally, the general condition and the surface type of the district roads in Aceh Jaya are 
presented in Table 5.10 and Table 5.11. As shown in the table, most of the road sections in the 
district are either in good or moderate condition.  
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Table 5.10 – District Road Condition in Aceh Jaya (Bappeda Aceh Jaya, 2012) 
Year Good Moderate Damaged Heavily 
Damaged 
Total 
2011 192.1 35.2% 95.4 17.5% 104.8 19.2% 153.6 28.1% 545.89 
As of 20120  540.78 
 
Table 5.11 – District Road Surface Type in Aceh Jaya (Bappeda Aceh Jaya, 2012) 
Surface type Asphalt Gravel Dirt Total 
2011 202.77 37.1% 179.04 32.8% 164.09 30.1% 545.89 
As of 2010  540.78 
 
The construction and the maintenance of the road infrastructure in Aceh Jaya are under the 
responsibility of the public works agency. The agency has five departments which are 
responsible for various tasks. The department responsible for the construction and the 
maintenance of the road infrastructure is Bina Marga. More details on the organisational 
structure of the public works agency is presented in Figure 5.20 
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Figure 5.20 – Organisational Structure of Public Works in Aceh Jaya 
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5.5.1.3 Case study 3: Aceh Barat Daya District  
The district of Aceh Barat Daya is located in the west coast area of Aceh province. Similar to 
Aceh Jaya, the Aceh Barat Daya district is a relatively new district as it was separated from the 
Aceh Selatan district in 2002. In the northern part, the border is Gayo Lues district and in the 
southern part the border is the Indian Ocean. As in 2012, the highest rainfall intensity was in 
November, with more than 476mm, while the lowest rainfall intensity was in July, with 123mm 
of rainfall.  
 
Figure 5.21 – Map of Aceh Barat Daya location  
Source: Wikipedia 
The district of Aceh Barat Daya has a population of 131,087 (BPS Aceh Barat Daya, 2013). The 
population is spread in 9 sub-district and 152 villages. More details on the geographical 
information of the Aceh Barat Daya district are presented in Table 5.12.  
Table 5.12 – Geographical Information of Aceh Barat Daya  
Description Remarks 
Location 03
034’24” – 4005’37” North Latitude and 
96o34’57” – 97o09’19” East Longitude 
Number of sub-districts: 9 sub-district and 152 villages 
Border North: Gayo Lues 
South: Indian Ocean 
East: Aceh Selatan 
West: Nagan Raya 
Land Area 1882.05 km
2 
Source: BPS Aceh Barat Daya (2013) 
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The Aceh Barat Daya district is governed by a Regent, locally called as Bupati. The Bupati is 
elected every 5 years through an election. The number of civil servants in Aceh Barat Daya is 
3628 personnel. From the political aspect, the parliament in Aceh Jaya consists of 25 members. 
Similar to other case study districts, the parliament is dominated by the representatives of the 
Aceh Party, with 18 members. The remaining 7 parliament members are representatives from 
various political parties which are included in the ‘Pelangi’ fraction in the parliament. The 
composition of the parliament members is summarised in Table 5.13 
Table 5.13 – Composition of the Parliament Members in Aceh Barat Daya 
Fraction Number of 
Representatives 
Aceh Party 18 
Pelangi 7 
Total 25 
 
Additionally, the list of road reconstruction project implemented by the BRR in the post-
tsunami reconstruction is shown in Table 5.14. As shown in the table, 11.23km of district road 
section was reconstructed in the district. This number is the least compared to other district 
included as the case studies.  
Table 5.14 – BRR’s Rehabilitation and reconstruction projects in Aceh Barat Daya district by 2008 
Project Name Project Value 
(x1000) 
Length 
(km) 
 Guhang – Cot Mane  Rp 2,000,000 0.8 
 Jalan Guhang I  Rp 3,198,020 0.8 
 Jalan Lapangan Terbang, Cs  Rp 2,608,717 1.25 
 Jalan Lingkar Rawa Sakti, Cs  Rp 4,040,000 3.5 
 Jembatan Drien Leukit  Rp 2,037,000 0.05 
 Jl. Lingkar Terminal Blang Pidie  Rp 2,621,220 2.83 
 Pulau Kayu – Lama Muda  Rp 2,085,378 2 
TOTAL Rp 18,590,335 11.23 
Source: Nugroho (2008) 
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The general road condition of Aceh Barat Daya district is presented in Table 5.15. As of 2012, 
most of the roads in the district were in good condition (1231.6km). Only less than 10% of the 
total road networks in the district are damaged. Additionally, the distribution of road surface 
type in the district is presented in Table 5.16. As shown in the table, more than 50% of the 
district road networks in Aceh Barat Daya are dirt road and less than 25% of the district road 
networks have been paved.  
Table 5.15 – District Road Condition in Aceh Barat Daya 2012  
Year Good Moderate Damaged Heavily Damaged Total 
2012 1231.6 78.3% 192.13 12.2% 30.56 1.9% 119.14 7.6% 1573.43 
2011  1557.83 
2010  1338.73 
2009  1316.75 
Source: BPS Aceh Barat Daya (2013) 
Table 5.16 – District Road Surface Type in Aceh Barat Daya 2012 
Year Asphalt Gravel Dirt Total 
2012 364.12 23.1% 321.07 20.4% 888.24 56.5% 1573.43 
2011  1557.83 
2010  1338.73 
2009  1316.75 
Source: BPS Aceh Barat Daya (2013) 
Furthermore, the responsibility to maintain the road infrastructure in Aceh Barat Daya is placed 
in the public works agency. In addition to road infrastructure, the public works agency is also 
responsible for the management of other type of infrastructure. More detail information on 
the organisational structure of the public works agency is presented Figure 5.22.  
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Figure 5.22 – Organisational Structure of Road Authority in Aceh Barat Daya 
 
The background of the case study district has been described in the above sections. The 
background information is presented to provide a context for each of the case studies. 
Accordingly the following section will elaborate the analysis of each of the case studies.  
5.6 Procedure of case study analysis 
The case study analysis began by exploring the various key issues related to the local 
governments’ road maintenance capacity as they emerged from the semi-structured interviews 
with the case studies’ respondents. Semi-structured interviews were selected as the main data 
collection technique as it provides more flexibility and higher degree of freedom to 
communicate the respondents’ perspective and answer the research question (section 3.3.6.2). 
The results of the semi-structured interviews were then transcribed manually using Microsoft 
Word Office 2013. Nonverbal indications seen from the interview process were also included 
as additional notes in the respective transcription. These transcriptions were then imported 
into the NVivo software and were attached to the recording files of each respondent. By 
importing the transcripts onto the recorded interviews, the researcher can easily play the 
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relevant interview section to confirm and recheck the wordings, tone and mood of the 
interviewees (more discussion on the content analysis method is covered in section 3.3.6.4). 
With regards to the analysis process, the case studies began by exploring the factors affecting 
the capacity of the local governments in the maintenance of the road infrastructure. The 
affecting factors were identified as they emerged from the semi-structured interviews 
conducted with the respondents from the relevant case studies. The affecting factors were 
then classified in three groups, the external, institutional, and technical factors. Accordingly, 
the maintenance affecting factors of the case studies are presented in section 5.7.1, section 
5.8.1, and section 5.9.1.  
In addition to the affecting factors, the maintenance strategy or responses to the road 
maintenance issues were also identified using a similar approach. In this part, the approaches 
or strategies adopted by the local governments of the case studies towards the road 
maintenance issues were explored and discussed. The analyses of the case study maintenance 
strategies are presented in section 5.7.2, section 5.8.2, and section 5.9.2.  
The next emerging issues were with regards to the capacity building initiatives within the case 
studies, responding to the road maintenance issues. The analysis covers the issue of capacity 
building approaches adopted in the case study local governments, as well as the challenges 
experienced in delivering the capacity building programs. The detailed discussion is presented 
in section 5.7.3, section 5.8.3, and section 5.9.3.  
5.7 Analysis of case study 1 – Aceh Besar 
5.7.1 The maintenance capacity affecting factors 
5.7.1.1 External factors 
The external factors for the road maintenance are those which are beyond the direct control 
of the road authorities. Accordingly, these external factors will be elaborated in the following 
sections.  
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5.7.1.1.1 Environment 
The environmental factors affecting the road maintenance capacity of the local governments 
of Aceh Besar were with regards to the frequent landslide occurring in the area and the vast 
land area of the district. Explicitly stated by CS02, the landslide was seen as a challenge faced 
by the Local Government of Aceh Besar in maintaining the road infrastructure. As he said 
“If the road construction is good, the (first) 5 year we don’t need (to maintain). Maybe the 
shoulder (needs maintenance) as it will be peeled-off, as occasionally there are 
landslides.” CS02 
In addition, the size of the district also affects the capacity of the Local Governments of Aceh 
Besar to monitor and maintain their road networks. According to the interviewees, the local 
government was struggling to maintain their local roads as the areas of the districts were too 
wide and the road networks to maintain were accordingly too extensive. As a consequence, the 
available budget was not sufficient for the maintenance of all the road networks. This view was 
expressed by CS03 by saying 
“The government of Aceh Besar is overwhelmed. Why? We have so little budget... In fact, 
in our district, the district road alone is 1320km, just for the district road. Not to mention 
the village roads and neighbourhood roads, which are also under the Local Governments 
responsibility. Not to mention drainage channels. Not to mention bridges.” – CS03 
Additionally, the Aceh Besar district consists of 23 sub districts which also includes some islands 
near the border of Banda Aceh. This condition gives the Local Government more challenges in 
monitoring and maintaining the road infrastructure. It appeared that the vast land areas and 
the extensive length of road networks led to frustration and reduced motivation in the Local 
Government personnel to maintain the road infrastructure. As the budget allocation for the 
road maintenance was very limited when compared to the actual needs, road maintenance 
works implemented by the Local Governments seemed to be unnoticeable. Such a frustration 
was also expressed by CS03. He said  
“What we did was unnoticeable. We tried to find money from any sources. I also asked 
for assistance from the central (government)… But what we did was unnoticeable. We 
worked in Jantho, and all the money was spent there. And then we also worked in Saree. 
From Saree to Lengat was 16km. From Seulimum to Lamteuba was 33km. We also 
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received Rp 19.6 billion. All was spent for the Seulimum to Lamteuba project, and not even 
50% was completed.” – CS03  
The next section will accordingly, cover the political aspect as one of the factors affecting the 
road maintenance initiative.  
5.7.1.1.2 Political  
In addition to the environmental condition, the political influence appeared to be one of the 
factors affecting the capacity of the Local Government of Aceh Besar in road maintenance. The 
parliament’s budgeting authority was argued to have affected the development planning and 
budget allocation for the road maintenance. Regarding the political influence in determining 
budget allocation for road maintenance, CS02 expressed that the political pressure in 
producing the annual budget proposal was very high. The budgeting authorities of the 
parliament, designed as a means to demonstrate and incorporate the community’s aspiration 
in the development program, eventually affected the development planning. In practice, 
however, the parliament’s budgeting authority resulted in budget proposal prepared by the 
government being scrutinised and forced to be modified according to the parliament’s request. 
CS02 illustrated this process as 
“When we make the proposal, we have to see that election zone 1 (for example) has been 
allocated Rp 5 billion, election zone 2 also a certain sum. We need to secure this and not 
to miss any single election zone. Otherwise the proposal will be jumbled. So it is a must.” 
– CS02 
Furthermore, on the one hand, it was acknowledged that the pressure from the parliament to 
disperse the development programs was necessary as a means to ensure the distribution of 
wealth. On the other hand, however, the pressure from the parliament would eventually affect 
the long-term planning since such pressure would recur every year, regardless what had been 
delivered in the previous year, and regardless whether or not it was considered as the 
development priority. CS02 further added that  
“For example, election zone 2… has got relatively good road infrastructure… and in other 
places the road is damaged, but due to the equal distribution pressure, we need to put at 
least one project there (in election zone 2) even though it is not a priority.” – CS02 
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He further added 
“Since there needs to be some sort of distribution, which is pressurised by the parliament… 
we cannot build in the same place continually… They will later ask, why always build in A 
and why nothing in B; even though B is not a priority.” – CS02 
A similar view was also expressed by CS01. With regards to the impact of the parliament 
intervention to the development plan, CS01 also expressed his disappointment and 
desperation with regards to the roles and use of development planning and programming 
produced by the planning agency. He further questioned the effectiveness of the development 
planning if it eventually depended on the political decision. He said 
“Honestly, the Bappeda does not have the authority to intervene and delete programs (in 
the budget proposal). And even to propose the allocation we also do not have (the 
authority). Because, whatever the Bappeda produces, in the end it will go to the 
parliament (depend on the parliament)” – CS01 
As described by CS01, the Bappeda practically could not enforce and implement what were in 
their development planning and program unless they were approved by the parliament. As a 
result, the annual budget proposal did not necessarily reflect and represent the development 
planning which was produced by the planners, but rather filled with aspirations and demands 
from the politicians, which might and might not be in accordance with the development plan. 
In regard to this issue, CS01 further stated  
“In the discussion of the budget, all of the aspirations are there. Everything is included. 
Even though the aspiration does not occur in the form of who owns this project or that 
project… they are blended into programs in the government agencies, but they have the 
notes, they know who proposed this and that project…” – CS01 
CS02 also added that such pressure had resulted in the reduction and diversion of road 
maintenance allocation to other low priority projects.  
In addition to the above discussion, another impact of the local political condition to the road 
maintenance was the high preference on the capital project. Regarding this issue, CS03 
suggested that this condition was affected by the great number of unpaved road sections. 
Consequently, he further said that spending the available budget allocation for the 
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maintenance of the existing road would not benefit those who lived in the unpaved road areas. 
Accordingly, upgrading the dirt roads was given a higher priority. More discussions on the social 
issue will be covered in the following section.  
5.7.1.1.3 Socioeconomic factors 
From the socioeconomic perspective, the road authority in Aceh Besar was also exposed to the 
pressure from the community to disperse road projects in different locations as a means of 
distribution of wealth. CS02 suggested that this condition was particularly due to the lack of 
knowledge of the community on the road maintenance concerns and the wider impact of 
damaged roads to the economy and road user safety. As explained by CS02 
“The community will see it this way, why do the paved roads get paved again? Why is it 
always there? Whilst the puddle remains a puddle, the muddy roads remain muddy. They 
do not care if the road is narrow and insufficient for the current traffic; that it may lead 
to accidents, or else.” – CS02  
Another main point emerged from the interview was that at the national level the maintenance 
of road infrastructure gets a high priority. The national government recognises the impact of 
poorly maintained roads to the economy. However, it was suggested that this view was not 
well grasped by the regional governments. At the regional level, the maintenance of the roads 
seemed to get a low priority. CS04 summarised this condition by arguing that this view was 
affected by the fact that there were many unpaved roads at the district level.  
“The problem is… they are using different viewpoints. At the national level, maintaining 
road is important… at the provincial level, it is less (important). Particularly roads located 
a bit far inside, they are poorly maintained. At the district level, they are far less 
(maintained)… Why should we maintain this road whilst the unpaved road sections are 
still so abundant? That’s how they see it.” – CS04 
CS03 also expressed that the Local Government was overwhelmed, particularly as the unpaved 
road in the district was more than 50% of the overall networks. As he said  
“… The Local Governments is overwhelmed to maintain (road infrastructure). The 
unpaved roads themselves are more than 50% in Aceh Besar.” – CS03  
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Additionally, CS02 further expressed that there was also another issue with the community, 
particularly with regards to their sense of ownership to the road infrastructure in their areas. 
CS02 suggested that the community awareness on the importance of the road infrastructure 
in their neighbourhoods had not been very well. CS02 added 
“Apart from the financial issue, community awareness is also not very good. When there 
are small potholes, they do not immediately patch them. They can actually do it, can’t 
they?” – CS02 
He also explained how the social custom of the society contributes to the rapid deterioration 
of the road infrastructure. He explained 
“When they clean their rice paddy, the grasses are abandoned along the road, mostly on 
the road shoulder… Later on when they need to plough the rice paddy, this (road shoulder) 
is already filled with grass, and they will not clean it. “– CS02 
He further explained that efforts had been done to educate the community regarding the 
importance of road maintenance. He reasoned that due to the many unpaved road networks 
and the vast area of the district, it would take a long time before the government could afford 
to repair the damaged road. However, the bad practice seemed to remain. He said 
“I told them, if the roads get damaged, it may take more than 10 years before the 
government can repair them because the area of Aceh Besar is so big. With 604 villages, 
if annually we can deal with 20 villages, they need to queue for 30 years. But they do not 
care.” – CS02 
In addition to the pressure from the community to distribute project locations and their lack of 
sense of ownership, the road authority in Aceh Besar seemed to undermine the importance 
and the economic benefit of maintaining the road infrastructure, particularly when it is 
compared with the development of the new roads. For instance, CS02 suggested that the 
economic impact of building and expanding the road networks would have greater benefit than 
holding back the development due to the lack of maintenance capacity. He further argued that 
as long as the maintenance works could be delivered on time, the road maintenance will not 
be a problem. As CS02 stipulated  
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“The benefit will be greater if we build a lot (of road sections) than to be scared of the 
maintenance needs. Maintenance needs is not that big. The important thing is that we 
come when it is required.” – CS02 
Moreover, corruption also appeared to be experienced in the case study district. As described 
by CS07 also, corruption also occurred in the implementation of road maintenance works using 
the force-account method. CS07 suggested that by using the force-account method, the public 
works does not need to make tender document and use the consultant services as the works 
may be provided by themselves, and supervised by themselves. However, CS07 indicated that 
it was through the utilisation of the force-account method that the project managers at the 
public works agency get their ‘extra income’ apart from the contractors. As he said.  
“The force-account project is different. They have separate allocation, they don’t use 
consultant… They have their own budget, they do it themselves, and they supervise it 
themselves. Normally, that is the project managers’ “project”. If they (the project 
managers) don’t get it from the contractors, then it’s from there they got the money.” – 
CS07 
This section elaborates the socioeconomic factors the Local Governments’ activities on road 
maintenance. Accordingly, the section will continue to discuss the safety and security aspect as 
one of the main contributing factors affecting the Local Governments’ road maintenance 
capacity.  
5.7.1.1.4 Security and safety 
From the security and safety aspect, the impacts of conflict were also experienced in Aceh 
Besar. Another form of threats to the security and safety in the road construction project was 
the collection of ‘security fee’ by the ex-combatant. The security fee, locally known as ‘Pajak 
Nanggroe’ or translated as the state tax, is the practice commonly experienced during the 
conflict. At that time, as the GAM was considered as a separatist group and fought in a guerrilla 
method, the collection of ‘Pajak Nanggroe’ was done to fund their movement and was 
performed covertly.  
After the peace agreement, the ‘Pajak Nanggroe’ turned into a security fee and charged by 
certain groups of communities or individuals, and must be paid by the contractors, which could 
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otherwise result in project disruptions. Even though the practice has now posed less serious 
threats as it used to be, the collection of ‘Pajak Nanggroe’ seemed to be conducted more 
openly and widely by the ex-combatant individuals. As CS06 expressed, this practice was 
commonly experienced in the construction project sites and was normally solved by giving 
them a relatively small amount of money and was therefore not considered as a big problem 
Whilst the above discussion indicates the security and safety issue posed by the community or 
individuals, there appeared to be security issue posed by the contractors. Another issue 
emerged in the interviews was with regard to the challenges experienced by the consultants in 
performing supervision tasks in a road project. CS07 explained that security and safety threats 
was also felt by the supervision consultant coming from the contractors. CS07 expressed that 
in that situation, personnel safety and security on the construction sites became the highest 
priority. As he said.  
“For me personally, what is important is that I am safe.” – CS07 
He further described that the level of security and safety threats in doing the supervision tasks 
depended on the supervision personnel’s capacity and ability to adapt to the situation and 
respond to the threats. He advised that such a threat would frequently require relaxed 
supervision. He further added that being too strict on the construction specification may put 
them in danger.  
On the other hand, however, CS02 suggested that after the peace agreement was in place, 
which means that the prolonged conflict had come to an end, the public work agency was then 
able to deliver and implement projects in the remote areas. Some of the dangerous areas, 
commonly referred to as “black” and “grey” areas, were untouched during the conflict time 
due to the security issues. CS02 said 
“Before peace (agreement), it was difficult for us to go to the field. There were certain 
areas that we could not reach. The ‘black’ and ‘grey’ areas were bothersome. If we went 
there, we could be kidnapped… They had a conflict with the government, and we, the 
government employees, were considered as the government.” – CS02 
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During the conflict, due to the security issue, CS02 suggested that the remote areas were simply 
abandoned from the development. The government could only implement projects in the busy 
areas where project activities could be safely monitored.  
After the peace agreement, however, the project implementations were not completely free 
of disruptions. As suggested by CS03, the road project implementation in Aceh Besar also 
experienced various disruptions and was accused to be linked with the post-conflict condition. 
CS05 shared his view that the community living along a road project frequently disturbed the 
contractor by proposing an unreasonable request. He described this situation as 
“They didn’t consider it as their public property, but they had personal interests. They 
wanted to raid money for their personal interest. Meanwhile the road project was for the 
benefit of the community. But due to their personal interest, the project was then 
abandoned.” – CS05 
This view was also supported by CS02, who suggested that after the peace agreement, the ex-
combatant returned to the community and started to rebuild their live through various means. 
However, as highlighted by CS02, some of the returning ex-combatants who worked as 
contractors forcefully tried to win construction projects in the disreputable way. He explained 
that whilst during the conflict threats and project disruptions were done covertly - as the 
combatant could not appear in public openly, after the peace agreement the disruptions were 
done more openly. Nevertheless, he also admitted that the peace agreement, however, has 
made reaching the remote areas possible. As he said 
“After the peace agreement, we have access to all areas. Even the remote areas we can 
now touch and we can open access.” – CS02 
Supporting the above views, CS01 also expressed that the peace agreement have provided 
better security assurance for non-local people to work in Aceh, allowing the local people to 
learn and broaden their views through the knowledge exchange.  
5.7.1.1.5 Inter-organisational relationship  
One of the issues emerging from the interviews regarding the inter-organisational relationship 
between the government and the private institutions is regarding the installation of public 
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infrastructure such as telecommunication cable and water pipeline. The installation of pipeline 
or telecommunication cable works often include excavation of the road structure along the 
shoulders as well as the main body of the road for the crossing work. However, the installation 
company frequently ignored the need to restore the affected road structure. CS03 told  
“That is also a problem. The water company always digs the road side, the road shoulder. 
When they dig, it causes the roadside to rut. And after they dig, they do not restore them. 
They hoard the holes, but they are not compacted… This is why the roadside deteriorates 
rapidly.” – CS03 
There seemed to be a lack of proper coordination between these agencies, and more 
importantly, lack of mechanism for the monitoring of the non-government institutions’ 
activities affecting the road infrastructure. When asked if the public work agency have the 
authority to act on the misconducts of the aforementioned companies, CS02 suggested  
“No. They are vertical institutions… They are not part of the local government… There 
should be one who coordinates this… It should be more controllable actually.” – CS02 
The explanation of CS03 and CS02 suggested that the lack of coordination or authority to 
coordinate and control such activities resulted in the more rapid deterioration of road 
infrastructure. Even more, the public works as the appointed agency for the road maintenance 
seemed to refuse any responsibility of the impact of such practice as it was outside their 
authority.  
Another inter-organisational relationship issue was raised by CS01. In addition to the conflicting 
roles in the road management between public works and the department of transportation 
(section 5.4.1.1.1.4), conflicting or unclear division of responsibilities was also identified 
between the planning agency (Bappeda) and the public works with regards to the road 
infrastructure development planning. As summarised by CS01 in the discussion of the road 
infrastructure planning procedure, he said 
“We cannot delete (programs), but we coordinate. Frankly, Bappeda do not have the 
authority to intervene or delete programs. Only to coordinate. Even for the allocation of 
budget, we also don’t have (authority).”  – CS01 
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The CS01’s explanation above regarding the practice in the road development planning process 
was in fact contradictory to the planning process as described in the Government Regulation 
no 8/2008 (Government Regulation, 2008). The regulation stipulates the steps and processes 
of district development planning and emphasises the authority of the Bappeda as the agency 
responsible to prepare the final draft of the development work plan (Paragraph 22 article 1 and 
2).  
The external factors affecting the capacity of the local governments in the maintenance of road 
infrastructure have been elaborated in this section. The cognitive map of the external factors 
is presented in Figure 5.23. Accordingly, the next section will present the analysis of the 
institutional factors.  
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Figure 5.23 - Cognitive maps of the external affecting factors of case study one
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5.7.1.2 Institutional factors 
The next category of the factors affecting LG’s road maintenance capacity is the institutional 
factors. These are factors which are under the authority and direct control of the road 
authority. The first institutional factor is regarding the financial management capacity, which 
will be discussed in the following section.  
5.7.1.2.1 Financial management 
The financial issues of road maintenance in Aceh Besar emerging from the interviews can be 
grouped into four categories. The categories are: fund is not allocated in sufficient amount, 
fund allocation is not spent, fund allocation is not spent effectively, and fund allocation is not 
spent efficiently.  
5.7.1.2.1.1 Fund is not allocated in sufficient amount 
The first financial issue in Aceh Besar was that the budget allocation for the road maintenance 
needs was not allocated in sufficient amount. This was expressed by CS02 as one of the main 
problems of road maintenance. Frequently, the road maintenance needs lost their priority over 
other needs. CS02 also expressed that even within the infrastructure sector road maintenance 
needs were given lower priority. CS02 described  
“The fund needs to be shared (with other programs). There are several (other) programs 
that need to be included because we are public works. The fund can’t be all used for roads 
only. We need to make drainage channels, we also need to include housing repair even 
though in small amount.” – CS02 
As also expressed by CS04, the maintenance of the district roads seems to receive insufficient 
allocation and was frequently neglected. He said 
“The road at the district level indeed becoming a problem. Let alone the road that we built 
for them, they do not even maintain the road they built. Due to the limited fund 
availability, or else. Or the parliament does not see it as an important agenda.” – CS04 
Whilst on the one hand the limited budget allocation for the public works need to be distributed 
to various public infrastructures, on the other hand the budget allocation for road maintenance 
was not sufficient for the maintenance of the district roads. As expressed by CS03, the limited 
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budget availability was the main problem in road maintenance. He further said that the 
available allocation was only sufficient to rehabilitate less than 50km of roads. As he said 
“The fund is not available. Last year we had Rp 70 billion, maximum. From that we can 
use it for (the maintenance of) roads of around 30-40km. (Including) the financial aid from 
the central government. – CS03 
The annual road maintenance allocation in the Aceh Besar district is presented in Table 5.17. 
As shown in the table, the average annual allocation for the road maintenance is approximately 
Rp 11 billion. Since there are more than 1300km of district road networks, the budget allocation 
for the maintenance is accordingly less than Rp 9 million (£450) per km per annum.  
Table 5.17 – Road Maintenance Budget Allocation in Aceh Besar 
Year Public Works Total 
Budget Allocation 
Road Maintenance 
Allocation 
Ratio** 
2006* Rp 44,272,131,891 Rp 8,726,468,000 19.71% 
2007* Rp 45,571,548,978 Rp 12,161,285,400 26.69% 
2008 Rp 45,940,289,250 Rp 13,830,778,500 30.11% 
2009* Rp 36,817,813,750 Rp 11,770,690,000 31.97% 
2010* Rp 65,325,518,134 Rp 8,868,782,500 13.58% 
2011* Rp 40,456,360,206 Rp 11,409,435,000 28.20% 
2012* Rp 57,445,912,245 Rp 14,403,875,000 25.07% 
Average annual allocation Rp 11,595,902,057   
Source: DPPKA Aceh Besar 
*Amended annual budget allocation, 2008 budget did not have amendments 
**Ratio of maintenance budget allocation over the public works total budget 
allocation 
However, regarding the financial sufficiency, there was also a concern whether the annual 
budget was being used optimally. In the discussion about budget sufficiency for the 
maintenance of district roads, CS04 suggested that the problem of road maintenance in the 
district was not rooted in the districts’ budget sufficiency but rather in the process of setting 
up of development priority. 
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5.7.1.2.1.2 Fund allocation is not spent 
The renowned poor capacity of local governments in spending their annual budget was also 
experienced in Aceh Besar. As CS06 also argued, the financial resource adequacy was not in 
fact a problem in Aceh. He based his view that every year the local governments had not been 
able to spend their budget allocation and that a large amount of the unspent budget had to be 
returned to the central government. As shown in Table 5.18, the annual budget of the Aceh 
Besar district was commonly left unspent.  
Table 5.18 – Annual Budget Realisation of Aceh Besar  
Year TOTAL INCOME TOTAL EXPENSES REALISATION UNSPENT 
ALLOCATION 
2006 Rp 432,211,870,000 Rp 432,176,360,000 99.99% Rp          35,510,000 
2007 Rp 545,858,299,177 Rp 497,480,088,694 91.14% Rp 48,378,210,483 
2008 Rp 602,632,001,941 Rp 544,592,368,898 90.37% Rp 58,039,633,043 
2009 Rp 595,937,911,496 Rp 527,754,711,205 88.56% Rp 68,183,200,291 
2010 Rp 625,875,949,325 Rp 569,225,389,127 90.95% Rp 56,650,560,198 
2011 Rp 713,223,930,627 Rp 685,192,004,199 96.1% Rp 28,031,926,428 
2012 Rp 824,630,426,428 Rp 759,904,000,000 92.2% Rp 64,726,426,428 
Source: DJPK (2014)  
Note: £1 ~ Rp 20,000 
As shown in Table 5.18, with the exception of the year 2006, the budget realisation rate in Aceh 
Besar had been approximately 90% of the total income. On average, the unspent budget 
allocation worth approximately Rp 50 to 60 billion. Not only do the unspent budget need to be 
returned to the central government, the budget of the following fiscal year might need to be 
adjusted and reduced to reflect the actual budget expenditure capacity of the respective 
district governments.  
One of the causes of the unspent budget was the delays in the approval of the annual budget 
proposal. Section 2.5.5.1.3 summarises that delays in the annual budget approval were 
commonly experienced in Aceh. Accordingly, the budget expending period was shortened as it 
would need to be expended by the 31st of December of the running year, regardless the time 
the budget was approved and the time the local governments were starting to use it. 
Consequently, the delays in the budget approval also mean that the road infrastructure project 
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may not start according to the initial schedule and that the projects frequently have to be 
implemented in the rainy season. As CS06 concluded  
“If (project starts) on April, according to the plan, there won’t be a problem… unless if we 
start working at the end of the year, during the rainy season. That is the only problem. 
Because the base work takes time.” – CS06 
The above discussions conform to the report of the ADB about road maintenance in Asia. The 
ADB (2003) suggests that road agencies in Asia are typically allocated only 40% of the 
maintenance needs (insufficient allocation issue) and that the actual disbursement were often 
much less (unspent budget allocation issue). 
5.7.1.2.1.3 Fund allocation is not spent effectively 
The next category on the financial management issue is that the allocation for the road 
maintenance is not effectively spent. This issue relates to the capacity of the local government, 
in this case the public works agency, in spending the budget allocated for the road maintenance 
in an effective manner.  
The ineffective use of road maintenance budget allocation was seen in Aceh Besar. As 
expressed by CS02 the local government did not allocate budget for the routine maintenance. 
Hence, the immediate needs of routine maintenance works were simply neglected and delayed 
until the road sections would require rehabilitation. The CS02’s comment was supported by 
CS03. He highlighted  
“When we see the road has been damaged, then we will repair.” – CS03 
In addition to the road maintenance neglect, CS02 also explained that the limited budget also 
led to providing improper road maintenance interventions. Consequently, the budget 
allocation spent for such interventions was virtually wasted. CS02 illustrated two examples of 
ineffective maintenance interventions. First, he suggested that due to the limited fund, 
damaged roads would only get potholes repaired and the cracks on the surface would be 
accordingly left untouched. Patching potholes would indeed help reduce risk of accident to the 
road users and somewhat reduce the road deterioration rate. However, leaving the cracks 
opened would allow water ingress and would soon result in new potholes and structural 
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degradation. Secondly, CS02 described that due the limited funding availability the public works 
occasionally provide routine maintenance interventions to roads which actually required 
periodic maintenance or rehabilitation works. He said 
“We used to include road sections which no longer appropriate for routine maintenance 
to be in the routine maintenance work list because to perform the period maintenance 
the fund was not available.” – CS02 
He further described the condition of roads receiving the routine maintenance as 
“These roads were not only having holes, the asphalt can no longer be seen. How can we 
do routine maintenance on them? The routine maintenance supposed to be patching 
potholes… but when the roads have been totally peeled off, heavily damaged, they are 
not supposed to get routine maintenance, but periodic maintenance or (surface) upgrade 
instead. But since the fund was not available, it was eventually included (in the routine 
maintenance).” – CS02 
5.7.1.2.1.4 Fund allocation is not spent efficiently 
In addition to the aforementioned financial issues, inefficient budget expenditure was also 
experienced in Aceh Besar. CS01 suggested that the approved allocation for the public works 
must always be allocated for the agency’s indirect expenditure prior to distributing it for the 
development activities. As he explained  
“(From the total allocation), we also see how much of the allocation is spent for indirect 
expenditure. This includes salary. How much for the salary, and the remaining amount is 
for the construction, grant, and other necessities.” – CS01 
His comment on the poor distribution of budget allocation expenditure was also worsened by 
the poor capacity of the road authority personnel. More discussion on the personnel capacity 
will be presented in the following section regarding human resource.  
5.7.1.2.2 Human resource 
In Aceh Besar, the human resource capacity was also found as a problem in the road 
maintenance effort. CS02 specifically revealed that the technical capacity of the agency’s 
personnel was poor. One of the causes of the poor capacity was due to the poor recruitment 
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system. CS02 revealed that many of the agency’s personnel were children of the retiring 
personnel who were recruited as a good gesture of the agency to honour them. He explained 
“So, a lot of the employee at the branch offices replaced their parents. They do not 
necessarily have engineering skill, even though the parents were technicians. As the kids 
graduated from high school they were then accepted and work to replace their parents.” 
– CS02 
He further suggested that the poor recruitment system consequently resulted in the agency 
having more non-technical personnel than the technical ones.  
“So if we look at the composition of the public works employee… there are more non-
technical personnel than the technical ones. It should not be the case for a department 
this big.” – CS02 
The poor recruitment system and consequently the poor capacity of the agency personnel were 
also worsened by the fact that many of the personnel were at the same time students in the 
university. Additionally, CS02 argued that he doubt that these personnel were seriously 
studying to pursue their degree and suggested that they were just looking for the qualification 
certificates, indicating the unlikely improvement they would give to the capacity problem. He 
said 
 “And then, how can I put this, maybe they are studying in college while working, or 
working while studying… How can they study? I mean, they also do not study seriously. 
We can see the difference between those who really study and those who work while 
studying or study while working. They are just looking for the certificate. Troublesome.” – 
CS02 
The above discussions on the human resource issue raised by CS02 are particularly related to 
the capacity of the human resource in Aceh Besar with regard to the preparation of the road 
maintenance work plan. For the execution and the implementation of the maintenance works, 
CS03 suggested that the district of Aceh Besar did not face any technical problems. This was 
expressed by CS03 by saying 
“There is no technical problem. We’ve never had problems in the implementation, 
whether during the BRR reconstruction period or after BRR. Ever since I am in the public 
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works there has been no (technical) problem. Everything (all projects) is completed. 
Whatever allocation is available, we can finish (the project)” – CS03 
5.7.1.2.3 Planning capacity 
The next institutional factor affecting the road maintenance capacity was the capacity of the 
road agency to prepare the maintenance work plan. In addition to the local governments’ 
commitment to the road maintenance, there was also an issue about the quality of the road 
infrastructure maintenance plan produced by the local governments. As revealed by CS06, the 
local governments were too much focused on the physical structure of the road construction 
but neglecting the supporting infrastructure such as drainage and road shoulder. CS06 
concluded 
“They prepare only the road construction, but the supporting infrastructure is ignored. I 
mean, it is not prepared together with the road construction.” – CS06 
In Aceh Besar, the road agency faced a great challenge in the planning of the road maintenance 
works due to the lack of proper road information system. As a consequence, the road agency 
could not know in advance which road sections would need maintenance interventions and 
accordingly could not produce a reliable maintenance needs estimate. CS02 revealed 
“But also we do not have information due to the wide area. The problem is that we do not 
have accurate information which sections need maintenance. It is also a challenge.” – 
CS02 
Due to the lack of information on which road sections require maintenance intervention, the 
quality and reliability of the maintenance work plan were accordingly questionable.  
5.7.1.2.4 Organisational management 
Organisational management relates to the capacity of the local government on the managerial 
aspect of their internal organisation. The first issue emerged in this category was the 
leadership. CS01 brought up his concern that the emotional bound of the head of the 
governments or the road agencies was the most influencing factor in the decision making. CS04 
also suggested that the process of determining road project locations was also spoilt by the 
conflict of interests of the local government officials. He said 
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“The challenge was that too many road projects were forcefully requested to be done in 
certain locations… Why do they have to be there? After we did field observations, we 
found that there was the house of the head of parliament, or it was the Bupati’s village. 
That happened.” – CS04 
Furthermore, he also suggested that such information was frequently found out during the 
construction process, when it was too late to make any changes. Concluding the above 
arguments regarding the influence of leadership in determining the project location, it was 
becoming apparent that whilst on the hand the political pressure from the parliament members 
was seen as a disruption in determining budget allocation and project locations, on the other 
hand the emotional bound of the head of government and agencies was also seen as a 
disruption to determining the location of road maintenance projects. CS01 further suggested 
that even though such condition was difficult to prove, the unbalanced distribution of the 
projects was felt widely.  
 “So, they directed the projects to their hometown, some of them… even though we 
cannot prove it, but everybody feels the unbalanced (distribution).” – CS01 
Another concern emerging on the leadership issue was with regard to the attitude of the head 
of the governments. It was suggested that the local governments tend to rely their 
development programs on the financial aid from the external sources such as from the 
provincial or the national government. For the maintenance of the post-disaster reconstruction 
assets in the district, Aceh Besar submitted a proposal to the national planning agency for the 
maintenance budget assistance. CS02 said 
“We have proposed to the Bappenas, that for the assets from BRR that have been handed 
over to the Local Governments, there should be maintenance allocations from the central 
government.” – CS02 
The above discussion on the organisational aspect of the road maintenance capacity concludes 
the institutional factors affecting the road maintenance capacity in Aceh Besar. The cognitive 
map of the institutional affecting factors is presented in Figure 5.24. Accordingly, the following 
section will start to elaborate the technical factors which affected the capacity of the Aceh 
Besar government in maintaining their road infrastructure.  
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Figure 5.24 – Cognitive maps of the institutional affecting factors of case study one
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5.7.1.3 Technical factor 
One of the major technical issues emerging from the interviews was regarding the overloading 
traffic. As explained in section 2.4.2.2, the axle loading capacity plays a significant role in the 
deterioration of road infrastructure. CS02 was aware of this issue and described 
“Currently the challenges that we are facing in Aceh Besar… is regarding the overloaded 
trucks. … They carry materials twice the vehicle’s capacity.” – CS02 
He further added that even though they were mainly using the national road networks, they 
would eventually pass through the district roads. Being aware of such condition, CS02 also 
revealed that it was the responsibility of the transportation agency and the police force to 
control and monitor the traffic.  
The vehicle overloading problem has been widely known to be a subject of argument between 
the public works and the transportation agency. The institutional arrangement and the 
distribution of tasks between the two agencies resulted in the continuing disputes between 
them.  
The next technical factor is regarding the supporting plant and equipment. In performing the 
road maintenance works, the adequacy of the plant and equipment for maintaining roads may 
largely contribute to the road condition.  
In Aceh Besar, CS02 explained that the district mainly used the equipment donated by the IBRD 
(World Bank) during the 1980s and 1990s. In the post-disaster reconstruction, however, BRR 
also donated a number of equipment including excavator, tandem roller and shovel loader. 
CS02 also suggested that they also have the operator personnel for the vehicles. Therefore, the 
public works of Aceh Besar did not seem to have technical difficulty regarding plant and 
equipment availability.  
However, a similar financial problem was also experienced in the maintenance of the plant and 
equipment. This was particularly due to the allocation of budget for the operation and 
maintenance of these vehicles which was argued to be insufficient. As expressed by CS02 
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“Every year we spare around Rp 100 million (£5000) especially for the maintenance (of 
equipment) and tools, and also for their operations, which include lubricant oil as well as 
the hydraulic system.” – CS02 
He further added that the equipment was also commercialised by renting it to the private 
companies. This was expected to provide income to the district. However, CS02 rose that Aceh 
Besar lacked the personnel with sufficient capacity to operate the laboratory equipment. CS02 
added 
“There were donations from the BRR for laboratory equipment, even though they were 
not so many that we still had to purchase some more. But… until now they have not been 
optimised as there are no personnel with adequate expertise to manage it.” – CS02 
The issue of lack of personnel expertise to operate the laboratory equipment links back to the 
human resource capacity issue as described in section 5.7.1.2.2. Additionally, CS02 also 
revealed that due to the lack of lab test equipment personnel, the public works could not use 
the lab for the projects in the Aceh Besar area. He stressed 
“The challenges include the human resource capacity. Actually, the lab equipment can be 
used for the projects in the district. The district government can actually use the lab to 
perform tests for the project, whether it is concrete test or asphalt test. But we lack the 
personnel.” – CS02 
The human resource capacity issue presented by CS02 raised another concern regarding the 
capacity building of the Local Government personnel during the post-disaster reconstruction. 
There seemed to be a gap in the capacity building reconstruction process that led to the 
procurement of laboratory equipment to agencies which lacked adequate personnel capacity. 
Additionally, the capacity of the local government in road maintenance is also affected by the 
construction quality, as it determines the road axle loading capacity and the deterioration rate. 
Accordingly, it may also determine the type and the time interval between the maintenance 
interventions. With regards to the road construction quality, the road surface roughness is 
widely used as one of the indicators to determine the extent of the road deterioration. For 
instance, the international roughness index (IRI) is normally used to measure the road surface 
degradation level. However, road deterioration does not immediately occur in the early years 
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of completion. Within the grace period, typically the initial four to five years of road 
construction, road may not show any deterioration at all. According to CS06, this fact could be 
misleading as people may get too focused on the roughness of the road surface and ignore the 
actual structures which help achieve or maintain the road roughness over time - the base 
works. He suggested  
“What creates the problem is that some defects are due to the base works. The drainage 
channel, the water outlet, and so on. That is the problem... This may lead to the base 
failure (collapse)... it normally occurs after two years.” CS06  
Furthermore, with regards to the construction quality, most of the road infrastructures start to 
show deterioration long after the project completion, and commonly after it surpasses the 
contractors’ defect liability period. Accordingly, by the time the roads were starting to show 
obvious deterioration, the contractors were no longer responsible for the maintenance. The 
contractors could no longer be held responsible for the damages, particularly on the basis that 
the road construction was accused to have a poor quality. This section provides an insight into 
the maintenance capacity of Aceh Besar government. The cognitive map of the affecting factors 
is presented in Figure 5.25  
 
Figure 5.25 – Cognitive maps of the technical affecting factors of case study one 
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As the technical factors affecting the capacity of the local governments in road maintenance 
have been discussed, the discussion on maintenance capacity affecting factors has been 
concluded. Accordingly, the following section will discuss the maintenance strategy adopted in 
response to the road maintenance needs.  
5.7.2 Maintenance Strategy 
The maintenance strategy refers to the responses and actions of the local governments to the 
road maintenance needs. Therefore, this section will elaborate the different issues in the 
maintenance strategy, covering the responses of the Local Governments to the maintenance 
needs, funding, and staffing strategy.  
5.7.2.1 Prioritisation 
It has been explicitly summarised in the previous sections (for instance, in section 5.7.1.1.2 and 
section 5.7.1.2.1) that the budget allocation for road maintenance generally gets lower priority 
in Aceh Besar and that the implementation of road maintenance works depended on the 
approved budget allocation. Additionally, as explained by CS01, the public works would then 
need to make adjustment in their programs in accordance with the approved budget allocation. 
CS02 also confirmed that the scope of maintenance works and intervention depended on the 
approved budget allocation. Furthermore, CS02 suggested that the public works had previously 
focused its routine maintenance activities on clearing the right of ways and at the same time 
indicated that such intervention was fruitless. CS02 highlighted 
“With regards to routine maintenance, we used to focus on clearing the right of way 
areas. But now in 3 or 4 months, at most 6 months after we cleared them it has fully 
grown again. Because of the damp and frequent.” – CS02 
The CS02’s comment above also implicitly suggested a disappointment and frustration of the 
public works on the rapid grow of the grass and bushes along the roads as the maintenance 
benefit and consequently the budget allocation would fade away very soon. This was one of 
the justifications that the public works opted to abandon the routine maintenance needs in 
their area. More discussion on the response to the maintenance needs will be presented in the 
following section.  
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5.7.2.2 Response to the maintenance needs 
5.7.2.2.1 Neglect 
With regards to the response of the Aceh Besar government to the road maintenance needs, 
maintenance neglect and responsive approach seem to dominate the road maintenance 
‘strategy’. CS03 suggested that due to the limited fund availability, road sections did not get 
regular maintenance. Even though he was aware that the road infrastructure requires 
maintenance immediately upon completion, the maintenance intervention provided was in the 
form of road repair when the road had been damaged. As explained by CS03 
“Actually, a road section, once they are completed, they would be in the maintenance 
period in the following year. There has been an effort towards it, but the fund is not 
enough. So regretfully we need to leave it aside, we do other sections first.” – CS03 
Whilst CS03 showed his awareness on the immediate needs of regular maintenance, CS02 did 
not share this view. Instead, CS02 suggested that the road infrastructure did not need 
maintenance for the next 5 years upon the completion. CS02 advised 
“As we discussed earlier, maybe for the next 5 years we do not need to maintain because 
the road construction is still good.” – CS02  
CS02 further reemphasised his view on the issue of road maintenance by saying that the 
maintenance was therefore not a big problem in Aceh Besar. He said.  
“I think there is no problem regarding maintenance. It is not a very serious problem. 
Because if the construction was good, for the next 5 years we don’t need (to maintain).” 
– CS02 
The contradictory view of the CS02 which relied on the initial construction quality instead of 
providing the routine maintenance immediately upon construction completion illustrated that 
there was a gap of knowledge and understanding on the importance of routine maintenance 
among the government officials. Such an understanding was particularly required since CS02 
had also suggested that their efforts on repairing roads had not been optimal due to the limited 
fund availability, which eventually forced them to provide routine maintenance on roads 
requiring periodic maintenance or rehabilitation.  
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Additionally, both CS03 and CS02 revealed that the road networks in Aceh Besar were simply 
neglected from maintenance. The adopted approach was to perform surface overlay - which 
actually falls into rehabilitation intervention, and therefore omitting the routine and periodic 
maintenance needs (please refer to section 2.4.3 regarding maintenance intervention).  
CS02 further added that the district government was currently focusing on improving and 
upgrading the existing district roads in their area to the Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA) type. As he said 
 “So now we are still upgrading roads. What was macadam we upgrade them to Hotmix 
(HMA).” – CS02 
Even though upgrading the road surface may improve the road serviceability and durability, the 
necessity of performing the surface upgrade was questionable, particularly since the district 
was suffering from financial issues, and that the necessity of the upgrade did not seem to be 
supported by the economic nor technical consideration.  
5.7.2.2.2 Reduced quality  
As mentioned earlier, in addition to the responsive approach, maintenance neglect seems to 
dominate the maintenance ‘strategy’ in Aceh Besar. However, in addition to the maintenance 
neglect, another important issue emerging from the interviews was that the limited fund 
availability also resulted in the reduced road construction standard and specifications. CS02 
described this by saying  
“Especially for the road shoulder… we do selective embankment. Not B class. The standard 
requirement is B class, but the budget is limited… so depends on the available fund.” – 
CS02 
Technically, CS02’s comment on the B class embankment materials was that the construction 
of road shoulder in Aceh Besar would need to use soil with a CBR of more than 10%, and 
plasticity index of less than 6% instead of the B class crushed stone as required by the national 
standard. Consequently, the road construction quality would be inferior.  
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5.7.2.3  Staffing 
The discussion of the maintenance strategy also includes the method of executing the 
maintenance works. In Aceh Besar, the road maintenance works were carried out by using a 
force-account method, i.e. using the in-house personnel. The approach was stipulated by CS02  
“We are expected, regarding the routine maintenance, that we do not use hired 
equipment. We use our own equipment.” CS02 
The discussion on the response towards road maintenance needs in Aceh Besar district have 
been presented in the above section. The cognitive map of the maintenance strategy analysis 
is presented in Figure 5.26. Accordingly, the following section will cover the capacity building 
issue.  
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Figure 5.26 – The cognitive map of the maintenance strategy analysis of case study one
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5.7.3 Capacity building in road maintenance 
5.7.3.1 Capacity building approaches 
This section described the various approaches and methods in implementing the capacity 
building programs related to the road maintenance, as construed by the interviewees. The 
capacity building programs in Aceh Besar were conducted in various approaches. As highlighted 
by CS02, there was collaboration between the public works of Aceh Besar and the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) regarding the road construction. Additionally, as emphasised by 
CS02, since the ILO was an organisation focused on the labour, the trainings provided by ILO 
were more focused on the manual labour aspect of the road construction. He stated 
“There was. We did have collaboration with the ILO. We also received training on road 
setting, and so on. And then there was a demonstration of the construction (method). 
Because it was a labour organisation, the training was more towards manual works such 
as macadam.” – CS02  
A supporting statement was also provided by CS01 regarding the impact and the benefit of the 
various capacity building programs provided in the post-disaster reconstruction period. CS01 
particularly suggested that the support from the foreign organisations during the post-disaster 
reconstruction have helped the local Bappeda improve its planning skills. He said 
“The support and roles of the Bappeda (in road maintenance) were not in the form of 
physical works. But I personally think that the great supports from the foreign institutions 
(donors)… also helped improve the planning skills. We feel the benefit.” – CS01 
Another capacity building approach adopted in the post-disaster reconstruction in Aceh, 
particularly in the road sector was in the form of knowledge sharing through partnerships and 
joint programs. Whilst they were not necessarily titled and clearly named as a capacity building 
program, the impacts and benefits from the knowledge sharing were acknowledged and were 
expected to sustain in the local institutions.  
Additionally, the contractors’ perspective on the benefit of being involved in the reconstruction 
seemed to be varied. CS06 suggested that the reconstruction activities provided a lot of 
opportunities to gain new knowledge. As he said 
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“A lot. From the technical aspect, we learned a lot.” – CS06 
He further explained that the reconstruction process in Aceh indeed increased the capacity of 
the local contractors and was ‘very helpful’. Contrasting the previous opinion, however, CS05 
did not seem to have benefited from the reconstruction process. He expressed this as  
“It depends. One may say there is knowledge increase. Some may say it was just okay (not 
really). Some will see no influence at all. To me personally, it is almost the same (no 
change).” – CS05 
Even though he personally did not feel to have had any improved knowledge as a result of being 
involved in the reconstruction process, he stipulated that the reconstruction process had 
provided a positive impact to the company‘s profit.  
5.7.3.2 Capacity building challenges 
On the one hand, the capacity building program provided for the Local Government personnel 
was generally limited, which was mostly due to the lack of political interest and the resulting 
poor budget allocation for the capacity building activities.  
On the other hand, there was also an issue with regards to the quality of the capacity building 
programs provided for the Local Government’s personnel. As suggested by CS04, the challenge 
in the capacity building of the local governments’ personnel, particularly with regards to the 
road maintenance capacity was due to the high focus on the physical infrastructure. 
Consequently, he added that no capacity building programs were provided to the local 
governments particularly aimed at improving the road maintenance skills. He revealed 
“Capacity building program regarding road maintenance, I think there was none… We 
never trained people (for road maintenance).” – CS04 
Additionally, even though the issue of political interference as a challenge in the capacity 
building efforts did not emerge in the interviews with the Aceh Besar representatives, it 
appeared that the capacity building programs did not seem to be conducted in an effective 
approach. CS02 gave an example that the workshop on road design provided to the public 
works personnel was not effective due to the very short period. Giving an example, he argued 
that road design skills could not be achieved from a short three-day course. He suggested  
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“For the workshop of road design, it was not effective because it was only a three-day 
short course. It was supposed to be maybe around 2 months specifically for road design, 
or bridge design. That way it would have better results. If the training is only for 1 or 2 
days, the result may not be optimal.” – CS02 
He further expressed that consequently, most of the personnel with the non-technical 
background learned and increased their knowledge informally from their colleagues.  
CS02 also suggested that the poor capacity of the public works personnel in Aceh Besar was 
also affected by the inappropriate personnel background. He stipulated that on the one hand, 
there was an insufficient number of personnel with engineering background which resulted in 
the technical positions in certain departments had to be filled by the non-engineering 
personnel. On the other hand, however, there was also a concern that the engineering 
personnel was assigned to the non-engineering positions 
“In some meetings, such as the last one… with the parliament, the infrastructure 
commission, we have frequently said that there are a lot of personnel with engineering 
background placed in the non-engineering institutions, which is not related to public 
works… It can be identified. They should be returned to their habitat (relevant 
institutions).” – CS02 
He further added that due to the inappropriate educational background of the personnel in the 
public works, the trainings and workshops provided to these personnel did not yield the 
expected outcomes.  
The capacity building in road maintenance in case study one has been discussed in this section. 
Accordingly, the cognitive map of the capacity building analysis is presented in Figure 5.27. The 
issue of post-disaster road reconstruction success indicators as they perceived by the 
respondents in case study one will be discussed in the following section.
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Figure 5.27 – Cognitive map of the capacity building in case study one
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5.7.4 Post-disaster road reconstruction success indicator 
As previously indicated, this section will present the analysis of the post-disaster road 
reconstruction success indicators as they are perceived by the respondents of the case study.  
The post-disaster reconstruction of road infrastructure in Aceh introduced a ‘new’ pavement 
type to the local governments, which was widely used in the reconstruction as it was supposed 
to have better quality than the initial road construction type, the hot mix asphalt pavement 
(HMA). CS05 stipulated 
“Almost everywhere in Aceh, almost 100% are hot mix. Even the village (roads) are all hot 
mix. No more gravel road. If any, small alley would use paving block or concrete road. 
Generally roads in Aceh are now good. – CS05 
From the interviews with the stakeholders in Aceh Besar, it emerged that the reconstruction of 
road infrastructure in Aceh Besar had provided positive impacts to the socioeconomic condition 
of the community. As expressed by CS01, the improved access in Aceh Besar has resulted in the 
development of a number of housing settlements in Jantho, the capital of Aceh Besar.  
“The economic condition has certainly improved… Jantho is now crowded, one of the 
reasons is the development of the housing settlements.” – CS01 
Not only have the road reconstruction processes resulted in the improved infrastructure and 
the socioeconomic condition, CS01 also suggested that the reconstruction activity had helped 
the local government personnel improve their capacity. He argued that the experience and 
knowledge obtained from being involved in the reconstruction process helped them prepare a 
better planning. He said 
“It can be seen in the (preparation of) planning document of every project. Before 
(tsunami), we undermine the importance of planning. I mean, we submit the request, and 
build. No planning. In the reconstruction, we were taught. We were trained to prepare 
planning document. The DED, master plan, budget and planning. It was, for me, the most 
important lesson.” – CS01 
He further said 
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“We’re not used to do that (planning). We used to do all in one year. It may work, but 
there was no good planning.” – CS01 
The above discussion concludes the discussion of the post-disaster road reconstruction success 
indicators. Accordingly, the cognitive map of the success indicator analysis is presented in 
Figure 5.28 
 
Figure 5.28 – Cognitive map of the post-disaster success indicators  
 
The above sections have provided an in-depth discussion of the analysis of the first case study. 
Accordingly, the following section will provide a discussion on the second case study of the 
research, Aceh Jaya. 
5.8 Analysis of case study 2 – Aceh Jaya 
5.8.1 The maintenance capacity affecting factors 
5.8.1.1 External factors 
The external factors for the road maintenance are those which are beyond the direct control 
of the road authorities. Accordingly, these external factors will be elaborated in the following 
sections.  
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5.8.1.1.1 Environmental 
In performing their road maintenance tasks, road authorities are often faced with the 
environmental challenges. The environmental condition, such as weather and terrain 
condition, negatively affects the deterioration rate of the road infrastructure. Cracks on the 
surface of the pavement may allow water ingress into the pavement surface. This may 
eventually disintegrate the road structure and therefore requires immediate repair 
intervention.  
The environmental factor emerging from the semi-structured interviews was regarding the 
frequent flooding events. As highlighted by CS11, the frequent flooding events in the districts 
largely contributed to the rapid deterioration of the road infrastructure. He said  
“Occasionally the nature also (contributes to the rapid road deterioration). Occasionally, 
there are floods. The Teunom area (a sub district in Aceh Jaya) is often flooded. Asphalt 
will break apart (the road structure) when water touches it. When it comes to water, 
asphalt is not very strong.” CS11 
Since some areas have different exposure to natural hazards, the areas with higher risk of 
natural hazards will accordingly need even higher attention with regard to the road 
maintenance. From the interviews with the respondents in the case study, flooding has been 
considered as the main environmental concern to the road maintenance. The following section 
will accordingly provide an insight into political factors which affect the Local Governments’ 
road maintenance capacity.  
 
5.8.1.1.2 Political  
In Aceh Jaya, the local political condition also affected the road maintenance capacity of the 
local government. As described by CS13, in order to meet their political agenda, the parliament 
members would therefore intervene the projects and programs proposed by the Local 
Governments. Additionally, CS09 also revealed that the political pressure in determining the 
budget use and location of projects was higher after the post-disaster reconstruction had 
completed. This was particularly due to the reduced number of projects in the area, which 
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resulted in the higher competition among contractors, as well as politicians, to win the 
development projects. As CS09 stated 
“There are conflicts of interests. It was not so high (the political pressure) during the 
reconstruction because there were many (work) packages. If they could not get from the 
public works, they might get it from the BRR. Now, they can only get it from the public 
works.” – CS09 
CS09’s statement above suggests that currently the road infrastructure maintenance was 
experiencing a higher political pressure from the parliament as the post-disaster reconstruction 
activity in the area had been virtually ended and the number of projects had decreased.  
5.8.1.1.3 Socio-economic factors 
The west coast area of Aceh province where Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya, and Aceh Barat Daya are 
located is mainly occupied by the palm trees agriculture and the mining industry. As a result, 
trucks and other vehicles transporting the heavy load consequently need to transport the 
harvest to the processing plant or ports through the district roads, before they get to the 
provincial or the national road. This activity consequently and greatly contributes to the rapid 
deterioration of the road infrastructure that they pass through, particularly when the road 
sections are not structurally designed to cope with the heavy loads. As explained by CS12 
“The roads which are designed for normal traffic are later on used for trucks transporting 
palm trees. The damaging factor is different, right? ... This means that on the one hand 
the government is faced with the dilemma that if it (traffic loading control) is enforced, 
they (business investment) may not come to the area. If they are allowed, the 
infrastructure will be damaged.” – CS12  
The CS12’s comment also reveals that the Local Governments were facing a dilemmatic 
position. On the one hand, the agricultural and mining industry is necessary to help improve 
the economic condition of the areas. On the other side, however, allowing the heavy loaded 
vehicles to pass through the district roads will damage the infrastructure. He also added that in 
reality the Local Governments tend to ignore this problem and is more focused on the direct 
income that the industry may provide to the district. To solve this issue, CS12 later emphasised 
that the local governments should be in charge and lead the process of enforcing the maximum 
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axle loading capacity regulation. This is particularly due to the involvement of several 
institutions in the road management.  
Furthermore, one of the justifications for the local governments to focus on the road 
construction rather than the maintenance was that because the district area was too wide that 
there were high needs and pressures to provide wider access to the community. This was also 
experienced in Aceh Jaya. Moreover, in Aceh Jaya, this condition was worsened by the fact that 
some areas in the districts were still isolated. As justified by CS10, referring to the isolated 
community in the district 
“We can say that they do not have their independence yet… They need to walk as far as 
5km before they could find the access road. So how can we (spend money to) maintain, 
whilst here (in the isolated area) it is very contrasting, they do not even have roads.” – 
CS10 
Accordingly, a similar view was also expressed by CS10. Combining the views on wealth 
distribution and setting up the development priority issues, he concluded that expanding the 
road networks should get a higher priority than the maintenance of the existing networks. He 
said 
“I am more towards the first option (expanding networks)… Why? Analogically, we need 
to eat first, and then we need to shower. It can’t be that we need to shower, if there is 
nothing to eat. So we need to construct first. If there is no construction, what to 
maintain?” – CS10  
CS10 added that the local governments did not focus on ensuring the comfort of the road users 
by providing the proper maintenance, but rather limited their focus to a level where road safety 
can be achieved. CS10 stated  
“We focus on the construction first, even though the maintenance is not so good, even 
though it is not comfortable… But in the LG, we do not seek comfort, we only seek for 
safety.” – CS10 
Furthermore, preferring to focus on the road expansion, CS10 based his argument that 
spending money for the road expansion would give more benefit to the community than the 
road maintenance would. He said 
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“If we maintain this road, a road section of 20km (for example)… 10km of the road is 
currently not passable. So, rather than maintaining the (passable) 10km, we better use 
the money to extend the passable length.” – CS10 
In supporting the CS10’s view, CS08 highlighted that the resulting impact of the high preference 
on the capital project was that the budget allocation for road maintenance was insignificant 
and insufficient 
“So the maintenance (fund) of the road is not significant, not so significant. The districts 
mostly focus on building new roads.” – CS08 
In addition to the above discussion, there also seems to be a high social pressure from the 
community to build and expand the road networks. However, the community was also argued 
to have lacked the sense of ownership to the road networks that have been built in their 
neighbourhoods.  
In another case, interviewee CS13 described an example from the project he was involved in 
where the farmers in the rural areas destroyed the drainage channel to water their farm. The 
local farmers were used to get water for their farms from the irrigation and drainage channels 
along the road shoulders. When the road was rehabilitated, the drainage channel was upgraded 
from the soil embankment to the concrete ones. Apparently, the new drainage construction 
did not provide water inlets to the farming areas and some spots were therefore smashed for 
the water inlets by the local farmers.  
In the particular case that the CS13 brought up, it seems that there had been lack of 
communication and stakeholders’ involvement in the construction process. Apparently the 
farmers’ dependence on the drainage channel was not accounted for, or alternative sources of 
water were not introduced to the farmer in the road drainage channel rehabilitation design. 
This flaw eventually led to farmer forcefully broke the drainage wall as the solution for their 
farming needs.  
Another major issue affecting the performance of the local governments in road maintenance 
was due to corruption. Particularly addressed to the development of the road information 
management system, CS12 argued that the idea to develop a proper GIS-based system for the 
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road maintenance had been proposed and initiated during the post-disaster reconstruction 
period. He argued that such system would provide the road authorities a strong basis to identify 
the maintenance needs. In turn, this would also help road authorities to justify their budget 
proposal, by delivering informed-consent options to the parliament, without having to fight and 
bribe the parliament. Regardless the benefit of adopting such a system, however, CS12 argued 
that the development of the GIS-based road information management system would reduce 
the Local Governments’ dependencies on the consultants for the preparation of their annual 
work plan and at the same time provide well-justified budget proposal. However, he further 
explained that the proposal for the development and utilisation of the road information 
management system was rejected by the Local Governments, accusing that it was based on the 
reduced chances and opportunities for corruption. Additionally, the local consultants seemed 
to have encouraged the Bupati to reject the system. As he said 
“By using the system, the local governments do not need to call consultant to do the 
planning… with minimum resource capacity, it can be notified which road sections need 
maintenance. If the system runs, it would be very helpful. However, I see that there was a 
high influence of the local consultants.” – CS12 
He further gives another suggestion of the influence of the local consultants by saying 
“In the bid tender of a project which was initially aimed for district road planning, there 
were so many consultants brought by the Bupati. Apparently behind the Bupati were them 
(the local consultant). It can be imagined that such program will be very much hated by 
them (the local consultant) as it would affect their roles.” – CS12 
The above sections have discussed the socioeconomic factors affecting the capacity of the local 
government of Aceh Jaya in the road maintenance. Accordingly, the following section will 
discuss the impact of safety and security condition to the capacity of the local government of 
Aceh Jaya in road maintenance.  
5.8.1.1.4 Safety and Security 
In addition to the socioeconomic factors, the performance of the public works in road 
maintenance was also affected by the safety and security issue. During the project 
implementation, contractors were often faced threats and oppressive behaviours from the 
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community. Such threats and oppressive behaviours were commonly followed or initiated by 
their demands to be involved in the project as materials suppliers or the construction workers. 
However, the community frequently demanded for irrational requests which contractor could 
not provide. 
After the peace agreement in 2005, a committee called KPA (Aceh Transformation Committee) 
was established. The establishment of the KPA was part of the peace agreement clauses, which 
aims at the transformation and the reintegration of the ex-combatants to the society. The KPA 
organisation structure spread all over Aceh and their chapters were also formed at the districts 
and sub-district level. However, as described by CS10, at the ground level this organisation 
further expanded and operated as a means to put pressure on the government personnel, 
particularly on the bid tender and the implementation of the development projects. CS10 
added that the implementations of the road projects were occasionally disrupted by the 
individuals from the KPA, who forcefully demanded to be involved in the project. As CS13 
explained, in many occasions, the lack of capacity of the local community to be involved as 
construction workers, as well as the higher price of materials offered by them, put contractors 
in a difficult position to approve their request and to accept the offer. CS13 further explained 
“Looking at the quality and the cost (of works provided by the community), the contractor 
could not give the job to the community groups… The community there asked to do the 
works by setting up a price which contractor was unable to pay.” – CS13 
Threats and oppressive behaviour were not only posed by some community groups towards 
the contractors working in their area. It was also suggested that there were unhealthy 
competitions between the contractors in winning a project.  
CS10 further explained that the solution to such disruption was to coordinate with the local 
village apparatus and the local KPA leader. The KPA at the village level was also known as 
‘Sagoe’, literally translated as the corner or branch in Acehnese language. He added that it was 
not only the government personnel who needed to coordinate with the ‘Sagoe’. The 
contractors would also need to coordinate and disseminate information about the project to 
the locals. As he said  
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“Also for the contractors, they would disseminate to the locals that they would have a 
work package there.” – CS10 
Additionally, to ensure that the project could be implemented well and without disruption, a 
personal approach and agreement with the Sagoe leaders was frequently required. As a result, 
the KPA members would generally be involved in the project as the contractors’ personnel or 
as the suppliers for the project. CS10 implicitly revealed that this practice was well-coordinated 
and well-organised by the KPA at the higher level. He said  
“Since the ‘Sagoe’ might have been directed by the KPA regarding the project in their 
village, the contractors would later need to recruit some of the local KPA members in the 
project. Whether as a night guard... or if they have a business, might also be as the 
suppliers. So we share (the works).” – CS10  
Whilst the above discussion illustrates how the security and safety issue would affect the 
implementation of a project in the field, the influences and pressures from the KPA also seemed 
to have a greater impact on the project tender process. CS10 described that he had to 
coordinate with the KPA and distribute the construction work packages to the KPA members. 
As CS10 explained 
“We always coordinated with them (KPA). We explained (to the leaders) so that they could 
convey the message to their members that we are all equal. We would distribute (the 
projects) in the tender process. So there would be no one says that I have to win such and 
such project, or this must be mine. What happened was that we arranged them through 
the (formal) procedure, through tender.” CS10 
It is then obvious that the security and safety threats in Aceh Jaya had significant impacts to the 
capacity of the local government in the implementation of the development projects. In some 
cases, such disruption occurred in the form of forceful demands to be involved in the project 
as construction personnel or suppliers. In some other cases the disruption took place in the 
form of forceful demands to win the project tender.  
The above discussion concludes the analysis of the external factors affecting the capacity of the 
local governments in road maintenance. Accordingly, the cognitive map of the external 
affecting factors is presented in Figure 5.29. 
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Figure 5.29 – Cognitive map of the external affecting factors of the case study two 
 
As the external factors have been discussed, the following section will present the institutional 
affecting factors 
5.8.1.2 Institutional factors 
5.8.1.2.1 Financial management  
The financial issues of road maintenance in Aceh Jaya emerging from the interviews can be 
grouped into three categories. The categories are: fund is not allocated in sufficient amount, 
fund allocation is not spent, and fund allocation is not spent effectively. 
5.8.1.2.1.1 Fund is not allocated in sufficient amount 
The financial issue of road maintenance in Aceh Jaya also experienced the extreme example of 
road maintenance problem. As stipulated by CS10, the road infrastructure was simply 
neglected of maintenance immediately upon their completion. This was particularly due to the 
lack of budget allocation for road maintenance. CS10 revealed 
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“All this time we never allocate budget for maintenance, because our budget is very, very 
limited.” – CS10 
One of the main causes of the insufficient budget allocation for the road maintenance was due 
to the fund competition with other expenditure needs. Accordingly, CS13 revealed that the 
maintenance needs always lose the competition with the capital projects. The resulting 
consequence was that the road maintenance did not get optimum allocation. However, CS10 
further added there was a small provision of budget allocation for patching potholes on the 
roads, even though in a very small amount. As he said 
“Well, for patching the roads the fund is very limited, not nothing at all.” – CS10 
A similar suggestion was also implied by CS09. Confirming CS10’s comment on the lack of road 
maintenance budget allocation, CS09 added that the budget for the road maintenance needs 
had not been allocated regularly in their annual budget proposal. CS09 stressed 
“For the maintenance, it is not certain. It seems that there is no maintenance this year, 
not at all. So it is focused on road upgrade and new construction.” – CS09 
5.8.1.2.1.2 Fund allocation is not spent 
On the one hand, there was an issue with regards to the insufficient allocation for road 
maintenance, due to various aspects as described in the previous section. On the other hand, 
however, there was also an issue with regards to the ability of Local Governments to spend 
their budget allocation. From the interviews, it was revealed that one of the financial problems 
in Aceh Jaya was the poor capacity of the local government personnel to spend their budget 
allocation. Even though it was not specifically addressed at the Local Governments’ capacity to 
spend the budget allocation for the road maintenance, the condition was relevant to the road 
maintenance capacity as the lack of funds was often used to justify the maintenance neglect. 
The annual budget realisation is shown in Table 5.19.  
As shown in the table, the budget expenditure ratio of the Aceh Jaya district had been poor. 
Whilst in 2007 the budget realisation was as low as 59%, the budget realisation in 2009 was far 
more than the budget at 116.2%, which means that the district expended more than their 
budget allocation.  
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Table 5.19 – Annual Budget Realisation of Aceh Jaya  
Year TOTAL INCOME TOTAL EXPENSES REALISATION UNSPENT 
ALLOCATION 
2006 Rp 145,425,680,000 Rp 137,792,440,000 94.8% Rp      7,633,240,000 
2007 Rp 497,696,806,270 Rp 293,971,531,305 59.1% Rp    203,725,274,965 
2008 Rp 494,610,005,769 Rp 380,475,472,070 76.9% Rp    114,134,533,699 
2009 Rp 317,410,485,560 Rp 368,747,488,635 116.2% Rp – 51,337,003,075* 
2010 Rp 420,207,756,862 Rp 389,319,578,238 92.6% Rp    30,888,178,624 
2011 Rp 457,873,401,687 Rp 413,563,457,294 90.3% Rp     44,309,944,393 
2012 Rp 475,805,789,433 Rp 408,950,000,000 85.9% Rp     66,855,789,433 
Source: DJPK (2014) 
*Overspent allocation 
Note: £1 ~ Rp 20,000 
With regards to unspent budget allocation, delays in the annual budget approval were accused 
as one of the reasons. As explained in section 2.5.5.1.3, the spending period of the annual 
budget will not be extended to compensate the budget approval delays. CS10 explained this 
condition by saying 
“The first problem is budget approval. It is usually (approved) on April. Later on, the 
(detailed) budget use is finalised by May. Then the tender process takes three or two 
months. So the project implementation begins in July, or august. Then, we know that 
September or October is rainy season. Consequently, by the end of the year we cannot 
finish. So, most of the fund is carried over (to the next year).” – CS10  
CS10’s explanation above also suggests that the delays in budget approval would lead to 
projects having to be implemented in the rainy season. Consequently, not only do the delays 
shortened the project implementation period, they would also force contractor to work in a 
poor site condition resulting from the rainy season, aggravating the already bad situation.  
Another cause of budget allocation not being spent, as revealed by CS10, was due to the poor 
capacity of the local government institution to create the development projects and complete 
them as planned. Being a local government personnel loaned to the BRR in the reconstruction 
process, CS10 compared and contrasted his experience in the BRR to the local government 
institutions. He illustrated 
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“For instance, there are 60 personnel (in the LG), but to spend a mere Rp 50 billion has 
been difficult. In my experience (in BRR), in one unit the personnel were only six people, 
but we could spend more than Rp 100 billion in a year… because of the capacity. The skills 
were really exercised. But the 60 personnel (in the LG) cannot even spend the Rp 50 billion. 
Every year there will be carried-over budget.” – CS10  
The carried over budget means that the unspent budget allocation for the project can be 
carried over to the next annual budget. However, to reflect the local governments’ actual 
budget expenditure capacity, the annual budget allocation may accordingly be reduced.  
5.8.1.2.1.3 Fund allocation is not spent effectively 
Another financial issue in the road maintenance is regarding the ineffective use of budget 
allocation. This was also experienced in Aceh Jaya, as revealed by CS10. He revealed that in 
Aceh Jaya, the new road expansion projects were occasionally disguised as road maintenance 
projects. This was done particularly due to the high interest on the capital projects and in 
providing wider access to the community. Disguising a capital road project as a maintenance 
work was also done in order to receive the financial assistance from the national government. 
The financial assistance would only be given under the condition that the fund would be used 
for the road maintenance. Regarding this issue, CS10 shared that 
“In some occasion, we construct new roads, but the (project) title is maintenance. This 
was done so that financial aid from the central government can be obtained. So we got 
the maintenance fund, but we could not use it (for maintenance). We had to use it for the 
road construction.” – CS10 
Since the financial assistance for the road maintenance was disguised to fund the road 
expansion projects, the use of the funds would then be ineffective to solve the road 
maintenance problems in Aceh Jaya. Until this issue was solved, it is argued that pouring-in 
more financial assistance for the maintenance of the road district in Aceh Jaya would not likely 
improve the road infrastructure condition.  
5.8.1.2.2 Human resources 
This section discussed the human resource capacity for the road maintenance in Aceh Jaya 
district. According to CS09, the technical capacity of the public works personnel was sufficient 
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and therefore was not a concern for the road maintenance. However, a different view was 
suggested by CS10. He suggested that the human resource capacity of the road maintenance 
personnel was very limited. Both in quantity; the number of personnel, and the quality; the 
individual skill. CS09 said 
“The available personnel were really limited. Whether in terms of quality or in terms of 
quantity, both are very, very limited.” – CS10 
CS13 added that the maintenance of the post-disaster reconstruction assets would have to deal 
with the poor engineering knowledge of the local government personnel. Similarly, CS12 also 
suggested the poor technical knowledge of the local government might hinder the road 
maintenance efforts, rather than the financial capacity. He argued 
“We realise that there will be special autonomy fund, which is very big. But indeed the 
capacity is so limited in terms of technical knowledge.” – CS12  
CS10 further added that there were no trainings or workshops provided by the agency for the 
personnel in order to improve their skills. He said 
“As far as I know, institutionally, there has not been such trainings, or sending the 
personnel to the educational institution.”- CS10 
According to CS10, the lack of training programs for the road maintenance personnel was due 
to the poor awareness and interest of the parliament towards such soft projects. Accordingly, 
the budget proposal for training was rarely approved. He further explained that the parliament 
was more concern on activities which could give direct and immediate result. Regarding the 
provision of training programs for the personnel, CS10 said 
“In addition to the budget (limitation), there is also an issue of awareness. The awareness 
of our parliament is rather poor towards such soft projects. Why would we spend money 
if it is only for training? The results are not immediately visible. For instance, if we spend 
the budget allocation of Rp 500 million, if it used for constructing road we would get 500 
meters. The results are immediately visible.  
Whilst the local government personnel were argued to have limited capacity, interviewee CS13 
proposed a contrasting view. According to CS13, the technical capacity of the Local 
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Governments’ personnel to perform road maintenance tasks was not a main concern. He based 
his argument on the relatively standardised technology of the road construction. CS13 
suggested argued 
“For road infrastructure, it is not the case (technical capacity problem), it is normal. 
Because the technology is the same. So in the road sector, from the human resource 
aspect there is no problem.” – CS13 
According to the above discussion, the political influence and pressure from the parliament 
seemed to be a major challenge to the human resource development in Aceh Jaya. 
Furthermore, with regards to the maintenance work plan, the lack of proper road information 
system also affected the road maintenance work plan in Aceh Jaya. According to CS09, the road 
agency produced their road maintenance estimate based on the road’s surface area. He 
explained 
 “We estimate road maintenance needs as a percentage of the roads’ square meter area 
(surface area).” – CS09 
Accordingly, it appeared that the road authority in Aceh Jaya district lacked the appropriate 
justifications to produce the road maintenance need estimates.  
5.8.1.2.3 Organisational management 
From the organisational management perspective, leadership was also seen as an issue in the 
road maintenance in Aceh Jaya. The first issue emerging from the interviews was regarding the 
conflict of interest in determining the development of road maintenance program. As 
suggested by CS13, the local governments did not give adequate attention to the road 
maintenance problems, particularly the roads that were far from the government centre. He 
argued 
“The Local Governments do not optimally allocate maintenance fund for their district, 
unless the roads are located in the centre of government activities. Why? For them, what 
is important is that the road to the government centre is good. Meanwhile, what we think 
most important is the economic access, access to the centre of economic activities” – CS13  
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He further argued that the local governments commonly make decisions based on the 
individuals’ personal desire and motivation instead of based on the needs and priority.  
The following concern emerging from the interview regarding the leadership in Aceh Jaya was 
the high dependence of the leaders on the financial assistance from the external source. The 
local governments were also suggested to have lack of motivations and initiatives to perform 
and improve their infrastructure condition using their own resources. This view was suggested 
by CS12. He argued that instead of showing efforts and initiating the improvement process, the 
local governments tend to ask for assistance from the very beginning of the process. As also 
revealed by CS09, the substantial scale of the road infrastructure reconstruction in the district 
was seen as a burden to the local government as they were obliged to provide the future 
maintenance needs. There was a high expectation from the Local Governments that the BRR 
would build all their road infrastructure needs. As expressed by CS09 
“If BRR built, for instance, in Aceh Jaya there are 230 km of roads, If BRR built all of them 
then we would only need to maintain them. No longer need to build the roads, just to 
maintain.” – CS09 
He further added that having to maintain the road infrastructure at the same time when they 
also have to expand their road networks was overwhelming.  
“We are overwhelmed. Whilst we build all of the roads, whilst we build what was left by 
the BRR, we also do maintenance. This is a polemic.” – CS09 
Accordingly, not only did this condition reflect the high reliance of the Local Governments 
toward the external aid, but also illustrated the poor understanding of the road authorities on 
the continuous need of the road maintenance.  
The above section have provided the analysis of the institutional affecting factors of the case 
study. The cognitive map of the analysis is presented in Figure 5.30. The next section will 
accordingly present the analysis of the technical factors.
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Figure 5.30 – Cognitive map of the institutional affecting factors of the case study two
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5.8.1.3 Technical factor 
From the technical perspective, the local governments’ maintenance capacity appeared to be 
affected by the over-standard design of the road infrastructure built in the post-disaster 
reconstruction period. The over-standard design generally refers to the ‘new’ type of road 
construction relative to the local governments’ general experience. One of the consequences 
of the introduction of the standard design was that the construction and the maintenance cost 
were accordingly higher. This concern was confirmed by CS13 as he said 
“Since the district financial capacity is poor, many of the projects we built do not get 
sufficient maintenance. Why? What we did was high design, high quality (infrastructure). 
Therefore… district financial capacity is insufficient to provide the optimum maintenance. 
Because what we built was of high quality.” – CS13 
Furthermore, in the execution and implementation of road maintenance projects, the 
supporting plant and equipment also plays an important role in determining the road 
maintenance success. In the district of Aceh Jaya, CS10 suggested that the available equipment 
was insufficient. He said 
“Both the human resource capacity and the equipment were very limited. So far we only 
have two motorised grader and 2 compactors. Those are the only equipment we have.” – 
CS10 
According to his further explanation, the poor equipment condition had been reported and, in 
fact, a request to buy more equipment had been regularly submitted with no success. CS10 
revealed 
“We have submitted a request. We did submit a request to buy equipment. Until last year, 
we did not get allocation for more equipment to support the maintenance of roads and 
bridges.” – CS10 
Furthermore, with regards to the construction quality, most of the road infrastructures start to 
show deterioration long after the project completion, and commonly after it surpasses the 
contractors’ defect liability period. Accordingly, by the time the roads were starting to show 
obvious deterioration, the contractors were no longer responsible for the maintenance. The 
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contractors could no longer be held responsible for the damages, particularly on the basis that 
the road construction was accused to have a poor quality.  
The issue of holding contractors’ liability gets more complicated since the poor quality issue is 
also then mixed with the issue of traffic loading control. The road deterioration problems are 
commonly linked with the issue of poor construction quality and the overloading traffic. The 
issue of the overloading traffic on the west coast of Aceh was raised by CS12 in the interview. 
He suggested that in addition to the poor technical and financial capacity to perform the road 
maintenance tasks, another important factor is with regard to the traffic loading control 
capacity. As CS12 highlighted 
“After that (the defect liability period), it is no longer the responsibility of the contractor. 
And we can do nothing about it. Roads that were designed to serve normal traffic, then 
used by trucks transporting palm trees. The damage will be different, right?” – CS12 
CS12’s view above described the common experience in the road project in the case study 
districts.  
The above discussion concludes the road maintenance capacity affecting factors from the 
technical perspective. The cognitive map of the technical affecting factors is presented in Figure 
5.31.  
 
Figure 5.31 – The cognitive map of the technical affecting factors of the case study two 
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As the analysis of the road maintenance capacity affecting factors have been elaborated in the 
above sections, the following section will accordingly present the analysis of the maintenance 
strategy of the case study two. 
5.8.2 Maintenance Strategy 
This section will elaborate the strategy adopted by the district of Aceh Jaya in the maintenance 
of its road infrastructure. Similarly, the maintenance strategy refers to the responses and 
actions of the local governments to the road maintenance needs. Therefore, such responses 
and actions include the responses of the Local Governments to the maintenance needs, 
funding, and staffing strategy.  
5.8.2.1 Prioritisation 
The discussion on the method of dispersing budget allocation was presented by CS09. He 
suggested that the government of Aceh Jaya used to spend its road maintenance and 
construction allocation to ensure that a certain part of a road section would have a complete 
construction and smooth surface. He further explained that in that approach a long road 
section would be chunked into shorter sections and that the available budget would be spent 
on whatever length it might be sufficient to pave the surface. However, he advised that the 
strategy would be changed. The available budget allocation would be used to repair or 
construct new road and spread equally to the whole targeted road sections. Even though this 
could mean that the budget allocation would be insufficient for the targeted road section to 
get the surface paved. As he said  
“In the future, what we will do, we will make a target first… If there are 50 km of road 
sections, what we did was (to fully complete the road in) 10km, 10km, 10km… In the future 
we will do it as per work item. For the foundation, we will do the foundation for 50km. 
Next year if we make the base, 50 km of the base must be completed.” – CS09 
CS09’s explanation above was believed to give more effective outcomes in terms of road 
infrastructure development. The argumentation was that such approach would help achieve 
the objective of providing the widest access to the community by opening and providing decent 
access to the previously inaccessible areas. The justification of such approach seemed to be 
logical, particularly if one would see the immediate result of improved and better access. 
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However, such approach might potentially lead to higher interest on the capital road project to 
upgrade and complete the unfinished construction, higher pressure from the community as the 
road infrastructure may appear to be incomplete, and at the same time does little or nothing 
to keep the constructed road maintained.  
5.8.2.2 Response to maintenance needs 
5.8.2.2.1 Neglect 
The response of the local government of Aceh Jaya to the road maintenance needs was similar 
to Aceh Besar. The local government did not see that road infrastructure would need to be 
maintained regularly and immediately after the construction. Even more, as described by CS08, 
the response to the road maintenance needs was rather responsive, which was to wait until 
the roads started to break, and that a regular maintenance would be unnecessary. CS08 
described 
“Most of the roads in the sub-districts, the district roads, are new roads… Maybe, there is 
no action yet (for maintenance), because the road is still in good condition, do not need 
maintenance… I think it does not need (to be maintained) every year. I think it will be only 
after three or two years that it breaks. Because the traffic passing the road is not more 
than 10 tons.” – CS08 
CS08’s comment above regarding the road maintenance issue demonstrates the poor 
understanding of the local governments on the importance of providing regular road 
maintenance. Accordingly, it came to no surprise that the local governments of Aceh Jaya 
simply neglected the road maintenance needs. This was confirmed by CS09 by stating that the 
road maintenance allocation was given intermittently, and occasionally no allocation was made 
at all. As he described 
“Maintenance (allocation), it is not certain. It seems that this year there is no 
maintenance. Not at all. It is focused on upgrading and new construction.” – CS09  
In addition to the total neglect of the routine maintenance, CS10 added that the local 
government of Aceh Jaya did not recognise maintenance works. The method they adopt for the 
development of road infrastructure was a sequential approach. The road development process 
was explained by CS10 
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“The first phase is to open (new road), gravel. Two years later, we allocate budget for 
upgrade. To be paved. So we don’t recognise maintenance works there. We only have 
upgrades. We upgrade them to asphalt pavement… No maintenance.” – CS10 
As described by CS10 above, the road development process would start by the Local 
Governments initially open up a new area and construct the gravel roads. The following phase 
would be to provide the budget allocation for the gravel road to be paved. Until the gravel 
roads get paved, no maintenance intervention was planned and allocated for the new gravel 
roads. The justification of such neglect was further given by CS10 
“We go straight to upgrade… instead of spending money for the maintenance which in 
two years later we would also need to maintain again.” – CS10 
The argumentation that CS10 put forward undermined the necessity and the objective of road 
maintenance. As explained in section 2.4.2, road construction would start to deteriorate 
immediately after the construction is complete. Maintenance intervention is accordingly 
provided to reduce and slow down the deterioration pace, restore the structural condition, and 
eventually extend the design life and reduce the life cycle cost. Taking CS10 illustration as an 
example, the provision of regular maintenance works to the gravel roads may accordingly delay 
the needs to upgrade, or in certain cases may even diminish the need to upgrade the roads at 
all.  
5.8.2.3 Staffing  
Similar to the previous case study district, the execution and implementation of the road 
maintenance works in Aceh Jaya also used a force-account method, i.e. using the in-house 
personnel. One of the justifications for using the force-account method as suggested by CS10 
was due to the limited budget availability. He explained 
“Due to the limited budget, we plan ourselves, unpaid, not using the consultant… we do 
it ourselves, using our own equipment. We only need to calculate the cost of the fuel and 
mobilisation.” – CS10 
CS10 further justified that by using the force-account method, the agency would be able to 
save costs and consequently able to extend the length of the road section that can be covered 
by the budget.  
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“If it’s done by the partners (contractors), they may only build 2km (for example) as they 
are profit-oriented. Our orientation is to open the isolated areas. If we do it ourselves, 
then we may open up to 5km.” – CS10 
The analysis of the maintenance strategy of the case study two have been discussed in this 
section. The cognitive map of the analysis is presented in Figure 5.32 down below. 
 
Figure 5.32 – Cognitive map of the maintenance strategy of case study two 
 
As the maintenance strategy analysis have been presented, the following section will 
accordingly present the analysis of the capacity building in road maintenance of the case study 
two 
5.8.3 Capacity building in road maintenance 
5.8.3.1 Capacity building approaches 
With regards to the capacity building in road maintenance, CS12 suggested that reconstruction 
of road infrastructure in post-disaster context beyond the original condition is reasonable as 
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long as it accompanied by appropriate capacity building programs. He further added that such 
capacity building programs should be aimed at both the local governments and the private 
sectors, in this case, the professional consultant who would assist the local governments. As he 
said 
“I am sure that when the capacity improved, practically the mind-set of the people would 
also change. And most attitudes are affected by the level of knowledge” – CS12 
5.8.3.2 Capacity building challenges 
With regards to the capacity building in road maintenance, lack of funding was also accused to 
be one of the main challenges. Interviewee CS08 argued that the local governments’ personnel 
really needed to be involved in capacity building activities such as trainings and seminars, but 
was challenged by the lack of fund to participate and attend the events. As he explained 
“We really need trainings, such as in the area of technical guidance, budgeting, and data-
based planning, for instance. We received a lot of invitations, but was hindered by the 
lack of budget… So even though the invitation letters keep coming in, they are ignored as 
there are no budget” – CS08 
In addition to that, CS10 supported CS08’s comments and suggested that the local personnel 
had not received trainings with regards to road maintenance. Similarly, the lack of budget to 
participate in such events was also accused to be the reason. Consequently, CS10 explained 
that the local governments’ personnel mostly learned from the more senior staff. He explained 
“There has never been budget allocation for that (trainings). We did submit a request, but 
has never been approved. Probably because the budget is limited. Accordingly, so far we 
learn from the senior staff, learning from their experience” – CS10  
The issues surrounding the capacity building in road maintenance of the case study two have 
been analysed in this section. The cognitive map of the analysis is presented in Figure 5.33. 
Accordingly, the following section will present the analysis of the post-disaster road 
reconstruction success indicator as perceived by the respondents of the case study two.  
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Figure 5.33 – Cognitive map of the capacity building in road maintenance of the case study two 
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5.8.4 Post-disaster road reconstruction success indicator 
5.8.4.1 Disaster impact recovery 
One of the success indicators of the road reconstruction was with regards to the impact of the 
reconstruction to the recovery pace. The interviewees generally perceived that the 
reconstruction of the road infrastructure had largely contributed to the speedy recovery of the 
tsunami affected areas. This was also argued to be the case in Aceh Jaya. As confirmed by CS09, 
the reconstruction of the road infrastructure in Aceh Jaya district was considered to be 
successful, particularly as indicated by the rapid development of the affected areas. CS09 
confirmed his view by saying 
“(It was) successful. The indicator is that I see many areas have developed. Recovered.” – 
CS09 
5.8.4.2 Improved road Infrastructure condition 
5.8.4.2.1 Wider network coverage 
With regards to the road network coverage, CS13 also suggested that the impacts and benefits 
of the road infrastructure reconstruction could also be seen in the improved quantity and 
quality of the road infrastructure. He further added 
“If we look at the success indicators, first is the quantity. The (required) quantity was met. 
In fact, it was more than (what was stipulated) on the blue print.” – CS13 
In addition to the length of the road sections repaired during the post-disaster reconstruction 
period, the quality of the reconstructed road was also believed to have better quality. As argued 
by CS13,  
“From the quality aspect. We see that the quality is still good until today, even though it 
has been 5 years.” – CS13 
Additionally, CS10 also suggested that the post-disaster road reconstruction process had also 
resulted in the better road infrastructure condition. Comparing the post-reconstruction and 
the pre-disaster condition, CS10 illustrated 
 296 
 
 “If we mark it from 0 to 10… now is around 7. Why? Because the access has been 
recovered, compared with the pre-tsunami condition… If we give marks, the pre tsunami 
was 5, now it is 7.” – CS10 
5.8.4.2.2 Reduced travel time  
Another positive impact and indicator of road reconstruction success in Aceh Jaya was the 
reduced travel time. CS10 suggested that the travel time between Banda Aceh and Calang, for 
instance, had been reduced to 2 hours, instead of 3 hours as it was before the tsunami.  
“The access is also better. Previously (prior to the tsunami), Banda Aceh to Calang would 
need 3 hours. Now it will need only 2 hours. So from the transportation perspective, it is 
better.” – CS10 
5.8.4.3 Socioeconomic condition 
From the socioeconomic perspective, the road reconstruction was also perceived to have 
provided positive contributions to the economic development of the community. CS10 
illustrated the improvement by referring to the apparent growth of the vehicles in Aceh Jaya.  
“The income (of the community) has also improved… and with regards to the number of 
vehicles, there used to be only motorcycle, and was limited, and now there are many cars. 
From that alone, we can see the improvement.” – CS10 
And also from the type of houses build by the community 
“There used to be many houses made of timber. As the road network improves, the 
economic condition also improved. Therefore the community’s income also improves. As 
a result, more houses become the permanent (bricks) ones.” – CS10 
The positive impact of the road reconstruction process to the socioeconomic condition of the 
people in Aceh Jaya was also confirmed by CS09. He said 
“(The reconstruction of the roads) really help the economic development of Calang.” – 
CS09 
This section concludes the analysis of the post-disaster road reconstruction success indicator 
as perceived by the respondents in the case study two. The cognitive map of the analysis is 
presented in Figure 5.34 
 297 
 
 
Figure 5.34 – Cognitive map of the post-disaster road reconstruction success indicator  
of the case study two. 
 
The above sections have provided an in-depth discussion on the road maintenance issue in the 
district of Aceh Jaya. Accordingly, the following section will provide a discussion about the third 
case study of the research, Aceh Barat Daya.  
5.9 Analysis of case study 3 – Aceh Barat Daya 
5.9.1 The maintenance capacity affecting factors 
5.9.1.1 External factors 
The external factors for the road maintenance are those which are beyond the direct control 
of the road authorities. Accordingly, these external factors will be elaborated in the following 
sections.  
5.9.1.1.1 Environment 
The analysis of the second study case district reveals that the environmental issue that was 
affecting the capacity of the local government of Aceh Jaya in road maintenance was regarding 
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the vast area of the district and the consequently long road networks. Similarly, the Local 
Government of Aceh Barat Daya was also overwhelmed by the extensive length of their road 
networks. As expressed by CS16, the local governments were overwhelmed with more than 
1200km of road networks in the district.  
Apart from the vast area of the district and the resulting lengthy road networks, there were no 
other environmental issues emerging from the interviews which would affect the capacity of 
the local government in the road maintenance.  
5.9.1.1.2 Political  
The political pressure from the parliament was also experienced by the road authority in Aceh 
Barat Daya, particularly in determining the project locations. CS14 expressed that on the one 
hand distributing wealth to the community in the form of dispersing road project locations is 
crucial for the development of an area. He also agreed that the distribution of budget allocation 
to different locations was necessary to address the various community needs at the different 
locations. On the other hand, however, the development should also be implemented based 
on the priority. This condition was seen as a dilemmatic decision by CS14. He also suggested 
that the road maintenance works were actually technically more preferable to the road 
authority personnel as they were easier to do, but he was more concerned with the parliament 
pressure. As he said 
“Really, it is a very dilemmatic issue for us. From the community perspective, the 
distribution of wealth is a must. It is even becoming more necessary when it is related to 
the parliament. They will insist it.” CS14 
Even though the road maintenance neglect was accused as a consequence of the high political 
pressure on the capital projects, the road authority in Aceh Barat Daya also seemed to have 
little interest in the maintenance works as the project value was relatively small. This view was 
expressed by CS16 by saying that the level of damages of the road infrastructure was too small 
to be listed as a project. He said  
“The problem is that if there are damages to the road, the damages are small… What I 
mean is if we do it as a project, it will be small.” – CS16 
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In a different occasion, CS18 also expressed similar opinion to the low interest of the road 
authorities on the road maintenance works. CS18 explained due to the small value of 
maintenance works, the road authorities tend to wait until the damage level have escalated to 
a level where the repair works are worth working for. He said 
“Not many are interested (in road maintenance), because the money involved is minor… 
because of the small value, (they would think) this is easy, I think so. So the motivation to 
repair escalates if the roads have had big holes (heavily damaged).” – CS18  
5.9.1.1.3 Socioeconomic factors 
The interviewees from Aceh Barat Daya also raised the issue of getting the social pressure from 
the community. Consequently, the Local Governments of Aceh Barat Daya tended to expand 
their road networks in order to provide access to the wider areas, and to avoid any social 
jealousy between the communities, which may lead to a greater social problem. When asked 
whether the Local Governments should put its focus on the road maintenance or expanding 
the road network, CS15 confirmed his view by saying that 
“For road infrastructure, I am more towards distribution (expansion)… This is because it 
may otherwise cause social jealousy between one area and another area. This may also 
create problems to the Local Governments.” – CS15 
Additionally, similar view was also seen in the Aceh Barat Daya district regarding the economic 
impact of road network expansion compared with the road maintenance. As a result, there 
seemed to be a consensus between the road authorities that the development of the road 
infrastructure need to be translated as expanding the road networks to the maximum extent 
possible. CS14 based his support by arguing that because the district was poor, expanding the 
road networks and developing the new areas was the way to improve the economic level of 
the community. As he said 
“Indeed, we are a rather poor district, so that the maintenance of road has not been very 
well. We focus more on the development of new areas which can improve the economic 
level, such as access roads to the farming areas.  
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5.9.1.1.4 Safety and Security 
The implementation of road projects in Aceh Barat Daya also experienced a number of safety 
and security issues. The safety and security issue occasionally turned into disruption of project 
implementation. As explained by CS15 and CS14, the safety and security threats from the 
individuals or the community during the project implementation were experienced widely in 
the district of Aceh Barat Daya, which was frequently due to the disputes on the land acquisition 
process. However, even though the road maintenance works did not normally involve land 
acquisition, CS14 revealed that the security threat might also occur when the awarded 
contractors were not from the local area, or if they were not welcomed by the local community. 
He explained 
“If the contractors who won the tender are not the local people, the community 
sometimes gets upset. Occasionally, even if the contractors were local people, but they 
didn’t like them, it would still get disrupted.” – CS14 
Additionally, CS14 also added after the peace agreement was achieved in 2005, there has been 
no obstacles in implementing road maintenance works from the security and safety aspect. He 
said 
“After the peace agreement, there are no more obstacles.” – CS14 
Additionally, further discussion with CS14 revealed that the diminishing obstacle meant by CS14 
above was referred to the ability of the local government to implement a project in certain 
areas, which was virtually impossible during the conflict period. However, it was suggested that 
disruptions in the project implementation were still experienced coming from the KPA (ex-
combatant) members after the peace agreement. CS15 suggested 
“As a post-conflict area, the impacts of the conflict still remain. Some people would 
consider themselves as the local mafia here, it certainly still exists. “- CS15  
Similarly, CS14 further described that the local mafias referred by CS15 were actually the ex-
combatants associated in the KPA (Aceh transformation committee). He added 
“Some people, labelling themselves as KPA representatives, the ex-combatants, would try 
to collect ‘Pajak Nanggroe’ (country tax). But after they had been given an explanation, 
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they would understand. They would eventually ask for a job, whether as a supplier or as 
the construction personnel for the project.” – CS14 
CS14 further confirmed that the illegal extortion of the ‘Pajak Nanggroe’ still existed even after 
the peace agreement. He said  
“Until today it is still happening. Even though not to a scale where it may hinder or cancel 
a project.” – CS14 
The above sections have provided an in-depth discussion on the impact of the external factors 
to the capacity of the local government in the road maintenance. As the analysis of the external 
affecting factors has been presented in this section, the cognitive map of the analysis is detailed 
in Figure 5.35. Accordingly, the following section will discuss the internal factors of the road 
maintenance capacity, initiated by the discussion of the institutional factors. 
 
Figure 5.35 – Cognitive map of the external affecting factors of the case study three 
 
 302 
 
5.9.1.2 Institutional factors 
5.9.1.2.1 Financial Management 
From the financial management point of view, the analysis of the interviews with the 
representatives from Aceh Barat Daya did not show a similar pattern with the previous case 
study districts. Whilst the insufficient allocation for the road maintenance was also experienced 
in Aceh Barat Daya and in fact was one of the major causes of the road maintenance problem, 
there were no indications emerged from the interviews that the road maintenance allocation 
was spent ineffectively. However, the issue of unspent budget allocation was experienced 
generally in Aceh Barat Daya. More details on the financial issues will be presented in the 
following sections.  
5.9.1.2.1.1 Fund is not allocated in sufficient amounts 
One of the main reasons to the insufficient allocation for the road maintenance is that road 
maintenance needs lose their priority when they have to compete with other needs, either with 
the needs in the road sector or with other needs in the other sectors like health and education. 
Accordingly, the lack of funds is often used to justify the road maintenance neglect.  
Regarding the maintenance of the infrastructure facilities, CS15 suggested that the 
maintenance needs did not get high priority in the district budget. Consequently, it would 
commonly receive small allocation. He stated that the government always allocated its budget 
for the maintenance needs, even though in a limited amount.  
“We can maintain… almost every department allocate budget (for maintenance)… even 
though it is not really a priority in the district budget... Since it is not a priority, even though 
there is allocation (for maintenance), it is not so big.” – CS15 
Even though the road maintenance budget insufficiency was experienced widely, CS18 
suggested that the main financial issue rooted in the capacity of the local government to 
prioritise and distribute the limited budget allocation. The Local Governments’ capacity in 
budgeting was also seen as a threat to the road maintenance. He argued that the willingness 
and the capacity of the Local Governments in setting up priorities of their budget expenditure 
were the actual problems of road maintenance. CS15 further described that the maintenance 
needs always lost their priority to other capital expenditure. The capital projects were seen as 
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the ‘real needs’ as they might give immediate and direct results compared to the maintenance 
project. He said 
“It always loses to other capital expenditure. It is not considered a real need. Not a priority. 
So if there is (allocation), it is not so big.” – CS15 
Nevertheless, CS15 further added that one of the causes of small budget allocation was also 
because the district of Aceh Barat Daya had a low district original income.  
“There are many other (needs). And annually, we always have limited budget allocations 
because our original income is smaller at the district level.” – CS15 
In addition, due to the competition with other sectors, and even with other activities in the 
road infrastructure sector, the maintenance of road infrastructure tended to get lower priority. 
One of the excuses to this problem was expressed by CS14 that even though in damaged 
condition, roads are still passable and therefore road development was focused on expanding 
road networks and to keep the road access open. Accordingly, the road maintenance needs in 
Aceh Barat Daya did not seem to be considered as an important item in the work plan. 
Therefore, the budget for the road maintenance was also not allocated regularly in the annual 
budget plan. This was confirmed by CS16 
In addition to the lack of fund, CS18 emphasised his concern and warned that even though the 
post-disaster reconstruction resulted in a large number of new assets and therefore increase 
the needs of the operation and maintenance allocation, it will be difficult for the local 
government to suddenly change the pattern and trend of their budget expenditure. CS18’s 
emphasis was referred to the resulting political pressure and complaints coming from the other 
sectors if their annual budget allocations were suddenly and drastically decreased for the 
benefit of the road infrastructure 
5.9.1.2.1.2 Fund allocation is not spent 
In addition to the budget sufficiency, the paradoxical issue regarding the financial concern is 
that the annual budget allocation is not spent by the end of the fiscal year. This was also the 
case in Aceh Barat Daya. For the period of seven years between 2006 and 2012, the budget 
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expenditure ratio in Aceh Barat Daya varied from as low as 35% to more than their budget 
availability, 101.6%. More detail of the annual budget expenditure is shown in Table 5.20.  
Table 5.20 – Annual Budget Realisation of Aceh Barat Daya  
Year TOTAL INCOME TOTAL EXPENSES REALISATION UNSPENT 
ALLOCATION 
2006 Rp 267,715,880,000 Rp 272,112,940,000 101.6% Rp -4,397,060,000* 
2007 Rp 334,081,521,722 Rp 118,624,573,527 35.5% Rp 215,456,948,195 
2008 Rp 354,295,232,180 Rp 340,008,240,464 96.0% Rp 14,286,991,716 
2009 Rp 310,441,886,204 Rp 302,019,306,059 97.3% Rp 8,422,580,145 
2010 Rp 346,559,726,913 Rp 327,414,791,217 94.5% Rp 19,144,935,696 
2011** Rp 433,603,231,367 Rp 384,424,128,666 88.7% Rp 49,179,102,701 
2012** Rp 547,451,505,902 Rp 520,856,511,333 95.1% Rp 26,594,994,569 
Source: DJPK (2014) 
*Overspent allocation 
**Data from DPKKD Aceh Barat Daya, (£1 ~ Rp 20,000) 
As shown in Table 5.20, the government of Aceh Barat Daya district had not been able to spend 
their entire annual budget allocations. However, compared to the other case study districts, 
the budget realisation ratio of Aceh Barat Daya appears to be higher, with the exception of the 
2007 fiscal year. Restating the previous notification regarding the unspent budget allocation, 
the budget expenditure realisation ratio may affect the allocation of the following year, in order 
to represent the actual budget spending capacity.  
5.9.1.2.2 Human resources 
From the human resource perspective, the local government of Aceh Barat Daya also 
experienced some issues. As a relatively new district (Aceh Barat Daya was established in 2002), 
CS15 disclosed that the personnel recruitment system in the district was poor. He explained 
that the high officials in the local government institutions in Aceh Barat Daya were generally 
former (old) school teachers, who had enough year-of-service in the government to fill the high 
level positions. CS15 explained 
“The capacity of our (human) resources is limited… We are new district… generally the 
high officials here are teachers who met the minimum rank requirement.” – CS15. 
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In the Indonesian government system, each government personnel would have a rank given 
based on their year-of-service in the government or their work function. In the case of Aceh 
Barat Daya, the teachers were recruited and reassigned to the different government 
institutions due to the high-rank requirement for the positions in the newly established 
institutions. Since after the separation of the districts most of the high officials of the technical 
agencies stayed in the main district of Aceh Selatan, it was then these experienced teachers 
whose workplace were physically located in the new Aceh Barat Daya district who met the 
requirement for the top positions.  
However, the impact of such recruitment system was that the high officials appointed as the 
head of the government institution or work units might not have the required skills in 
accordance with the agencies they were leading. As a result, the quality of the work was 
accordingly questionable.  
5.9.1.2.2.1 Planning capacity 
From the road maintenance planning aspect, the road authority of Aceh Barat Daya was too 
experiencing an issue with the road management and information system. As stipulated by 
CS15, every year the road authority allocated a certain amount of budget allocation for the 
road maintenance needs. However, the extent to which the budget allocation had contributed 
to solving the road maintenance problems was not known. As CS15 explained  
“For the district roads… every year there will be budget allocation for maintenance… But 
how far, the level of success to solve road problems, I do not have the answer.” – CS15  
Accordingly, CS15’s comment suggested that the Aceh Barat Daya districts appeared to lack the 
mechanism or system to evaluate their road maintenance performance and the impact of the 
road maintenance interventions that they have performed. Furthermore, CS16 added that the 
public works also lacked of reliable road data. He described that the road data they collected 
was done manually and based on rough estimate. As he said 
“Here in Aceh Barat Daya, we do it (collect data) ourselves. And the data collection system 
is done manually, we make rough estimates of the length of the particular road sections.”- 
CS16 
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Since there had been no accurate information about the road data, it would then be difficult to 
estimate the actual maintenance needs and accordingly to justify the budget allocation 
proposal for the road maintenance to the parliament.  
This section has presented the analysis of the institutional affecting factors of the case study 
three. The cognitive map of the analysis is presented in Figure 5.36. As the institutional factors 
have been covered, the following section will accordingly present the analysis of the technical 
factors. 
 307 
 
 
 
Figure 5.36 – Cognitive map of the institutional factors of the case study three
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5.9.1.3 Technical factor 
Overloading traffic did not emerge as a major concern in Aceh Barat Daya in terms of the 
maintenance of district roads. In fact, as suggested by CS14, one of the reasons that the district 
roads in Aceh Barat Daya were still in good condition was because the traffics passing the 
district roads were relatively lightweight vehicles. As expressed by CS14 
“Probably, the overloading traffic, heavy equipment, and so on are still minimal. Thus, our 
existing roads are more durable. The damage is less, and it would take longer to 
deteriorate…” CS14 
Another similar view was also expressed by CS16. When asked if the transportation of 
construction materials had resulted in any negative impacts to the road infrastructure, he said 
“I don’t think there is any impact. Up until this year there have been no impacts.” – CS16 
However, even though NG05 did not think there had been any negative impacts from the 
transportation of construction materials in the area, he expressed a concern that it might have 
an impact in the near future, as there would be more construction activities in the settlement 
areas. He said 
“Maybe in the future… because more of the roads are having Hotmix design… it starts to 
reach the settlement areas… more transportation (of construction materials)… The way 
they transport it… that will have impacts as the roads are small (in the settlement areas).” 
– CS16 
The concern that CS16 raised above indicated a growing threat of the rapid road deterioration 
in the near future.  
The above discussion concludes the analysis of the technical affecting factors of the case study 
three. The cognitive map of the analysis is presented in Figure 5.37.  
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Figure 5.37 – Cognitive map of the technical affecting factors of the case study three 
 
As the road maintenance affecting factors of the case study three have been elaborated in this 
section, the next section will accordingly present the analysis regarding the maintenance 
strategy of the case study three. 
5.9.2 Maintenance Strategy 
5.9.2.1 Response to maintenance needs 
5.9.2.1.1 Neglect 
With regards to the response of the local government on the road maintenance needs, similar 
condition was experienced in Aceh Barat Daya. Due to the lack of financial resources, the road 
maintenance needs did not regularly receive budget allocations. Additionally, even when the 
road maintenance received budget allocation, it would be used for major maintenance works 
only. Hence, similar to the previous case study districts, routine maintenance was simply 
neglected. This condition was explained by CS16. He said 
“For maintenance, in the upcoming year, we won’t do. But in the previous years we did. 
But only maintenance of roads with puddles (potholes), we patch and repair.” – CS16  
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Furthermore, the maintenance ‘strategy’ adopted by the Aceh Barat Daya district was also to 
neglect maintenance needs and to directly upgrade the road surface when fund became 
available. CS14 described the road surface upgrading process as the following 
“Our focus is for the roads in the settlement areas to be upgraded. From dirt roads to 
gravel, from gravel roads to macadam. Later on, if possible, if there is budget allocation, 
they will also (be upgraded) to Hotmix.” – CS14  
CS14 explanation suggested that there was no indication that the road infrastructure would get 
maintenance intervention in order to ensure that the road was kept in good condition.  
5.9.2.1.2 Contractors’ voluntary contribution 
Whilst the local government of Aceh Barat Daya would generally neglect the maintenance 
needs due to the limited budget availability, the road maintenance works in the area would 
also be performed by the contractor. CS16 and CS14 explained that the strategy adopted by 
the local government of Aceh Barat Daya was to ask contractor working in a nearby road project 
to informally and voluntarily do the maintenance works for them. As expressed by CS16 
“(if) there are any damages in a particular road section, if there was a project running in 
that section, then we would ask the project packages (the contractor) to repair them on 
the go, because the damage level is also not so big.” – CS16 
CS14 also added a similar comment on the use of contractor as a means to help solving the 
road maintenance problems. He said 
“Nowadays, we would ask for help (from the contractor). No maintenance… because we 
don’t have the budget allocation for that… If there was a pavement project nearby… we 
would ask the contractor to pave the potholes as well.” – CS14 
Having to do extra jobs unpaid, CS14 further explained that the contractors did not object and 
complain on the request. He said 
“They did not complain. Because we told them that this was to help the district, not to 
help the individuals in the public works.” – CS14 
This section has covered the analysis of the maintenance strategy of the case study three. 
Accordingly, the cognitive map of the analysis is presented in Figure 5.38. 
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Figure 5.38 – Cognitive map of the maintenance strategy of the case study three 
 
As the maintenance strategy of the case study district has been discussed in the section, the 
following section will accordingly present the analysis of the capacity building in road 
maintenance of the case study three.  
5.9.3 Capacity building in road maintenance 
5.9.3.1 Capacity building approaches 
The capacity building programs in Aceh Barat Daya were also conducted in various approaches. 
As summarised from the discussion with the interviewees, the capacity building approaches 
included the provision of trainings and workshops, recruitment and placement in the BRR, 
procurement of tools and equipment, as well as knowledge sharing through partnership and 
joint programs.  
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As described by CS15, the local government personnel regularly received trainings from the 
central government for the procurement of goods and services. However, whilst he admitted 
that the procurement trainings were necessary, he expressed the necessity to have more 
various trainings provided to the local government personnel.  
“Well, only goods and services procurement (training). And it is done by the central 
(government). That’s it… That is what has been annually done.” – CS15 
A similar thought was also expressed by CS14. He suggested that the local government 
personnel used to receive trainings for the construction technical skills during the post-disaster 
reconstruction period, but not now. He said 
“There were trainings to improve the personnel quality. In the form of workshops... about 
the construction technical issues.” – CS14 
Additionally, CS16 also expressed the benefit of having the trainings and workshop to the local 
personnel. Particularly mentioning the portable bridge construction workshop, he suggested 
that the skills remained with the local personnel, and that they were now able to install the 
bridge themselves. He said  
“For the non-road infrastructure… the bailey (portable) bridge, we know now how to 
install it. The steel frame (structure), at least we know it now.” – CS16 
In addition to receiving trainings and workshop, the local personnel were also recruited and 
posted in the BRR. As suggested by CS16, the public works of Aceh Barat Daya was involved in 
the reconstruction process and at the same time had its personnel recruited into the BRR. He 
further argued that such an arrangement lead to a better communication between the local 
governments and the BRR. He said 
“Obviously we were involved, and the personnel were also involved. They were recruited 
from the respective departments… Even more, for the road sector, the (BRR) office was 
also near to the public works. So the communication… was also (better). And the 
personnel were recruited from the Public works. So it matched better.” – CS16 
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Similar to the other districts, the capacity building in Aceh Barat Daya also took place in the 
form of the procurement of tools and equipment, which generally accompanied by the 
provision of trainings for the tools and equipment operators. As suggested by CS14 
“BRR provided, helped us with heavy equipment such as the grader. And there was also 
lab equipment. We were also invited to have training in the lab… so that we can use the 
equipment.” – CS14 
Furthermore, CS14 rose that the local government also learned from the national consultant 
that assisted them during the post-disaster reconstruction process. As CS14 expressed 
“What I had been observing, the (national) consultant that used to help us, with regards 
to experience and knowledge, they are more (knowledgeable) than us… we even learned 
from the consultants.” – CS14 
In contrast, CS14 also suggested a different experience if local consultants were involved in a 
project. In a project where local consultants were involved, he argued that the local 
government personnel frequently had to teach the consultants and tell them what to do. He 
said 
“In the district, it was us who teach the consultant. This is not allowed, that is not 
according to the specification, you should do this and this… But them (the national 
consultant), they informed us. If we say this and this, (they may say) this is not according 
to the specification.” – CS14 
He further confirmed that the road reconstruction process had indeed given benefit to the local 
government in terms of knowledge sharing. He said 
“It’s true. From the road sector perspective, it’s true.” – CS14 
5.9.3.2 Capacity building challenges 
The capacity building program in Aceh Barat Daya also saw the poor political interest as a 
barrier in the capacity building effort. As suggested by CS14, in addition to the limited budget 
availability, the parliament did not see capacity building as an important component of the 
development. Accordingly, the parliament was more interested in delivering physical 
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construction projects, particularly since the impact was more visible to the community. He 
explained 
“We are constrained by the budget. First, our budget is limited. Second, it’s regarding the 
parliament’s approval of the budget. Occasionally, the parliament, with regards to 
capacity building program for the personnel, does not consider it as important. They tend 
to be more interested in the physical (construction). More visible to the community.” – 
CS14 
Supporting CS14’s view, CS15 also highlighted that the district of Aceh Barat Daya was actually 
required a lot of skilled personnel to fill the various positions and expertise requirements in the 
local government.  
“Trainings are also limited. Not sufficient. In fact, there are many skills needed to be 
provided to the Local Government personnel, but there aren’t.” – CS15 
With regards to the low awareness on the importance of the capacity building programs, CS15 
also revealed that there were no scholarship programs provided for the local government 
personnel to continue their formal education to a higher level, apart from the medical doctor, 
which was considered as the most required skills in the district. He added 
“From the district (governments), (capacity building program) for the personnel is poor… 
There are no such things like scholarship from the Local Governments for the Local 
Government personnel…” – CS15  
Another issue highlighted by the interviewees in Aceh Barat Daya was regarding the 
inappropriate educational background of the local government personnel. CS15 stipulated that 
the district development planning agency lacked the personnel with an urban planning degree. 
He argued that this condition was due to the lack of awareness of the local governments on the 
human resource needs. He said 
“I think the problem is maybe due the poor awareness of the Local Governments 
themselves towards human resources needs. For example, in the infrastructure, we need 
planning personnel. We don’t have bachelor (engineers) in urban planning.” – CS15 
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He further argued that as a relatively new district, Aceh Barat Daya would require skilled town 
planning personnel. Particularly since the infrastructure development activity was high. He 
argued 
“Actually, in the process of planning, in a new district like this, where the infrastructure 
development (activities) are high, there need to be a town planner who understands 
urban planning, spatial planning, but there is none.” – CS15 
He added 
“The last time we did the spatial planning, we only used (civil) engineering personnel who 
understand GIS. They haven’t got even the basic knowledge of urban planning, or spatial 
planning… They are not even experts in mapping… They just know how to make map (use 
the software)... – CS15 
On the one hand, the political condition was accused as one of the main causes of the poor 
capacity building program. On the other hand, however, the gap in the personnel existing 
capacity was also suggested to be among the causes of the slow progress of the capacity 
building efforts. One of the reasons of the aforementioned problem was argued by CS17 due 
to lack of personnel with appropriate educational background.  
Furthermore, CS14 added that hiring local consultants to assist the local governments did not 
seem to be a proper solution to the local government poor capacity problem. As discussed in 
the previous section, with regards to taking advantage from the local consultant to assist the 
government, CS14 said that instead of receiving assistance, it was the local government 
personnel who frequently gave advice to the local consultant on how to do the work. He 
highlighted 
“In the district, we in fact teach the consultant.” – CS14 
The analysis of the capacity building in road maintenance of the case study three has been 
presented in this section. The cognitive map of the analysis is presented in Figure 5.39. 
Accordingly, the analysis of the case study three will progress to the issue of post-disaster road 
reconstruction success indicator in the next section. 
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Figure 5.39 – Cognitive map of the capacity building in road maintenance of the case study three
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5.9.4 Post-disaster road reconstruction success indicator 
5.9.4.1 Improved road Infrastructure condition 
The benefit of the road infrastructure reconstruction in Aceh Barat Daya was perceived by CS16 
as obvious.  
However, he could not clearly stipulate the extent to which the road infrastructure 
reconstruction had benefited the affected community in the district. This was particularly due 
to the relatively low destruction level that the tsunami caused to the local community. 
Nevertheless, he suggested that the reconstruction of road infrastructure in Aceh Barat Daya 
had provided the community with the better access. He revealed 
“Regarding the benefit, obviously it was really beneficial. Regarding the community, 
whether there was economic improvement, it may need a further study since the impact 
of… the tsunami… was not so great here. However, the access has become better.” – CS16  
The reconstruction of the road infrastructure resulted in more road reconstructed than 
destroyed. Regarding this, CS18 explained that rebuilding more roads than what was destroyed 
was among others caused by road networks interdependency. He further gave an example of 
road project near the border of Aceh with North Sumatra.  
“For instance, the national road in Singkil which was built only up to the North Sumatra 
border. If it was only until the North Sumatra border, we designed the road to have 
60km/hour average speed, but when it enters North Sumatra, it would get into the palm 
tree farms (gravel road). So it was extended by 10km (to reach the main road).” – CS18 
In addition to the road networks interdependency, he added that the reason why the 
reconstruction activity resulted in more road network rebuilt than destroyed was also due to 
the inaccuracy of the initial assessment, as well as due to the additional demands and 
requirements that came later in the implementation stage.  
Additionally, CS16 also suggested that after the post-disaster reconstruction process the district 
roads had now had better surface condition. He said  
“Of course we feel it (the improvement). Initially we had only gravel road, now we have 
hot mix. Shortly, that’s the answer.” – CS16 
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CS16 further added 
“Our first introduction to hot mix road, was the BRR project. Even though afterwards it 
was followed by (projects funded by) the special autonomy funds. In fact, now the district 
has started to (use) hot mix as well. Because the benefit… the design life can reach 10 
years. CS16 
CS16’s view on the application of Hotmix for the district road was also supported by CS14. He 
said 
“Obviously, prior to BRR we did not have a single meter of road with hot mix asphalt 
except the national roads. When BRR was here, since the policy was that road must use 
hot mix, we look for road section that needed hot mix pavement. Particularly roads 
providing access to the community.” – CS14 
Furthermore, not only had the reconstruction of road infrastructure resulted in the better 
access and the better road surface condition, CS16 also suggested that the road reconstruction 
had resulted in the reduced travel time in the area. Comparing the pre-disaster and post-
reconstruction condition, CS16 gave an illustration  
“The difference is significant. If, for instance, we go that way, it used to be impassable, 
now it is passable. Areas that were impassable, required the use of rafts or other means, 
now they are passable. The travel time is also improved. Banda Aceh to here (Aceh Barat 
Daya) now (seems)… close.” – CS16 
5.9.4.2 Socioeconomic condition 
As previously suggested by CS16, the extent to which the road reconstruction had improved 
the socioeconomic condition of the community could not be clearly stipulated. However, the 
better road infrastructure condition; better access, better road condition, and reduced travel 
time, which would eventually result in the reduced road user cost could indicate the economic 
benefit to the area. Not only was the road reconstruction activity perceived to have largely 
contributed to the rapid recovery of the affected community, the general socioeconomic 
condition in Aceh was also seen to be better than the pre-tsunami condition. This view was 
suggested by CS18 
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“In general, it was successful. What is the proof? The proof is that it (the reconstruction) 
recovers the condition of Acehnese people better than before the tsunami. We cannot 
deny it. Obviously successful.” – CS18 
Furthermore, from the interviews with the Aceh Barat Daya representatives, the local 
governments’ personnel also felt the positive impact of being involved in the reconstruction 
towards their personal development. As stated by CS14 
“Thank God it was very helpful. Regarding our livelihood… because, from the salary 
aspect, the BRR was obviously better. Maybe because they used international standard. 
Meanwhile the standard in the district is very low. From this aspect, I have to show my 
gratitude. I was trusted, and I got a good return from the trust. Wealth.” – CS14 
The road reconstruction was also suggested by CS17 to have provided positive impacts on the 
tourism sector. As CS17 said 
“Regarding tourism, people have started to come… Particularly those who used to work 
(in Aceh reconstruction) like me, return to Aceh to see the beauty of our works. To me, if 
I had money, I would take my family to Aceh.” – CS17 
5.9.4.3 Improved capacity 
Supporting the CS14’s view on the impact of being involved in the road reconstruction to the 
personnel’s wealth, CS16 also argued that the reconstruction process had also provided them 
the opportunity to improve their capacity. As described by CS16, the different background of 
those involved in the reconstruction gave him the opportunity to learn from his colleagues. 
CS16 said 
“We had so much experience. From the technical aspect, we now know more… the BRR 
had better personnel. The BRR personnel was not only local people, but also from the 
central (government), so the knowledge was better” – CS16 
Focused on the road sector, CS16 further detailed the skills he had learned from being involved 
in the process.  
“In the road sector, it was the implementation system. The administration management 
system was different. It was easier for us to use. The presentation of graphs and figures 
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was also better… easier for us to check where the location was, how much the volume 
was.” – CS16 
CS14 further gave an example of how he had learned to construct Hotmix pavement, which 
was not known by the district personnel prior to the post-disaster reconstruction process. He 
stressed 
“Here, there was no one who understands the hot mix (pavement type), but because of 
the BRR, me and my team can all learn about it. Also, the consultants that were sent to 
us were generally good, either by knowledge or experience.” – CS14 
This section has presented the analysis of the post-disaster road reconstruction success 
indicator as perceived by the respondents of the case study three. The cognitive map of the 
analysis is presented in Figure 5.40 
 
Figure 5.40 – Cognitive map of the post-disaster road reconstruction success indicator  
of the case study three 
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5.10 Link and summary  
The above sections have presented the analysis of the various issues in the case studies. At this 
stage, each of the case studies has been analysed in separate sections. The analysis covers the 
various issues regarding the factors affecting the local government road maintenance capacity, 
followed by the maintenance strategy, the capacity building in road maintenance and the post-
disaster road reconstruction success indicator as they are perceived by the respondents. 
Furthermore, the following section will accordingly present a cross case analysis of the three 
case studies. The results of the case study analyses will be compared and contrasted across the 
cases.  
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SECTION C – THE CROSS CASE ANALYSIS 
This section presents the cross-case analysis of the data captured from the semi-structured 
interviews with a number of respondents from the three case studies. Being a cross-case 
analysis, the responses from the respondents will be compared and contrasted across the case 
studies. Accordingly, the similarities and differences between the case study districts can be 
identified. However, it is worth noting that the responses of the analysis were collected using 
a semi-structured interview method. By using the semi-structured approach, the interviewees 
were not presented with an identical list of questions. Rather, a list of themes and questions to 
be covered were used as the interview guideline which may also vary between interviews. 
Additionally, since the study adopts a qualitative approach, the analysis is not merely focused 
on the frequency that a particular case is mentioned in the interviews, but is rather more 
focused on the justification and the rationale behind each response. Therefore, the numbers 
of the respondents shown in the cross case analysis matrices indicate the relevance of the 
issues in the particular case study instead of their importance.  
5.10.1 Maintenance capacity 
The first category of the cross case analysis is with regards to the road maintenance capacity. 
The presentation and discussion of the maintenance capacity are ordered based on their 
relevance to the road maintenance issues. Accordingly, the section will start with analysing the 
external measures, followed by the internal aspects which are further divided into two main 
sub-categories, the institutional and the technical factors.  
5.10.1.1 External factors 
The external factors affecting the local government road maintenance capacity are those which 
are beyond the direct control of the road authorities, but somehow constrain and affect the 
road maintenance performance. The external factors therefore include the environmental 
condition, legal and regulatory arrangement, political and socioeconomic condition, safety and 
security, and the inter-organisational relationship between the various government and private 
institutions involved in the road management.  
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Summarising the analysis of each of the case studies as discussed in the previous section, the 
various external factors affecting the road maintenance capacity of each local governments are 
presented in Table 5.21. The national and provincial perspectives are also presented as a 
measure to compare and contrast the experience of the case study districts with the general 
views of the respondents at the national and the provincial level. The numbers in the table 
represent the number of interviewees citing the respective issues during the interviews.  
Table 5.21 – External factors 
External factors Aceh Besar Aceh Jaya 
Aceh Barat 
Daya 
111 Environmental 3 - 1 
112 Legal and regulatory - - - 
113 Political 3 3 5 
114 Socioeconomic 5 4 3 
115 Safety and Security 5 2 2 
116 Inter-organisational 
relationship 
2 1 1 
 
As shown in Table 5.21, most of the external factors affecting the road maintenance capacity 
appear to be experienced in every district of the study, with the exception of the legal and 
regulatory aspect. The issue of legal and regulatory impacts on the road maintenance emerged 
only in the discussion with the respondents at the national level as presented in Section A of 
this chapter. It appeared that the respondent at the national level were more familiar with the 
impacts of the legal and regulatory arrangement to the assets management, which became a 
major problem in the asset transfer process and the provision of budget allocation for the road 
maintenance.  
5.10.1.2 Institutional factors 
The cross case analysis of the external factors, factors which are out of the direct control of the 
road authorities, have been discussed in the above section. The internal factors, however, are 
divided into two categories, the institutional factors and the technical factors. The institutional 
factors refer to the organisational and managerial arrangement of the road authorities and the 
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likes, whilst the technical factors refer to the capability of the road authorities to perform the 
physical and engineering tasks (Robinson et al., 1998). The various institutional factors affecting 
the capacity of the local governments in road maintenance are summarised in Table 5.22.  
Table 5.22 – Institutional factors 
Institutional factors 
Aceh 
Besar 
Aceh 
Jaya 
Aceh Barat 
Daya 
121 Financial Management 6 4 4 
122 Human resources 5 3 3 
123 Organisational management 3 4 3 
 
From the summary of the cross-case analysis as presented in Table 5.22, all of the three main 
institutional aspects of the road maintenance; financial management, human resources, and 
organisational management, appear to be experienced in all of the case-study districts. 
In addition to the above issues, the financial management problems were also caused by the 
shortened budget use period. As shown in Table 5.23, the approval of the annual budget 
frequently experience delays. As a result, the remaining period for expending the budget 
significantly shortened as the budget would expire by the end of the year, regardless the 
approval dates. Additionally, delays in budget approval also resulted in the postponement of 
development project schedule. With regards to road projects, this condition often led to 
projects having to be delivered in the rainy season.  
Furthermore, there was also an issue with the rate of budget expenditure. The average budget 
realisation ratio in the three case study district between 2006 and 2012 is shown in Table. As 
shown in the table, the average budget realisation ratio of the case study districts is 91.48%, 
representing an average annual unspent allocation of more than Rp 41 billion per case study 
district.  
  
 325 
 
Table 5.23 - Budget approval date of the case study district 
Financial Year Aceh Besar Aceh Jaya Aceh Barat Daya 
2005 June 13
th 2005 June 3rd 2005 July 20th 2005 
2006 May 1
st 2006 July 7th 2006 June 19th 2006 
2007 April 12
th 2007 March 27th 2007 May 5th 2007 
2008 April 8
th 2008 May 14th 2008 April 1st 2008 
2009 – – – 
2010 – April 5
th 2010 Jan 28th 2010 
2011 – April 2011 – 
2012 – April 2012 – 
2013 – May 2013 Feb 8
th 2013 
2014 – Jan 10
th 2014 Jan 23rd 2014 
Source: GoA and Syiah Kuala University as cited in World Bank (2008) and 
Public Works 
Note: “ – “ data not available 
 
Table 5.24 – Unspent budget allocation of the Case Study Districts (x Rp 1 billion) 
Year Kab. Aceh Besar Kab. Aceh Jaya Kab. Aceh Barat Daya 
National 
Average 
 Unspent 
budget 
Spending 
Ratio 
Unspent 
budget 
Spending 
Ratio 
Unspent 
budget 
Spending 
Ratio 
 
2006 Rp  0.04 99.99% Rp   7.63 94.75% Rp - 4.40 101.64% 94.30% 
2007 Rp   48.38 91.14% Rp   203.73 59.07% Rp   23.56 92.95% 89.57% 
2008 Rp  58.04 90.37% Rp   114.14 76.92% Rp   6.72 98.06% 88.47% 
2009 Rp   68.18 88.56% Rp - 51.34 116.17% Rp   7.69 97.52% 90.95% 
2010 Rp   56.65 90.95% Rp   30.89 92.65% Rp   19.15 94.48% 91.03% 
2011 Rp   28.03 96.07% Rp   44.31 90.32% Rp   49.18 88.66% 91.03% 
2012 Rp   64.73 92.15% Rp   66.86 85.95% Rp   26.60 95.14% 89.49% 
2013 Rp   134.15 86.56% Rp   72.37 87% Rp   57.75 90.07% 97.88% 
Average Rp  57.27 91.97% Rp  61.07 87.82% Rp  23.28 94.81% 91.59% 
Source: Analysed from raw data Provided by DJPK (2014)  
The average spending ratio of the case study districts are indicated in  
Table 5.24, and compared with the national average of the district budget spending ratio. The 
red numbers indicate the spending ratio which are under the national average ratio and the 
blue numbers indicate spending ratio exceeding the budget availability (spending ratio of more 
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than 100%). As shown in the table, on average, all case study districts underspent their annual 
budget allocation. Among the three case study districts, the district of Aceh Jaya has the lowest 
budget expending ratio, with an average of Rp 61 billion of unspent budget allocation.  
Having presented the cross case analysis of the institutional factors, the following section will 
accordingly present the cross case analysis of the technical affecting factors. 
5.10.1.3 Technical factors 
The third category of the factors affecting the road maintenance capacity is the technical 
factors. Three subcategories were identified from the data analysis, namely road design, traffic 
loading control, and plant and equipment issue. The technical factors of the road maintenance 
capacity are summarised in Table 5.25 
Table 5.25 – Technical Factors 
Technical Factors Aceh Besar Aceh Jaya 
Aceh Barat 
Daya 
131 Road design 1 3 3 
132 Traffic loading control 1 1 1 
133 Plant and equipment 1 1 - 
 
As summarised in Table 5.25, the technical factors are in general perceived similarly in all of the 
study cases. With regards to the road design, the issue was mainly with regard to the use of 
Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA) surface type as it was widely used in the post-disaster reconstruction. 
The use of HMA for the local roads was introduced in the case studies during the post-disaster 
reconstruction. Accordingly, the benefit of using the HMA (better durability), as well as the 
financial consequences of adopting the HMA (more expensive), was perceived to have a greater 
contribution to the road maintenance efforts in the district.  
Additionally, the issue of the availability and quality of the supporting plant and equipment for 
performing the road maintenance tasks appeared to be an issue in Aceh Besar and Aceh Jaya. 
In both districts, complaints were made regarding the lack of sufficient budget allocation for 
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the procurement and the maintenance of equipment and tools required for the road 
maintenance.  
5.10.2 Maintenance strategy  
This section discusses the maintenance strategy adopted by the case study districts. From the 
cross case analysis, the different maintenance strategies adopted by the local governments 
were identified. The strategies include preventive, neglect, reduced quality, and contractor’s 
voluntary contribution. The summary of the cross-case analysis of the maintenance needs is 
presented in Table 5.26.  
Table 5.26 – Responses to the road maintenance needs 
Response to Maintenance 
Needs 
Aceh 
Besar 
Aceh Jaya Aceh Barat 
Daya 
221 Preventive 1 2 2 
222 Neglect 2 3 3 
223 Reduced quality 1 - - 
224 Contractors' voluntary 
contribution 
- - 2 
 
As shown in Table 5.26, neglecting and abandoning the road infrastructure after the 
construction appeared to be the general ‘strategy’ adopted by case study district. The 
preventive action of the maintenance need was suggested by the respondents in the form of 
road maintenance MoU between the BRR and the local governments, expressing the 
willingness and acceptance of the local government beneficiaries to provide the maintenance 
allocation for the reconstructed road assets. In addition to the MoU, the adoption of the higher 
road design standard, the Hotmix design, was also perceived as a preventive action to prolong 
the road maintenance needs as the design was expected to be more durable than the previous 
road standard.  
In addition to the above strategies, two approaches seemed to be unique and were adopted 
by different districts. The ‘reduced quality’ strategy was a response identified only in Aceh 
Besar. The argument was that due to the limited budget allocation, road sections requiring 
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rehabilitation were given routine maintenance. Even though the impact and benefit was 
admitted to be negligible, the strategy was adopted to keep the road accessible. In the other 
district, Aceh Barat Daya adopted the ‘contractor’s voluntary contribution’ approach. The 
approach, which was done by asking the contractors working in a nearby area to repair the road 
damages, was adopted by the Local Government of Aceh Barat Daya due to the limited budget 
allocation for road maintenance, as well as due to the small value of road maintenance works 
to be delivered as a separate project.  
5.10.3 Capacity building in road maintenance 
5.10.3.1 Capacity building challenges 
The capacity building efforts in the cases study districts regarding the road maintenance 
experienced a number of challenges. The summary of the cross-case analysis of the capacity 
building challenges is presented in Table 5.27. As shown in Table 5.27, the low political interest 
in the capacity building program was identified in Aceh Jaya and Aceh Barat Daya. In both 
districts, the local governments were suggested to have put a higher preference on the physical 
construction activities than the capacity building, since such a program was not seen to yield 
immediate benefits.  
The quality and availability of personnel were seen as a challenge in the capacity building effort 
in Aceh Besar and Aceh Barat Daya districts. In Aceh Besar, the limited number of personnel 
with engineering background in the public works was worsened by the fact that the personnel 
with the engineering background was assigned to other non-engineering agencies. In Aceh 
Barat Daya, on the other hand, the lack of personnel with urban planning skills was worsened 
by the poor quality of the local consultants, which one of the respondents in Aceh Barat Daya 
claimed that the public works personnel frequently needed to tell and taught the local 
consultant what to do.  
Additionally, the respondents in all three case studies also suggested that the existing capacity 
building programs were either poorly designed or insufficient for the personnel’s needs. The 
Aceh Besar respondent complained that the existing trainings and workshops were generally 
delivered in short courses. He argued that it was impossible to gain the benefit from such short 
courses, particularly when the training or workshop was about complicated subjects such as 
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road and bridge design. As a result, he further suggested that the personnel mostly learnt from 
the informal interactions with the more senior personnel. In Aceh Jaya, the respondent added 
that there had been no capacity building program delivered at the district aiming at improving 
the budgeting capacity. As in Aceh Barat Daya, the respondent revealed that the lack of capacity 
building programs in the districts had resulted in the local personnel having to look for 
assistance from the external sources.  
Table 5.27 – Capacity building challenges 
Capacity Building 
Challenges 
Aceh 
Besar 
Aceh 
Jaya 
Aceh Barat 
Daya 
331 Low political interests - 2 2 
332 Personnel issues 2 - 3 
333 Poor CB program 3 1 2 
334 Limited budget 
allocation 
- 2 - 
 
The local government appeared to have low interest in the capacity building programs, apart 
from the subjects which were considered as urgent needs, such as the medical. Finally, in Aceh 
Jaya, the limited budget allocation for the capacity building activities had resulted in invitations 
and calls for trainings and workshop being turned away. Even though most of the trainings were 
free, the district did not even have the budget to pay for the travel and accommodation for the 
personnel attending the trainings.  
The next section will present the cross-case analysis regarding the post-disaster road 
reconstruction success indicators as they are perceived by the respondents in the case studies.  
5.10.4 Post-disaster road reconstruction success indicator 
In the interview, the respondents were asked whether the post-disaster road infrastructure 
reconstruction in Aceh was considered successful. The respondents were later asked to justify 
their responses and accordingly provide the success indicators. The summary of their response 
was recorded and is presented in Table 5.28. Accordingly, this section will elaborate the success 
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indicators of the post-disaster road infrastructure reconstruction as perceived by the 
respondents.  
As shown in Table 5.28, the success indicators of the post-disaster road infrastructure 
reconstruction can be grouped into four major categories. The four categories are disaster 
recovery, socioeconomic condition, improved infrastructure condition, and the improved 
capacity of the local government personnel. From the disaster recovery aspect, the 
respondents suggested that the disaster affected areas had recovered from the disaster 
impact. Additionally, the recovery was also considered to be achieved in a relatively short 
period, and with budget expenditure less than the original estimates and the budget allocation. 
These views were raised by the respondents from Aceh Jaya.  
Table 5.28 – Post-disaster Road Reconstruction Success Indicator 
Road Reconstruction Success Indicators 
Aceh 
Besar 
Aceh 
Jaya 
Aceh Barat 
Daya 
 441 Disaster recovery - 2 - 
442 Socioeconomic conditions 1 3 3 
443 Improved infrastructure condition 1 2 3 
444 Improved capacity 1 - 2 
 
In the next category, the socioeconomic condition of the affected areas was also seen as 
indicators of the road reconstruction success. The economic condition of the affected areas 
was seen to be improved, compared to the pre-disaster condition. This was suggested by the 
respondents from all the case studies. Other indicators include the better flow of goods and 
people in the affected areas and the development of tourism sector in Aceh. From the road 
infrastructure perspective, there appeared to be a consensus among the respondents that the 
post-disaster road infrastructure reconstructions have resulted in improved road infrastructure 
condition. This can be seen from the wider coverage of the road network, the improved 
durability of the road pavement, the better surface quality, and the reduced travel time.  
In the last category, the respondents from Aceh Besar and Aceh Barat Daya suggested that the 
reconstruction of the road infrastructure in their districts had helped them improve their 
 331 
 
capacity. In Aceh Besar and Aceh Barat Daya, the road reconstruction activity was believed to 
have generally improved the personnel’s skills, with particular reference was addressed at the 
personnel planning skills. Additionally, the respondent in Aceh Barat Daya also added that being 
involved in the reconstruction had helped them better organise the project administration.  
5.10.5 Links and summary 
In this section, the cross case analysis of the semi-structured interviews with the respondents 
from the three case study districts; Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya, and Aceh Barat Daya have been 
presented and discussed in detail. When applicable, the responses from the different 
respondents have been compared and contrasted to provide an insight into the similarities and 
differences between the case study districts. Since the study adopts a qualitative approach, the 
analysis is not merely focused on the frequency that a particular case is mentioned in the 
interviews, but is rather more focused on the justification and the rationale behind each 
response. Therefore, the numbers of the respondents shown in the cross case analysis tables 
above are used to indicate the relevance of the issue to the particular districts.  
Having presented the analysis of the case studies, the following section will present the analysis 
of the expert semi-structured interviews. The expert semi-structured interviews were used as 
a method to triangulate the main findings and to validate whether the main findings represent 
the actual conditions.  
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SECTION D – THE EXPERT VALIDATION SEMI-
STRUCTURE INTERVIEWS  
This section is dedicated to presenting the result of the expert interviews, which was conducted 
as a method to validate the research findings. Accordingly, five respondents were asked their 
views on the research findings. The basic profiles of the expert respondents are presented in 
Table 5.29. 
Table 5.29 – Respondents of Validation Interview  
No Respondents’ 
code 
Main Professional 
Background 
1 Val01 Academic 
2 Val02 International Consultant 
3 Val03 Consultant 
4 Val04 Academic 
5 Val05 International Consultant 
 
The interviews were conducted using semi-structured interview approach. The interview 
questions were with regards to the key research findings, which were grouped into four main 
categories; the general responses of the local governments towards the road maintenance, the 
main factors affecting the local governments’ performance on the road maintenance, the post-
disaster reconstruction process, and the safety and security issue in the post-conflict area. The 
interview guidelines are available in Appendix D.  
5.11 Local Governments’ general responses towards road maintenance 
The key findings on the general responses of the local governments towards the road 
maintenance were that maintaining roads had not been a culture within the road authorities 
at the local level. Road networks were neglected from the routine and periodic maintenance 
immediately after they were built, and repaired only when the level of damages was considered 
significant and that the value of intervention works were worth working for. All respondents 
agreed on this issue as being a general attitude of the local governments, even though 
suggesting that there have been cases where local governments paid high attention to this 
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matter. Interviewee Val03 suggested this condition was mainly affected by the lack of 
consequences to the local governments who failed to maintain their roads. Val02 further added 
that local governments tend to spend their road maintenance budget on the easy-to-arrange 
maintenance interventions; such grass cuttings, but do not do the important parts such as 
keeping the drains clear. Val01 argued that the small value of road maintenance works was also 
part of the reasons that road maintenance needs being abandoned until the level of damage is 
significant enough and is considered to be worth working for. Adding to that, Val03 suggested 
that the academic world also contributed to this problem by undermining the importance and 
needs to generate good road maintenance engineers, proven by the lack of courses on the road 
maintenance subjects in the universities.  
From the international perspective, Val04 added that a similar condition was also found in Sri 
Lanka as the local governments’ response to the road maintenance needs was rather 
responsive based on the complaints from the community. With regards to the road 
maintenance strategy, he further suggested that the local governments need to assess the 
benefit and cost ratio of each maintenance strategy they opt to adopt, even if it was to abandon 
and neglect the road maintenance. Furthermore, whilst agreeing to the general attitude of the 
local governments, Val05 raised the need to carefully observe the reasons behind such 
condition, as the purpose and aim of the research has been set for.  
5.12 The main factors affecting the local governments’ road maintenance 
performance 
5.12.1 Local political condition 
From the political perspective, the respondents agreed that the high level of political 
intervention in the planning and budgeting process greatly affected the development priority. 
The local governments tend to accommodate the pressures posed by the parliament onto 
them. Val01 argued that this condition was mainly caused by the fact that the head of the 
government election campaign are commonly supported by the businessman and the political 
parties. In return, the businessman supporting the campaign would accordingly be paid back in 
the form of development projects, and that the political parties would have the pressuring 
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power to direct and divert the development planning and budgeting proposal for their 
advantage.  
Additionally, Val03 suggested that the lack of consequence for failing to maintain the road 
infrastructure, and the high political incentive gained from building new roads were considered 
as the main drivers for the annual budget being channelled towards the capital projects. From 
the decentralisation point of view, Val02 argued that the high level of detail and control that 
the parliament has and can impose over the budget proposal prepared by the local 
governments resulted in the budget being diverted towards what the parliament thinks would 
be the most impressive investment in their district. Val04 further added that a similar case was 
also experienced in Sri Lanka. He argued that when politicians are given authorities over the 
budget, they would utilise it based on their political agenda and political opportunities. He 
added that this condition was also experienced in developed countries like the UK, even though 
in a more constrained way as the budgeting process is more transparent and accountable.  
With regards to the issue of fairness and equality in dispersing the road project and expanding 
the road networks, Val02 referred to this issue as a problem experienced at all levels of the 
government. He suggested that the appropriation of budget to a reasonably even spread has 
produced an inefficient budget and the absence of prioritised expenditure. Additionally, Val03 
also suggested that the local governments lack the understanding of the important features 
that road infrastructure offers, the accessibility and mobility. He further elaborated that even 
though the need for access have to be provided to the community, the mobility aspect should 
actually be used to help the local government decide the road maintenance priority, which 
could be done by putting into account the level of traffic in the particular area.  
5.12.2 Conflict of authorities 
Another finding emerging from the research is with regards to the conflict of authorities 
between the governments agencies involved in the road management. The department of 
public works and the department of transportation have been the two government agencies 
frequently in disputes regarding road deterioration problems. The department of public works 
was frequently accused of providing poor quality road infrastructure, whilst the department of 
transportation was also accused of allowing overloading vehicles to pass through.  
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All respondents agreed that both agencies were contributing to the road deterioration 
problem. Val04 described that the ‘blaming culture’ between government institutions involved 
in the road management was quite common. Val05 added that such condition may be affected 
by the lack of training and assessment to properly estimate the traffic. However, Val02 
described that this problem was actually rooted to the fact that the axle load limit had been set 
to a very low level, which was “below the reasonably economic level for the operational of most 
of the networks.” Accordingly, there had been too much incentive for the operator to break 
the axle load limitation. This condition was exacerbated by the very low capability of the 
department of transportation to control the limit, and the high level of corruption and abuse 
of any control system by both the operator and the community. Val02 further argued that if 
the axle load limit is set to an unreasonably low standard, people will abuse it regardless of the 
reasons (please refer to section 6.3.2.3 regarding economic consideration). He also referred to 
this problem as a “self-reinforcing negative cycle” as the cost to rebuild the damaged low 
standard road would be much higher than the cost to build the road to the sufficient standard 
in the first place.  
5.12.3 Financial capacity 
The findings of the research suggest that there are four financial issues identified in the case 
study districts; fund is not allocated in sufficient amount, allocated fund is not spend, fund is 
not spent effectively, and that the fund is not spent efficiently.  
For the first issue, insufficient road maintenance allocation, all respondents agreed with this 
finding. Val01 suggested that the fund for road maintenance was deliberately allocated in 
insufficient amount, as the focus was placed on the capital projects which attract more political 
benefits. Val02 argued that this problem was also due to the high backlog of maintenance built-
up as a consequence of the lack of proper road maintenance system.  
Regarding the unspent allocation, Val01 was unconvinced that the local road authorities were 
not able to spend the budget allocated to them. However, at the district level this was in fact 
true in the case study districts that the annual budget allocation had rarely been exhausted. 
Val05 argued that this condition is affected by the poor commitment of the LGs in preparing 
good budget proposal and in spending them accordingly. However, as described by Val02, the 
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unspent allocation problem is rooted in the budget expending mechanism which was treated 
strictly within the annual budget cycle. As described in section 2.5.5.1.3, the delays in the 
budget approval resulted in the shortened budget expenses period. Accordingly, Val02 
recommended that by utilising forward-planning and the budget envelope assurance model, 
the procurement and the award of the projects for the following year may commence before 
the annual budget cycle start. This way, the time wasted in waiting for the budget proposal and 
approval process may greatly be reduced. Adding to the above comments, Val03 added that 
the requests from the local governments to increase the budget allocation for the road 
maintenance had been previously rejected by the MoF due to the fact that on average annually 
the local governments in Indonesia had more than Rp 100 trillion of the total annual budget 
unused.  
From the effectiveness point of view, Val01 stated that the ineffective budget expenditure was 
mainly due to the improper response to the road deterioration problem. Val03 corroborated 
this statement by saying that the ineffective expenditure was because the local governments 
tend to spread the available maintenance budget too thin over the road networks requiring 
intervention. Accordingly, he argued that “instead of concentrating… on certain points and do 
it properly, they spread it over the whole length.”  
Furthermore, in accordance with the research finding which suggests that a large proportion 
of budget allocation was inefficiently spent for routine expenditure, such as salary and travel 
expenses, Val01 agreed that the government agencies tend to spend a significant amount of 
fund for the travel expenses, which were often considered to be unnecessary. Accordingly, 
Val04 confirmed his view on the financial issues and stated that there was a conflicting situation 
between the first condition - fund insufficiency, and the remaining three factors - unspent 
budget and ineffective and inefficient expenses. He added that this was affected by the 
bureaucratic process in the governments which have a quite restricted budget expenditure 
mechanism where certain funds could only be channelled to certain types of works. As a result, 
there would be areas which have leftover expenses, whereby other areas at the same time 
were suffering from fund insufficiency.  
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5.12.4 Human resources 
With regards to the accountability issue, where the problem of unreliable road information 
system being accused as the cause of the road maintenance neglect by the political leaders, 
Val03 illustrated this problem as the chicken-and-egg problem, referring to which one exists in 
the first place and initiates the problem. Respondent Val03 and Val05 further recommended 
that there was a need to bridge the gap of communication between the road authorities and 
the politicians using terms understood by both parties. Val05 specifically suggest that using 
financial terms might provide better impacts to the politicians. They also suggested that the 
gap could be reduced if the road authorities were able to present a different set of scenarios 
or alternatives which describe the impacts and consequences for choosing or not choosing 
them.  
 In addition to that, Val02 further argued that the problem also rooted in the poor enforcement 
of the use of the data to the road maintenance budgeting plan. He further underlined that the 
information system itself was part of the problem as the interpretation of the simple 
parameters obtained from the observation of the road condition was very indirect. As an 
example, he contended that the road roughness data does not provide a clear link to what kind 
of responses and how much money would then be required, as much as how drainage condition 
could affect the road deterioration problem.  
From the capacity building point of view, all respondents agreed that there was little interest 
in the capacity building program. Val01 argued that the capacity building programs were often 
delivered ineffectively and considered merely as activities that need to be delivered, with little 
interest in the outcomes. Additionally, Val03 indicated that training programs were frequently 
used as a means to get some extra income through the provision of the travel allowances, and 
also as ‘vacation’ opportunities. Regarding this issue, Val02 added that the ineffective capacity 
building problem was due to the very shallow concept of the capacity building in the first place. 
He further added that the capacity building problem required a complete change of 
understanding of what the systematic approach is, the required tools, and then the training of 
the people to specifically do that, rather than to go for a general study and training. Supporting 
this argument, Val05 warned that such an effort requires changing of attitude, which was 
difficult to implement and would require medium to long term process.  
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With regards to the skilled personnel shortage and inappropriate personnel educational 
background in the local road authorities, all respondents also agreed with the findings. As one 
of the causes of the problems, Val01 added that at the local level, there were many unqualified 
honorary and pre-arranged personnel. The pre-arranged personnel stipulated by Val01 
referred to the personnel who got the job through a political endorsement. Added to this 
argument, Val02 and Val03 supported that there were many cases at the district level where 
certain posts were filled with inappropriate or low capacity personnel due to the promotional 
opportunity and the Bupati’s request. Val04 also implied that such condition was also 
experienced in Sri Lanka as a result of the improper recruitment process and the political 
interference in the appointment of personnel at the strategic places, where the expertise had 
not been necessarily ensured. Consequently, there might also be local experts being prevented 
to come to the surface by the local politics. Balancing the view, however, Val02 added that if 
high skilled engineers were required for every engineering position in the road authority, there 
would always be a shortage of engineers. Accordingly, he suggested to have two divisions of 
path; path where personnel with lower qualification can be trained to manage the work in every 
way, and the path where the engineer can concentrate on the jobs that do require engineering 
input such as road upgrade and drainage system.  
5.13 Post-disaster reconstruction process 
5.13.1 Asset transfer issues 
As discussed in section 5.4.2.3 regarding the asset transfer, the process of transferring 
reconstruction asset back to the local governments experienced a number of problems 
including rejection and delays, which resulted in maintenance neglect. The research findings 
suggest that the asset transfer problems had resulted in the reconstruction assets being 
neglected from maintenance and that the reconstruction assets would therefore need to be 
transferred back to the local governments immediately after their completion. The research 
also recommends avoiding assets change of ownership in the post-disaster reconstruction 
activities and the necessity to establish a clear set of rules and regulations regarding 
reconstruction assets prior to the commencement of the project, and even prior to the disaster.  
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Various responses were suggested by the respondents regarding the asset transfer issue. As 
raised by Val03, “no other region, except in Aceh during the tsunami reconstruction by the BRR 
that road ownership status changed from the national assets down to be the district assets. 
Only in Aceh.” Additionally, Val01 could not comment on this matter apart from his experience 
on the normal road construction procedure where roads should actually be handed-over by the 
contractor to the respective governments immediately after the project completion. Adding to 
that, Val04 suggested that the reconstruction of the infrastructure in Sri Lanka was not that 
complicated and rigid. He explained that the national government acted on behalf of the local 
governments as part of the reconstruction process. Therefore there had been no asset transfer 
issues in the post-disaster reconstruction in Sri Lanka.  
Furthermore, Val02 and Val04 confirmed their support on this view and stated that there need 
to be an agreement between the parties before the project started. However, Val04 warned 
that such process may lead to delays and argumentations between the parties. One way to 
avoid delays and argumentation is therefore to have the rules and regulations established well 
in advance, as suggested by Val02. Val02 added that for an asset to be transferred back to the 
local governments immediately after its completion, a definite set of rules and regulatory 
arrangements was required. Such regulation would need to exist before a disaster occurs, and 
the agreement from the local government to maintain the reconstruction asset would need to 
be in place before the project starts.  
5.13.2 Considerations of road maintenance need 
Three main arguments were suggested as the key research findings regarding the consideration 
of future road maintenance needs; future road maintenance needs was not-well accounted for 
in the reconstruction process, the MoU for the road maintenance was not effective to ensure 
that the roads were maintained, and the selection of HMA as the standard pavement had 
turned it as a new road pavement standard. The latter eventually led to the local governments 
to ignore the economic benefit of the different types of road surfaces.  
Val01 raised his doubt that the future road maintenance was well-considered in the disaster 
reconstruction process and said that “I think road maintenance needs was not accounted for 
as the reconstruction activity did not seem to be that well-structured and detailed to that level.” 
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Adding to that, Val03 suggested that donor agencies normally expect that the road 
maintenance to be the responsibility of the benefiting local governments. Confirming the above 
statement, Val02 underlined that at the beginning of the reconstruction process in Aceh, the 
future maintenance needs had not been well-considered. It was only later in mid-2007 that the 
BRR realised that the future post-reconstruction problems need to be addressed. However, 
whilst most donors were aware and agreed on the potential problems, not many were able and 
willing to readjust their reconstruction program and their funding scheme to address the issues.  
Furthermore, regarding the use of the maintenance MoU between the BRR and the local 
governments, Val02 agreed that it was ineffective to ensure that roads would be maintained. 
He added that the MoU was not sufficiently binding and that the BRR was a temporary agency. 
Furthermore, Val03 suggest that the MoU was not an effective solution to ensure roads would 
be maintained as there were no penalties for breaching it, and there were also the lack of 
incentives and motivations for the local governments to respect it.  
Additionally, Val03 agreed that the Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA) had been uniformly and widely used 
in Aceh, disregard of the actual traffic volume of the particular network. Whilst on the one hand 
it was highlighted that high standard pavement was used as a means to prolong the 
maintenance needs, on the other hand Val03 underlined the political aspect that caused it. He 
argued that the reconstruction of Aceh involved a large number of donors, each of which was 
‘competing’ in displaying the best products and outcomes. In the case of road infrastructure, 
as the HMA became a widely used pavement, donors were hesitant to use the ‘inferior’ 
pavement type. With regards to the impact to the local governments, Val02 suggested that the 
problems had been experienced widely in Indonesia. He argued that it was mainly because the 
local governments did not have enough knowledge about the most economic type, and that 
“they generally tend to think the one that is probably the easiest to maintain is the one to go 
for.” He summed it by suggesting it as a natural preference since the local governments did not 
have a good road maintenance capacity. Adding to that, Val04 suspected that this condition 
occurred due to the lack of sufficient discussions, knowledge, and stakeholders’ engagement 
in the process. He further added that the technical ‘know-how’ is an important element which 
is often overlooked, particularly in a circumstance such as the post-disaster reconstruction.  
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5.13.3 Involvement of the local governments in the post-disaster reconstruction process 
With regards to the involvement of the local governments in the post-tsunami reconstruction 
in Aceh, the research identified that the post-disaster condition was a major constraint to the 
effective and efficient involvement of the local governments. All respondents agreed with these 
findings and acknowledged that involving the already devastated local governments in the 
reconstruction process was proven to be a major challenge. Comparing the east coast and the 
west coast area of Aceh, Val02 implied that the self-planning process in the east coast was 
much more successful than the west coast, as the west coast area was heavily devastated and 
had a substantially greater loss of capacity compared to the east coast area.  
Adding to that, Val03 argued that there was a big gap of capacity between the BRR and the 
local governments. This condition in turn affected the involvement of the local governments in 
the process, and the transition from the disaster reconstruction to the normal development 
phase. Accordingly, Val04 highlighted the importance of local resiliency towards disaster. He 
argued that when the local governments are under pressure due to the impacts of the disaster, 
it would be difficult to get them involved in the reconstruction process. Accordingly, Val05 
added that the fact that the Local Governments are victims of the disaster should not justify 
the exclusion of the LGs in the reconstruction process. Val04 further stressed that 
understanding the local situation carefully and contextualising the problem before applying the 
textbook answer would be the key to the reconstruction success.  
5.14 Safety and security issues in the post-conflict area  
5.14.1 Main safety and security issue 
From the safety and security point of view, the research identifies three issues affecting the 
road reconstruction process in Aceh; the oppressive behaviour of the community and 
individuals, illegal extortion of ‘security fee’, and the relaxed supervision due to the safety 
threats to the construction supervision personnel.  
Even though agree with the findings, all respondents suggested that these issues were not 
unique to Aceh. At various levels, the problems of project disruptions and security fee were 
admitted by all respondents as common problems experienced in road projects. Additionally, 
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with regards to the relaxed supervision due to safety threats, Val01 also argued that whilst this 
was very likely, most relaxed supervisions result from the collusion and corruption between 
those involved in the projects rather than due to threats. In Aceh, these problems were 
worsened by the post-conflict condition, where parts of the peace agreement were to provide 
work opportunities for the ex-combatant as part of the reintegration process. Accordingly, as 
described in section 5.7.1.1.3 regarding Safety and Security, the ex-combatant association – 
known as KPA, frequently put pressure to the contractors for the security fee, to works as the 
project labour, or as the project suppliers. Regarding this issue, Val05 argued that when the 
capacity exists, the local community should be given a chance to be involved in the 
reconstruction process. Whilst admitting that the process would be challenging, it would have 
better long-term impacts as it creates a better sense of ownership to the community.  
Additionally, with regard to the post-conflict, Val04 referred to conflict as a highly context 
specific situation, as there are many variables involved. Consequently, he stressed that there 
would be no universal approach to address a post-conflict situation. In Sri Lanka, the conflict 
ended in 2008 after a series of military oppression, instead of peace negotiation such as what 
happened in Aceh. Accordingly, prior to 2008, Val04 described that the areas in conflict did not 
receive sufficient post-disaster intervention from the national government since people could 
not reach the affected areas and provide what was needed.  
5.15  Summary and the links 
This section provides an in-depth discussion on the responses from the experts in the road 
management and the road transportation subject regarding the findings of the research. Not 
only has the section elaborate the confirmation and refutation from the experts, it also covers 
the justification and explanation behind the respective phenomena. Accordingly, the research 
findings are found to be conforming to the views of the experts and are therefore considered 
to be valid.  
The following chapter, is accordingly dedicated to presenting the research findings in more 
detail and will be further linked and associated with the literature. When appropriate, the 
findings will be compared and contrasted to the literature, in order to provide a more thorough 
understanding of the issues and as another means of finding validation.  
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Chapter - 6  RESEARCH FINDINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
In chapter 5, the data analysis of the semi-structured interviews with the high-level officials and 
policy makers, the case study analysis, the cross-case analysis and the expert validation semi-
structured interviews have been presented and discussed in detail. The analysis and reviews 
from the experts on the key research findings have also been presented as a means of 
triangulation and validation of the research findings.  
In this chapter, accordingly, the overall empirical research findings of this study will be 
compared and contrasted with the literature as a form of findings triangulation. The structure 
of this chapter will be arranged as follows.  
 First, the general approach of the case study districts towards road maintenance needs 
will be discussed.  
 Second, the main challenges and factors affecting the performance of the local 
governments in road maintenance are presented.  
 Third, the local governments’ capacity in the road maintenance is linked with the post-
disaster reconstruction process. The discussion is expected to establish and propose a 
model for the post-disaster road infrastructure reconstruction.  
 Lastly, the conceptual framework is refined and updated to reflect the findings of the 
research. 
6.2 General responses to road maintenance  
The detailed responses of the local governments of the case study districts towards road 
maintenance needs are presented in section, 5.7.2, 5.8.2, and 5.9.2. The analysis of the 
interviews suggests that the road infrastructure were generally neglected from maintenance. 
The routine and periodic maintenance activities were not regularly performed. The local 
governments of the case studies lacked the preventive maintenance culture and the general 
responses to preserve the road infrastructure were accordingly to repair the road when it was 
broken (refer to section 5.7.2, 5.8.2, and 5.9.2 of chapter 5 regarding the maintenance 
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strategy). This condition is in accordance with ADB (2003) report, which highlights that in the 
countries where road maintenance is not a culture, roads are repaired when they fail. 
Preventive maintenance is even considered to be a waste of resources, and the expensive 
remedy for premature rehabilitation is not linked back to the lack of regular maintenance.  
In the case study districts, the newly rehabilitated or reconstructed road networks were 
abandoned from maintenance immediately after their completion. Road rehabilitation and 
reconstruction were perceived as the necessary repair interventions. Dirt and gravel roads were 
left to deteriorate until there were enough funds to upgrade the surface. Similarly, the paved 
roads were also neglected from maintenance interventions until the next rehabilitation works 
were considered necessary and the fund became available. Occasionally, the limited 
maintenance allocation was even used for periodic maintenance on roads requiring 
rehabilitation, which impacts would diminish in a short time. Harral and Faiz (1988), stipulate 
that two thirds of the pavement deterioration problems occur in the final third of the pavement 
design life. In the first two-third of the period, accordingly, road pavement may survive even 
without maintenance; after which road maintenance needs may surge dramatically. This is 
probably the reason why in the case study districts, road maintenance was generally delayed 
and ignored, until it was eventually too late to rectify the level of damages which had occurred.  
To prolong the road life, hence the needs for the maintenance, the local governments opted to 
use the high specification pavement type (section 5.4.1.1.3.1). This option appeared to be 
reasonably justified, as the road deterioration rates are among others affected by the 
construction quality, material standard, design specification and proper craftsmanship 
(Kendrick, 2004), and the age of pavement. However, as identified by Karim (2011), road 
designers often ignore a very important aspect of the road management, which is the possibility 
to maintain the networks in the future. Consequently, instead of providing regular 
maintenance, gravel roads and macadam roads in the districts were being upgraded to hot mix 
asphalt (HMA) pavement. HMA was therefore widely used as the new standard for the district 
road construction and was perceived as the solution to extend the road serviceability period. 
In fact, despite their initial build quality, road pavements deteriorate over time. Road design 
life can only be achieved if roads are maintained, as it would keep the roads’ level of 
serviceability and prolong the need for rehabilitation and reconstruction. ADB (2003) refers to 
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this problem as the road agency’s poverty trap; building more roads or improving roads to the 
wrong standards; approving only asphalt road projects even though expensive to build; or 
failing to recognise that some roads are no longer maintainable and need to wait for 
reconstruction. Accordingly, as the higher road specification is more expensive to build, more 
financial resources are potentially wasted due to the lack of maintenance. Such conditions also 
ignore the necessity and the economic advantages of the different pavement types. 
The result of the case study analysis and experts validation interviews corroborates this finding. 
Detailed elaboration on this issue for each of the case study is presented in section 5.7.2, 5.8.2, 
and 5.9.2 of chapter 5 regarding the maintenance strategy. The expert validation analysis on 
this issue is also covered in section 5.11. Nevertheless, this condition was affected by a number 
of reasons. Among other reasons, the local political condition, the conflict of authorities 
between the government agencies involved in the road maintenance, the poor financial 
capacity of the districts, and the poor capacity of the road authorities’ personnel have been 
identified as the main challenges in the road maintenance. More discussion on these issues will 
be elaborated in the following section.  
6.3 The main factors affecting the performance of the local government in 
road maintenance  
The results of the data analysis suggest that the road maintenance problems in the case study 
districts can be grouped into the external, institutional and the technical factors. This is in 
accordance with Robinson et al. (1998) classification of road maintenance problems. From the 
external side, the road maintenance problems in the case study districts have been identified 
to include the environmental, legal and regulatory, political, socioeconomic, safety and 
security, and the inter-organisational relationship. From the internal side, the institutional 
factors include financial management, human resources, and organisational management. 
Accordingly, the technical factors of the road maintenance problems are road design, traffic 
loading controls, as well as the plant and equipment. After observing the level of significance 
of each of the affecting factors, as well as the interrelationship and the interdependencies 
between them, the research has identified that the local political condition, the conflict of 
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authorities, the financial capacity, and human resources are the most affecting factors to the 
local governments’ road maintenance capacity.  
6.3.1 Local political condition 
The outcomes of the data analysis suggest that the local political condition, the socioeconomic 
conditions and the conflict of authorities between the government agencies involved in the 
road sectors were the most affecting external factors to the local governments’ road 
maintenance performance. This was particularly due to the level of impacts and influence that 
these factors could affect the other factors. The impact of the socioeconomic condition will be 
discussed in section 6.3.2, whilst the issue of conflict of authorities will be discussed further in 
section 6.3.3. 
The data analysis of the political factors affecting the capacity of the local government in the 
maintenance of the road infrastructure is presented in sections 5.7.1.1.2, 5.8.1.1.2, 5.9.1.1.2. 
The findings on the political aspect presented in this chapter are built around the three major 
aspects surrounding the political issue which include the political intervention on the 
development priority, the poor interest in the road maintenance, and the principle of wealth 
distribution.  
6.3.1.1 Political intervention on the development priority  
ADB (2003) identifies that the decision-making process in the developing countries tends to be 
intentionally subjective and political, based on consensus requiring discussion, committees and 
compromise. To a certain extent, this was in fact part of the purposes of the decentralised 
system in Indonesia, which was expected to be the instrument that encourages broader 
participations of the citizens and ultimately leads to increased efficiency and improved 
governance (Jütting et al., 2005). The decentralised system was then expected to provide the 
community with “much more independence in electing their own leaders, promoting their own 
interests, developing their own institutions, initiating their own policies, managing their own 
financial resources, and mobilizing support from their own communities” (Rasyid, 2004) 
However, as highlighted by Ahmad and Mansoor (2002), the demand for decentralisation in 
Indonesia was not primarily driven by a perceived need to improve the local service delivery, 
 347 
 
but more by a desire to have control over resources and the political and legal autonomy. 
Consequently, along with the decentralisation of authorities, the decentralisation process has 
been argued to be a process of ‘decentralisation of the corruption, collusion and nepotism 
practices to the local level (Darmawan, 2008), which affect the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches of the government (Mahfud cited in Daslani, 2012).  
As with the case study districts, the political pressure was experienced widely with regards to 
the decision making process. In particular, the budgeting authority of the parliament resulted 
in the political interference in the development programs prepared by the local governments 
and, in particular, the road maintenance planning. Consequently, since the parliament held the 
right to refuse the budget proposal, the local government tended to accommodate the 
parliament requests to ensure political stability is achieved, to avoid political disputes and 
delays in the budget approval process. Accordingly, whilst road maintenance activities received 
a small budget allocation, the limited road maintenance allocation would also need to be 
distributed in accordance with the political interest. Such pressure resulted in the budget 
proposal unnecessarily reflects the development plan prepared by the planners and that the 
approved maintenance budget allocation may not reflect the actual road maintenance needs.  
6.3.1.2 High preference on road capital projects 
As highlighted by ADB (2003) the value of the project, the relatively more sophisticated level of 
the work, and the immediate impact of a capital project is more politically and technically 
interesting for the politicians, as well as for the road engineers. Since the maintenance needs 
frequently get low priority, the final budget allocation often resulted in the postponement of 
maintenance works to the later year, due to the limited budget availability in the running year 
and the competition with other sectors.  
Levik (2001) argues that in most countries, investing money in building new roads is more 
politically favourable. Road maintenance is less politically attractive when compared with new 
road construction, road rehabilitation, or social programmes which provide more ‘visible’ 
impacts and therefore offer greater political benefit (UNESCAP, 2005, Donnges et al., 2007). 
This confirms the findings from the case study districts. In the case study district, the political 
intervention did not only occur in the form of shifting development plan towards certain 
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development sectors, but also in determining the road project types and location. Building new 
roads and upgrading road surface were also found to be more preferable than the road 
maintenance as allocating budget for the road maintenance rarely attract political benefits. 
Donnges et al. (2007) also argue that such condition is particularly affected by the limited 
tenure of the politicians in their office.  
Nevertheless, the poor maintenance budget distribution and allocation is not solely due to the 
political pressure. In the case study districts, the low political interest in the road maintenance 
was worsened by the fact that the road engineers and professionals also perceived road 
maintenance works as being inferior to road construction (section 5.10.2). According to 
Robinson and Stiedl (2001) such condition is one of the consequences resulting from a 
decentralised system, which erratically place responsibility for the road maintenance to the 
incompetent organisation. Additionally, as emphasised by Estache and Sinha (1994), 
decentralization tends to increase government expenditure on infrastructure, possibly due to 
different preferences on quality and quantity of infrastructure between national and regional 
government. 
In accordance with the argument, the importance of the road maintenance was not well-
perceived by the road authorities of the case study district. The relatively small value of the 
road maintenance projects was not seen as interesting areas by the engineers in the road 
authorities. Regarding this issue Donnges et al. (2007) add that the road maintenance does not 
seem to offer an interesting career path for the engineers. Such a preference, according to 
UNESCAP (2005), is one of the factors which complicate the efforts to raise sufficient 
maintenance funds and is also identified as one of the main constraints in the maintenance of 
road assets.  
6.3.2 Socioeconomic condition 
6.3.2.1 Distribution of wealth 
As a response to the road maintenance problems, Heggie (2003) suggests that road need to be 
managed professionally and treated as a business. Practically, this suggests that the local 
governments should only build roads that can be maintained, and to maintain what have been 
built. This argument leads to the recommendation to establish independent road authorities 
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and the adoption of the road fund mechanism as a sustainable source of maintenance fund (De 
Richecour and Heggie, 1995, Potter, 1997, Zietlow and Bull, 1999), and the involvement of 
private companies in the operation or the ownership of road infrastructure (Carpenter et al., 
2003, Ozbek and Jesus, 2007, IndII, 2010).  
Nevertheless, the poor awareness on the road maintenance needs, and the high political 
interest in the construction of new roads in the case study district are also affected by the 
socioeconomic condition of the areas. Hence, adopting the rational approach of prioritising 
road maintenance over the equal distribution of access had not been well perceived in the case 
study districts. As highlighted by ADB (2003), in the developing countries, roads are regarded 
as an essential public service and therefore the rational economic decision-making rules may 
not be applied. Accordingly, the need to distribute wealth to the community in the case study 
districts was practically translated as the equal provision of access. The local governments were 
more focused on building new roads and upgrading gravel roads to asphalt pavement than the 
‘rational’ approach of maintaining the existing roads and maximising the value of the 
investment (please refer to section 5.7.2, 5.8.2, and 5.9.2 of chapter 5 regarding the 
maintenance strategy). 
Explaining such condition, Donnges et al. (2007) also add that the development of the rural 
road networks is vital to the development of the agricultural sector, which would lead to the 
economic improvement of the area. This was also the view perceived by the local governments 
who saw that limiting the road networks to the maintainable scale may restrict the potential 
economic growth. Additionally, as the benefit was more immediately visible than what road 
maintenance could offer, the local governments put a higher interest on what the businesses 
and the industries may immediately contribute to the economic development of their areas. 
This was reflected by allowing the overloaded vehicles to keep operating in the district roads, 
despite the damages they caused to the road infrastructure.  
However, even though Donnges et al. (2007) underline the importance of the impact of the 
rural road development to the economy, they further argued that two basic measures need to 
be in place in a decentralised road management system, namely the provision of basic 
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minimum of fund for the road maintenance and the adequate capacity to spend the fund 
effectively, which is quite challenging to the LGs as discussed in section 6.3.4.  
6.3.2.2 Community’s lack of sense of ownership 
In addition to the issue of wealth distribution, the community was also argued to have lacked 
the sense of ownership to the road networks in their neighbourhoods. The community was 
argued to have frequently disturbed the projects in their area by proposing irrational requests. 
The irrational requests commonly took place in the form of forceful demands to work as the 
project labour, or as the supplier of the construction materials, which often came with higher 
unit prices. In another case, farmers were frequently dumped the waste from cleaning their 
rice paddy fields on the road shoulders, blocking the road drainage and intensifying the road 
deterioration rate.  
Regarding the sense of ownership of individuals towards an organisation, Pierce et al. (2001) 
propose that psychological ownership emerges from three major routes; intimately know the 
target, controlling the target, and investing the self into the target. With regards to the road 
infrastructure, ‘Intimately know the target’ can be achieved through consultations and 
dissemination of project details to the stakeholders. ‘Controlling the target’, on the other hand, 
can be achieved by involving the stakeholders in the key decision making process. ‘Investing 
the self into the target’ is accordingly achieved by allowing the stakeholders to contribute to 
the capital cost of the project, or involved as the construction labour. Supporting the above 
view, by observing the rural water infrastructure development in Kenya, Marks and Davis 
(2012) propose a similar finding that the community members’ sense of ownership can be 
stimulated by involving the community in the key decision making process, contributing 
towards the capital cost of the construction, participation in the planning and construction 
activities.  
In the case studies, the aforementioned key components to stimulating the sense of ownership 
of the community had not always been existed. Being a disaster response, most reconstruction 
projects were funded by the government or donor agencies. Accordingly, creating the sense of 
ownership through the community contributions of the capital cost seemed to be irrelevant. 
Furthermore, recruiting the community as labour for the project was not always rational nor 
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practical. This was mainly because the community may not have the required skills to keep the 
project run in the required pace, and that road projects are packaged and tendered in a way 
that it would commonly span over a number of villages, which makes recruiting different 
personnel for different sections of the road project inappropriate.  
On the other hand, the lack of community sense of ownership also appeared to be a result of 
the exclusive road reconstruction process. There was an example given where the traditional 
farmers in the rural areas destroyed the drainage channel along the roadside to make water 
inlets for their farms, as the new drainage channel did not provide water inlets to the farming 
areas (section 5.8.1.1.3). This condition suggests that there had been lacked of communication 
and stakeholders’ involvement in the reconstruction process. The farmers’ dependence on the 
drainage channel had not seemed to be accounted for or alternative sources of water were not 
introduced to the farmer in the road drainage rehabilitation design.  
The above sections have presented the arguments on the social pressure to the distribution of 
wealth and the dilemma between dispersing development project due to the equality issue and 
working in accordance with the actual development priority. A discussion on the community’s 
lack of sense of ownership was also argued to contribute to the rapid road deterioration. 
Accordingly, the following section will present the economic consideration that drives decision 
making process in the road management. 
6.3.2.3 Economic consideration 
In addition to the social pressure, the economic consideration also contributed to the road 
deterioration and the road maintenance capacity. One of the main causes of the road rapid 
deterioration is related to the structural bearing capacity, which is affected by the vehicle axle 
loading capacity (section 2.4.2.2). Road is structurally designed to cope with a certain vehicle 
axle loading capacity. In Indonesia, the vehicle maximum axle loading capacity allowed for class 
III roads, the lowest road class, is set to be at eight tons (Law, 2009a, article 19), even though 
in certain circumstance, the vehicle maximum axle loading capacity may be and frequently set 
to a lower limit; as low as three tons. Occasionally, this condition led to the confusion between 
the public works agency - as the agency which was responsible for the construction, and the 
transportation agency which was responsible to control and enforce the traffic loading capacity 
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limit (section 5.4.1.1.1.4). This condition frequently led to unsolved disputes between the two 
agencies (Bappeda Jatim, 2011, Dewi and Maris, 2014).  
The West Coast area of Aceh province where Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya, and Aceh Barat Daya are 
located, is mainly occupied by palm oil agricultural industry and the mining industry. As a result, 
trucks and other vehicles transporting the heavy loads accordingly would need to transport 
their products to the processing plants or ports through the district roads, before they reached 
the provincial or the national road. This activity consequently and greatly contributes to the 
rapid deterioration of the road networks, particularly when the roads were not structurally 
designed to cope with the heavy load.  
On the one hand, the agricultural and mining industry is necessary to help improve the 
economic condition of the areas. On the other hand, however, ignoring the consequences the 
heavy loaded vehicles cause to the road infrastructure will result in the rapid road 
deterioration. In reality, the Local Governments tended to ignore this problem and was more 
focused on the direct income that the industry may provide to the district (section 5.7.1.1.3, 
5.8.1.1.3, and 5.9.1.1.3). As a solution to this issue, it was argued that the Local Governments 
should be in charge and lead the process of enforcing the maximum axle loading capacity 
regulation. This is particularly due to the involvement of several institutions in the road 
management. However, enforcing traffic regulation is not only a matter of a dilemma between 
business investment and the damage to the road infrastructure. In fact, the issue of corruption 
in enforcing the vehicle loading capacity regulation seems to be a greater barrier in controlling 
the overloading traffic. More detail on the corruption issue will be discussed in the following 
section.  
6.3.2.4 Corruption 
The report of the Transparency International on the global corruption perception lists Indonesia 
as the 114 out of the 175 countries surveyed in the 2013 report (Transparency International, 
2013). In the road sector, the transaction cost of the capital works can reach from 5 to 20 per 
cent due to corruption (World Bank, 2009b) and that every dollar’s worth of stolen materials 
may lead to reduced returns to the project as much as $3.41 (Kenny, 2007a). The World Bank 
(2009b) also adds that the corruptions in the capital works are most obviously detected in the 
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process of selecting and awarding the contract in the form of bribes and kickbacks, bid rigging, 
and fraud. 
Moreover, not only did corruption occur in the road construction phase, it was also experienced 
in the traffic loading control. The traffic loading control is particularly performed by operating 
the weighing stations. However, the traffic loading control initiative was spoilt by the corrupted 
operators. It was suggested that working as one of the weighing station operators has been 
one of the most favourite positions among the transportation agency’s staff due to its 
corruptibility (please refer to section 5.4.1.1.1.3 on the corruption section for more detailed 
discussion). Regarding this issue, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) suggest that the practice of 
corruption spreads as a result of competition between both officials and the consumers. They 
further conclude that competition between officials to get a job trough ‘auction’ mechanism 
will assure that maximal bribes are collected.  
In accordance with the above discussion, a joint report of the World Bank and BRR (World Bank 
and BRR, 2006b) reveals that there are four forms of illegal payment that truckers coming into 
and going out of Aceh province had to pay, namely,  
1. Police and military post,  
2. Weigh stations,  
3. Convoy fees and  
4. ‘Facilitation’ agencies.  
The police and military post and convoy fees were less relevant to this study as they are mainly 
fees charged by police and military troops for truckers transporting goods without legal 
documents such as scrap metals and plastic. Also, after the peace agreement, the police and 
military post reduced quite significantly as a large number of troops were pulled-out of Aceh as 
part of the agreement, even though it eventually rose as the abandoned post were later 
occupied by the local police and military troops.  
What are more relevant to this study are the illegal extortion collected by the weigh station 
operator and the ‘facilitation’ agencies. The report concludes that payments at the weigh 
stations have been the largest illegal charges for truck drivers. At the weigh station, truckers 
needed to commonly pay as much as Rp 20,000 (£1) per overweight ton. This practice 
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continued to occur regardless the Law no 22/2009 (Law, 2009a) article 307 which stipulates 
that overweight vehicles should be brought to court and may be imprisoned for a maximum 
period of 2 months or Rp 500,000 (£25) in fine. As expected, it was argued that none of the 
charges income went into the government treasury (World Bank and BRR, 2006b).  
The ‘facilitation’ agency fee, on the other hand, are fees collected by mafia-like freight 
transporter organisations which provide reduced overweight charges for its members when 
they pass the weighing stations. A collusion between the organisations with the transportation 
agency personnel at the weighing stations had been arranged. While some agencies provide a 
fixed rate of Rp 50,000 – Rp 70,000 (£2.50 – £3.50) regardless the amount of overweight loads, 
some others offer a reduced rate of Rp 10,000 (£0.50) per overweight ton. Both models require 
monthly membership fees of around Rp 25,000 – Rp 50,000 (£1.25 – £2.50) and distribute the 
truckers with stickers to be attached in the front windshield that the weighing station personnel 
can immediately recognise. 
6.3.3 Conflict of authorities  
A clear division of tasks and a framework to ensure the accountability of the agencies involved 
in the road maintenance is essential. Heggie (2003) highlights the importance of the 
institutional frameworks and stresses that strengthening the institutional framework is a 
prerequisite to overcome the “the numerous technical, organisational and human resource 
constraints that hampered the introduction of better road maintenance policies.” As there are 
conflict of authorities between the public works and the department of transportation, the 
public works agency as the agency which is responsible for the construction and the 
maintenance of the road networks, cannot be held accountable for the poor road condition, 
referring it as being a consequence of poor traffic loading control. Likewise, the department of 
the transportation cannot be held accountable for the poor road condition, referring it to the 
poor road construction quality, in addition to the lack of the weighing station facilities (more 
discussion in section 5.4.1.1.1.4) 
Both institutions appeared to have reasonable claims and at the same time are responsible for 
the poor road condition problem. The research identified that the road infrastructure have 
been poorly constructed particularly due to the corruption, security threats, and poor 
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supervision quality. On the contrary, the department of transportation failed to monitor and 
control the maximum axle loading capacity of the passing vehicles due to corruption, and the 
lack of weighing station facilities. On top of that, the national law which regulates the 
enforcement of vehicle maximum axle loading capacity, which does not allow overloaded 
vehicles to pay for the excess loads and continue the journey, is not respected by the authorities 
at the regional level.  
The high interest of the political leaders towards the business investment and the perceived 
economic growth in their areas which offered more immediate and direct contribution to the 
regions’ income appeared to be more attractive to the decision makers. As suggested by 
Donnges et al. (2007), a recommended approach to the political interest problem would be to 
create a platform for discussion and demonstrate the worthiness of the road maintenance 
investments. Accordingly, the politicians will be made accountable for the road condition, and 
the technical staff need to be provided with the capacity, tools, and procedure to produce an 
effective road maintenance plan within the constrained budget; the absence of which may end 
up in both parties cannot be held responsible for the lack of road maintenance.  
6.3.4 Financial capacity 
The institutional factors include financial management, human resources, and organisation 
management. Out of the three institutional factors identified in the study, the financial 
management capacity and the human resource issues are argued as the most affecting factors 
to the road maintenance performance. The case study analysis of the financial management 
aspect of the road maintenance is presented in sections, 5.7.1.2.1, 5.8.1.2.1, and 5.9.1.2.1. The 
findings on the financial management demonstrate a close causal-relationship with the human 
resource issue, which will be discussed more specifically in the next section. The data analysis 
suggests that the road authorities at the district level lack the financial capacity for performing 
proper road maintenance.  
6.3.4.1 The four financial problems 
As highlighted by ADB (2003), the financial problems in the road maintenance are rooted to 
four issues; fund is not allocated in sufficient amount, allocated fund is not spent, fund 
allocation is not spent effectively, and fund allocation is not spent efficiently. These issues are 
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also identified in the case study districts. The vast areas of the districts, the extensive length of 
the road networks, and the limited budget availability indicate that the budget allocation for 
road maintenance may never be sufficient to cover the maintenance needs of the entire road 
networks. The global experience indicates that the financial resources for the road 
maintenance are rarely sufficient to cover all the road networks, even in the developed worlds 
(Zietlow and Bull, 1999, ADB, 2003, UNESCAP, 2005). However, as Donnges et al. (2007) argue, 
the fact that the whole maintenance financial needs can never be met does not mean that the 
maintenance cannot be done effectively with the available funds. They further suggest that the 
improvement of capacity at the local level has to be a major focus of any road administration if 
the limited available funds are to be spent effectively. Accordingly, it is argued that the road 
authority requires the capacity to create a list of priorities and distribute the limited budget 
allocation for the maintenance of road sections which provide the most benefit to both the 
communities and the local economy. 
Additionally, the road maintenance budget in the case study district had to compete against 
the other sectors, as well as against other activities in the road sector such as the construction 
of new roads. This condition is commonly experienced in a country where the funds for road 
maintenance needs are allocated through the general government budgetary system. As 
highlighted by Gupta (2006) securing an adequate and steady flow of funds for road 
maintenance is impossible if it needs to go through the general budgetary allocation procedure, 
particularly if the allocation depends on the political debates.  
The global experience suggests the establishment of a road fund mechanism as one of the 
solutions to the road maintenance financial problem. When the budget allocation for the road 
maintenance is distributed through the general account approach, it is exposed to inconsistent 
allocation sufficiency (ADB, 2003). Accordingly, the main advantages of establishing a road fund 
system are that it helps ensure that the budget allocation for the maintenance is used for the 
road maintenance, secure a steady flow of financial resources by excluding it from budget 
competition with other sectors, and implementing fairness and equity principle – those who 
used roads need to pay for the maintenance. Even though the regulatory framework to 
establish the road fund mechanism has been produced in Indonesia, it has not been in effect. 
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Hence, the road maintenance allocations need to be obtained from the general budgetary 
procedure.  
However, the lack of sufficient budget allocation to cover the road maintenance needs as 
complained by the road authorities was worsened by the poor capacity of the road authority 
personnel to spend the approved budget allocation, and that the limited budget allocation is 
not spent efficiently and effectively for the maintenance of the road infrastructure (refer to 
Table 5.24 in section 5.10.1.2 regarding the case studies annual budget realisation ratio). Two 
factors have been identified as the main causes of the unspent budget; the poor spending 
capacity of the personnel and the delays in budget approval. The delays in the budget approval, 
which frequently resulted in a shorter implementation period and the project implementation 
period being deferred to the rainy season, should be avoided by improving the budgeting 
capacity and the approval process 
Additionally, the limited budget allocation was also spent inefficiently. Budget allocation was 
largely spent for the routine expenditure such as salary, office administrations, and travels. The 
remaining allocation was also aggravated by the corruption and security issues; the contractors 
would need to pay to win projects and to avoid safety and security threats from certain 
individuals, and lowly paid supervision consultant would be threatened to relax the supervision. 
These conditions eventually resulted in the poor road construction quality.  
Furthermore, there was also an issue in regard to the budget allocation being spent 
ineffectively. In some cases, the roads requiring rehabilitation were given periodic maintenance 
interventions, which impacts of intervention will vanish in a very short time. Road maintenance 
allocation was also used for upgrading road surface, and in some cases, concealed to fund the 
new road construction projects.  
6.3.5 Human resources 
The human resources of the case study districts were identified to be a great barrier in 
performing the proper road maintenance. As suggested by Karunasena et al. (2010), capacity 
building is a key concept for achieving sustainability in the developing countries. The study 
identified that there was an apparent need to improve the capacity of the local personnel, 
particularly in the road maintenance planning and procurement. The poor maintenance budget 
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distribution and allocation is not entirely due to the political pressure. The road authorities and 
the local governments in general, appeared to lack the skills and willingness to produce a well-
justified budget proposal to the parliament. Accordingly, the annual budget proposals were 
commonly prepared as a slightly modified budget allocation of the previous year, which might 
not represent the actual needs (refer to section 5.7.1.2.2, 5.8.1.2.2, and 5.9.1.2.2 regarding the 
human resource issues) 
This finding is supported by Donnges et al. (2007), who have identified that the capacity of the 
local road authorities are frequently insufficient to deal with the responsibility they had been 
assigned to. They further list the requirements as: technical staff, a thorough knowledge of road 
network, sound procedures for road condition inventories, efficient planning procedures, 
effective procurement systems, good supervision, adequate logistical support, transparent and 
up-to-date reporting, and reliable financial management. In the case study districts, the lack of 
skilled personnel, inappropriate educational background, and the poor recruitment system in 
the district road authorities are suggested as the main human resource issues in the case study 
districts.  
6.3.5.1 Accountability issue 
As highlighted by Donnges et al. (2007), the limited technical capacity of the road authority at 
the local level results in the lack of information on the state and size of the local road networks. 
Comparably, the road authorities in the cases study districts were unable to produce a reliable 
and accountable road maintenance planning. The road authorities of the case studies appeared 
to lack the skills and willingness to produce a well-justified budget proposal to the parliament 
Additionally, the lack of initiative, and also support, to produce a road information management 
system which was required to justify the maintenance budget proposal consequently resulted 
in the road maintenance needs being neglected, particularly due to the unreliability of the 
submitted road maintenance planning proposal. Donnges et al. (2007) conclude that 
performing the efficient and timely maintenance involves “the capacity to plan and carry out 
the works at the right time, preserving investments with solutions which are cost-effective and 
thereby utilising available funding resources in the most efficient manner.”  
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Furthermore, the budget allocation for the road maintenance was also not set as a recurrent 
budget and what was included and referred to as road maintenance were not clearly defined 
in the budgeting process. This finding is in line with Donnges et al. (2007) study, which states 
that the budget for road maintenance is often listed as a development budget and ineffectively 
spent to repair roads that are unmaintainable. As identified in the case study district, the 
budget allocation for the road maintenance was dominated by rehabilitation and surface 
upgrading activities, which has little contribution to the real aim of road maintenance which is 
to preserve the road condition and prolong the asset life.  
Additionally, the poor capacity of the local consultants was also argued to have contributed to 
the slow human resource development process. As identified in Aceh Barat Daya, the transfer 
of knowledge from the local consultants to the road authorities’ personnel which was expected 
to occur from the interaction between the two institutions did not materialise. Rather, it 
appeared that the road authority had to frequently give instructions and advices to the 
consultant personnel regarding the work implementation and methods, instead of vice versa 
(section 5.9.3.2).  
6.3.5.2 Capacity building challenges 
The poor capacity of the local governments was aggravated by the poor interest in the capacity 
building programs. The capacity building programs for the road authority personnel in the case 
study districts lacked the support from the political leaders. Budget allocation was spent on 
activities and programs which could attract the public interest and yield more immediate and 
visible benefits. Consequently, the road authorities at the local level could not initiate capacity 
building programs, and invitations to participate in trainings and workshops from the external 
organisations were turned away due to the lack of budget to cover the basic costs such as 
accommodation and travel fare (section 5.7.3.2, 5.8.3.2 and 5.9.3.2). Whereas, as previously 
highlighted by Robinson and Stiedl (2003), the benefit of having a decentralised road 
management system in developing countries, i.e. laying the highest responsibility for road 
management at the local level, can only be assured through a long-term investment in 
establishing an effective system at the local level and building the local capacity. Donnges et al. 
(2007) partially blame such condition to the lack of efforts to ensure that the local authorities 
possess the knowledge and skills to effectively deal with the road maintenance during the 
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decentralisation process. They further argue that the existence of appropriate capacity is the 
key to the effective implementation of road maintenance, on top of the existence of the 
political will, changed attitude, and the financial availability.  
Furthermore, the challenges in the capacity building efforts in the case study districts appeared 
to be rooted in four factors; poor political interest, poor budget allocation, personnel issues, 
and poor capacity building programs. Technical positions were frequently filled with poorly 
skilled – and inappropriate educational background personnel. The available capacity building 
programs were frequently argued to be poorly designed. Consequently, the knowledge transfer 
process expected to occur from the various capacity building programs did not yield the 
expected results, where many claimed to have learned the required skills from the informal 
interactions between colleagues. This condition was argued to be affected by the rapid 
decentralisation process which had not been followed by adequate capacity building programs.  
6.3.6 The positive affecting factors 
The above sections have identified and provide discussions on the factors which negatively 
affected the local governments’ road maintenance capacity. However, the research also 
identifies several positive affecting factors which help increase the opportunity to properly 
maintain the road networks. More discussion on these factors will be presented in the following 
paragraphs. 
First, the peace agreement between the Aceh Free Movement and the Government of 
Indonesia ends the conflict that took place for more than thirty years in Aceh. As the safety and 
security conditions have significantly improved, the local government can now implement 
projects in the rural areas which were isolated during the conflict. More discussion regarding 
the conflict in Aceh is presented in section 2.5.7. Second, the special autonomy status of the 
Aceh province provides the local government additional budget allocation. The additional 
allocation may accordingly help improve the condition of the local roads, provided that the 
allocation resources are properly managed. More discussion on the special autonomy status of 
the Aceh province is available in section 2.5.6 . Third, post-disaster reconstruction activities 
have improved the overall road condition in the case study districts. The maintenance backlog 
has been reduced significantly, which provides the local governments opportunities to 
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gradually increase their maintenance budget allocation and improve their road maintenance 
planning capacity. Fourth, the establishment of road transport traffic board was argued to have 
resulted in better coordination between the road stakeholders (section 5.4.1.1.1.4). Even 
though the actual impacts and contribution of the traffic boards towards road condition need 
to be further investigated, it has however provided the platform for the stakeholders in the 
road sectors to communicate and discuss issues in the road sector.  
The road maintenance capacity affecting factors have been discussed in details in the above 
section. Not only has the research identified the negative affecting factors, the factors which 
positively contribute to better road maintenance capacity have also been acknowledged. Table 
6.1 provides a summary of these factors.  
Table 6.1 – Road maintenance capacity affecting factors 
Negative Factors Positive Factors 
Political intervention and social pressure 
deviate the development priorities 
Improved safety and security after the conflict 
ends enables implementation of projects in 
the rural areas 
The high preference on road capital projects 
undermines maintenance needs 
Special autonomy status provides more 
financial resources 
Community’s lack of sense of ownership 
accelerate road deterioration 
Post-disaster reconstruction activities reduce 
road maintenance backlog 
Economic consideration harms traffic loading 
enforcement 
 Establishment of road transport and traffic 
board improves coordination between road 
stakeholders 
Corruption hampers road maintenance 
planning and traffic enforcement 
 
Conflict of authorities damages accountability   
Inadequate human resource capacity damages 
accountability 
  
Capacity building programs do not get 
sufficient support 
  
 
6.4 Post disaster road reconstruction process 
The previous section focuses on the capacity of the local government in the maintenance of 
the road infrastructure assets after the post-disaster reconstruction activities have ended. This 
section is therefore dedicated to presenting a discussion on the links between the local 
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governments’ road maintenance capacity and the post-disaster reconstruction process in the 
case study districts. Accordingly, this section will mainly provide a discussion based on the result 
of the semi-structured interviews with the high-level officials and policy makers as elaborated 
in more detail in section 5.4 of chapter 5) 
6.4.1 Asset transfer issue 
The issue of asset transfer in the post-disaster reconstruction in Aceh is analysed from the semi-
structured interviews with the high-officials and the policy makers (section 5.4.2.3). In the 
reconstruction of Aceh, the ownership status of the reconstructed roads need to be transferred 
and listed as the BRR assets before they were transferred back to the local governments after 
the completion. Consequently, the changing of asset ownership status led to a series of 
problems and was accordingly identified as one of the major challenges in the reconstruction. 
Even though the literature has covered a wide range of asset management issues in the disaster 
management context (e.g. Vatsa (2004), Salmerón and Apte (2010), Warren (2010), Kalamaris 
et al. (2012), Rademacher (2013)), the concerns regarding the asset transfer process in the 
post-disaster reconstruction has not been sufficiently discussed. The findings of this research 
are therefore expected to fill the gap. From the data analysis, the problems experienced in the 
asset transfer process are considered to be avoidable if the road assets ownerships had not 
been transferred from and back to the local governments. As the asset transfer process 
resulted in delays and maintenance issues, it is argued that the BRR should have rehabilitated 
and reconstructed the road infrastructure for the local governments without having to change 
the asset ownership status, even though such arrangement may need special legal and 
regulatory supports from the national government. The identified problems were related to 
the asset management capacity, asset valuation method, project administration, land 
registration, poor asset condition, time gap, and the environmental impact (see 5.4.2.3).  
The rigidity in applying the regulation in the post-disaster context proved to be resulting in road 
assets being neglected from maintenance. Additionally, if asset change of ownership was 
required, the reconstructed assets would need to be returned back to the local governments 
immediately after their completion. Accordingly, a definite set of rules and regulatory 
arrangement was required. As also suggested by the experts interviewed in the study, the 
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regulations and agreement regarding asset ownership had to be achieved prior to the 
reconstruction, and even more, prior to the occurrence of the disaster. This is particularly since 
discussing such arrangement in the post-disaster reconstruction period would be too late as 
the focus would be placed on meeting the needs of the affected people in a speedy manner 
(section 5.13.1). Accordingly, the local governments might not refuse to accept and maintain 
the reconstructed assets as experienced in Aceh. As a result, the argumentations and excuses 
justifying the maintenance neglects resulting from the asset transfer problems can be 
eliminated, provided the road projects are handed-back to the local governments immediately 
after the project completion.  
6.4.2 Consideration of road maintenance needs 
The extensive scale of the road infrastructure reconstruction in Aceh raises a concern over the 
maintainability of the assets in the long run by the local governments. However, the research 
finds that the consideration of the future road maintenance needs had only been partially 
accounted for in the reconstruction plan, which was mainly through the maintenance MoU 
between the local governments and the BRR, and the application of high quality road 
specification standard (section 5.4.2.2). However, the requirement of the maintenance MoU 
only covered a relatively small number of the district road projects (those co-funded by foreign 
donor). Even more, the maintenance MoU, were eventually not respected by the local 
governments of the case study districts due to a number of reasons, including political, 
financial, and bureaucratic procedure in the asset management area. However, even if the MoU 
had been respected, nevertheless, Donnges et al. (2007) suggest that the local governments 
are often left obliged to allocate the limited maintenance budget for roads that may not 
necessarily be priorities to them. As a result, such maintenance agreement may result in the 
local governments maintaining the road sections required by the MoU at the cost of neglecting 
maintenance of other road sections not included in the MoU.  
The findings of the research on the issue of considering the future maintenance needs in the 
post-disaster reconstruction process, conforms with the conclusion made by Karim (2011). 
With regard to the problems that lead to insufficient considerations towards maintenance 
aspects during the planning and designing process, he highlights that the problems of poor 
consideration of the maintenance needs are rooted to six categories: insufficient consulting, 
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insufficient knowledge, the absence of regulation and specification considering the 
maintenance aspects, insufficient planning and design activities, as well as inadequate 
organisation and demands from other authorities.  
However, the nature of the post-disaster reconstruction limits the applicability of the 
procedures for the normal development context. As argued by Alexander (2004), post-disaster 
projects struggle with a more complex, dynamic and chaotic environment compared to 
construction projects in a normal situation. The level of destruction caused by the tsunami 
created a high pressure to ensure that the needs of the affected communities were met and 
that the affected area could recover as soon as possible. Arguably, the future maintenance 
needs were therefore not well considered, particularly since the availability of fund for the 
reconstruction of the road infrastructure was virtually unlimited. Another rationalisation for 
the reconstruction agencies to omit the needs for future maintenance was due to the additional 
financial resources the Aceh regional governments would receive as part of the special 
autonomy status, as the additional fund was expected to be sufficient to cover the financial 
needs of the road maintenance (please refer to section 2.5.6 regarding the special autonomy 
status of Aceh province).  
With regard to the consideration of future road maintenance needs in the post-disaster 
reconstruction process, it is argued that the road maintenance needs should be better 
accounted for in the planning phase as an integrated part of the road reconstruction program. 
This means that a road reconstruction program should not only cover the cost of the 
reconstruction of the road infrastructure, but also the maintenance cost. The experience of the 
rural road programme in India, Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana - PMGSY, has suggested a 
successful story by including the maintenance needs for the 5 year period in the road 
rehabilitation contract (Donnges et al., 2007). The additional benefit of implementing such a 
program is that it may provide a gradual transition in the process of introducing the culture of 
road maintenance to the local authority. 
Furthermore, the result of discussions with the interviewees suggests that the application of 
higher road surface quality standard, on the other hand, seemed to have a positive short term 
impact on the durability and serviceability of the respective district roads. However, the lack of 
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maintenance of the reconstructed assets raises two concerns on the long run. First, without 
maintenance, the reconstructed assets will soon deteriorate and lost the investment value. As 
highlighted by Harral and Faiz (1988), road infrastructure will deteriorate rapidly after the end 
of the grace period, which is around 6-7 years of service period. As the BRR closed in 2009 most 
of the reconstructed roads are now at least in the fifth 5 year of service. Accordingly, the road 
will start to deteriorate rapidly in the following two or three years.  
The absence of road maintenance culture in the local governments makes it difficult to see that 
proper intervention will be performed and that the financial resources will be available when it 
is crucially needed in the near future. Secondly, the application of the high road surface quality 
standard, on the one hand, appeared to have delayed the maintenance needs, and prolonged 
the serviceability of the district roads. The improved road condition in the district was also 
believed to have largely contributed to the rapid recovery of the affected areas and was also 
argued to have offered a greater opportunity for the economic development of the case study 
districts. On the other hand, however, the application of the new road surface type also creates 
a new ‘perspective on the road authority, and probably in the community as well regarding the 
‘proper’ road surface design. The road authorities seemed to aim at building and upgrading the 
road networks in their areas into hot mix asphalt (HMA) pavement type, as it is now perceived 
as the ‘proper’ pavement surface standard (please refer to section 5.13.2 for the experts’ views 
on this issue). Consequently, with the lack of road maintenance culture in the district road 
authority, such view potentially means that the roads will be more expensive to build, require 
greater budget allocation, reduced maintenance allocation sufficiency, and more importantly 
that the new road pavement will also deteriorate rapidly and that the investment value will also 
diminish shortly. 
Additionally, regarding the selection of the high quality pavement alternative (HMA), as argued 
by Donnges et al. (2007), the fastest increase in the socioeconomic benefit is obtained when 
the access is provided in the first time, and when it is kept open all year. They further conclude 
that the road improvement and upgrading also offer the least significant socioeconomic 
improvement. Accordingly, the research recommends that the road authorities need to take 
into account the necessity and the Cost-Benefit ratio of the various road pavement types to be 
applied in their area, particularly for the low volume traffic roads. The implementation of high 
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quality pavement alternative, such as HMA, as a shortcut to prolong road maintenance needs 
do not justify the higher investment cost and the abandonment of regular road maintenance 
needs. 
6.4.3 Local government involvement 
The involvement of the local governments in the post-disaster reconstruction of road 
infrastructure in Aceh was conducted through four approaches; inputs gathering, recruitment 
and assignment of the local government employees in the reconstruction agencies, the 
distribution of tasks and coordination, and through the establishment of the joint secretariat 
at the district level (refer to section 5.4.2.1). 
The involvement of the local governments in the reconstruction process was mainly through 
the recruitment and assignment of local government personnel in the BRR, and through the 
establishment of the joint secretariat office at the regional level. However, being victims of the 
disaster, the local government could not be actively involved in the post-disaster 
reconstruction. Accordingly, even though the responses from the interviewees regarding the 
level and quality of the local governments’ involvement in the post-disaster reconstruction 
varied, they generally suggested the post-disaster condition as the main constraint to the 
effective and efficient Local governments’ involvement.  
As described in detail in section 2.2.5.3, Kenny (2007b) highlights five major reasons for the 
exclusion of the locals in the reconstruction process. The first reason related to the scale of the 
destruction and the urgency for quick actions. The second reason is due to the curtailed 
freedom to work with the locals by the government and military surveillance. The third reason 
is owing to the sheer complexity of the reconstruction, which is affected by the pre-disaster 
level of the government authority and exercise of power as well as by the destruction of the 
official records. Furthermore, she claims that the established paradigm of Eurocentric notions 
which separates the worlds into ‘south’ and ‘north’ or ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ 
regions has been the fourth reason to the exclusion of the locals. The fifth explanation is 
regarding the marketization or commercialisation of the disaster aid programme. 
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6.5 Safety and security – A post-conflict area 
The challenges experienced in the reconstruction of the disaster-affected area in Aceh were 
exacerbated by the fact that Aceh is also a post-conflict area. The data analysis on the impact 
of safety and security issue on the road maintenance is discussed in section, 5.7.1.1.4, 5.8.1.1.4, 
and 5.9.1.1.4.  
From the data analysis, it emerged that the reconstruction of the road infrastructure was 
primarily challenged by the oppressive behaviour of the community, illegal extortion of the 
‘security fee’, and safety threats which contributed to the relaxed construction supervision. 
These challenges eventually affected the implementation of the road reconstruction project in 
the form of project disruptions, higher project costs, and poor construction quality. These 
challenges conform with the World Bank (2009a) report, which suggests that that conflict also 
change the behaviour, preferences, and institutional functioning resulting from the 
compromised security of individuals and communities.  
Additionally, the findings demonstrate close connection and similarities with the challenges of 
infrastructure reconstruction in a post-conflict setting as suggested by Anand (2005). As 
identified by Anand (2005), the reconstruction of infrastructure in a post-conflict settings has 
to face at least nine challenges, which make post-conflict reconstruction different from 
infrastructure development in the normal condition. The nine challenges are: conflict is often 
a complex situation caused by a mix of economic, political, and social and historical condition; 
different perception on the level of importance of infrastructure reconstruction; weakened 
state institutions, eroded trust, and increased transaction cost; demoralised workers and delays 
resulting from confrontation with the opponent of peace; ‘missing the baseline’, which is the 
necessity to cover those which have deteriorated due to the maintenance neglect and those 
required to accelerate the recovery; the displacement of people, leading to scarce local 
resources; the role of visual media, which may exaggerate the effect of infrastructure failure; 
increased expectation of the local community regarding the standards and quality of 
infrastructures to be provided; and the governance dilemma with regards to determining the 
higher priority between institutional rebuilding and infrastructure reconstruction.  
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Additionally, as further argued by Anand (2005), the principals of fairness and equity might be 
considered to be more crucial than resource efficiency in a post-conflict reconstruction. In 
Aceh, this condition was indicated by the higher focus of the reconstruction on the needs and 
the scale of the road infrastructure reconstruction, with little focus was addressed at the long-
term maintenance needs. Being in conflict for nearly thirty years, the poor economic condition 
of Aceh also affected the decision-making process and was in fact considered as a major driving 
force in the tsunami reconstruction process. Hence, in addition to having to restore and rebuild 
the impacts of the disaster, the reconstruction in Aceh had also to include the need to restore 
the impacts of the prolonged conflict. Related to this concern was the impact of the local 
socioeconomic condition to the local governments’ road maintenance capacity. This has been 
discussed in more detail in section, 5.7.1.1.3, 5.8.1.1.3, and 5.9.1.1.3.  
From the local government point of view, the issue of fairness and equity was also considered 
as a major external challenge in the road maintenance efforts. In the broader view, the impacts 
of the political condition, as discussed in section, were also argued to be affected by the post-
conflict situation in Aceh, particularly where the local parliaments and the heads of the local 
governments were dominated by the ex-combatants, or those who supported them (please 
refer to section regarding the factors, and Table 5.3, Table 5.8, and Table 5.13 regarding the 
composition of the parliament members in the case study districts).  
To sum up, on the one hand, the impacts of conflict were experienced in the road 
reconstruction process. Security and safety threats were experienced more widely and were 
also conducted more openly. However, on the other hand, the level of risks and severity of the 
threats posed by the community and individuals in the post-conflict period in Aceh was also 
suggested to be lower than it was in the conflict period. As a result, the peace agreement in 
Aceh has provided an opportunity to expand the road infrastructure program to reach the 
remote areas, which was abandoned and isolated during the conflict period.  
Nevertheless, the discussion of the impacts and influences of the post-conflict condition on the 
post-disaster reconstruction and the capacity of the local government in the maintenance of 
the road infrastructure would require a comprehensive and thorough investigation. To what 
extent the post-conflict condition affects the political decision in Aceh was outside the context 
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of the study. Accordingly, as this research is not specifically focused on the post-conflict setting, 
it is therefore recommended as the further research.  
Moreover, as the findings suggest, the impact of the post-conflict in Aceh has to be seen as a 
context rather than merely as a category of factors affecting the local governments’ road 
maintenance capacity. Accordingly, this is reflected in the updated conceptual framework of 
the study, which will be discussed in section 6.6 further below.  
6.6 Refined Conceptual Framework 
The findings from the empirical analysis have provided the inputs essential for the refinement 
of the conceptual framework developed in the earlier phase of the study as presented and 
discussed in chapter 4. The issue of asset transfer and post-conflict area are included in the 
framework to reflect the relevance of the issues as they emerged in the research findings. 
The refined conceptual framework of the study, as illustrated in Figure 6.1, accordingly helps 
provide a framework for evaluating the capacity of the local government in the maintenance 
of the road infrastructure and the links to the post-disaster reconstruction process. More 
discussion on each of the components in the framework will be presented in the following 
section. 
6.6.1 The components of the conceptual framework 
The refined conceptual framework, as presented in Figure 6.1, incorporates the various phases 
of the road project life-cycle and their positions with regards to the post-disaster management 
and road maintenance activities. The road reconstruction process, which take place in the post-
disaster reconstruction period highlights the need to consider the future road maintenance 
needs and the involvement of the local governments in the reconstruction process. The 
“consideration of future road maintenance needs” accordingly include the political interest, 
technical design, project funding mechanism, donor attitude regarding conflicting and 
enforcing regulations and consideration of future maintenance needs, and the existence of 
regulations and agreement on maintenance responsibility. The “local government 
involvement” highlights the need to properly investigate the impacts of disaster and the 
resiliency level of the affected local governments, the contributions and role of the local 
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governments in the planning process, the recruitment and placement of local governments’ 
personnel in the disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation executing agency, and the 
coordination and distribution of tasks between the stakeholders of the post-disaster 
reconstruction process.  
The “road maintenance” underlines the various factors affecting the local governments’ 
capacity in maintaining the road infrastructure. These affecting factors are grouped into three 
main categories; external, institutional and technical factors. These factors need to be 
sufficiently accounted for in the post-disaster reconstruction planning, as they greatly 
determine the sustainability of the road reconstruction assets.  
The “asset transfer” box accordingly highlights the main issues in the asset transfer process, 
which take place in the transitional phase between the post-disaster reconstruction and the 
normal development context. These issues include the need to have pre-established 
regulations and agreements regarding the asset transfer condition. Such arrangement should 
be made available prior to project commencement, and even prior to the disaster occurrence 
which covers the asset valuation methods as one of the sources of dispute in the asset transfer 
process. Furthermore, there is also a need to immediately transfer the assets back to the 
relevant governments in order to avoid future disputes resulting from unclear ownership 
status. Other factors requiring detailed attention include the asset management capacity of the 
local governments and personnel involved in the post-disaster reconstruction activities, project 
administration and documentation required for the asset transfer process, as well as the land 
registration process resulting from the land acquisition process.  
The “safety and security" aspect illustrates the need to continuously assess the condition and 
impacts of the safety and security to the project implementation. The safety and security issues 
spans across the whole road project life-cycle and therefore require attentions in the 
reconstruction, asset transfer, as well as the road maintenance process. Likewise the “safety 
and security”, the “capacity building” also span across the road project life-cycle. This 
demonstrates the need to sufficiently incorporate the capacity building programs in the 
reconstruction process, transitional phase, and the road maintenance process.
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- CB programming and delivery
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Safety and Security
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- Impacts to project implementation
Transitional Phase
 
Figure 6.1 – Refined conceptual framework
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Chapter - 7  CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
The background and justification for conducting the research is presented in chapter 1. Chapter 
2 elaborates the result of the literature review on the subjects relevant to the research topic. 
In chapter 3, the research methodology adopted in the study in order to achieve the aim and 
objectives of the research is presented. The development of the conceptual framework is 
discussed in chapter 4, followed by the analysis of the primary data gathered from the semi-
structured interviews in chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the findings of the research. Chapter 7, 
this chapter, presents the conclusions of the study by summarising the results of the study. 
Accordingly, this chapter is structured as the following 
 First, the relevance of the findings to each objective of the study will be summarised 
 Second, the contribution of the research to the theory and practice are presented 
 Third, the limitations of the study are discussed 
 Finally, recommendations for further research are suggested. 
The following section will therefore present the findings for each objective of the study 
7.2 Summary of key findings 
As stipulated in section 1.3, the aim of the study is to evaluate the capacity of the local 
government in the maintenance of the road reconstruction assets. To help achieve the aim of 
the research, four objectives have been identified. Accordingly, the findings for each of the 
objectives will be elaborated in the following sections. 
7.2.1 Objective 1: To explore the road infrastructure reconstruction process, policy and 
management model in Indonesia at the national and the local government level 
The reconstruction of the road infrastructure in the post-tsunami recovery in Aceh was 
coordinated by the BRR, the agency appointed to coordinate the rehabilitation and the 
reconstruction in Aceh and Nias. Most of the road networks in Aceh were reconstructed by BRR 
and big donor agencies such as the World Bank, USAID, JICA, and ADB. Other donor agencies, 
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such as ILO and GTZ, also worked on a relatively smaller scale. The involvement of the local 
government in the road reconstruction process was mainly through input gathering for the 
blueprint, the assignment of their personnel in the BRR, and the establishment of joint 
secretariat at the district level to meet the needs of the local people and ensure that the 
duplication and gaps of works could be avoided (section 5.4.2.1).  
The management of road infrastructure in Indonesia follows the government administration 
system, which has been decentralised rapidly since 1999. Accordingly, the national roads are 
managed by the national government – through the MPW. At the regional level, the provincial 
roads are managed by the provincial governments and the management of the district roads 
are therefore under the responsibility of the local governments, through their public works 
agencies (detailed discussion is presented in section 2.5.4.1). In practice, the responsibility of 
the national road management is partially placed on the provincial governments, as the 
representatives and the extended hand of the national government at the regional level. The 
construction and the maintenance of the national road networks would be executed by the 
provincial road authorities, funded by the national government, and the activities are 
accordingly listed in the national budget. Due to the decentralised system, which is placed at 
the district level, the MPW is unable to provide budget allocation and implement projects at 
the district level, but is however able to implement projects at the provincial level, providing 
that they meet the requirements (section 5.4.1.1.1.4).  
The national government assistance on the road infrastructure at the district levels in Aceh, 
however, is exercised in a more general approach. The provision of assistance to the regional 
governments by the national government is implemented through the allocation of Specific 
Grant Allocation (DAK). The DAK is a grant provided by the national government to the regional 
governments for specific purposes only, which are authorised by the MoF, and detailed by the 
respective line ministries. According to the regulation of MPW no 15/PRT/M/2010 article 10, 
for the road sector, the DAK fund can only be used for the periodic maintenance, rehabilitation 
and surface upgrade, as well as for completing the short-funded road construction projects. 
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7.2.2 Objective 2: To identify and analyse the obstacles and challenges of road reconstruction 
in post-disaster context 
The study reveals that the post-disaster road reconstruction projects in the case study districts 
were exposed to significantly challenging situations. Whilst most of the risks and challenges 
were commonly experienced in road projects in the normal development context, the scale of 
the risks had been frequently underestimated. The post-disaster reconstruction projects 
struggle with more complex, dynamic and chaotic environment which were identified in the 
finalisation of the project design and the land acquisition process.  
This condition was also aggravated by the relatively few aid agencies focusing on the road 
sector, and that the local governments, as one of the key stakeholders in the reconstruction 
process were also victims of the disasters. The challenges experienced in the reconstruction of 
road infrastructure in the case study district include administrative issues resulting from 
conflicting regulations and unfamiliarity with the local conditions, the limited availability of 
skilled professional, dispute between local contractors and the local partners, price increase, 
the difficulties in obtaining bank loan due to the global financial crisis, as well as the security 
issue which were affected by the post-conflict condition of Aceh province. More detailed 
discussion of the obstacles and challenges in post-disaster road reconstruction is covered in 
section 2.3.5.  
7.2.3 Objective 3: To analyse the local government's roles in the road infrastructure 
reconstruction and their capacity in the maintenance of road infrastructure assets. 
The role of the local government in the post-disaster road reconstruction process is elaborated 
in section 5.4.2.1. The study identifies that the local governments were involved in the post-
disaster reconstruction by four means; input gathering, recruitment and assignment of local 
government employees in the BRR, coordination and distribution of tasks, and the 
establishment of the joint secretariat. Accordingly, the study identified that the capacity of the 
local government of the case study districts in maintaining the roads were very poor. Road 
reconstruction assets were neglected from maintenance, and the road development programs 
were focused on rehabilitating and upgrading the road surface, as well as on the network 
expansion (please refer to the road maintenance strategy, section 5.7.2, 5.8.2, and 5.9.2).  
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The study has also identified the factors affecting the capacity of the local governments in 
maintaining the road infrastructure. These factors are grouped into two major categories; 
external and internal. The external factors affecting the poor maintenance capacity are 
described in section 5.10.1.1. The internal factors are divided and discussed in two sections; 
section 5.10.1.2 covers the institutional factors and section 5.10.1.3 accordingly elaborates the 
technical factors.  
7.2.4 Objective 4: To develop a framework for post-disaster reconstruction of road 
infrastructure  
The final objective of this research is to develop a framework for post-disaster reconstruction 
of road infrastructure. Accordingly, a conceptual framework was developed aiming at enabling 
a successful reconstruction and sustainable asset focussing on the maintenance aspect. The 
conceptual framework was developed by identifying the key issues and main subjects which 
are relevant to the research aim through comprehensive literature reviews. The key issues were 
then fine-tuned in accordance with the result of the pilot interviews (section 4.4 of chapter 4). 
The process of developing the initial conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 4.1 in section 
4.4, and the resulting initial conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 4.2 in the same 
section.  
As the research progressed to the analysis of data collected from the documents and archival 
records as well as the semi-structured interviews with the high-level officials and policy makers, 
stakeholders at the local level, and the experts in the disaster management and road 
infrastructure development, the theoretical framework was further refined. Additionally, the 
findings of the research, as presented in chapter 6, suggest a number of issues which need to 
be addressed in the road infrastructure reconstruction process. Based on the empirical 
investigation, the conceptual framework for the reconstruction of road infrastructure in the 
post-disaster reconstruction context is accordingly refined. The refined conceptual framework 
is presented in section 6.6, as Figure 6.1. The conceptual framework exhibits the three phases 
of the road infrastructure reconstruction in the post-disaster context, which spans from the 
reconstruction to the post-reconstruction period and highlights the significance of the asset 
transfer process during the transition period. In addition, the conceptual framework shows the 
identified concerns and issues in each of the reconstruction phase, which enables and assists 
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the post-disaster reconstruction of road infrastructure achieving a successful and sustainable 
post-disaster reconstruction asset. 
7.3 Contribution to the theory and practice 
The contribution to the theory and practice presented in this section is mainly established from 
the findings of the research as presented and discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
7.3.1 Contribution to theory 
Achieving the aim and the objectives of this study required the combination of literature review 
of two major areas; disaster management and road maintenance. Additionally, providing the 
context for the case study accordingly required the discussion on the issue of capacity building, 
local governance, and the post-conflict reconstruction (refers to chapter 2 regarding the 
literature review).  
By merging the concepts and theories on the various subjects, this study provides a better 
understanding of the complex issue of road infrastructure reconstruction in the disaster 
affected areas, which at the same time also happened to be a post-conflict area. The 
contribution that the study has provided to theory is presented in the following paragraphs.  
7.3.1.1 The identification of challenges and obstacles in performing road maintenance in the 
post-disaster affected areas in a developing country  
The study has contributed to the theory by providing an in-depth discussion of the main factors 
affecting the local governments’ road maintenance capacity. The study identified and grouped 
the external factors affecting the road maintenance capacity of the case study districts into six 
broad categories, namely environmental, legal and regulatory, political, socioeconomic, safety 
and security, and inter-organisational relationship (section 5.10.1.1). The internal factors 
affecting the maintenance capacity have been identified in the area of financial management, 
human resources, and the organisational management (section 5.10.1.2). On the technical side, 
the road maintenance capacity of the local governments is mainly affected by the road design, 
traffic loading control, as well as the plant and equipment condition (section 5.10.1.3).  
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7.3.1.2 Linkages between road reconstruction process and road maintenance  
Furthermore, the study has particularly observed and established linkages between the road 
maintenance capacities of the local governments and the post-disaster road reconstruction 
process. The study proves that putting into account the future road maintenance needs into 
the road reconstruction planning and programming have been difficult due to the dynamic and 
chaotic environment of the disaster reconstruction activities, the high pressure to rapidly meet 
the needs of the affected communities, and particularly due to the fact that the reconstruction 
involved ad-hoc organisations and temporary emergency projects.  
On the other hand, the study notifies that the introduction and the wide use of the high grade 
pavement type in the post-disaster reconstruction, as one way to prolong the maintenance 
needs, leads to a cultural change in the local road authorities. It appears that the local 
governments are aiming at improving and upgrading the district road networks to the Hot Mix 
Asphalt pavement type as the new ‘appropriate’ surface standard. Such view essentially neglect 
the necessity and advantages of the various pavement alternatives, and at the same time 
increase the possibility of maintenance neglect as more financial resources would be 
channelled for the construction of the high specification pavement type. Detailed discussion on 
this issue is presented in section 5.4.2.2. 
7.3.1.3 How the post-conflict situation affect both the road reconstruction process and the 
road maintenance efforts.  
From the project execution point of view, the study has also identified the impacts of the post-
conflict to the road reconstruction and road maintenance process. The study identified that the 
impact of the post-conflict condition have been seen in the community’s oppressive behaviour 
and the more open practice of illegal extortion known as the security fee. This condition 
aggravated the project disruptions and relaxed supervision commonly found in the road 
construction projects. However, on the positive side, the peace agreement has also improved 
the possibility to expand the coverage of the development programs to also reach the remote 
areas, which was not possible in the conflict time.  
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7.3.2 Contribution to practice 
The findings of this study have provided essential inputs to both solving the district road 
maintenance problems and the post-disaster road infrastructure reconstruction. First, the 
identification of road maintenance capacity affecting factors has produced a list of concerns 
that practitioners involved in the road maintenance sectors need to put into account in their 
road infrastructure project planning and programming.  
Furthermore, the establishment of linkages between the road maintenance capacity and the 
post-disaster reconstruction process offers a comprehensive overview on the process and 
experience of post-disaster road reconstruction efforts, which focused particularly on 
maximizing the value of investments made in the reconstruction. Such overview, would serve 
as lessons learnt and recommendations for any road reconstruction activities in a post-disaster 
context. Some of the organisations that may benefit from the research are local governments, 
road management authorities and disaster management agencies. More discussion will be 
presented in the following sections. 
7.3.2.1 Local governments and the road management authorities 
The research identifies the main factors affecting the local governments’ capacity in the 
maintenance of the road infrastructure from the external, institutional, and the technical 
aspect. The local governments may therefore benefit from the study by identifying the 
existence of these factors in their institutions and address the issues accordingly. The road 
management authorities and local governments may accordingly adopt and adapt the findings 
of the studies to their road infrastructure maintenance initiatives and contextualised the 
concept to suit their needs.  
7.3.2.2 Disaster management agencies 
As stipulated earlier, the research establishes linkages between the post-disaster 
reconstruction of the road infrastructure during the disaster recovery period and the road 
maintenance initiatives performed by the local governments after the post-disaster 
reconstruction activities are completed. The research highlights the importance of considering 
the future road maintenance needs and local governments’ capacity into the disaster 
reconstruction plan, as the sustainability of the reconstruction assets and the value of the 
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investment made in the reconstruction are highly dependent on the local governments’ 
maintenance capacity. Accordingly, the research suggests that the future road maintenance 
needs need to be integrated into the disaster recovery plan before disaster occurs, as in the 
post-disaster reconstruction period the main focus will be drawn on meeting the needs of the 
affected people and the speedy recovery of the affected areas. In addition, the research also 
highlights the importance of carefully selecting the technology to be implemented in the 
reconstruction of road infrastructure and to fill the gap in the local government capacity 
through various capacity building programs which specifically aim at improving the local 
government road maintenance capacity. 
7.3.2.3 Hyogo Framework for Action 
From the road infrastructure perspective, the results from the case studies provide strong links 
and contributions to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) priority actions, particularly the 
priority actions no 1, 3, and 4. The priority action 1 of the HFA is focused on ensuring that 
policies and legislations are established at the national and the local level. This priority action 
was addressed by the research through highlighting rules and regulations which support or 
hinder the effective post-disaster road reconstruction and road maintenance. The research also 
contributes towards meeting the priority action 3, which are focused on the use of knowledge 
to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels, by providing lesson learnt from the 
reconstruction and the maintenance of the road infrastructure in the case studies. With regards 
to priority action 4 – reduce the underlying risk factors, the research has contributed to this 
action by identifying the various factors affecting the local governments’ capacity in the 
maintenance of the road infrastructure.  
7.4 Limitations of the study 
Being a PhD research, the study is challenged by the typical constraints of time and resources. 
This research is conducted using the multiple case study approach as the replication logic to 
ensure the external validity of the research findings. The three case studies selected are located 
in the province of Aceh. This is mainly due to the availability of access to data and the fact that 
this research is financially sponsored by the provincial government of Aceh. Even though the 
external validity has been achieved, attempting the generalisation of the research findings 
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needs to put into account the limitation of a research using a case study approach, which is 
primarily constrained by the context of the research; represented by the research objectives 
and the case study selection criteria. 
Another limitation of the study is associated with testing the applicability of the theoretical 
framework established by the study. The limitation of the PhD research period and the lack of 
access and authority to apply the proposed framework into practice are also acknowledged as 
the further limitation of the study.  
7.5 Further research 
The recommendations for further research discussed in this section are primarily resulted from 
the limitations of the study as presented in the previous sections. Based on the limitations of 
the study, the further research recommendations are: 
7.5.1 A comparable case study research on other developing or developed countries 
This study is conducted in three districts in Aceh province as the case studies. Considering that 
the research is context specific, future research may consider doing a comparative case study 
research in either the developed or developing world. A similar study conducted in the Sri 
Lanka, for instance, would draw an interesting comparison study as both areas share similar 
characteristics; both were affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami, both located in the developing 
countries, and both are also post-conflict areas.  
7.5.2 Application of the developed conceptual framework 
As stated in the aforementioned sections, one of the limitations of the study is the inability to 
test the applicability of the developed conceptual frameworks. Accordingly, provided that the 
constraint of this research can be overcome, a future study can therefore be conducted on 
testing the applicability of the frameworks. Consequently, the theoretical framework may be 
updated and modified based on the outcomes of the study.  
7.5.3 Detailed observation on one particular maintenance affecting factor 
The lack of previous study conducted on the issue of local government post-disaster road 
maintenance capacity had led the research to identifying the various factors affecting the 
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capacity of the local government in the maintenance of the post-disaster road reconstruction 
assets. This yields rather breadth discussions of each of the affecting factors. Accordingly, 
future research may undertake a deeper investigation on how a particular concern, for instance 
the local political condition or human resource capacity, affects the overall road maintenance 
capacity of the local government.  
7.6 Final note 
This chapter summarises the findings of the study obtained from the literature, case study 
investigation and the semi-structured interviews with the stakeholders, and the expert 
interviews. Even though the literature has covered a vast range of issues in the disaster 
management, road maintenance, as well as the post-conflict reconstruction, the study 
identified that there is a gap in the literature which put the three major subjects in the same 
context. By successfully achieving all of the research objectives, the study has contributed to 
the theory and practice. Moreover, the limitations of the research have been revealed for 
cautions, and recommendations for future research have also been suggested to strengthen 
the research findings.  
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